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ABSTRACT
My dissertation examines an unexpected outcome of post-socialist agricultural transformation in the
Central and Eastern European countries. Contrary to the initial expectations of Neoliberal transition
policy-makers, various forms of agricultural associations emerged throughout the former communist
countries, following the distribution of private property rights to individuals. The reallocation of land
in associations occurred while this institutional arrangement was criticized in the literature and
individual farming was portrayed as the panacea for these countries.
The main research question that frames my dissertation is: Why do farmers still persist in joining
associations despite perceived collective action problems and the availability of leasing as a close
substitute? Additional questions are also examined: Why did associations emerge in some regions and
not in others? What are the factors that affect landowners' choices between associations and leasing
transactions? How different, or similar are associations from the old socialist collective farms?
While earlier literature focused on explaining why landowners choose to farm the land individually,
the choice between associations and leasing has not been previously researched. Using statistical
analysis on household surveys and qualitative fieldwork I explain why and under what conditions
associations are the optimal farming alternatives for landowners. Going beyond the capital constraints
argument, I examine the role of institutional legacies and the effect of collectivization in explaining
regional differences in land reallocation during transition.
Based on my findings, theories of institutional change that view transition as a homogeneous and a-
temporal process across and within countries do not fully capture the interdependencies between
different factors that shape individuals' responses to the incentives and constraints imposed by
transition. This research provides policy recommendations especially for land consolidation efforts.
Given high transaction costs associated with participating in land markets, farming associations should
be strongly emphasized as a channel for achieving land consolidation. Support measures, such as
improved access to credit and marketing channels, can enhance the competitiveness of associations.
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Chapter 1 : Introduction
1.1 Post-Socialist transition and land reform
The fall of the Berlin Wall, symbolizing the demise of communism, ushered a process of
change unmatched in its scale and speed in economic and political history. Neoliberal reformers were
anxious in promoting their ideological agendas for the transition to a market based system. These
agendas, embraced by international lending institutions, called for eradicating former institutional
structures and for replacing them with western capitalist institutions. Soon, however, it became
obvious that the transformation of these countries was growing out of the "ruins of communism" in
close interdependence with the former institutional structures, historical legacies and systems of values
and beliefs (see Stark 1996; Eyal et al. 1998; and edited volumes such as Pickles and Smith 1998;
Burawoy and Verdery 1999), rather than achieving a fully bloomed market capitalism as the
Neoliberal transition advocates expected.'
The first and most comprehensive institutional reforms in the early 1990s were implemented
in the agricultural sector, signaling a major ideological change - the transfer of property rights in land
from the state to the individuals. The social and economic changes generated by these reforms were
unprecedented in complexity and scale. This dissertation analyzes the process of post-socialist
transformation in the context of land reform.
Agriculture and land reform received a renewed interest among development scholars in the
past two decades. 2 The 2008 Human Development Report is centered on the agricultural sector, after
25 years of "silence" in the policy arena on the role of agriculture in development. The World Bank
(2007b p. 1) argues that "it is time to place agriculture afresh at the center of development agenda,
taking account of the vastly different context of opportunities that have emerged."
A confluence of events brought land back on the policy agenda of international development
institutions, changing the overall focus of land reform and the perceptions of rural livelihoods
(Gwaynne and Kay 2004). Currently there is a deeper understanding that agricultural growth plays a
major role in pursuing sustainable development, in poverty alleviation, and that access to land is
critical (Timmer 2005 p. 78; World Bank 2007b). Another major factor that called attention to the
agricultural sector has been the fall of communist regimes in Europe and Asia, the subsequent
1These countries did not perform like "wind-up toys lumbering through" (Hirschman 1981 p. 24) the various
stages of reform single-mindedly. Soon, instead of a pure western capitalism, terms such "pseudo-capitalism"
(Amsden et al. 1998), varieties of capitalism, "recombinant property" (Stark 1996) or "capitalism without
capitalists" (Eyal et al. 1998) emerged.
2 Nevertheless, as Ronald Herring (2003) claims, while land reform was taken off the policy agenda of national
governments and international agencies, it always remained on the political agenda of peasants and their
organizations.
property rights reforms in land, and the restructuring of state and collective farms. At the same time,
however, the Neoliberal transition paradigm that emerged in the 1990s, led to a shift in the
development perspective from state-led to market oriented land policies focused on land
individualization, titling, and privatization (Borras et al. 2007), quite different from earlier land reform
policies in Latin America (deJanvry 1981).
Analyzing the process of post-socialist transformation in the rural context poses significant
challenges. Scholars point to an inherent rigidity to change in rural institutions (Geertz 1968; Connell
and Lipton 1977) and to the complexity of rural societies (Verdery 1983). Moreover, an abundance of
literature shows the great variation in speed and direction of change across countries and regions
following the fall of communist regimes (Swinnen 1999; Meurs 2001; Rozelle and Swinnen 2004;
Akram-Lodhi et al. 2007a). Despite far-reaching commonalities imposed by the communist policy
agenda on the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, and on agriculture in particular, deep
cultural, social, and economic differences remained. This variation led to the adoption of different
reform strategies reaching different outcomes despite starting from a common heritage and aspiring to
common goals (Lerman 2000; Rozelle and Swinnen 2000; Lerman et al. 2004). Explanations for these
unexpected outcomes suggest that there is no best-outcome and "no uniform lessons to be learned"
(Akram-Lodhi et al. 2007b) about how to enhance agricultural production and implement land
reforms, calling for more in-depth country specific analyses to understand the specific historical and
institutional context that led to certain outcomes.
In Romania, the post-socialist land reform marked the beginning of a series of transformations
in the ownership structure and in the production system in agriculture. By 2005 almost 95% of land
was in private ownership as compared to only 9% in 1990, at the start of transition. Collective farms
were dismantled, land was successfully restituted to former owners based on the 1940s land records,
and state farms were slowly reorganized into large corporate farms. Almost overnight more than four
million new landowners were created, establishing an unprecedented level of private property.
However, the slow pace of implementing institutional reforms for the newly created small and
medium farms resulted in extreme land fragmentation, limited access to markets and, in effect, strong
challenges to transition from subsistence farming to more commercially oriented production.
1.2 Dissertation objectives and research questions
This dissertation examines, what seems to be, an unexpected outcome of post-socialist
agricultural transformation. Contrary to the expectations of transition policy-makers, and despite the
reallocation of land to the individual sector, various forms of associations widely persisted throughout
the former communist countries following de-collectivization. In the CEE countries nearly 40% of
agricultural land is managed by different associations, collectives, or corporate farms, while in the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) nearly 80% do so (Lerman at el. 2004 p. 223).
In Romania, by 1993 more than 40% of land has been voluntary returned to associations,
despite rapid de-collectivization and land tiding (Brooks and Meurs 1994). The reallocation of land in
associations has occurred while this institutional arrangement is widely criticized in the literature and
individual farming is portrayed as panacea for the agricultural sector in the former socialist countries.
The persistence of associational arrangements is even more intriguing since in the second half of the
1990s the opening up of land markets made way to alternative farming arrangements, such as leasing
and sales. Small farmers were presumed to resort to land transactions in order to consolidate scattered
plots and to release assets to more productive users. In addition, wide regional differences exist within
the country with respect to land reallocation patterns. While in the West most landowners chose to
farm the land individually, in the South associations predominate.
Given this context, the following questions frame the dissertation:
(1) Why do associations still persist in farming decisions in Romania, despite perceived collective
action problems and the availability of leasing as a close alternative for land reallocation?
(2) How can we explain regional differences in land reallocation during the transition process?
To fully answer these questions, a accompanying questions will be explored:
(a) Why do households seek alternative farming strategies instead of farming the land
individually?
(b) What are the factors that affect landowners' choices between associations and leasing?
(c) Why have associations emerged in some regions and not in others?
(d) How closely do farming associations resemble the socialist collective farms?
Figure 1-1 shows the main factors hypothesized to affect landowners' decisions for land
reallocation. One of the main hypothesis is that the current institutional configuration around land
reflects the choices made by landowners given market imperfections, constraints specific to transition
and household characteristics. Capital endowment (referring to social, human and physical capital) is
the most widely researched factor to explain the choice of farming arrangements. However, I expand
the analysis to include other aspects related to the physical characteristics of land (i.e. land
fragmentation), and the contractual arrangements for each alternative.
Figure 1-1: A schematic illustration of the factors affecting the choice of farming
arrangements
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In addition, I hypothesize that current patterns in land reallocation can also be explained by
exogenous factors such as regional development level and path-dependent processes. I find that
historical legacies from earlier land reforms and the experience of collectivization affect the choices
landowners make with respect to farming institutions in different regions. Understanding why certain
choices were made, why expectations such as increased land market participation were not met, and
what are the potential benefits and drawbacks from these outcomes, contributes to promoting
informed policies and to the literature on institutional change during transition. The Romanian
experience with land reform is not unique to post-socialist countries or even to the developing world.
Hence, findings from this study have relevance to other transition or developing countries undergoing
institutional change.
To examine these research questions, I focus on the large segment of household farms, for
whom land is still the main source of income, aiming to investigate the process by which landowners
reallocated land assets during the transition from a socialist production system to a market economy
based on private individual property.
A note on terminology
A few specifications have to be made on some key terms I use in the dissertation. Due to the
complex nature of agricultural transformation during transition, I use the term land reform with a
broader meaning. Aside from restitution (and privatization) of land from the state to the individuals, I
use land reform to reference changes in agricultural organization (commonly referred to as agrarian
reform).
Given the focus of this research, the term landowners refers to small farmers (part-time or full-
time) who received land titles following restitution in 1991 and own at least 0.5 hectares. Most of these
new landowners were former workers on the communist collective farms. I use the term
interchangeably with household (or family) farms.
I sometimes use the term institutional arrangements instead offarming arrangements to denote
different alternativeness for land reallocation. The term "institutional arrangements" provides more
specificity in terms of variation in the rights and responsibilities embedded in each form of land
reallocation: individual farming, associations, leasing arrangements.
1.3 Research contributions
By analyzing the persistence of farming associations throughout the transition, despite the
availability of leasing as a close substitute, this research diverges from the literature that emphasizes
the benefits of land market participation over farming associations. I explain why, and under what
conditions, farming associations are the optimal choice for landowners. Going beyond the capital
constraints argument, I account for physical characteristics of land (i.e. land fragmentation),
contractual arrangements, and for path-dependent aspects embedded in the legacies of property rights
reform and collectivization. The choice between alternative farming arrangements (why landowners
choose associations instead of participating in land markets) has not been previously researched.
Following property rights reforms emphasis has been placed on explaining why landowners choose
individual farming, as the ultimate goal of agricultural transformation. Nevertheless, the emerging
pattern of land reallocation shows that the choices individuals make are far from reformers' initial
expectations, requiring a multifaceted inquiry into the alternatives that were deemed temporary (i.e.
associations) but proved to persist throughout the transition.
Moreover, this research contributes to the literature on post-socialists transition and
institutional change by revealing the variety of institutional arrangements during land reform at
national and, most importantly, at regional level. Based on my findings, theories of institutional
change that view transition as a homogeneous and a-temporal process across and within countries do
not fully capture the interdependencies between different factors that shape individuals' response to
the incentives and constraints imposed by transition.
Analyzing regional differences in land reallocation during transition is interesting for
theoretical and policy reasons. From a theoretical point of view, this disparity suggests that the reform
of property rights creates a different set of incentives for farmers in different regions, conditions on
historical legacies, economic opportunities, and the social environment. Regional disparities are also
important for policy reasons because they highlight that policies need to be flexible enough to allow
the emergence of local solutions to land reallocation. In addition they suggest that different regions
may require different policies to make the transition to a market economy.
Lastly, this research provides policy recommendations especially for land consolidation efforts,
at a time when the Romanian agriculture (and that of other countries in the region) is confronted with
large inefficiencies from land fragmentation. Given high transaction costs for participating in land
markets, farming associations should be strongly emphasized as a channel for achieving land
consolidation. Support measures, such as improved access to credit and marketing channels, can
provide enhanced conditions for the associations to maintain competitiveness.
1.4 Introducing Romania as a case study
Romania stands out as a particularly interesting case to study agricultural transformation
during transition for several reasons. First, during the communist regime, Romania had among the
lowest share of private property rights. "Tacit de-collectivization" (Hann 1993) that started in
Hungary and other CEE countries in the 1970s and 80s had no precedent in Romania, which
followed strictly the Soviet model of large (Kolhoz) collective and state farms. Nevertheless, after a
decade of transition, more than 90% of the agricultural land was in private hands.3 This massive
transfer of ownership had dramatic outcomes not only on the economic structure but also on the
social fabric of the local communities.
Second, by late 1989, Romania ranked the poorest among the members of the Council of
Mutual Economic Assistance (Shen 1997), making the transition process much more difficult as
compared to its peers. Built-in structural rigidities and functional inefficiencies pervaded the
Romanian economy in the 1990s, while its newly formed government was still in embryonic form.
Third, the approach to land reform in Romania was in many ways more complex than in
other countries in the CEE. Policy-makers in Romania pursued both land privatization and restitution
based on the pre-communist land records and location. Only a few other countries underwent such a
comprehensive land reform in the region (e.g. Hungary) (Lerman et al. 2007). Moreover, restitution
was not limited only to land but it extended to physical assets and livestock, coupled with dismantling
the former socialist collective farms.
3 Tacit de-collectivization, as experienced in Hungary, Poland, and former Yugoslavia, has been entirely
rejected by the communist cadres in Romania, being considered a threat to the very core of socialist ideals.
Lastly, but probably the most important reason for the purpose of this dissertation, is the
distinctiveness of Romania's agricultural sector among the European Union (EU) countries, posing
significant challenges to the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and to the Romanian
agricultural producers entering a more specialized market with higher quality standards. Romania has
the largest agricultural area in use after Poland (14,324 thousand hectares as compared to 16,301
thousand hectares in Poland), and 30% of the total number of farms in the EU (4,485 thousand farms
in Romania as compared to 15,021 thousand farms in the EU) (Eurostat 2007). However, farm size is
the smallest (an average farm size of 3.2 hectares4 in Romania as compared to 4.2 hectares in
Bulgaria, 5.6 hectares in Hungary, 7.8 hectares in Poland, and 74.9 hectares in the Czech Republic)
and the share of civilian population employed in agriculture is the highest, 3 3 % (European
Commission 2006b). Another striking difference comes from the much higher contribution of the
agricultural sector in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 12% as compared to a range of 1-5% in the rest
of the EU countries. All these indicators show that agriculture plays a significant role in the Romanian
economy (as well as relative to the EU), but that productivity levels remained low during the transition
period as compared to the rest of Europe.
Equally important are the regional differences that emerged following land reform. This
outcome is not specific only to Romania (Lerman et al. 2004). Nevertheless, there is almost no
research that examines the socio-economic and political factors assumed to have triggered unequal
responses to the incentives and constraints generated by land reform.5 In Romania, despite a uniform
policy implementation, institutional outcomes with respect to property rights and land market
development vary most significantly between the West and the South regions. I hypothesize that
different historical legacies and economic conditions contributed to this variation in outcomes.
All these characteristics make Romania a distinctive case to explore especially at this point in
time when the CAP subsidies were reduced and the role of the state was drasitically curtailed following
the Neoliberal transition.
1.5 The structure of the dissertation
The complex endeavor of post-socialist transformation and the diversity in outcomes call for a
multifaceted theoretical framing of the problem under study. Hence, Chapter Two reviews several
strands of literature revolving around the process of institutional change, the core of the transition
from a centrally planned economic system to a market based economy. Mainstream theories of
institutional change cannot fully account for the complexities of post-socialist transformation. Rather,
4 On average, 9 5 % of the farms are smaller than 5 hectares, which after Bulgaria (9 7%) is the highest
proportion. In addition more than 7 5% of the farms in Romania are categorized as subsistence and semi-
subsistence according to EU criteria (European Commission 2006b).
5 Allina-Pisano (2004b) contributes to such regional analysis by examining two regions that were part of Former
Soviet Union, which currently are located in Ukraine and Russia.
the theoretical framework should be expanded to incorporate a historical and social perspective on
institutions. This approach provides a better "tool kit" to explain the persistence of institutions, such as
institutional legacies and social capital. The specific literature areas that I examine, given the main
research questions, are: 1) the issue of individual choice; 2) private property rights; 3) land tenure; 4)
associations and collective action; 5) land market participation. Lastly, I show that while there is an
abundance of literature on why landowners choose to farm the land individually, there is limited
research on why landowners choose to join farming associations rather than to participate in land
market transactions (i.e. leasing).
Chapter Three discusses the research design and methodology used in addressing the
research questions. I start by describing the two regions on which most of the analysis is based, the
Western Plain and Central Romanian Plain. The data for this research derives from two household
surveys, in 1996 and 2006, providing a unique panel across villages. The survey strategy and the
questionnaire is discussed at length in this chapter. The analysis of landowners' choices of institutional
arrangements for farming requires a blend of theory, modeling, and knowledge of the historical and
social context to understand how certain institutions persisted and changed over time. Hence, the
methodology comprises of statistical analysis as well as qualitative research based on interviews and
participatory observations.
One of my main hypotheses is that current institutional outcomes are embedded in a
historical framework. Accordingly, reform outcomes are path-dependent on the legacies of the
communist regime, and also on pre-communist institutional structures. Hence, in Chapter Four I
review the chronology of land reforms that altered property relations in Romania from the end of the
19th century until the last land reform in the 1990s. Using historical data I show how earlier
institutional arrangements tend to replicate themselves and to adjust to new economic and political
circumstances. In addition, I trace regional differences in land reform (and in property rights
implementation) along different historical periods, in order to explain the current regional
heterogeneity in land reallocation among different farming arrangements.
After a historical perspective, in Chapter Five I examine the current socio-economic
outcomes of land reform and post-socialist transition at macro level. I start by discussing the so-called
"Neoliberal Myth" of transition (the wide gap between initial expectations and later outcomes of the
post-socialist transformation), with particular emphasis on land reform. Then, I place Romania's
agricultural sector in the larger European context, and I discuss its major role in the national
economy. Given the wide social implications of post-socialist transformation, I evaluate the effect of
transition on rural poverty and migration. I argue that the overall environment plays a key role in
influencing the decisions that landowners make in respect to land reallocation.
While an aggregate evaluation of reform outcomes is very valuable, in-depth, micro level
evidence can unearth more subtle nuances in the consequences of post-socialist transformation on
small farmers. Hence, Chapter Six disaggregates this analysis to the regional and household level.
The goal of this chapter is to show the diversity of land reform outcomes when we hone in to the
receiving end of transition policies. Using secondary statistics and household surveys, I show that there
is substantial regional variation in terms of economic development, urbanization level, income
opportunities, resource endowment, and household characteristics (i.e. age, education, farm size). In
addition, I point to regional variation in farming arrangements: mostly private individual farming in
the West, and mostly farming associations in the South. A close familiarization with the regions and
the types of small farmers existing in Romania, allows me to provide a better understanding of the
choices landowners make under different socio-economic and historical circumstances.
While in the previous chapter the landowners were at the center of the analysis, in Chapter
Seven I elaborate on the institutional arrangements currently available to Romanian farmers: private
individual farming, formal associations, and leasing transactions. I examine these arrangements from
different angles: the type of households that engage in each arrangement, the way they are organized,
the rights and obligations embedded in each arrangement, contractual terms, and the main benefits
and drawbacks associated with each alternative. By evaluating how formal associations operate and
the underlying aspects of land markets, I can distinguish and interpret the factors that affect the
persistence of associations during transition. Hence, this chapter generates research hypotheses on the
choice of farming arrangements and the persistence of associations, to be tested in the next two
chapters.
Having laid out the economic, social, and institutional background for land reallocation,
Chapter Eight introduces the analytical part of the dissertation. Using statistical analysis (choice-
based models), I inquire into the choices between different farming arrangements, evaluating factors
related to capital endowment (i.e. human and physical capital) and farm characteristics between 1996
and 2006. Based on landowners' decision structure, I divide the analysis into two sections. First, I
examine why landowners choose alternative farming arrangements rather than farming all land
individually. Second, I inquire into the persistence of farming associations throughout the transition,
as an alternative to participating in land markets. I find that capital constraints affect the choice of
alternative farming arrangements, but that the degree of land fragmentation, the age of landowners,
and the availability of alternative sources of income determine the choice between joining associations
and leasing-out land.
Statistical analysis can capture only certain factors that play a role in the decision process.
Hence, in Chapter Nine I expand the analysis to alternative explanation for the choice of, and for
regional differences in farming arrangements. Using qualitative research (interviews with farmers and
participatory observations in villages), I explore other sources of motivation for landowners to engage
in farming associations. I argue that focusing only on the capital constraints argument to describe land
reallocation patterns can be shortsighted given the complexities of transition. Rather, additional layers
complete the narrative: the legacies of collectivization, the role and interests of different actors directly
affected by land restitution and de-collectivization, and the specific way in which farming institutions
are embedded in the local community. In addition, given the critique in the literature on the close
resemblance of associations with the old collective farms, I show that there are important aspects that
differentiate the two institutional forms, such as the rights and obligations that households have as
owners of land, and the monitoring of the production process.
In the concluding chapter I summarize the main findings and contributions to the topic of
land reallocation during the transition, and in particular to explanations on the persistence of farming
associations following land restitution and the liberalization of land markets. Regional differences
provide a challenging angle to analyze this process, strengthening the argument that there is wide
heterogeneity in transition outcomes. Therefore, I argue that theoretical approaches to transition
should be expanded to accommodate variation in institutional legacies, past experiences with markets
and social capital. In addition, I point to policy recommendations that emerge from these findings,
and I suggest future areas for research.
Chapter 2 : Literature Review and Analytical Framework
The uniqueness of post-socialist transformation and the diversity in outcomes calls for a
multifaceted theoretical framing of the problem under study. As Hirchman (1981) claimed,
understanding transition requires the ability to trespass from one social science domain to another and
beyond. My dissertation seeks to explain two important phenomena. First, I explore why farming
associations persisted throughout the p ost-socialist transformation when other institutional
arrangements, such as land leasing, became available. Second, I seek explanations for regional
differences in farming institutional arrangements and land market participation following the 1990s
land reform in Romania.
In examining the process of post-socialist transformation and specifically the way farmers
shape their farming practices and market behavior, I draw on literature addressing the issue of
institutional change, individual choice, benefits and constraints from collective action, land tenure and
land market participation, emphasizing social embeddedness and path-dependence processes. Since
the concept of property rights is at the core of post-socialist agricultural transformation, the literature
review also addresses the role of formal and informal institutions (social norms, values and traditions
associated with land) in explaining transition outcomes, drawing on the experiences of East Asian and
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries.
In the past decade, having agreed that "institutions6 matter," as "engines of growth" (North
1990) and, more recently as "engines of history" (Greif 2006), significant headway was made in
inquiring into the process of institutional change by incorporating cognitive processes in individual
and collective decision making (Mantzavinos 2001; Mantzavinos et al. 2004; North 2005), as well as
historical elements to emphasize the impact of past institutions on subsequent institutional
development (Greif 2006). This created fascinating opportunities for understanding not only the
variety of reform outcomes in transition and developing countries, but also the mechanism of market
creation.
As Currie (1981) argues, neither the Classical, not the Neoclassical treatment of land is
satisfactory for examining different aspects related to property rights (institutional arrangements) in the
agricultural sector. First, the Classical theory (as shaped by Ricardo, Mill, and Malthus), offers large
simplifications and abstractions by regarding the agricultural sector as one large farm. However, this
conceptual approach obscures many aspects related to land ownership and institutional arrangements.
6 Institutions are generally understood as "formal rules, informal constraints (norms of behavior, conventions,
and self-imposed codes of conduct) and the enforcement characteristics of both (North 1993, 2005). Greif (2006
p. 382) provides another definition of institutions as a "system of social factors that conjointly generate a
regularity of behavior."
Second, the Neoclassical theory offers a different type of abstraction, by analyzing ownership and
rental markets for land on the assumption that land comprises perfectly divisible and homogenous
land plots. But, an abundance of research on the agricultural sector in developing and transition
countries shows that this assumption is far from reality. As an example, land fragmentation became a
widespread reality, meaning that location of different plots matters, and, therefore, land is not
homogenous.
In addition, lessons drawn mostly from the East Asian transition experiences and more
recently from CEE countries resulted in broad consensus that mainstream neo-liberal approaches
centered on notions of rational behavior and complete liberalization are only partially explaining
transition patterns (Borras et al. 2007; Amsden 1993). These countries experienced unparalleled
processes of economic, social, and institutional change that cannot be captured by mainstream
theories that are more static in nature. The most debated sources of growth for China, for example,
(in contrast to the CEE "comrades") were the unorthodox policies departing from the Washington
Consensus and the hybrid institutional structures enacted by the Chinese government in support of
reform (Rawski 1996; Brezis and Schnytzer 2003; Rozelle and Swinnen 2004). Changes in the
structure of incentives for farmers, coupled with an innovative set of public-private institutions
triggered sustained growth (e.g. Town Village Enterprises in China) (Rozelle and Swinnen 2004,
among others). The differences within the CEE countries as well as relative to China were attributed
to several factors: the degree to which farm management was restructured (Lerman et al. 2004), initial
conditions (Roland 2000), and the level of state support (Rawski 1996).
This chapter is organized as follows. Since institutional change is at the core of post-socialist
transition, I start by contrasting the "new" and "old" institutionalist schools, arguing that earlier
institutionalist theories of change, in the Veblenian tradition, are more appropriate for explaining the
transition process. The emphasis, in Section 2.1 is on the necessity to view institutions as "the structure
that influences behavior, including behavior leading to new institutions" (Greif 2006). Section 2.2
focuses on the issue of individual choice, conceptualizing the main assumptions in this dissertation and
assessing the main aspects that were raised by scholarly work on the subject, with relevance to small
farmers and agricultural transformation. In Section 2.3 I review the main literature on the role of
private property rights in land reform and agricultural transformation. Because the choice of farming
arrangements revolves around the concept of tenure relations, in Section 2.4 I review some key
theoretical aspects on tenancy arrangements (e.g. share-cropping). In addition, I stress that during
transition a different process emerged, that of reverse tenancy, which has been less researched. In
Section 2.5 I review the main research on farming arrangements during transition. Lastly, in Section
2.6 I point to the fact that the choice between alternative farming arrangements (farming associations
and leasing) has not been sufficiently explored in the literature. Hence this dissertation makes one step
to fill this gap in the literature.
2.1 Transition and the Institutionalist theories
Since the end of Cold War, post-socialist economies became intense research laboratories in
social sciences for experimenting with the capitalist market economy. The breakdown of a strong,
rigid, and overall ineffective economic system, created conditions for a fresh start in adopting the only
other recognized system in mainstream economics, the market economy.7
However, the diversity in outcomes after more than fifteen years of transition, as well as the
less successful results than those expected in the beginning of transition, raised intense intellectual
debates about the fit of Washington Consensus prescriptions for these countries. As Ibrahim and Galt
(2002) argue, the type of institutional changes suggested were strictly based on those operating in the
Western market economies. That model stressed the importance of private property rights,
liberalization of markets and the creation of exchange systems that would minimize transaction costs.
This approach drew extensively on the "new" institutional economics, guided by the neoclassical
economic theories. There was very little emphasis on the socio-economic and historical settings in the
transition countries. To a certain degree, the Neoliberal institutional reform assumed tabula rasa, a void
in the earlier institutional legacies that would make the transition to market economy instinctive.
The main theoretical goal of this dissertation is to argue that mainstream theories of
institutional chance cannot fully account for the complexities of post-socialist transformation. Rather,
the theoretical framework needs to be expanded to include aspects related to the evolutionary nature
of institutions established along the lines advocated by the "old" institutionalists (Ibrahim and Galt
2002; Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Greif 2006). As Murell (2003) also argues, the unique historical
experience of transition offers lessons of importance to the new institutional economics literature,
strengthening, or perhaps reshaping existing knowledge. The New Institutional literature sees the
"pure market" as the inevitable end result of the transformation phase, while the whole process should
actually be seen as "open-ended" without a pre-determined trajectory (Smyth 1998).
Institutional change is important and has been strongly emphasized by the "new" institutional
economics approach. Nevertheless, the limited institutional recommendations that this approach
promotes tend to ignore the unprecedented changes that occurred over time in countries such as
Romania. As Ibrahim and Galt (2002) argue, such cases are better viewed from the "old"
institutionalist approach, which draws more attention to the difficulties of embedding a market-based
economy in countries where such system has not operated for decades or never at all.
In an innovative approach (comparative and historical analysis of institutions), Greif (2006)
combines several strands of literature (historical institutionalism in political science (Hall and Taylor
1996; Pieson and Skocpol), path-dependence (David 1994; Arthur 1988), and the study of culture
7 Murell (2003) claims that "twenty-eight countries were free to choose their own economic and political
institutions." To a certain extent I disagree with this statement. The pressure from the Bretton Woods
Institutions (i.e. World Bank, IMF) through loan conditionalities, as well as the pressure from the European
Union, gave little leeway for these countries to chose what institutions would better match their particular
culture and economic history.
(Swidler 1986)), to analyze institutional dynamics as a historical process.8 This approach assumes that
"past institutions influence the timing of institutional change, the manner in which they change, and
the details and implications of new institutions" (Greif 2006 p. 15). This historical perspective of
institutions, which provides a better "took-kit" to explain the persistence of institutions, includes
elements of social capital9 and culture, and hence departs from the mainstream new institutional
economics approach. In this view, which I share in my analysis, institutions are shaped by social and
cultural legacies, and they contain norms and behavioral beliefs. In turn, these elements "reflect the
cognitive models, knowledge, and coordination that were generated through a historical process of
interactions, socialization, learning, experimentation, and leadership" (Greif 2006 p. 380).
2.1.1 Limitations of the "new" institutionalist approach
New institutionalism, with its emphasis on transaction costs, property rights, and contractual
behavior, adopts the neoclassical concept of rational, self-interested, utility maximizing individual
(Coase 1937; Williamson 1985; North 1987, 1994). This approach sees the development of institutions
as an outcome of individuals' behavior (Ibrahim and Galt 2002). Moreover, economic agents act
"within a framework of institutional cooperation to reduce transaction costs and secure property
rights" (Vandenberg 2002 p. 222). In this respect, the economic agent is expected to act upon
changing the institutions towards more efficient cost structures (to maximize choices). Nevertheless,
Powell and DiMaggio (1991) argue that the "new" institutional economics improves the standard
microeconomic assumptions: "individuals attempt to maximize their behavior over stable and
consistent preference orderings, but they do so in the face of cognitive limits, incomplete information,
and difficulties in monitoring and enforcing agreements."
The new institutionalists view the economic system in terms of contracts and exchange
relations. The organizational structure that arises as a result is seen to minimize transaction costs. The
policy implications for the transition process are that the structure of the economy is changed by
"creating firms that adopt the role of the market rather than combating the structural rigidities that
might exist within the economy" (Ibrahim and Galt 2002 p. 106-107). Moreover, new institutionalists
see markets and privatization as the only guarantee that efficient organizations can replace the less
efficient ones.
Another related aspect is that "there is no recognition in the new institutional approach that
markets may fail for reasons other than transaction costs" (Ibrahim and Galt 2002). Rather than
responding to market stimuli, firms may continue to operate at a limited scale, or they can just close
8 Greif (2006 p. 16) views this process by explaining that "institutions can remain stable in a changing
environment and can change in the absence of environmental change, while past institutions even those that
are no longer self-enforcing - can influence the details of subsequent ones."
9 Social capital is generally defined as "features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that
can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions" (Putnam 1993 p. 167 making
democracy work).
down (Nelson and Winter 1992, Murell 1992). Therefore, as Ibrahim and Galt mention, rather than
concentrating on transaction costs issues, "a more detailed focus is needed on how emerging
institutions respond to issues such as the legacy of central planning, the collapse of the traditional
markets, the rigidities associated with production and the lack of technology."
2.1.2 Revisiting the contributions of the "old" institutionalist approach
In contrast to "new" institutionalists, the "old" institutionalists (Veblen 1898, Commons 1934)
place greater emphasis on the socio-economic framework within which institutions form, shaping
individual behavior. Evolutionary theory grew out of the main tenets of old institutionalism.' 0
According to this approach to economic development, individual behavior is path-dependent on
previous circumstances and behavioral responses. As Ibrahim and Galt (2002) argue, "replacing one
institutional form with another, which does not take into account the habits of individuals, is not likely
to be successful, at least in the short run." Moreover, Landesmann and Abel (1995) claim that
representing transition as a simple automatic adjustment, as the new institutionalist approach does,
ignores the dynamics that such a process entails.
That history matters and can give rise to alternative paths for development has been
recognized by North (1990) also, who despite his general adherence to transaction costs analysis,
asserts that "if the process by which we arrive at today's institutions is relevant and constraints future
choices, then not only does history matter but persistent and poor performance and long-run
divergent patterns of development stem from a common source." Greif also argues that institutional
elements inherited from the past influence subsequent institutions and calls for the need to use
contextual (historical) information in studying institutions (2006 p. 21). For example, Romania's
reform process after 1989, reflected a muddled strategy, more than in other CEE countries, followed
by "an institutional vacuum where market institutions struggled to get established in an environment
that had not been sufficiently prepared for their imposition" (Ibrahim and Galt 2002 p. 109). Among
other authors, Stark (1996) and Clark and Soulsby (1999) adopted an approach that recognizes the
evolutionary outlook by arguing that during transition institutions were built "on the ruins of
socialism," process in which social networks and ties from the previous regime were critical for post-
socialist restructuring.
Legacies of the past derive not only from the communist times, but also from the inter-war
period. The outcomes of land reform are illustrative in this sense. Restitution of land based on the pre-
communist land records transposed on the current social and economic conditions not only a whole
10 Veblen's perspective on economic change is that of an evolutionary process. The conception of the economy
is that of an evolving system in historical time, subjected to processes of cumulative causation, a constant friction
between habits of thought generated by a new material condition and the habits and institutions more
appropriate to an earlier phase of development.
I Hodgson (1998 p. 185) claims that North's work now exhibits a "degree of convergence" with the old
institutionalism, with a strong emphasis in history, cognitive constraints, and ideology.
set of past formal institutions but also social (informal) institutions that were suppressed during the
communist rule. The way these institutions interact with each other in the new environment and
under constant pressures for change, makes the post-socialist transformation a very multidimensional
and dynamic process.
In the old institutionalist approach, market and non-market institutions are socially
constructed, suggesting that economic activities cannot be solely explained by individual hedonistic
motives (Veblen 1898 p. 73). Explanations of socio-economic evolution must involve individual agents
as well as institutions and structures (Veblen 1897).
The complex and dynamic view of the economic system advocated by old institutionalists led
to its critiques of being too descriptive and lacking an overarching theoretical framework (Hodgson
1994). Nevertheless, the transition process requires such a complex conceptual approach given that
"new" institutional interpretations tend to ignore the heterogeneity of Eastern European countries, as
well as regional differences within countries.
Another relevant aspect of old institutionalism is the emphasis placed on the process of
change. "The question," Veblen (1934) wrote, "is not how things stabilize themselves in a 'static state,'
but how they endlessly grow and change." Veblen stressed the importance of habit and routine (hence
culture) in shaping institutional change. He argued that when these norms are enforced within a
society or group, individual habits assume the form of socioeconomic institutions. As a result, in the
old institutionalist perspective, the conception of economy is of an evolving, open system in historical
time, subject to cumulative causation, instead of approaches to theorizing focusing on mechanical
equilibrium, as the neoclassical theory claims. Drawing on the old institutionalist approach, Greif
(2006 p. 17) also argues that in analyzing the process of institutional change, individuals' "shared
cognitive models," in the form of rules, beliefs, and norms inherited from the past affect feasible
institutional alternatives. This argument is highly relevant for the analysis of land reallocation in post-
socialist countries where I hypothesize that the experience of collectivization and the perception of
market processes were critical to whether landowners joined farming associations or participated in
land markets.
Given the complexities of post-socialist agricultural transformation, the varieties of
institutional arrangements to which individuals resorted following land restitution, and the regional
differences in these outcomes, a larger conceptual approach is needed, one that that views institutions
from a dynamic perspective, as embedded in the social and historical structure., The social structure
and historical legacies play an important role selecting among alternative institutions in new socio-
economic and political circumstances. This approach allows me to explain the persistence of
institutions perceived to be inefficient, and the apparent rigidity to adapt to new market conditions.
Moreover, it also allows to identify policies that are better meshed with the socio-economic realities of
transition and developing countries, by taking into account the importance of institutions (formal and
informal) inherited from the past and the interests of specific actors involved in the process.
2.2 The issue of individual choice: conceptual aspects
A theory of economic change is inevitably concerned with the way choices are made. Hence,
the issue of choice runs through many aspects of this dissertation. People (as individuals or collective
entities) make decisions about every aspect of live. When a major process of economic change is
underway, choices affect the direction in which change will occur. Therefore, understanding the
criteria based on which individuals choose between different alternatives, is critical.
The gist of this dissertation is to explain the factors that differentiate between farmers
choosing different institutional arrangements. Why did some farmers choose to leave part of their land
in associations and others did not? What factors affected the decision to lease out land? Why is
participation in land markets higher in some regions than in others? The answer to these questions is
embedded in the concept of choice and is strongly influenced by the system of values of beliefs as well
as the external economic environment.
The main assumption in this analysis is that individuals strive to maximize their own utility.
Utility maximization is different from the concept of rationality of action, which has mainly a
normative character. As Mantzavinos (200 1) argued, under the name of "rationality" (whether perfect,
or bounded), diverse theoretical considerations on human behavior are hidden. The problem then
becomes one of how to better explain rational behavior (Lane et al. 1996), tightly linked to how
human beings reason and choose (Mantzavinos et al. 2004).
In the discussion of individual choice, especially within the context of peasants (or small
farmers), the literature has shown a constant tension between categorizing the behavior of small
farmers (mainly subsistence farmers) as rational or irrational. It was Schultz (1964) who first responded
strongly to the argument that peasants are poor because of their unwillingness to modernize and adapt
new practices, deemed as a reflection of their irrationality. Lipton (1968) rephrased this response in
more realistic terms, claiming that "farmers are reasonable, but they cannot always be efficient," given
the unpredictable nature of the environment in which their operate.
But, as Stiglitz (1989) argues, economic models which assume that peasants are working
within rational and efficient institutions are as inadequate and misleading as the ones which assume
that peasants are irrational, bounded by traditions and non-economic principles. The view I adopt,
which has been articulated by Stiglitz (1989 p. 2), is that "peasants are rational but are not fully
informed" about the consequences of either their actions, or about the institutions in which they
operate. As a result, because of imperfect information (including transaction costs), there are higher
constraints to competition, institutional rigidities, and the persistence of seemingly inefficient
institutions. Therefore, if we assume that leasing can provide higher productivity (or returns),
information asymmetries could offer part of the explanation for why peasants were slow to adopt these
alternative institutional arrangements.' 2
When we explore the concept of utility maximization in the context of subsistence and semi-
subsistence farmers, differentiations need to be made as compared to other economic agents. The
small farmer is risk-averse and profit maximization is not primordial in the decision making process,
being replaced by the need to balance the utility of output (Chayanov 1966; Swain 1985; Rabin 1998;
Liu and Zhuang 2000; Spoor 2007).13 Moral economists, such asJames Scott, argue that the small
farmer's actions are mainly driven by the "safety-first" principle. Hence, in economic terms, the
tenant prefers to minimize the probability of loss rather than to maximize his average return (Scott
1976). Todaro and Smith (2003) also argue that risk-averse farmers prefer traditional technologies that
combine low yields with low variance, to new technologies that offer higher yields but also pose higher
risks. The political economy view, advanced by Popkin (1979 p. 31), suggests that peasants consider
both short and long-term investment decisions, making choices which they believe will maximize their
expected utility. Rationality, in this view, is not limited to material wellbeing, but is associated with
preferences and values, closer to the economic theory assumptions. Nevertheless, in the case of
subsistence farming, the use of premium of investment is high also because the use of savings for
investment denied farmers consumption smoothing benefits (Eswaran and Ashok 1989). Interestingly,
field research suggests that in rural communities we find both types of behavior: more traditional
farmers and farmers that are less risk-averse. Understanding the underlying causes that lead to these
differences is critical.
Closely related to the aspect of choice, scholars point to the differences in work ethics in
capitalist societies as compared to peasant societies. As Chayanov (1966) argued in his classic study of
Russian smallholders, and as more recent research in the post-socialist countryside confirmed (Hann
1993; Verdery 2003), when there are no job alternatives and there are shortages of capital and labor,
peasant families must work unimaginably hard and long for the smallest increments in production.
Chayanov calls this "self-exploitation."' 4 Such behavior of self-exploitation can be seen as driven by
both risk-aversion and utility maximization and is widely seen in the Romanian countryside.
In the past decade, elements from cognitive science have been successfully used to
complement the assumption of rational choice in order to understand human behavior and its effect
12 By using this argument, Stiglitz (1989) claims that the "Pareto-efficient markets" is an entirely inadequate
framework to understand farmers' behavior in rural economies (and generally in the context of developing
countries). Not only does Pareto-efficiency assume perfect competition, but it also requires perfect information
and a complete set of markets, conditions which are obviously not fulfilled in less developed countries (not even
in developed economies for that matter).
1 As Mullainathan (2004 p. 20) argues, "insight about loss aversion can also help understand why policy change
is so difficult in developing countries."
14 When this pattern prevails in an economy, a so-called process of "agricultural involution" (Geertz 1963) sets
in.
on economic and social processes.15 Individuals are constantly in a process of problem solving in order
to increase their utility. Choice is part of this process. "Choice is the creative stage or conscious mental
probing of alternatives before proceeding to the trial of the one judged the best" (Mantzavinos 2001,
p. 54). It is a process of reflection before action in close connection to the environment, which takes
place in the human brain. In effect, individuals are rationalizers, not rational human beings. This
argument is similar to Veblen's (1914 p. 30-32) claim that individuals have a basic instinct of engaging
in purposeful action. 16
Economists generally assume that agents strive to rationally maximize their utility function,
while sociologists believe that agents' behavior is dictated by norms. On the other hand, a central
hypothesis of the cognitive approach (and classical institutionalism), which I share in my analysis, is
that individuals learn from past problems, and that problem solving is a dynamic process in constant
"communication" with the environment.
Another aspect related to the issue of choice, aside from risk-aversion and profit
maximization, which assumes an explanation based on the availability of resources, is the concept of
"collective memory." This concept, primarily discussed by the sociologist Maurice Halbwachs (1992),
postulates that choices are based on past memories, which the mind reconstructs under the pressure of
society. Nevertheless, there is "incongruity in many respects between the constraints of yesterday and
those of today" (p. 50), suggesting that choices made in the present are not entirely path-dependent,
but that they are shaped by the new social and economic environment. At the same time, reliance on
this argument should be made with caution since, as Halbwachs (1992 p. 182) claims, various groups
in the society "most frequently distort the past in the act of reconstructing it." However, the issue of
collective memory can be a useful concept especially in explaining regional differences in the choice of
institutional arrangements following land restitution. The concept becomes less binding as compared
to the path-dependent argument to explain the institutional outcomes in the post-socialist context.
2.3 Private property rights
In the neoliberal theory, privatization is the sine-qua-non condition for the well functioning of
market economies (Ho and Spoor 2006). Accordingly, incomplete land rights are likely to impose
constraints on the smooth development of land markets. Moreover, having property titles reduces
private enforcement costs, provides security and collateral for long-term investment in land
15 As Mullainathan and Thaler (2001) argue from a behavioral economics point of view, while neo-classical
economics has defined itself as explicitly anti-behavioral, more recently there is mounting "empirical and
experimental evidence against the stark predictions of unbounded rationality."
16 As Vandenberg (2002 p. 223) argues, Veblen suggests that individuals are operating within a culture of habits
and established patterns of thought, that they are instinctively engaged in purposeful action and that such action
is guided, to some degree by intelligence.
improvements, and promotes development of land markets. All these activities are wealth-enhancing
(Alston 1996).
The neo-liberal policy of transforming public into private property, widely implemented in the
former communist countries, appealed to the larger population and political class not only because of
its role in creating markets. Its ideological character was the centerpiece of transition. The re-creation
of private property aimed to erase decades of communist injustices, by acknowledging the concept of
entitlement and responsibility.
Land titling and registration plays a critical role in property rights reform in transitional
countries. Demsetz (1967) and Deininger (2003) argue that property rights that do not contain the
right of alienation are often considered to be ill defined and are likely to lead to inefficiencies.
Nevertheless, Larson and Bromley (1990) challenge this view, and claim that there is a need for much
more information on the type of property rights and other social or economic barriers to land market
participation, before such judgments can be made.
At the final stage in land redistribution, land registration involves "defining and recording the
various rights to a given plot of land" (Ho and Spoor 2006 p. 2). According to the property rights
school of thought, secure property rights (achieved mainly through titling), is the sole most efficient
and secure institutional arrangement, it is the means to increase transfers to more productive farmers
thereby putting land to its best use, and to increase investments (Dorner 1972; Feder et al. 1988; Feder
and Feeney 1991; Besley 1994; Harrison 1987; Hayes et al. 1994).
However, it is now understood that privatization is insufficient for creating properly
functioning markets (Bromley 1997; Dale and Baldwin 2003; Amsden 1993) and this argument
becomes even more evident for land markets (Wallace and Williamson 2006). The concept of
exclusive property rights is insufficient to understand post-socialist transformation, investment
behavior, and market creation (Field 2005; Kim 2004). Do and Iyer (2007) also show that titling by
itself does not lead to higher land market participation, or investment. Complementary policies are
needed to increase the functioning of these markets.
Similarly, rights over land do not explain much if they are not embedded into a system of
social relationships and if the broader institutional structure does not allow full exertion of these rights
(such as easy access to capital and labor). Collectivization took away the rights over land but it
provided other social rights such as wage-labor employment, education, or medical provision. This is
one reason why earlier studies found that despite lack of property rights, collective farms were still
productive (Swain 1985; Boyd 1987; Amelina 2000) and de-collectivization was not embraced
unanimously at the start of transition (Hann 1993).i1 This shift from a collective system to a more
open economy entails a loss of protection (welfare and insurance provided by collective farms) and an
expectation of change in mentality from a collective orientation to an individualist, market orientation.
17 The highest dismissal of private property has been seen in Russia (Tho Seeth et al. 1998; Lerman et al. 2004).
The degree and circumstances under which this shift occurred creates challenging research
opportunities to be examined in greater detail in the larger dissertation.
Nevertheless, the property rights school remained influential in mainstream academic and
policy circles, and most transition reform programs incorporated this perspective especially in their
analysis of land markets. Miceli et al. (2000) claim that "one of the least controversial principles in the
economics of land markets is the notion that the more clearly defined property rights are, the greater
the land market efficiency." The empirical evidence, however, has questioned the confidence in this
assertion. For example, several studies on African countries show that, mainly due to the high cost of
titling, the effects of land tenure security are contrary to expectations (Atwood 1990; Lanjouw and
Levy 1998).
Despite controversial evidence, there seems to be agreement on at least one critical advantage
from having secure land titles, and that is access to credit. Nevertheless, even if land rights are secure,
if the credit markets are not adjusted to the needs of the small farmers, the benefits from private
property rights will be slow to occur (Do and Iyer 2007). On a similar note, aside from the security of
tenure, another aspect which has been widely researched by the anthropologist Katherine Verdery,
relate to the relationship between the values embedded in property rights, and market imperfections
during transition (2004). Verdery's argument is that when market imperfections prevent landowners
from exerting their rights and obligations over land, property rights became irrelevant, being hollowed
out of their real meaning. Hence, land reforms that strictly target property rights restitution, without
simultaneously extending the opportunities for access to markets, labor, and capital, are very likely to
undermine the actual purpose of property rights reforms.
But, as the previous section underlined, to understand the transformation of post-socialist
economies, we should appeal to an analytical framework that incorporates social, cultural, and
political relations that inquire rather than assume the nature of property conceptions (Verdery 1997).
Property rights are intrinsically social and political relations, they are tied to social and political status
(Hall 1993), and can be conceived as "maps of human relations" (Shanin 1990). In peasant societies,
property rights are not clearly vested in the individual but rather in the family, and "sentimental
attachments to family land run deep" (Hann 1993 p. 302).
Property is also a reflection of different meanings shaped by community, kinship, and history.
Within this context, land restitution is a channel through which the rural population regain meaning
for their lives, which were significantly emptied (devalued) with collectivization. As Verdery (1997)
argues, "all the villagers and especially the elderly, who lived through the devastating experience of
collectivization that many felt as life amputation, are struggling to recast and revalorize the past 40
years." Hence, work, position, social embeddedness and community are vital for understanding the
outcomes of land reform. There is a personal investment in things, and a sense of worth entailed in
these investments (Verdery 1997).
2.4 Land tenure
The fundamental difference between the owner-operators and tenant farmers is that rather
than enjoying full ownership over land and assets, the tenant farmer has only a right of temporary
occupation in return for which he pays rent to the owner. From this point of view, both farming
associations and leasing arrangements are forms of land tenancy. The differences between them,
however, are largely unexamined.
Land tenure research agendas vary extensively across regions and socio-economic
circumstances. As Tibako (2003) claims, in Africa where land has been perceived as a relatively
abundant factor of production, most research was focused on the relationship between tenure security
and productivity. In Asia and Latin America, where land is scarce and unequally distributed, emphasis
was placed on inequality aspects of tenure relations (Maxwell and Wiebe 1998).
In the CEE countries in transition, very limited research has been carried out on what seems
to be a very different tenure system in an entirely new context. Land restitution in the former
communist countries in Europe resulted in a so-called process of "reverse tenancy," situation in which
a poor landowner contracts with a rich tenant, quite different from the canonical model of
sharecropping (Bellemare 2006).18 Nevertheless, conceptual and theoretical aspects of the classical
tenure system contribute to our understanding of the choice for different institutional arrangements
during transition.
In Romania, the unanimous restitution of private property rights resulted in a large share of
absentee landowners, part-time and poor inexperienced farmers, in a context of dramatically changed
market conditions. As a result, these outcomes contributed to increased incentives for reverse tenancy,
seeking alternative (or mixed) property rights arrangements. This outcome was quite different from
the period before and between the World Wars in Romania (or in Latin American case of land
reform) where, to the most part, large rich landowners were seeking poor tenants to rent part of their
land.
The literature on tenancy arrangements is very rich on issues of contractual choice (fixed or
share contracts) and risk sharing (Shaban 1987; Ghatak and Pandey 2000; Pandey 2004; Alland and
Lueck 1992). Other related aspects of land tenure arrangements refer to transaction costs, incentives,
risk aversion, and imperfect information (Cheung 1969; Allen and Lueck 1993; Stiglitz 1974).
However, as Bellamare (2004) found, most sharecropping models are inconsistent with the
phenomenon of reverse tenancy, mainly because the poorer landowner no longer holds comparative
advantage in risk-bearing over the tenant.
18 Bellemare (2006) summarizes that reverse tenancy received some attention lately due to its prevalence in
Lesotho (Lawry 1993), South Africa (Lyne and Thomson 1995), Ethiopia (Tikabo and Holden 2003),
Bangladesh (Pearce 1983), Malaysia (Pearce 1983), Mexico (Colin and Bouquet 2001), India (Pearce 1983) and
the Philippines (Roumasset 2002).
Currie (1981 p. 66) argues that the behavior of the tenant will depend on his rights and
obligations under the contractual arrangement, for two main reasons. First, the nature of property
rights may affect the set of legally feasible courses of action available to him. Second, property rights
will influence the nature of incentives, that is, the extent to which the costs and benefits of particular
actions accrue to him, rather than to the landowner. Of these, the later is more important. The extent
to which costs and benefits are internalized will depend on the nature of rental payments, on the
duration and security of tenure, and on the form of provisions, if any, for compensatory payments at
the termination of the tenancy.
Moreover, I hypothesize that the benefits from different tenancy arrangements also depend on
the security of tenure (i.e. the sort of activities that a tenant farmer would pursue would depend on the
duration and security of his tenure). The security of tenure can be affected by factors endogenous to
the contractual arrangement, as well as determined by market conditions. If the tenant does not have
easy access to credit, and cannot have a guarantee that he will be able to keep part of the production,
he will not engage in long-term investments on the plot, and he will feel more insecure over his
contractual arrangements. Moreover, short-term leases also mean that the tenant has interest only in
his own revenue, not in the long-term enhancement of the land plot. He would have no incentives to
undertake long-term improvements of the property, since all or most of the benefits would accrue to
the landowner (Currie 1981 p. 69-70). In addition, if the tenant hopes to renew the lease at the end of
the period, he will have an interest in the state of the property at the end of the lease. Given the
legislative changes that were enacted for leasing contracts in Romania after 1994, 1 hypothesize that
the length and type of tenancy contracts affect the choice that landowners make for reallocating land
to associations or in leasing transactions.
Nevertheless, security of tenure is not affected only by economic factors, such as the extent of
property rights over land or the length of tenure. Other factors such as social capital (the relationship
between the landowner and the tenant) also affect the perception of tenure security. These factors,
however, are less explored in the literature. In this study, I argue that institutional arrangements are
embedded in the social structure at community level, and as a result, social capital plays an important
role in the decisions that landowners make.
As Singh (1989 p. 34) claims, it is almost impossible to come up with a theory of
sharecropping or any other form of land tenancy because of the different realities in the field and
inconsistency of different institutional arrangements overtime. 19 Nevertheless, sharecropping can be
viewed as a consequence of the disparity between the distribution of human resources (labor) and
physical resources (land and capital) (Stiglitz 1989 p. 25). On a more general note, sharecropping is a
19 The author uses the different aspects of sharecropping as an example, and he argues that there are variations
overtime in terms of productivity, share payment, economic status of the tenant, and types of crops produced
under this arrangement, which makes it very unlikely to predict it under a theoretical framework.
response to uncertainty and asymmetries of information, as well as a response to different types of
market failures in labor, insurance, credit, and capital markets (Singh 1989).
Nevertheless, the institutional outcomes (the current equilibrium, in economic terms) of land
tenure can only be understood if we examine the historical determinants, "the processes by which we
arrive at where we are" (Stiglitz 1989 p. 26). Historical forces create an important asymmetry of
information in which individuals know more about the institutions and conventions they experienced
in the past than about the more recent institutions. Therefore, given that change brings uncertainties,
risk aversion itself can lead to the preservation of past institutions.
2.5 The choice of different institutional arrangements for farming
Current literature on the choice between different institutional arrangements for farming has
been couched in terms of stark choices between farming individually or not. There is quite a lot of
research done on the question of why landowners farm the land themselves rather than collectively, as
well as on the question of why farmers engage in land transactions (leasing and sales). Nevertheless.
there is significantly less, if any, research on the factors that determine landowners to choose between
farming the land in associations (i.e. collectively) rather than leasing (i.e. land transactions).
The main factors discussed in the literature highlight that resource constraints and transaction
costs are at the core of the decision process on farming arrangements. However, more recent evidence
shows that any evaluation of land regimes must go beyond material well-being, to incorporate aspects
of social capital, social embeddedness, and institutional legacies (collective memory) (Verdery 2004).
This section highlights the main theoretical and empirical findings on these aspects, especially with
reference to the post-socialist context, and points to the gap in the literature on the choice between
alternative farming arrangements. In Section 2.5.1 I review the literature on associational forms of
production and collective action. Then, in Section 2.5.2 I review the literature on land market
transactions, as alternative institutional arrangements for farming.
2.5.1 Farming associations
As I mentioned in the introductory chapter, despite the initial emphasis on private individual
farming during the post-socialist transformation, soon it became evident that alternative institutional
arrangements, such as farming associations, started to emerge. Associations were created either on the
structures of the old collective farms, or were endogenously formed among kin or neighbors. As a
result, issues of collective action became highly relevant in explaining current outcomes of land
reform. Nevertheless, there is little discussion of the tenure arrangements that lie in between private
and state ownership, such as associations or collective ownership, despite their prevalence in the CEE
context.
For neo-classical economists, who dominated the policy scene during transition, groups
remain for the most part on anomaly: "the rational maximizing individual continues to be the central
actor and group activity as something to the explained as a response to 'market failure' not as a
natural phenomenon" (Stewart 1996 p. 10). In addition, one reason for the "neglect" of groups
articulated by Mearns (1996), is that "the meaning of terms such as 'collective action' and 'common
property' has been tainted" by the failed experience of socialist agriculture. Stewart (1996 p. 24) also
mentions that the failure of communism is being used to deny the critical importance of groups and
collective action in development. The downgrading of the term was made both by policy makers and
by former workers in collective farms. For policy makers, the failure of socialist agriculture model was
a clear proof that the collective arrangement was fraught with inefficiencies (i.e. free-riding, moral
hazard), or "opportunism" (Williamson 1985 p. 47)20. At the same time, former workers on the
collective farms associated collective action with the exploitative approach of the socialist state, the
hierarchy, control and the extractive character of the old socialist farms. As a result, relations of trust
and reciprocity (social capital) seem to be "lacking precisely where they are most needed" (Mearns
1996) following land restitution.
The most important contributions to the theory of collective action were made by Buchanan
(1965)21, Ostrom (1990)22 and Olson (1995)23, addressing questions on what type of goods or resources
could be managed in private or cooperative type of arrangements, how large an ownership group
should be, what are the advantages and disadvantages of one form of ownership over another, and in
what circumstances would collective action prevail. The seminal work of Hardin (1995) and Demsetz
(1995) argue through the lens of cost-benefit analysis, that private property as opposed to communal
property is the most justifiable ownership form.
One common explanation for collective action is the existence of market imperfections.
Imperfect information leads to high transactions costs, suggesting that individuals cannot produce
certain good and services efficiently for themselves (Nugent 1986).
However, while in these explanations the main incentive to act collectively revolves around
efficiency considerations, evidence from the field indicates that the situation is more complex, and that
20 Williamson groups the problems such as free-riding, principal-agent issues, shirking, into a more general
category called opportunism, which is defined as "self-seeking with guile," being the central element on his
interpretation of institutionalism.
21 Buchanan's main contribution is the theory of clubs based on which collective action can emerge only if the
motivation for joining in sharing arrangements is economic, that is, if choices are made on the basis of costs and
benefits. The theory assumes that for any good and service, the utility that an individual receives from its
consumption depends upon the number of other persons with whom he must share the benefits.
Ostrom has made clear differentiation between communal property, in which resources are restricted to
members of a particular community and are subject to regulation under community norms and rules, and open
access, in which resources are open to all (true commons). Previously, Demsetz, which is considered the father of
property rights theory distinguished private property, state property, and communal property, the last of which
he appeared to equate with open access.
23 Olson's core argument is that collective action can be achieved only if groups are smaller, and if coercion is
applied.
non-efficiency criteria should be taken into account as well. Understanding the historical trajectories
in institutional change in a particular setting is one of the most widely discussed explanations for
choosing a particular institutional structure based on non-efficiency criteria. The theory of path
dependence offers part of the theoretical context for these debates.
Stewart (1996 p. 14) provides a schematic representation of the mainstream neo-classical view
and of alternative views on the role of groups (see Table 2-1). In his alternative view, Stewart sees
groups as being evolutionary, influenced by society and history, with wider goals of satisficing rather
than solely maximizing. In my analysis of farming associations I adopt a similar approach by which
past institutional legacies are as important as efficiency considerations to explain the persistence of
farming associations during transition.
Table 2-1: Contrasting views of group functioning
Neo-classical Alternative
Individual goals Exogenous Evolving, influenced by society and
history
Maximizing Satisficing
Egotistical Commitments to group as well as self
Norms Must be enforced externally; Some norms internalized; developed via
developed to increase efficiency tradition as well as efficiency
Group functions To enhance efficiency (NIE) To enhance efficiency; to enforce claims
To constrain trade (rent-seeking Historic/evolutionary
view)
Effect of society (i.e. class Neutral, except via factor Strongly influences group norms, power,
structure) availability and hence prices structure
Group characteristics Functionalist/efficiency raising Evolutionary/contingent, with
functionalist elements; increases power
and resources of members
Source: Stewart (1996 p. 14)
Lerman et al. (2004 p. 223-229) enumerates few factors that could explain the persistence of
associations in the former socialist countries in Europe. Individual risk preferences provide one
explanation. As the authors argue, an association (collective or cooperative farm) may provide lower
income but it offers a relatively safe, non-volatile environment. Another explanation related to land
restitution which created a large share of landowners who were too old to farm or living in the urban
areas. Lerman et al. (2004) argue that this category of landowners has no immediate personal use for
the restituted land, but they would like to keep the land in ownership. This argument, however, does
not explain why these landowners do not lease out the land instead of joining associations.
Therefore, while there are both economic and non-economic incentives for being in any
organizational form, the existing evidence is conflicting as to whether individual private farms are able
to generate more productive output than associative types of farms. First, discussions over cooperative
versus individual arrangements in agriculture referred both to the level of production and to the
service related activities in agriculture (input supply, marketing, credit, processing, technology)
(Deininger 1993). It is argued that service related activities in agriculture are more sensitive to
economies of scale and hence could perform better in cooperative forms of ownership (Deininger
1995; Leonte and Alexandri 2001). Currently there is a large consensus that economies of scale in
agricultural production are very limited. 24 However, Mathijs (1998) argues that when market
imperfections in access to credit and inputs persist (especially in the initial phase of transition), this
conclusion does not hold anymore. 25 Lerman et al. (2004 p. 226) claim that in an imperfectly
competitive environment, large farms may have easier access to input supplies, product marketing
channels, and credit facilities.
Another explanation for the persistence of farming associations derives from a political
economy argument. Lerman et al. (2004 p. 227) claim that there is a symbiotic relationship between
the management of large collective (associations) and corporate farms, on the one hand, and the
regional authorities, on the other hand. It is easier for the regional authorities to deal with a small
number of large farms than with a large number of small and fragmented farms. The authors further
argue that "in return for the rents and payoffs that the local authorities extract from the large
collective farms, their managers are rewarded with preferential access to inputs and credits, as well as
personal prestige and other prerequisites." This symbiosis between the regional authorities and the
associations (collective farms) acts to preserve the existing farm structure, preventing other private
entrepreneurs from entering the sector.
The main critique of cooperative forms of production in agriculture is related to problems of
free-riding and principal agent concerns. It is argued that the cost of monitoring labor is too high for
associations and shirking tends to prevail. Hence, the incentives for efficient use of resources and profit
maximization are much lower as compared to individual private farming, which maximize family
welfare rather than individual welfare and hence face no incentives to shirk (Pollak, 1985; Carter,
1984).26 Individual farming not only reduces the instances in which people need to be watched, but it
also makes the task much simpler (Ellickson 1993).
However, some authors argue that production cooperatives can solve their agency problems
by setting up the right labor contract structure (Johnson 1983; Putterman 1985). Lin (1990) offers as a
solution the self-enforcing contract for members, but such contract can be sustained only in
cooperatives that provide the right to exit. Brooks and Meurs (1994) argue for cooperative ownership
structures in production on the grounds of institutional economies of scale. Collective forms of
24 Empirical evidence shows that there are no increasing returns to size in agriculture production beyond a
certain minimum size which can be captured by (larger) family farms, both in developing (Berry and Cline,
1979; Hayami and Ruttan, 1985) and in developed countries (Kislev and Peterson, 1991; Peterson, 1997). The
long-run, average cost curve in agricultural production is L-shaped under long-run competitive equilibrium
conditions (Hallam, 1991).
25 Matjis (1998) argues that in the beginning phase of the transition there are plenty of opportunities for scale
economies at any level.
26 Ellickson (1993 p. 1327) argued that "the parcelization of land is a relatively low-transaction cost method of
inducing people to 'do the right thing' with the earth's surface, the vernacular for avoiding deadweight losses."
As a result, private property tends to equate the personal product of an individual's actions with the social
product of those actions.
production can serve the role of risk-sharing (Carter 1987) land reallocation, or can provide benefits in
bargaining with persisting monopolies (Brooks and Meurs 1994).
While several other studies showed empirical evidence in favor of cooperative forms of
property rights Johnson 1983; Boyd 1987; Brada and King 1993; Beckmann and Hagedorn 1997;
Mathijs et al. 1997) their time frame is the pre-transition period. Boyd (1987) finds that large collective
production farms in Yugoslavia had higher rates of growth in labor and land productivity than private
producers. Hence, he argues that collective farms are not inherently inefficient and can outperform
private producers. Both types of producers were responding to their environment and the constraints
they each faced. Collective farms exhibited technology adoption behavior similar to non-socialist
enterprises elsewhere. 27 Similarly, Brada and King (1993) conclude that in Poland, between 1960-
1975, there was no difference between technical efficiency of state and private farms, although the
variation in efficiency levels is greater among state farms than among private farms.
One factor used to explain the diversity of farming arrangements during transition is farm
productivity explored extensively byJohann Swinnen and his co-authors across several CEE countries.
Mathijs and Swinnen (2001 b) show that in East Germany farmer associations 28 are more efficient
than either individual or former collective farms. But, they argued that the inefficiency of the collective
farms declined during the transition period. Sabates-Wheeler (2002) draws a similar conclusion for the
case of Romania. These results suggest that stages in transition (which may involve changes in the set
of incentives) as well as more sector specific variables are important for unraveling the relationship
between property rights and productivity. Additionally, Mathijs et al. (1997) conclude that for the case
of Czech and Slovak agriculture, being a member of a cooperative or partner of a company, positively
affects the efficiency level of family farms once production inputs become easily accessible.
Brooks and Meurs (1994) observe that in Romania, in the beginning of land reform,
landowners tend to engage more in farming associations, explained in part by the slow development of
competitive markets, and the low availability of machinery. However, the authors argue that
associations appear less responsive than private farming to market stimuli, which may impede
agricultural restructuring. Rizov et al. (200 1) found that individual farming in Romania is influenced
by several household characteristics, such as human capital endowments and access to financial
resources. 29 Moreover, the authors point to striking differences in the process of individualization of
land ownership between regions, which could be due to their distinct history of private property, as
highlighted by the path dependency argument.
The only study that examined the issue of household choice between different farming
arrangements (or property rights arrangements) was Sabates-Wheeler (2005) on the Romanian case.
27 These results however, might incorporate some bias due to inaccuracies of the published statistics during the
communist regime.
28 In the case for East Germany these farming institutions are actually called partnerships.
29 \Velch (1970) argues that education can affect the quality of direct labor inputs as well as allocative decision
making.
Assuming an ordered preference for formal associations, family associations, mixed strategies, and
individual farming, the author found that differential resource endowments largely explain farming
choices. Farmers with higher levels of their own resources are more likely to farm individually than
those with fewer or no resources. However, I argue that while this conclusion points to the structural
factors affecting choice, highly relevant during transition where market imperfections are pervasive, it
leaves out other critical factors that shape individual decision-making. Historical legacies of private
property in land, and embeddedness of land in social relations are critical for explaining property
rights arrangements and land market participation.
Given the circumstances of post-socialist transition and the structural factors that make
associations a preferred alternative to individual farming, Mathijs and Swinnen (2001) argue that these
arrangements are an intermediary alternative to farming. So does Davidovici (2002), who claims that
associations are a transitory organizational form until ownership rights are finalized and land markets
develop. Ellickson (1993) also argues that especially when it comes to land, increasing returns and
concerns about risk sharing, create a better environment for collective action (group land ownership),
but that later on there is an inevitable switch to private land tenure.
2.5.2 Land market participation
Since the beginning of transition, the literature on land reform and farm restructuring has
been abundant. However, most studies focused on the role of land rights and institutions for land
exchange in development (Binswanger et al. 1995; Deininger 2003b). There has been little written on
the development of land markets, and the determinants of active participation in land transactions in
the post-socialist context. The institutional changes in the post-socialist countries were unprecedented
in the past two decades, when several countries in Europe and Central Asia reformed their land
tenure systems and liberalized land exchanges (Spoor 2003; Lerman et al. 2004).
One reason for the limited emphasis on explaining land market participation in these
countries is the scarcity of data. Therefore, more recent empirical studies just pieced together the
available information on country by country basis (see Lerman and Shagaida (2007) on Russia;
Vranken et al. (2004) on Bulgaria; Vranken and Swinnen (2006) on Hungary; Swinnen and Vranken
(2007) in rental markets on a group of transition countries). Because land rental markets were
established after land was restituted and privatized, most studies are concerned with the distributional
outcomes, and with the economic and social effects from leasing transactions. Land sales markets are
certainly still thin in most countries in comparison with leasing markets.
Participation in land markets was emphasized as a channel for adjusting the size of land
holdings and allocating resources to the most efficient producers. In line with the neo-classical school
of thought, it is believed that over time land markets alone should determine the most efficient size of
farming operations in different regions of the country (Duncan and Prosterman 2000). Nevertheless,
the functioning of land markets is highly affected by market imperfections in credit access, input,
product, and insurance markets, in strong connection with the development of the economy as a
whole (Swinnen and Vranken 2007). Yet, regional differences prevail even where there is little
economic development variation (Swinnen 2002; Swinnen and Vranken 2007), which cannot be
entirely attributed to market or economic differences. Swinnen and Vranken (2007) argue that
variation in land markets is strongly influenced by the relative importance of different farm
organizations in vanous countnes.
While restrictions on land transferability are a barrier to the flow of resources from less
efficient to more efficient producers and thus an impediment to agricultural growth, some scholars
argue that temporary restrictions on buying and selling of land (especially in the transition countries)
may be necessary for political or social considerations (Lerman et al. 2004, Banerjee 200 1). There is
concern that land market liberalization leads to re-concentration of land, especially when access to
information, capital, and markets is asymmetric (Lerman et al. 2004). The ban on land transactions in
Romania has been justified on these grounds, at a time when land reform was viewed as a "cushion"
against the hardships of transition. Nevertheless, Deininger (2003a) argues that restrictions on land
sales often resulted in weakening of property rights, increase in transaction costs, and rise in
informality.
In general, in agricultural markets there are "push" and "pull" factors that effect land
transactions (Spoor 2007 p. 14). Examples of push factors are the persistence of poverty, and
legislative encouragements of land sales, along with low capacity for production and need for liquidity.
Pull factors derive from an increased entrepreneurial behavior of some farmers, tendency for land
concentration, and speculative purchases in the expectation of higher land prices. Therefore, several
factors are hypothesized to affect land market participation, such as land titling, transaction costs,
household characteristics, productivity levels, off-farming employment opportunities, and credit
markets.
Transaction costs
Transaction costs impede land market development especially when there are market
imperfections (Lipton 1968). Transaction costs constrain access to land for rural households willing to
consolidate land plots, to enlarge their farm, or to start up a farming enterprise, leading to the
persistence of large scale corporate farms (Dale and Baldwin 2000; Lerman et al. 2004; Ciaian and
Swinnen 2006; Swinnen and Vranken 2007). Transaction costs include costs incurred from bargaining
with the farm management, asymmetric and inadequate information on land valuation, from
obtaining information on land and tenure regulations, delineating land boundaries and dealing with
inheritance and co-owners (Mathjis and Swinnen 1998; Prosterman and Rolfes 2000; FAO 2005;
Ciaian and Swinnen 2006). Boucher et al. (2005) use the term "neo-structural" to describe the effect
that imperfect information has on market development through transaction costs.
In addition, other costs incurred by land transfers are notary fees, taxes, and other
administrative charges. Studies on Poland, Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Romania estimate these costs to
be 10-30% of the value of land transaction (OECD 2000; Prosterman and Rolfes 2000; World Bank
200 l a). Hence, due to low land prices and high transaction costs land sales generate little, if any,
profit.
Another source of high transaction costs is land fragmentation, common to the CEE
countries. Fragmentation of land increases per unit transaction costs because plot size is smal and
some of the costs are fixed (Duke et al. 2004; Ciaian and Swinnen 2006). The high level of transaction
costs often leads to the development of "black" (informal) land markets, as is the case in Romania and
other CEE countries (FAO 2005).
Risk aversion
Despite secure property rights, small household farms might still be reluctant to participate in
land markets. Aversion to risks is a general characteristic of subsistence farmers who suffer the most
from any change in economic or weather conditions. Small farmers prefer to use land as a fallback
option, being reluctant to even use land as collateral, as indicated by World Bank surveys earlier in the
transition process (Razzaz 1995). Sale of land raises risks as well as expected income. Hence, it is
unlikely that a farmer that is risk averse would sell land if he is concerned for the future of the
household. Moreover, the attitude towards risk is highly dependent on the overall macroeconomic and
legal environment, the availability of non-farming jobs, and the prospects for future. Therefore in the
early stages of market development, one strategy for making transactions more secure is leasing
instead of selling (Razzaz 1995).
Household characteristics
Specific household characteristics such as household size, human capital (education, age), and
occupational status, were found to determine the degree of participation in land markets. For small
household farms, these indicators measure, to a certain degree, farm management capacity. Vranken
and Swinnen (2006) found that better education is correlated with leasing-in land, and older age with
leasing-out. Similarly older age increases land sales if the welfare outcomes are higher than leasing out
transactions. Moreover, I expect that human capital plays a much more important role in land sales
than in leasing operations. When market imperfection are so pervasive as in the transition context,
and land is a critical source for subsistence, landowners resort to land sales when their physical ability
is severely impaired, or their education level allows them to find better income opportunities in the
non-farming sector.
Household size, as an indicator of labor supply, affects the degree of engagement in land
transactions. As monitoring costs make hired labor more expensive, the availability of household labor
will positively affect decisions to lease in or to buy land. In addition, the small size of individual
household farms suggests that larger households might have to acquire more land in order to satisfy
household consumption.
In a perfectly functioning market, efficient farmers (regardless of their wealth) should be able
to engage in land transactions to expand their farms and increase production. Nevertheless, when
conditions such as those discussed above increase transaction costs and limit access to capital and
financial resources, it becomes difficult for poor but efficient producers to acquire land through the
sales market (Carter and Mesbah 1993; Deininger 2003a). Moreover, in such an environment distress
sales by poor and technically efficient farmers can occur, but they could result in negative equity and
efficiency impacts (Cain 1981; Kranton and Swamy 1999).
Resource access
Access to affordable credit, as well as to other markets (i.e. capital and labor) is hypothesized
to affect participation in land market (Binswanger et al. 1995; Carter and Barham 1996; deJanvry et
al. 2001; Deininger 2003c, 2003a). However, even if the importance of these markets has been widely
emphasized, this recognition was virtually absent from policy measures in the CEE countries. Under
the neo-liberal policy panacea the mainstream assumption was that market institutions (i.e. for credit)
would evolve to fill these gaps (Boucher et al. 2005). However, surveys have shown that even if
affordable credit was available farmers would not necessarily resort to loans (FAO 2005). The reality is
that banks are reluctant to accept farmland as collateral (Razzaz 1995) mostly because prices are still
low compared to urban land, and in some cases property rights are incomplete. When banks do offer
loans, they tend to be short-term and with high interest rates.
2.6 The missing link
While there is a plethora of research on the factors that constrain or enable farmers in
developing and transition countries to farm the land individually as opposed to joining associations or
to participating in land markets, there are no studies specifically examining the factors that affect the
choice of landowners between alternative institutional arrangements. Associations and land leasing are
both alternatives to farming the land individually, widely used by farmers in the post-socialist context.
Earlier literature shows that the most common reason for landowners seeking alternative
arrangements is lack of capital and labor for farming, as well as high transaction costs.
Drawing on the case of Bulgaria and Hungary, Meurs (200 1) argues that there is a social cost
of experimenting with new institutional arrangements, and that landowners prefer to rely on familiar
arrangements especially when market imperfections are pervasive. Given that the experience with
markets was extremely limited during the communist regime, this explanation provides a valid
hypothesis for why farming associations persisted throughout the transition.
Based on ethnographic research in Transylvanian, Verdery (2004) claims that leasing
arrangements are likely to provide higher rents for the land in tenancy as compared to associations.
Nevertheless, following on Meurs' argument (2001) the social costs from experimentation are likely to
offset the higher rents from leasing. To date, however, research on rent differentials between
associations and leasing arrangements is inconclusive.
Another factor that was discussed in the literature (especially with reference to the choice for
individual farming) is the role of networks. Because most farming associations were created on the
institutional structure of the former socialist collective farms, associations are likely to benefit
extensively from the web of production networks inherited from the previous regime. Such networks
(for input markets, information access, product distribution) provide associations with a "first mover
advantage" over the new institutional arrangements that are currently in formation (Meurs 200 1).
Lerman et al. (2004 p. 225) puts forth another factor that could explain why associations
persist in landowners' choices. The authors argue that leasing to individuals may be perceived as
riskier than leasing to a larger organization, which is regarded as a more reliable source of rental
payments. However, they do not go deeper to explain why this might be the case.
This research aims to fill the gap in the literature with respect to the choices between
alternative farming arrangements, in order to explain the persistence of farming associations during
transition in different regions. I hypothesize that leasing provides a viable farming alternative only for
landowners that are older and capital constraint, and for landowners having non-farming income
opportunities, assuming that productivity levels outside farming are higher than from farming.
Moreover, because of the fragmentation of land plots, created by the restitution of land on the
1940s land records, I hypothesize that institutional arrangements (associations and leasing) respond
differently to consolidation efforts. Specifically, because of high transaction costs, leasing arrangements
are more costly than associations that do not require formal land registration.
Lastly, I argue that regions where private property rights were not institutionalized in earlier
land reforms and where collectivization was enforced in a less forceful manner, landowners were more
likely to join farming associations rather than to engage in market transactions. For them, the social
cost of engaging in new institutional arrangements is higher than for other farmers that went different
expenences.
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Chapter 3 : Research design
3.1 Setting the scene
This moment in time may be ideal to study the Romanian land reform experience for
different reasons. The time that separates us from the beginning of the transition process (more than
15 years) allows today's research to take into account longer-term economic and social effects of
reform in a way that earlier assessments could not. More than 9 5 % of the agricultural land has been
successfully redistributed and privatized, the legislation for land leasing transactions were streamlined,
and land sales were formally institutionalized. Moreover, the recent integration in the European
Union (EU) economic and political structures has created a sense of inevitability for institutional
change. EU enlargement creates a unique momentum for concerted efforts from the political arena to
improve the rural economy.
This chapter covers the research design used in exploring the research questions behind this
dissertation. However, before going into the more technical and descriptive aspects of the dissertation
methodology, I will briefly discuss the two regions that form the basis of comparison throughout this
dissertation.
Since the issue of land reallocation into different institutional arrangements and the
persistence of farming associations is very complex and multifaceted, single methods are not able to
capture all the factors that could play a role in these decisions. Therefore, my methodology comprises
of both statistical analysis based on household surveys, as well as qualitative research based on
interviews and participatory observations. As Greif (2006 p. 4) argues, "institutional analysis requires
going beyond traditional empirical methods in social sciences that rely on deductive theory and
statistical analysis." Such research requires a blend of theory, modeling, and knowledge of the
historical and social context to understand how certain institutions persisted and changed over time.
The set of data I am using is a unique panel across villages between 1996 and 2006, which allows me
to trace changes in the social and economic condition of farmers in the selected villages, and to
evaluate their decisions on land reallocation over a period of time when significant institutional
changes were implemented.
3.2 The two regions: Western Plain and Central Romanian Plain
In analyzing the pattern of land reallocation during transition, I had to make a choice
between breadth (analyzing Romania as a whole), or depth (selecting two regions that would allow for
a more varied interpretation of reform outcomes). Because regional differences are important in the
Romanian case, I chose the latter. Following preliminary research in 2005, I selected for fieldwork two
agro-regions30 that concentrate most of the agricultural production in Romania, are similar in terms
of geo-physical characteristics but provide challenging contrasts in terms of institutional changes
following land reform. These two agro-regions 3' are the Western Plain and the Central Romanian
Plain, both located in the rich land plains (see Figure 3-1 and Figure 3-2). Given their location,
throughout the dissertation I will use interchangeably the term West for the Western Plain and South
for the Central Romanian Plain.
Central Romanian Plain has a drier climate, it is flatter, being more suitable for grains
cultivation, while the geography and climate makes agriculture in the Western Plain appropriate for
both grains and vegetables (see Figure 3-3). Nevertheless, while these differences in climate are
marginal, the two regions are very similar in having the highest land quality as compared to the rest of
the country.
Table 3-1 illustrates that Central Romanian Plain has the largest share of arable land. Even if
the Western Plain is not the second largest region in terms of arable land, its share of arable land is
above the national level and its production mix, land quality, and climate, make it the closest
comparison with the Central Romanian Plain.
Table 3-1: Arable land as a percentage of total agricultural land by agro-regions
2004
Central Romanian Plain 94.0
Low Danube Delta 84.6
South Oltenia 79.0
Plateau Moldova 71.7
Western Plain 68.9
Hilly Moldova 56.7
South Sub-Carpathians 53.0
Transylvania 38.1
Source: Calculations based on data from the Romania National Institute of Statistics (NIS 2005).
30 Romania's administrative units, counties (judete), can be grouped into eight agro-regions. Agro-regions are
clusters of counties that have similar patterns of agricultural land use (arable land, pastures, vineyards, and
orchards) (Sandu 1999 p. 17). According to Sandu, using the agro-region as a unit of analysis allows one to
connect the information on land use to economic and social characteristics of the area (Idem p. 17). In addition,
there is a very close match between the agro-regions and the historical Romanian provinces: Western Plain is
part of the larger region of Transylvania (made out of Banat, Crisana, and part of Maramures), and Central
Romanian Plain includes the most area of the oldest historical region of Romania, Muntenia. However, another
advantage of grouping the counties in agro-regions rather than historical regions is that it extends the
classification criteria to socio-cultural and demographic characteristics as well.
31 Based on cluster analysis eight agro-regions were identified: Transylvania (Caras-Severin, Hunedoara, Alba,
Cluj, Salaj, Maramures, Bistrita-Nasaud, Mures, Harghita, Covasna, Brasov, Sibiu), Western Plain (Timis,
Arad, Bihor, Satu-Mare), Hilly Moldova (Suceava, Neamt, Bacau), Plain Moldova (Botosani, Iasi, Vaslui),
Danube Delta Plain (Braila, Galati, Tulcea, Constanta), Central Romanian Plain (jalomita, Calarasi, Ilfov,
Giurgiu, Teleorman), South-Sub Carpathians (Gorj, Valcea, Arges, Prahova, Dambovita, Buzau, Vrancea), and
South Oltenia (Mehedinti, Dolj, Olt).
Critical differences between the Western Plain and Central Romanian Plain that are of
interest for the purpose of this study derive from three main sources (which will be explored in greater
detail in later chapters):
- differences in the stage of modernization and institutional legacies in land rights in the
pre-communist period;
- differences in the social and cultural values attached to land;
- differences in regional economic development.
As I discuss in more details in Chapter 4, because of different individual legacies in land rights
in the pre-communist period, ownership structures were very different in these regions, as were the
property relations between peasants and the aristocracy (the large landowners). I hypothesize that
these factors partially contributed to different choices of institutional arrangements and land market
participation. Moreover, historical differences in property rights led to variation in land valuation, the
social meaning of land, and as a result in the response to de-collectivization and land restitution.
Therefore, a cultural and historical layer is critical in exploring regional differences.
Western Plain 32 has been historically under the Austro-Hungarian Empire from 1867 to 1947
period in which individual property rights in land have been granted to the population and the
process of industrialization has begun much earlier than in other regions of Romania. Aside from a
longer history of property rights, for the Romanian population living in Transylvania land had a
deeper significance being intertwined with issues related to national identity. I hypothesize that this
aspect was influential in the post-socialist de-collectivization and the quest for land in this region.
Central Romanian Plain differs significantly from this aspect. The region is part of old
Romania, also called Muntenia (Tara Romaneasca) or Valahia33, and for the most part its land
relations were shaped by feudalism almost up until the 1920s. Here traditional agriculture
predominated and property rights have been granted only for a limited period of time. Nevertheless,
large land estates dominated the organizational structure and private plots for farmers were too small
to suffice their subsistence needs. Therefore, property rights were hollowed of their meaning and
peasants continued to be laborers on large hacienda estates. Not having cadastral maps and clearly
specified property titles (as in the Western Plain region), the efforts to reconstruct the new properties
after the 1990 land reform based on pre-collectivization land structures were very feeble. Most
landowners preferred to only receive the title on the amount of land they contributed with at
collectivization, which differed from the Western Plain where the new owners pushed hard for getting
back the land on the exact location. These differences form the basis for further explanations of land
reallocation choices in the two regions during transition. As Table 3-2 shows, regional economic
development clearly differentiate the two agro-regions.
3 The counties included in the Western Plain agro-region are part of the larger historical region called
Transylvania, which extends from the west, north-west and the center of the country.
3 Valahia is the larger region formed by Oltenia (to the west) and Muntenia (to the east).
Table 3-2: Rural Development Index 34 by agro-regions
1992
Western Plain 63.55
South Sub-Carpathians 63.47
Plateau Moldova 62.80
South Oltenia 61.37
Low Danube Delta 61.35
Central Romanian Plain 61.18
Transylvania 59.31
Hilly Moldova 58.57
Source: Calculations based on data from Harta Saraciei, CASPIS (2002).
The West has been traditionally more industrialized and currently enjoys one of the highest
levels of economic growth in Romania. Its diverse economic base and its location on the border with
Central and Western Europe, was able to attract significant amounts of foreign investment in the past
decade. Unemployment rates have been the lowest and average real incomes were maintained above
the national average.
Central Romanian Plain, despite its location around the dynamic capital Bucharest, exhibited
lower levels of development and higher poverty levels along with Hilly Moldova (see Table 3-3)
(World Bank 1998). Its economy is less diversified and unemployment rates are higher. These
differences are salient in shaping the outcomes of land reform since they affect market size as well as
economic diversification.
Table 3-3: Poverty rates35 in the rural areas in 2002 by agro-regions
2002
Western Plain 0.33
Transylvania 0.35
South Sub-Carpathians 0.40
Central Romanian Plain 0.43
South Oltenia 0.45
Low Danube Delta 0.46
Hilly Moldova 0.48
Plateau Moldova 0.51
Source: Calculations based on data from NIS (2005)
3 In the report from the National Commission for Poverty Reduction and Promotion of Social Inclusion
(Comisia Anti-Saracie si Promovare a Incluziunii Sociale) (CASPIS 2002), rural development is measured by an
index based on the hypothesis that the development level in a commune depends on the levels of education,
employment, age groups, population density, a better endowment with housing and infrastructure, and location
closer to regional development centers. If does not however, take into account the economic structure in the
community nor the type of institutions and organizational arrangements present at the local level for
administering these resources.
3 For a note on the calculation of poverty rate, see the report prepared by the Bucharest University and the
National Institute of Statistics for The National Commission for Poverty Reduction and Promotion of Social
Inclusion (CASPIS 2002).
3.3 Research design
In general, studies in the rural areas pose significant challenges for researchers mainly due to
the prevalence of subsistence practices, where quantifications of production and consumption patterns
are difficult to make. Important behavioral characteristics of farmers are unquantifiable and
incommensurable, while others can be readily measurable. Hence, reliance on only one
methodological tool (quantitative or qualitative) prevents social scientists from understanding the rural
society in its complexity, generating conclusions that only partially explain reality.
To move beyond a surface-level analysis, I aim at a more comprehensive analysis of the small
farmers in their effort to adapt to institutional changes during the post-socialist reforms by using a
combination of quantitative and qualitative research approaches. As Hulme (2007) argues, in
international development studies there is an emerging consensus that combined approaches and
mixed methods, or "Q-squared methods" as they are more recently named (Kanbur and Shaffer
2007), can create knowledge that is socially useful and can contribute to more effective policy (Udry
2003).36 Hence, I adopt a more ecumenical approach and argue that no research method is superior
to the other, but rather some techniques or combination of techniques are more appropriate based on
the problem being investigated.
As Sieber (1973) argues, integrating research techniques opens enormous opportunities for
mutual advantages in research design, data collection, and data analysis. A special issue of World
Development from February 2007, was dedicated to this topic, where several articles served as
examples of the "value-added associated with mixing" (Kanbur and Shaffer 2007), such as:
interpreting counterintuitive or surprising findings from household surveys, explaining the reasons
behind observed outcomes, probing motivations, underlying observed behavior, or suggesting the
direction of causality. Kabeer (2004) also provides one such example in which a combination of
methods can lead to findings that could not be reached with confidence by a single approach. By using
a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, I enhance and expand the interpretation of
findings from the household surveys and I probe motivations for the observed behavior.
The specific research methods I use in this study comprise of household surveys, in-depth
qualitative interviews, and participatory observation in the two regions. The data from the household
surveys is analyzed using statistical analysis, i.e. discrete choice regression analysis and descriptive
statistics. Each method (quantitative and qualitative) has strengths and limitations, but used together
and bounded by a theoretical framework, they complement each other.
36 Even if significant progress has been made towards the use of mixed methods in international development
research (especially poverty), the "process of mixing is not seamless but, at bottom, tensions remain," especially
with respect to epistemology and normative theory (Kanbur and Shaffer 2007).
Survey research, as a positive approach37 , allows to observe changes in variables that are
easily quantifiable, and to measure the strength of the hypothesized relationships. However, the
specific methodology requires a certain degree of isolation (detachment) from the situation we study
through standardizing and "bracket[ing] external conditions" (Burawoy 1998). On the other hand, in-
depth qualitative interviews and participant observation are part of what Burawoy (1998) calls
"reflective models of science". This approach promotes engagement in the local environment, and
"extraction of local knowledge (Geertz 1973, 1983) through "indigenous narratives" ("thick
descriptions" to use Geertz's terminology) that are guided by cognitive maps based on theory. The
reflective approach deploys multiple dialogues to reach explanations of empirical phenomena, and has
the social context as its point of departure. In the end, the qualitative (ethnographic) methods will
complement and enrich the interpretation of statistical relationships, and the clarification of puzzling
findings in the specific socio-historical context (Jick 1979).38 The convergence or agreement between
the two methods "...enhances our belief that the results are valid and not a methodological artifact"
(Bouchard 1976 p. 268).
3.3.1 Qualitative methods
Qualitative research was carried out during several months in the summer of 2005 and 2006.
I conducted preliminary research in the summer of 2005 when, through semi-structured interviews 39
and participant observation, I identified the main problems that the agricultural sector, and small
farmers in particular, were confronted with, as well as the regional sites where to conduct my larger
research. A second round of interviews was carried out during the summer of 2006.
The interviews were conducted with several small landowners in different villages in the two
agro-regions (Western Plain and Central Romanian Plain), and with a total of fourteen agrarian
engineers, eight policy makers from the Ministry of Agriculture and research institutions, four
academics and five local cadres. The interviews with landowners inquired into the incentives and
constraints that they face in operating in a new economic environment of transition to a market
economy, and the reasons behind their choices for different institutional arrangements and
participation in land markets. The goal was to detect more subtle factors than what could be learned
through structured survey techniques, by extracting meaning from social relations around land and
farming, and from perceptions on market creation. The interview technique was based on semi-
structured and open-ended interviews allowing for a two-way communication. One advantage of
semi-structured interviews is that oftentimes the information obtained provides not just answers, but
the reasons for the answers as well.
3 According to Rorty (1979), "the purpose of positive science is to promote the most accurate mapping of the
workings of the external world, to mirror the world" (cited in Burawoy 1998, p. 10).
38 "Reflexive methods become the handmaidens of positive methods" (Burawoy 1998, p. 29).
39 The advantage of using semi-structured interviews is that the questions and observations can be refined by
what has been learned from earlier work.
Aside from small landowners, I also interviewed medium and large farms in the two agro-
regions (three farms in the Western Plain, and five farms in the Central Romanian Plain). These
interviews contributed greatly to my understanding of a different class of farmers and their interaction
with the household farms. Most of these farms (associations or private corporate farms) were created
as a result of restructuring the former socialist collective farms, and institutionalizing land leasing
transactions. In almost all cases the leadership stayed the same, which at times could be both an
advantage (in terms of easier access to markets) as well as a constraint (inability to operate based on
market based principles).
I have also conducted participant observation by spending time with farmers in their work
and social environment over extended periods of time in the past three years, in order to understand
the specific social and economic dynamics in farming communities, and the motivations behind
different individual and collective choices related to land. The specific techniques I used are direct
observation, participation in the life of the community and farming practices, and collective
discussions. Most of this research has been conducted in the West, due to a higher personal familiarity
with the area, which made it easier to become immersed and integrated in the community.
3.3.2 Survey research methods
Despite past research efforts, it is reasonable to acknowledge that we know little about the
effect of transition reform policies on small farmers, their motivation and response to market-oriented
policies. The limited number of earlier survey studies provided only cross-sectional snapshots at
national or regional level, at different points in time, without allowing one to consistently observe
changes over time following major policy reforms.4 0 Resurveys are costly and governments are rarely
able or willing to finance long-term research while other projects already in operation are considered
more important (Connell and Lipton 1977). However, because they give a formal time dimension and
ease the task of hypothesis testing, resurveys (or follow-ups) are of greater value to policy and theory
than a series of cross-sectional surveys.
Primarily because of the above reasons, I am using two household surveys supplemented with
secondary statistics. These two surveys are unique in the Romanian context because they allow the
examination of changes over time in the same communities, which is critical to understanding reform
outcomes and changes in household behavior.
The first survey was conducted in 1996 on a sample of 1,650 households at national level with
joined funding from the Romanian Government, the European Commission (EC) and the World
Bank. For the purpose of this dissertation, I use a sub-sample with households from Western Plain and
4 Two national surveys, conducted in 1996 and 1998 with funding from the European Commission, the World
Bank, and the Romanian Government, attempted to offer a time comparison by resurveying in 1998 some
households from the 1996 survey. Nevertheless, several limitations (i.e. different questionnaire having an entirely
different focus, with a different set of questions) made comparisons across time hard to establish. In addition, the
time difference between the two surveys was too small to capture major changes in policy or individual behavior.
Central Romanian Plain (a total of 246 households, 105 in the Western Plain and 141 in the Central
Romanian Plain).
In order to account for the impact of policy changes on private farmers, in the summer of
2006 I conducted a re-survey in villages where the first such household survey was implemented in
1996. 1 implemented the survey in 45 villages4 ' (619 households) in the two agro-regions (316 in the
Western Plain and 303 in the Central Romanian Plain). I used the same sampling strategy as in 1996,
and the same research instruments (with few additional questions and slight changes in the earlier
version), in order to allow comparisons to be made.
An earlier analysis that I conducted in 2005 on productivity differences between different
farming arrangements on the 1996 and 199842 household surveys, suggested that data limitations do
not pertain to very sophisticated econometric methods. However, while some of these limitations are
specific to research on the subsistence sector, others could be overcome by a more focused survey
instrument and better formulated questions. It is specifically this drawback that I tried to address with
the new 2006 survey.
As Connell and Lipton (1977) argue, a period of five years is minimum between two rural
surveys in order to capture effects of fairly unspecific changes. Therefore, a decade after the first
survey, I was able to capture important changes in farming practices and the rural economy, period in
which major policy reforms were implemented. Some of these policy reforms were: finalizing the
property restitution, elimination of state subsidies in 1997, opening up land markets in 1998, higher
commitments for structural reforms under the prospects of EU enlargement from 2001 onwards, and
privatization of former state-owned farms.
In addition to household surveys, I applied a questionnaire to the agricultural specialists in the
communes (or the mayor in some cases) to gather information at commune level on land use, labor
market, land market, and institutional constraints for private farmers. More details on the sampling
strategy are provided in the next section. Table 3-4 summarizes key descriptive statistics collected in
41 In Romania the rural area is organized in 2,688 communes, which are administrative units set up according to
Law 2/1968 (article 5) on the administrative and territorial organization. One commune consists of one or
several villages. In total, there are 12,751 villages in Romania. Administratively, the 42 judets (counties)
represent the basic administrative units that are headed by administrative staff. "Comuna" is the territorial
administrative unit comprising of rural population united by common interests and traditions. A comuna is
composed by one or several villages, according to economic, social, cultural, and geographical conditions. The
organization of the commune ensures the economic, social, cultural, and administrative development of the
rural localities. There is an average of 4.7 villages per commune. More than half of the communes (55.4 %)
consist of 1 to 4 villages and 6.2% have more than 10 villages. Villages are characterized by a great diversity in
terms of population. Village dimensions vary, from those with only a few inhabitants, to villages with more than
7,000-9,000 inhabitants. Villages with only a few inhabitants prevail, the average number being around 800
people.
42 In 1998 a national survey was conducted by the World Bank, using a different survey instrument, focused
mainly on land market issues, but attempting to build a panel data on a sub-sample of the households surveyed
two years earlier. However, because the questionnaires were not similar, it was mainly background information
(household characteristics) that were directly comparable with the 1996 survey data. In addition, given that this
was a national survey, the re-surveyed households in the Western Plain and the Central Romanian Plain were
too few to conduct a meaningful analysis.
the two household surveys (in 1996 and 2006). A more detailed discussion of regional differences and
survey findings can be found in Chapter 6.
Table 3-4: Key descriptive statistics from household surveys
Western Plain Central Romanian Plain
1996 2006 1996 2006
Household size (nr. pers.) 3.9 pers. 3.3 pers. 3.1 pers. 3.00 pers.
Age of the household head (yrs.) 53 yrs. 57 yrs. 64 yrs. 64 yrs.
Gender of the household head (% male) 74.0% 57.0% 74.5% 63.0%
Education of the household head (% who 69.5% 63.0% 84.4% 79.0%
completed 8 years)
Main occupation (% in agriculture) 64.8% 52.0% 85.8% 86.0%
Secondary occupation (% in agriculture) 24.0% 25.0% 12.7% 6.0%
Occupational status (% pensioners) 54.3% 55.0% 79.3% 69.0%
Average landownership (ha) 3.9 ha 4.0 ha 3.9 ha 4.0 ha
Land fragmentation (# of plots) 3.8 plots 3.8 plots 3.2 plots 4.0 plots
Final ownership title (%) 49.5 % 86.7% 42.6% 93.3%
Joined farming associations (% of 21.9% 4.1% 56.7% 35.6%
households)
Leased-out land (% of households) 8.6% 10.4% 12.1% 29.7%
Leased-in land (% of households) 0% 4.4% 3.5% 2.3%
Sold land (% of households) n.a. 22.2% n.a. 3.3%
Bought land (% of households) n.a. 18.4% n.a. 4.0%
Own tractor (% of households) 9.5% 21.1% 8.5% 4.3%
Sold agricultural products (% of 98.1% 40.2% 87.2% 24.4%
households) 1
Sample size (N) 105 316 141 303
Source: Household surveys, 1996 and 2006.
n.a. = not available. Since land sales were formalized only in 1998, no data was collected on land sales and
purchases in 1996. Nevertheless, as I show in Chapter 7, informal land transactions were recorded even
prior to 1998.
Sampling and questionnaires
The type of available data did not allow me to build a true panel dataset with the 1996 and
2006 surveys, as I initially expected. Past organizational problems, lack of coordination among the
institutions involved in previous surveys, as well as lack of long-term vision at a time of major
economic instability and political uncertainty, led to loss of contact information for the households
surveyed in 1996.
The organization that administered the 1996 survey was the Center for Urban and Regional
Studies (CURS). CURS is one of the most important survey and pooling agency in Romania,
conducting research in a variety of fields spanning from economic, social, political, and market
research. For the 2006 survey I worked with the same agency, which generated major advantages.
Having already a team of field-interviewers familiar with the rural context and farming issues proved
to be essential in ensuring a good understanding of the questionnaire while collecting the data.
Another institution that I collaborated with in preparation and implementation phase was the Institute
for Agricultural Economics (IEA) from Bucharest. IEA is a prominent national research agency
affiliated with the Ministry of Agriculture and the Romanian Academy of Sciences, having first class
researchers and policy makers working on critical aspects related to the agricultural sector and rural
development.
Not having the list with households interviewed in 1996, I decided to implement the
household level questionnaire in the same villages that were surveyed a decade ago, based on the same
sampling strategy. This approach ensured comparison at the village level, rather than at the individual
level. Nevertheless, given that the average age in the rural areas is high43, the probability that farmers
interviewed in 1996 would still be around and able to farm, was anyway small.
Consequently, in the summer of 2006 a sample of 619 rural households was selected at
random from 45 villages in eight counties in the two regions: 316 households in the Western Plain and
303 households in the Central Romanian Plain (see Table 3-9). One person from each household, the
household head, was interviewed.44 The sampling procedure was carried out in two stages with
stratification in the first stage. Sample strata were a function of the agricultural profile of the commune
and the development level of the county (judet) in which the communes are located.
The primary sampling unit in this case is the household, private individual farm (see Table
3-5). A household is considered (potentially) agricultural if it owns at least 0.5 hectares of agricultural
land. Owning less than 0.5 hectares reduces very much the probability of using land as a source of
income or as a primary occupation. Even if agricultural activities are also present in urban
communities45 , the selection included only rural farms.
The main hypothesis of the sampling design is that agricultural activity at the commune level
is a function of: (a) the pattern of land use measured by the percentage of arable land cultivated with
grain; (b) the soil quality measured by a specific index ('bonitare' GEO); and (c) the labor and social
pulling profile of the community, measured by the temporary net migration rate for 2002.
4 The share of the population 50 years and older in total population in the rural areas, is 1.6 times higher than
for the urban areas (Dumitru et al. 2004).
44 During the interviews data were collected on other members of the household as well, although for the
purpose of this report only responses from the household head are used.
4s The percentage of the population occupied in agriculture, living in urban communities is reported to be of 8%
out of the total population occupied in agriculture, in the third trimester of 1996, according to the survey of the
National Commission of Statistics, "Ancheta asupra fortei de munca in gospodarii (AMIGO)", Trimestrul III
1996.
Table 3-5: Main characteristics of the sample
Representativeness Rural agricultural households
for:
Type of sampling design Two stage random sample with
stratification in the first stage
Stratification criteria 1. Commune type strata
2. County development level (2 strata)
Sample size designed 650
accomplished 619
Source: MAA, EC and WB (1997)
Table 3-6: Sampling design by stages
Stage 1
Inputs Selection units Rural communes
Stratification criteria GEO soil quality (2 classes)
(2*2*3*2= MIG migration attraction (2 classes)
24 strata) GRAIN land use pattern (3 classes)
e County development level (2 classes) 46
Sampling frame Farm survey data file with all the communes of the
country, built on the basis of National Commission of
Statistics NCS data (1994), Agricultural Economics and
Sociology Institute and 2002 published census data
Operations Stratifying the The distribution of the agricultural active population
sample in the 24 cells of the stratification table is the basic
estructure of the sample.
Distributing the The sample of 619 households is divided by strata
sampling points according to the proportion of active labor force in
(=communes) by agriculture. The number of the communes by stratum is
strata given by the division of the strata sub-sample by 14 (=the
number of farms to be interviewed by commune)
Randomly the From the total number of communes by strata we
communes by strata selected randomly a number of communes according to
the number of sampling points by stratum determined
above.
Stage 2
Selection units Agricultural households
Sampling frame Local agricultural registry ("Registrul Agricol")
Operations Selection of the Random selection of farms having at least 0.5 ha of
farms for the survey agricultural land, from the Agricultural Registry (Registrul
Agricol) in each village.
Source: MAA, EC and WB (1997)
The stratification criteria did not change since 1996 (see Table 3-6) and therefore I did not
have to change the distribution of sampling points (the communes) by strata and randomly selecting
the communes. I used the same communes and villages that were surveyed in the previous years, but I
46 Using the classification from (Ramboll Consultancy 1996).
had to do a new selection of the households, using the local agricultural records available in each
commune. A random selection of farms was made based on the total number of questionnaires in each
commune and the total number of households in the commune/village. The refusal rate, that is, the
number of respondents who refused to participate in the survey or who were not at home repeated
times, was less than five percent (12 households in the Western Plain and 29 in the Central Romanian
Plain).
Questionnaires
I collected data from two survey units: households, and communes. In order to ensure
comparability with earlier data, the household questionnaire was based on the 1996 survey instrument
to which I added few questions and took out some in order to keep it within a reasonable interview
time frame. Feedback from a pretest on 20 households, before implementing the full survey, suggested
that the questionnaire had to be maintained within a manageable size in order to ensure reliability
and completeness of collected data. The questionnaire consisted of more than 100 questions. The
questionnaire I used for the 2006 household survey is presented in Appendix 3-1.
Interviews were conducted person to person by a research team from CURS. Two training
sessions were conducted by myself and CURS, one in Bucharest for 12 field interviewers from the
Central Romanian Plain, and one in Oradea for 8 field interviewers in the Western Plain. I
participated in part of the data collection during the fieldwork.
Random field checks were performed at the end of the surveying procedure for ensuring
accuracy of data collection. Due to lack of phone lines in most of the rural areas, field trips were made
in randomly selected villages. Having the contact information for the surveyed households (name and
address) we were are able to trace them back and inquire as to whether a field operator from CURS
approached them recently with questions about their farm operations. Random questions from the
questionnaire were also posed in order to verify the accuracy of information.
The household questionnaire has the following sections: background information on the household
members (age, education, occupation); land ownership; land market participation (leasing in, leasing
out, sales, purchases); size of the livestock; agricultural production; capital and buildings; participation
in product market; purchases of inputs; investment and credit access; labor force; sources and levels of
income; changes in wellbeing.
The commune questionnaire was administered to mayors' 7 or agricultural secretaries in 19
communes (8 in Western Plain and I1 in Central Romanian Plain), and gathered information on:
distance to the closest urban center, age level in the commune, land market participation, share of
47 In many cases the mayor was the same person as the agricultural representative, which eased the process of
data collection.
land left fallow, traditional market for agricultural products, labor migration, and problems faced by
farmers in the commune. The commune questionnaire is presented in Appendix 3-2.
Table 3-7: Summary statistics from the commune questionnaire (2006)
Western Plain Central Romanian Plain
Distance to the closest city 16 km 18 km
The largest age group 45-54 years 55-60 years
HH sold land in the commune 100% 91%
Share of land sold in total arable land 13% 4%
Average price for sold land 2,888 RON/ha 2.565 RON/ha
Average wage for hired labor 33 RON/ha 20 RON/ha
Share of land left fallow 25% 14%
Peasant market in the commune (% yes) 25% 27%
Share of youth that left for work abroad 22% 1 20%
Source: Commune questionnaire, 2006.
3.3.3 Data limitations
The type of data used for this research calls for a clear specification of the main limitations.
As mentioned earlier, this study is based on a "pseudo-panel" dataset, on two cross-sectional surveys at
village level. Therefore, while comparisons between the two years are still possible, such an attempt
faces several constraints. First, in a time-series set-up, the unit of comparison is the village or the
commune. Hence, since this is not a national level study, the number of observations is too small for a
very through analysis (i.e. 49 villages, or 19 communes). Therefore, more complex analyses, such as
the estimation of long-term household productivity, become highly controversial from a
methodological point of view. Consequently, in the statistical analysis, Chapter 8, I will spell out all the
robustness tests (though different methods and techniques) that I performed in order to choose the
specific methodology I am using.
Another limitation comes from the type of data that was collected. Because of time, budget,
and ethical constraints, I had to limit the length of the household questionnaire. As a result, I was not
able to capture the full spectrum of information from the households. For example, I did not collect
data on agricultural production at plot level, and on land quality at plot level. Therefore, I use
household aggregate values for agricultural production, and commune level land quality data. In
addition, I was not able to fully capture the amount of rent paid to the households that were leasing-
out land or were farming land in associations because of the type of contracts signed with these
different farming institutions. Some households were receiving between 20 to 5 0% of the harvest,
while others were receiving a fixed payment each year. Moreover, for other households the association
was keeping almost the entire production to cover the expenses with land preparation and harvesting.
For these reasons it was difficult to accurately estimate the level of production and revenues received
from alternative farming arrangements.
Moreover, production estimates were hard to make in general because the survey was aimed
at small household farms that are mostly producing for subsistence needs. Hence, it is difficult to know
exactly how much they produced in conventional measurements (kilograms or tones). Therefore, in
the 2006 questionnaire, I allowed respondents to report their output in traditional measurements (such
as carriage, wagon, basket), which then I approximated to kilograms, based on references from IAE in
Bucharest. The traditional measurements varied by regions and conversions were made by crop type
(i.e. one carriage from corn is different in quantity than one carriage of wheat because of density
variation). Despite allowing me to get more specific and accurate production quantifications, this
approach is not entirely perfect either. For example, there are differences between a kilogram of corn
on the cob and a kilogram of corn kernels that vary with the density of the kernel and the weight of
the cob. Therefore, a carriage of corn on the cob will weight a bit more than a carriage of corn
kernels. Nevertheless, when farmers harvest the corn they bring it home on the cobs, and that's when
they know how much they produced. When sold, most of the time the corn kernels are separated from
the cob, which gives a different, more accurate, estimate (generally slightly lower) of the production.
But, since only a few households in the sample claimed to have sold part of the production, I used the
corn on the cob production estimate. Table 3-8 summarizes the approximate conversions I made
based on responses in the household questionnaire on production levels by types of crops.
Table 3-8: Production measurement conversions
Traditional unit Crop type Kilograms
Carriage (caruta) corn 420 kg
wheat, barley 550 kg
Trailer (remorca) corn 4,500 kg
Sack (sac) corn* 40 kg
wheat 43 kg
oats 30 kg
grapes 40 kg
Maje** corn 100 kg
Wagon (vagon) corn 10,000 kg
Balot (bundle) hay 25 kg
Basket (cos) corn 22 kg
Duble*** corn 14 kg
wheat 15 kg
barley 13 kg
oats 10 kg
Source of estimates: Institute for Agrarian Economics (IEA), Bucharest.
* When the corn is kept in sacks, usually it is corn kernels (without cobs).
** Maje is a measurement used only in the western part of the country.
*** Duble is a measurement used only in the southern part of the country.
Table 3-9: The sample distribution by agro-region, communes and villages in 2006
Agroregion WESTERN PLAIN N
County Arad 69
Commune Barsa 27
Village Barsa 14
Village Aldesti 8
Village Hodis 3
Village Voivodeni 2
Commune Zarand 42
Village Zarand 22
Village Cintei 20
County Bihor 42
Commune Bors 42
Village Bors 14
Village Santaul Mare 4
Village Santaul Mic 6
Village Santion 18
County Satu Mare 81
Commune Agris 21
Village Agris 14
Village Ciuperceni 7
Commune Botiz 21
Village Botiz 21
Commune Gherta Mica 39
Village Gherta Mica 39
County Timis 124
Commune Beint 43
Village Belint 23
Village Babsa 4
Village Chizatau 12
Village Gruni 4
Commune Darova 39
Village Darova 21
Village Hodos 5
Village Sacosu Mare 13
Commune Giulvaz 42
Village Giulvaz 16
Village Crai Nou 7
Village Ivanda 9
Village Rudna 10
TOTAL 316
Agroregion CENTRAL ROMANIAN PLAIN N
County Calarasi 54
Commune V/ad Tepes 26
Village Vlad Tepes 26
Commune Ulmeni 28
Village Ulmeni 28
County Giurgiu 84
Commune Daia 28
Village Daia 11
Village Plopsoru 17
Commune Gostinu 28
Village Gostinu 28
Commune Joita 28
Village Joita 17
Village Bacu 11
County lalomita 56
Commune Barcanesti 28
Village Barcanesti 14
Village Condeesti 14
Commune Valea Macrisului 28
Village Valea Macrisului 20
Village Grindasi 8
County Teleorman 109
Commune Lita 28
Village Lita 28
Commune Didesti 28
Village Didesti I1
Village Insuratei 7
Village Satu Nou 10
Commune Dracsenei 28
Village Dracsenei 13
Village Dracsani 7
Village Odobeasca 6
Village Satul Vechi 2
Commune Pietrosani 25
Village Pietrosani 25
TOTAL 303
Figure 3-1: Map of Romania's counties with the two agro-regions highlighted and
superimposed on the historical regions
Source:
ittp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counties of Romania
Figure 3-2: Map of the Western Plain and the Central Romanian Plain
Cho 77XTFT
Western Plain (lelt) and Central Komanian Plain (top)
Source: www.liis.ro
Figure 3-3: Map of land utilization in Romania
Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/naps/ronania.html. Map produced by the
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
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Appendix 3-1: 2006 Household Survey Questionnaire
Date of the interview (month/day)
Duration of interview (minutes)
Enumerator code
Basic rules for the interviewer:
1. MENTION TO THE PERSON YOU TALK TO THAT:
- "YOU WERE SELECTED AT RANDOM, SIMILAR WITH A LOTERY";
- "WE ASURE YOU THAT THE INFORMATION WILL BE HELD CONFIDENTIALY;
COMPUTER DATA PROCESSING WILL BE USED AT THE END OF SURVEY"
- "THIS IS A VERY IMPORTANT SURVEY TO HELP US UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEMS
FACED BY FARMERS"
* "YOU CAN HELP SOLVING THESE PROBLEMS BY ANSWERING THIS
QUESTIONNAIRE"
2. SELECT FOR THE INTERVIEW THE HOUSEHOLD MEMBER WHO IS MOSTINVOLVED IN
AGRICULTURE
3. EACH QUESTION SHOULD BE MARKED WITH ONLY ONE ANVSWER. IT IS SPECIFIED IF
THE OUESTION CAN HAVE MORE THAN ONE ANSWER . THE ANSWERS ARE MARKED
WITH A PEN
4. A CELL OF A TABLE IS FOR THE ANSWER TO A QUESTION. IF A WHOLE TABLE OR
BLOCK OF CELLS COULD BE LEGITIMATELY SKIPPED, YOU SHOULD MARK IT BY A
LARGE X. THE BLOCKS OR THE BUNCH OF OUESTIONS THAT CAN BE MARKED BY X
IN THIS WAY ARE PRECEDED BY AN INSTRUCTION SPECIFYING THIS POSSIBILITY AND
ARE BORDERED BY A BOLD FRAME
5. INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE INTERVIEWERS ARE WRITTEN WITH CAPITALS. THOSE ARE
ONLY FOR INTERVIEWERS' USE
6. AT THE END OF THE INTERVIEW, CHECK IF YOU ASKED ALL THE QUESTIONS
FOR LARGE TABLES THE HORIZONTAL ARROW -- NDICATES THAT YOU
SHOULD ASK QUESTIONS ROW BY ROW; THE VERTICAL ARROW INIICATES THAT
YOU SHOULD ASK COLUMN BY COLUMN
7. ALL QUANTITIES SHOULD BE RECORDED IN INTEGERS, EXCEPT IN THOSE CASES
WHICH HAVE TWO DECIMALS
8. FOR THE WHOLE QUESTIONNAIRE "YOU" MEANS 'YOUR HOUSEHOLD"
9. TO ENSURE ACCURACY, THE QUESTIONNAIRES WILL BE CHECKED IN THE FIELD,
ESPECIALLY FOR THE "FILTER" QUESTIONS , BY RANDOM SELECTION
10. SYMBOLS: NA = NON ANSWER NC =NOT THE CASE
B. BACKGROUND
B 1. How many persons live in your household, including those temporary
out?
B2. How many of them are children of 14 years old or less? __
. Household members of 15 years old and more. I. Respondent II III IV V VI
B3. Status in relation to 1. Head 2.Spouse 5. parent in law
the head of household 3. Child 4. Parent 6. daughter/son in law 7. other
B4. Age
B5. Gender Lmale 2. female
B6. Highest level of 1.elementary uncompleted 6. non-agricultural technical school
education completed 2.elementary 7. agricultural technical school
3.gymnasium ' 8. undergraduate non - agricultural
4. non-agricultural high studies
school 9. undergraduate agricultural studies
5. agricultural school 10. other
11. uncompleted, going on (student, pupil)
B7. Primary occupation Agriculture Industry +construction Services Agroindustry
(taking most of the ll"ush"ldOw f"irm I I 21 31 41
, . Private/other owner 12 22 32 42
working time) is ssoc 13 23 33 43
Legal association 14 24 34 44
(without occupation=X) Ste setor 15 25 35 45
Cooperative 16 26 36 46
B8. Second occupation (USE THE SAME CODES AS FOR B7. IF NO SECOND
is in EDUCATION, MARK WITH X)
B9. If no occupation, 1. unemployed 4. child/pupil/student
what is your status? 2. pensioner 5. other
3. housewife
B10. What is your job l.same commune 3. city
location? 2.another commune 9. no job
B 11.Type of work for primary occupation
1. manual non-qualified 3. non-manual non-qualified
2. manual qualified 4. non-manual qualified X = NC
B13. Did you return to the village after 1989?
1. yes, from a city
2. yes , from a village; 3. did not leave
B14.Intention to migrate in 1. decided for city 4. undecided
the next 5 years and 2. decided for other village 5. no intention
destination 3. decided for other country 9. NA
P. OWNERSHIP
Pl. What is the legal status for the land your household owns? (several choices are
possible)
legal title of ownership; 2. user certificate; 3. other (which ......... )
P2. How much land do you own?
(including the land in informal or legal association)
P3. How much of the land
you own is cultivated?
I. II. III. IV. V.
in own
household,
not leased
ha
in family
association
ha
P4. In how many parcels is # # #
the agricultural land you
own and/or you lease in,
divided?
P5. How much land does ha ha ha
your household plan to
cultivate next year
P6. How large are each of the plots you own?
Plot I ha Plot 3 ha Plot 5 ha
Plot 2 ha Plot 4 ha Plot 6 ha
P7. How much of the land you own is...? (use 2 decimals)
1. Arable ha 4. Hay ha
2. Orchars ha 5. Grazing ha
3. Vineyards ha 6. Forest ha 7. Unused ha
T. LAND TRANSACTIONS
LEASING-IN
T1. In the last two years did you or someone in your household work land from
someone else (through leasing or other arrangements)?
1. Yes 1. No (if No, GO TO T8)
T2. If yes, how much land do you work that is owned by other households? h
T3. Are you (or someone in your household) responsible for this land on the basis of:
1. lease contract certified by a public office
2. informal agreement with the owner
3. formal agreement with the owner but uncertified by a public office (notary)
T4. What year did you lease-in the land?
T5. Until when do you have a commitment to work the land?
T6. Who is covering the cost of working the land?
1. you 3. you and the owner
2. the owner of the land 4. there was no need for payments
in legal
association
leased
out
leased in
_ha
|
T7. How do you pay the owner? (several choices possible)
I. cash
T8.1 percentage of the crops, per year
T8.2 a fixed amount, per hectare per year
II. in kind
kg
LEASING-OUT
T8.Did your household lease out land to be cultivated by others?
(Not including the land given to associations)
1.Yes 2.No If "No", mark the block with X and GO TO T16)
T9. How much land did you lease-out to others for cultivation? ha
T10. If yes, who is cultivating your land?
1. a family association in which you are not member 5. private firm
2. a legal association in which you are not member 6. other individuals
3. a state owned farm 7. others
4. relatives
T11. Under what type of arrangement do they cultivate your land?
1. lease contract certified by a public office
2. informal agreement with the owner
3. formal agreement with the owner but uncertified by a public office (notary)
T12. What year did you lease-out the land?
T13. What is the length of the lease?
T14. Who is covering the cost of working the land?
1. you 3. you and the owner
2. the one who leased-in the land 4. no need for payments
T15. How are you paid by the person cultivating your land? (several choices are possible)
I. cash II. in kind
T16.1 percentage of the crops, per year % %
T16.2 a fixed amount, per hectare per year lei kg
LAND SALES
T16. Have you sold any hectares of land?
1. Yes 2. No
T17. If yes, how much did you sell in...:
Before 1998 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
ha
T18. What was the price for which you sold the land in...:
Before 1998 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Lei/ha
T19. Are you planning to sell more land?
1. Yes 2. No
T20. If YES, why?
1. need money
2. lack of mechanical implements
3. health problems
4. unprofitable
T21. If NO, why?
1. 1 do not have enough
2. lack of mechanical implements
3. health problems
4. unprofitable
5. moved out of the village
6. not interested in farming anymore
7. other reason
5. moved out of the village
6. not interested in farming anymore
7. other reason
LAND PURCHASES
T22. Have you bought any hectares of land?
1. Yes 2. No
T23. If yes, how much did you buy in...:
Before 1998 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
ha
T24. How much did you pay for the land you bought in...:
h I Before 1998 11998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
ha
T25. Are you planning to buy more land?
1. Yes 2. No
A. LIVESTOCK
As. Do you have any animals in your household?
1. Yes 2. No (check using test questions, if there are animals before go to U)
If 'No' mark the block of questions with X and go to U
I. Total II. Have you changed the livestock in your household
number in in the past 10 years?
2005 1. yes, increased 3. no, kept the same
2. yes, decreased 4. don't know
Al. Dairy cows
A2. Calves
A3. Bulls
A4. Horses
A5. Pigs and piglets
A6. Sheep, lambs, goats
A7. Poultry
A8. Bees
A9. Others (please specify)
A9. Please estimate the proportion of the animal feed do you purchase (hay, green
fodder, straws, beet, etc.)? %
A10. Please estimate the percentage from your production that you use to feed your
livestock? %
C.CROPS
Cs. What do you cultivate on the land you work (owned and leased)?
Type of crops [I. 1 II. The total 1 III. Do you plan to I IV. If you gave IV. If you gave
Cultivated
area (ha)
production
obtained, sold
or not
(in any unit of
measurement)
change the
cultivated area in
the coming year?
1. yes, increase
2. yes, decrease
3. no, keep the same
4. undecided
land to an
informal
association how
much of each
products did you
receive/will you
receive?
Cl. maize
C2. wheat
C3. vegetables
C4. sunflowers
C5. fruits
C6. barley, oat
C7. sugar beets
C8. hay, lucerne,
clover
C9. soy
CIO. barley
Cl 1. grapes
C12. Others
U. CAPITAL
I. Do you II. (In NO for I) Do III. Did you IV. (If YES V. Who supplied
own? you intend to use any of for III) How the services?
purchase in the next these many days 1. other households
5 years? equipments in did you use 2. informal
2005? these association
equipments? 3. formal association
4. state farm
5. other private
source
Yes No Yes No Yes No
U1. Truck/ARO 1 2 1 2 1 2
U2. Tractor 1 2 1 2 1 2
U3. Plough for tractor 1 2 1 2 1 2
U4. Combine for grains 1 2 1 2 1 2
U5. Carriage 1 2 1 2 1 2
U6. Seeder 1 2 1 2 1 2
U7. Irrigation equipments 1 2 1 2 1 2 1
U8. Equipments for food 1 2 1 2 1 2
processing I I
U9. Stable for animals 1 2 1 2 1 2
"U10.Storag efor crops 1 2 1 2 1 2
Ul11.Storag efortools 19
land to a
formal
association
how much of
each products
did you
receive /will
you receive?
SALES
Vs. Did you sell any agricultural products or animals in 2005?
1. Yes 2. No 1.wholsale state
If 'No', skip this block of questions and go to INPUTS. agency
2.other farmer
3.private trader
5.private processor
6.state processor
7. other (AVICOLA)
SALE U = contract N = non-contract
If "yes" (= code 1 or 2 in column I)
Did you sell in I. Sold II. Sold quantity III. How much IV. Largest V. (if
2005 1. yes, for cash did you get for it buyer formal
2. yes, for barter in 2005 contracts
3. no C N C N exist)
C N
V. maize kg
V2. wheat kg
V3. sunflowers kg
V4. barley, oats kg
V5. sugar beets kg
V6. hay, kg
lucerne,
clover
V7. soya kg
V8. vegetable kg
V9. fruits kg
VlO. pigs, piglets
V11. sheep, head
lambs, goats
V12. cattle/horse head
Vl3. poultry head
V14. meet kg
V15. milk
V16. eggs pieces
V24. How much did your household earn in 2006 by selling agricultural products? thou. lei
Payments were made
1. before delivery
2. after delivery, on time
3. installments, before and after
delivery
4. 1 month delay
5. 1- 3 month delay
6. more than 3 month delay
SN
1. other householder
2. production state
enterprise
3. COMCEREAL
4. SF/AROM
5. #IEC IF "yes"
7. private source
8. family association
9. legal association
10. other
in column I
Did you buy in 2005: I. Bought II III IV V Did you buy on: VI. IF you had
Quantity Where did you How (several choices) CONTRACTS
or value buy from much 1.cash Delivery was:
(several choices did you 2.contract-products (several choices possible)
possible) pay? 3.credit 1. on time
4. barter 2. later, <1 month
yes no 5.other 3. later, > 1 month
II. Seeds 1 2 kg
12. Fertilizer 1 2 kg
13. Insecticides, herbicides 1 2 kg
14. Grain for feed 1 2 kg
15. Hay 1 2 kg
16. Fuel for machinery 1 2 1
17. Parts for machinery 1 2 lei
18. Building and raw materials 1 2 lei
19. Veterinary medicines 1 2 lei
Did you pay for services:
I10. Mechanical services (plough, 1 2 lei
seeding, etc.)
Ill. Maintenance 1 2 lei
112. Veterinary 1 2le
122. How much did you spend on purchased farrnin inputs and services in 2005? lei?
I. INPUT PURCHASE
a 4 iww a- - I
FI. FINANCE, CREDIT, INVESTMENT
If he had invested
I. II. III.
FI. Did you spend money in 2005 to: Most How much lei did
Money spent important you spend for it
Yes No source (X = NC)
FIl 1. buy agricultural equipment 1 2
F12. buy livestock 1 2
F13. buy land 1 2
F14. build new annexes/improve old 1 2
ones
F15. develop non-agricultural private 1 2
enterprise
FI6. develop a private food processing 1 2
enterprise
F17. build a new house /improve 1 2
housing conditions
F18. buy a car/track/ ARO 1 2
F19. children education 1 2
FIl Is. Did your family take loans in the last two years?
1. Yes 2. No If 'No', GO TO FI18.
FI12 IF "yes" , from whom did you borrow the most money: (several choices possible)
1. a state bank 4. a relative
2. a private 5. a non-relative private person
3. an association
F113 For what did you take the largest loan (several choices possible):
1. to buy farm machinery 6. other agricultural expenses
2. to buy land 7. to buy processing equipment
3. to pay hired - labor 8. to pay debts
4. to pay mechanical works (services) 9. to pay for tree planting
5. to buy livestock 10. other reasons
FI14. What was the amount of the largest loan? lei (USD/Euro)
F115. How many months did/do you have for repayment?
FI16. What interest rate do you pay per month (in %)?
Source of funds:
1. own savings from selling agric. products
2. own savings from other sources
3. borrow from relatives
4. borrow from other individuals
5. loans from state owned bank
6. loans from private bank
7. credits from ANPA, processing factories
8. other sources; 9. NC
FI17. Did you provide any collateral for the loan? (several choices possible)
1. yes, land 5. yes, crops
2. yes, livestock 6. yes, car, truck
3. yes, house 7. no guarantees needed
4. yes, jewels 8. other guarantees
F1 18. In case you need to borrow money, whom would you ask for help? (several choices
possible)
1. relatives 4. banks
2. friends 5. wealthier people in the village
3. neighbors 6. I don't know
F119. If you had more money, how would you use it?
1. buy agricultural machinery 6. buy electronic/electrical durable goods 11. trips
2. buy animals 7. start a private business 12. other_
3. buy land 8. children's education
4. buy car/ truck/ARO 9. buy food
5. buy/ renovated house 10. buy clothes
L. LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
On average, how many members of your household, including yourself, cultivate your
land?
Ll. full time
L2. half of their working time
L3. less than half
Do you use the following type of labor on your farm:
I. Use II. If "Yes" III.
How many How many days/year
persons? did each one work on
1. Yes 2. No average?
L4. regular hired workers
L5. seasonal/temporary hired
worker
L6. relatives by exchange
L7. non-relatives by exchange
If "Yes" to L4 and L5
L8. For which of these activities do you use hired workers? (several choices possible)
1. planting 4. taking care of livestock
2. harvesting 5. selling agricultural products
3. between planting and harvesting works 6. other activities
L9. How much in all did you spend on hired labor in 2005 (in cash or in kind)?
In 2005 did you make use of
any of the following
organizations in your farming
activities?
I.Used
yes no
(IF YES to I) Are
you satisfied with
their service?
yes no NC
III.(IF NO) Why?
1. too expensive
2. unavailable
3. bad quality
4. not needed
5. other reasons
9. NC
IV. Do you
expect to
intend to use
their services
in the future?
yes no
L10. Agricultural Chamber 1 2 1 2 9 1 2
L1. Independent agricultural 1 2 1 2 9 1 2
engineers
L12. Veterinary doctors 1 2 1 2 9 1 2
L13. Private agricultural firm 1 2 1 2 9 1 2
L14. Agricultural association 1 2 1 2 9 1 2
Li5. Private individuals 1 2 1 2 9 1 2
VEN. INCOME
VENI. What was your household income obtained by your household in June (salaries,
pensions, allowances)?
1) less than 3,000,000 lei 7) 10,000,001 - 15,000,000 lei
2) 3,000,001 - 3,500,000 lei 8) 15,000,001 - 20,000,000 lei
3) 3,500,001 - 4,000,000 lei 9) 20,000,001 - 25,000,000 lei
4) 4,000,001 - 5,000,000 lei 10) 25,000,001 - 30,000,000 lei
5) 5,000,001 - 7,000,000 lei 11) more than 30,000,000 lei
6) 7,000,001 - 10,000,000 lei
What are the sources of income I. II IV. What is
in your household Is a source What is the most the monthly
important source of amount of
income for your income from
yes no household? this source
(RANK) (thou. lei)
X=NA
VEN2. sale of agricultural 1 2
products
VEN3. income from agricultural 1 2
association
VEN4. leasing land 1 2
VEN5. salaries 1 2
VEN6. from a non-agriculture 1 2
company
VEN7. pensions
VEN8. other state allowances 1 2
(children, student etc.)
VEN9. Money from relatives 1 2
VEN 10. Other sources 1 2
Total I I I I _I
S. CHANGES
Do you think that a year ago the following conditions were
now?
better, the same, or worse than
Beter Same Worse NR
S1. Financial situation 1 2 3 9
S2. The possibility for selling agricultural products 1 2 3 9
S3. Contracting with the state for selling products 1 2 3 9
S4. The possibility to purchase equipments 1 2 3 9
S5. Joining in mechanical works with others 1 2 3 9
S6. Hiring workers for farming 1 2 3 9
S7. Purchasing seeds 1 2 3 9
S8. Purchasing fertilizer and other chemical products 1 2 3 9
for farming I I 
_ I
RELATIONS WITH THE AGRICULTURAL ASSOCIATION
Are you a member of:
Yes No
1. Informal association 1 2
2. Formal association 1 2
If the household IS NOT A MEMBER in a family or legal association:
AS 1. Do you intend to become member of an agricultural family association?
1. yes 2. undecided 3. no 9. NA
AS2. Do you intend to become member of a legal agricultural association?
1. yes 2. undecided 3. no 9. NA
If the household IS MEMBER in a family or legal association, fill AS3 - AS17. If not, mark the section
with X.
AS3. What year did you join the association?
AS.31 Why did you join the 1. lack of labor to work the land
association? 2. lack of money/means for mechanical work
(do not read the answers) 3. hope to get more than by working alone
(several choices possible) 4. followed my neighbors/relatives
5. persuaded by the association leaders
6. other reasons
AS.32 Do you intend to stay in the 1. yes 2. undecided 3. no 9. NA/NC
association
AS.33 Are there conflicts between 1. frequent 2. rare 3. not at all 9. NA/NC
leaders and the members
AS.34 Are there conflicts between 1. frequent 2.rare 3.not at all 9. NA/NC
the association' members
AS4. How do you participate in the
1. with land
2. with agricultural machinery
association? (several choices possible)
3. with manual work
4. as an agricultural specialist
AS5. How are you paid by the association? (several choices possible)
I. in bani II. in natura
AS5.1 percent from the yearly harvest % %
AS5.2 fixed quantity, per ha, per year -lei kg
AS6. How many members are in the association you are member in? nr. of families
AS7. How many days of work did you put in the association in 2005?
How are decision in the only by by the by the by the by the NA
association made in the leading general household leader and
respect to: leader body assembly affected by members
the decision
AS8. what to plant on the 1 2 3 4 5 9
land
AS9. distribution of the 1 2 3 4 5 9
production
AS10. buying agricultural 1 2 3 4 5 9
machinery
ASI 1. hiring agricultural 1 2 3 4 5 9
machines
AS 12. getting loans
AS13. buying seeds, 1 2 3 4 5 9
fertilizer
AS 14. selling agricultural 1 2 3 4 5 9
products
ASl5. hiring in 1 2 3 4 5 9
Appendix 3-2: Commune Questionnaire
FC 1. What is the distance to the closest city? I - I - km
FC2. What is the largest age group in the commune?
1. Under 15 years 4. Between 35 - 44 years 7. Over 60 years
2. Between 15 - 24 years 5. Between 45- 54 years
3. Between 25 - 34 years 6. Between 55 - 60 years
FC3. Did anyone in the commune sell land?
1. Yes 2. No
FC4. If YES, how many hectares?
FC5. What was the average price for the land sold in the commune? lei/ha
FC6. What is the average rent for leasing 1 hectare of arable land in the commune?
lei/ha
FC7. What was the average payment for hiring agricultural workers in the summer of
2005? lei / day
FC8. Approximately what percent of the agricultural land in the commune is left fallow?
FC9. Do you have in the commune...?
I. II.
Yes No If "YES", how many?
FC9 1. Informal associations 1 2
FC92. Formal associations 1 2
FC 10. Do you have in the commune market for selling agricultural products and animals?
1. Yes 2. No
FC 11. If NO, how far is the closest market? km
FC 12. Did youth leave the village/commune for work abroad?
1. Yes 2. No (If "NO", Go to FCl 4)
FC13. If YES, approximately what percent of the youth left? %
FCl4. What are the main problems that farmers in your commune confront with? Rank based on relative
importance (1-the most important, 7 - the least important).
Problems Rank
1. Transport and marketing
2. Not enough agricultural machinery, including tractors
3. Natural disasters, including drought/floods
4. Limited access to credits
5. Limited access to inputs
6. Lack of knowledge for using new technologies
7. Other difficulties (specify)?
Chapter 4 : The chronology of land reforms in Romania
4.1 The "never-ending" story of land reform
Scholars of the social sciences neglect too often to analyze and evaluate the results of development
processes within a historical framework (Kornai 2006). Among the conceptual frameworks that theorists of
transition brought forward is the issue of "legacies," or path-dependent rationale, based on which past
institutional frameworks are being reinterpreted, and re-organized in order to adjust to new socio-
economic and political conditions.
To move away from the rigidities that often a path-dependent approach offers, a more nuanced
assessment of the concept should account for the role of institutional legacies and mental constructs in
influencing present outcomes in a historical continuum. This view suggests that institutions are "carriers of
history" (David 1994) and therefore history matters in the functioning of market and non-market
economy. As Verdery (1983 p. 2) claims, "rural populations are bound up with events of international
scope extending far back in time."
Within the context of post-socialist countries in CEE, Stark (1996) explained the diversity of
capitalist paths with the concept of "recombinant property." He argued that reform outcomes depend on
the legacies of the communist regime, and also on pre-communist institutional structures. Based on this
rationale, he argues that, the process of change that these countries underwent should not be labeled
"transition" (which implies a pre-determined destination) but rather "transformation" as changes spring
from "the ruins of socialism" and the end-destination is unknown (Stark and Bruszt 1998).
I content that the same argument can be made for the case of land reform in Romania, whereby
regional differences, the choice of institutional arrangements, and the persistence of farming associations
in the post-socialist period can partially be explained by historical patterns in property rights in different
regions during the inter-war period, and the intensity of communist collectivization process.
Hence, to understand current regional patterns in land reform outcomes, a brief chronology of
the main land reforms is needed. While the scope of this dissertation does not allow for an exhaustive list
of historical facts, I intend to focus on some key aspects of the historical legacies from earlier land reforms
that are important for the outcomes of post-socialist land restitution.
Agriculture has always played a dominant role in the Romanian economy. Before the First World
War agricultural land represented 55% from the whole territory, and for 8 0. 3 % of the population,
agriculture was the only source of income (Sandru 2005). Moreover, Romania was one of the largest
exporters of grains in the region. In the last three years before the war (between 1911-1913) 74 .6% of all
Romanian exports were grains, suggesting a strong capacity for growth in the agricultural sector
(Patrascanu 1978).
Property rights, and social and economic relations in the rural areas, played a critical role in the
formation of Romania as a nation and in its economic development. Not having a diversified rural
economy, successive land reforms radically changed property relations in the countryside. Over the past
century and a half, land tenure has constantly shifted between peasants, large landlords, and the state,
every thirty to forty years, a process described by Cartwright (1994) as "reversing history." The term "de-
collectivization" is used by anthropologists such as Sampson (1995) to suggest this circular historical
process.
The chronology of the most important land reforms in the history of Romania starts from 1864
and ends in the 1990s, period in which four radical changes in ownership occurred. The first reform was
implemented in 1864, before Romania was granted independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1877-
187848, followed by another reform in 1918. In 1948 the Communist regime took power and reshaped
again the property structure. Lastly, in 1991 land privatization and farm restructuring were implemented
following the overthrown of the centrally planned economic system.
In both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the agrarian question frustrated the efforts of
reformers. Interestingly, over the years, one can observe intriguing similarities between the political and
economic context for land reform, as well as the recent outcomes. Therefore, path-dependence is an
appropriate conceptual element, in a larger framework, to think about the economic, social, and political
context in which land reforms were implemented. It appears that political leaders tended to repeat past
mistakes, partly because they were under the same structural pressures that existed after the First World
War and the communist takeover (van Meurs 1999). Modernizing the agricultural sector (in terms of
physical capital, infrastructure, market orientation) and achieving economic sustainability became lower
priorities as compared to political tactics and suppressing upheavals.
In the following sections I highlight the key aspects of agrarian reforms since the post-war period
with emphasis on the two agro-regions analyzed in this study, Western Plain and Central Romanian Plain
(Part of the historical regions Transylvania and Muntenia, respectively) (see Figure 4-1).
48 Between 9-21It of May 1877, Mihail Kogalniceanu, the ministry of foreign affairs at the time, declared the
independence of Romania from the Ottoman Empire. After fighting the War, Romania's independence was finally
recognized by the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, and Bulgaria) on 13July
1878.
Figure 4-1: Historical regions of Romania
Source: http://www.romaniatourism.com/hist reg map.html
Note: The boundaries highlighted in black show the relative location of the agro-regions analyzed in this research.
4.2 The 1918-1921 land reform
Reforming the agrarian system in the CEE region remains one of the main consequences of the
First World War, strongly influenced by the Bolshevik revolution in Russia (Patrascanu 1978). At the time,
the gap in the level of economic development between the eastern part and the rest of Europe was
significant. Moreover, in the interwar period, the Romanian peasants had one of the lowest standards of
living in Eastern Europe. Agrarian reform, with its emphasis on land individualization and deep
institutional changes, aimed to increase the level of development in this mostly agrarian part of Europe, to
decrease poverty levels for the population, and to improve competitiveness of the agricultural production.
Over a period of approximately 50 years the rural population in Romania accounted for 75 to
8 0% of total population. As Table 4-1 illustrates, the share of agricultural employment in Romania in
1921 was much higher as compared to countries in Western and Central Europe, denoting a more
traditional economy. At the same time, the industrial and service sectors were insufficiently developed,
unable to absorb the large share of rural population.
Table 4-1: Employment by sectors in 1921 by countries (% from total labor force)
Agriculture Industry Other sectors
Romania 80% 8% 12%
England 9% 52% 39%
France 40% 36% 24%
Germany 370/o 41% 22%
Italy 56% 28% 16%
Bulgaria 82% 1 6% 12% 
Source: Axenciuc (2000 p. 207).
The driving motive for the 1918 land reform is not to be found in the unequal distribution of land
(between the landlords and the tenants) but mainly in the social and economic relations of servitude and
control by feudal lords ("semi-iobagie"). This constant quest for "land and freedom" was strongly evoked
in the literary works of the time (Negrici 2005). Consequently, the 1918 agrarian reform involved both
land redistribution (from hacienda landlords to peasants) as well as major changes in the economic and
social relations.
Land reform was announced at a time when the country was significantly weakened from the war
and the population was severely impoverished. Changing the land structure was considered a critical step
to avoid mass uprisings. Nevertheless, as soon as the economic conditions stabilized and the revolutionary
influences from Russia tempered (Patrascanu 1978), the government gave up the idea of land reform
obliging landlords to lease out land to tenants. But, in the end, international circumstances forced
Romania to undergo an ample land reform. Frightened by what the state and the ruling elite saw as an
impending socialist revolution, the ruling class introduced a reform that only temporarily appeased the
peasants' desire for land, and yet, "they had neither the courage nor the conviction" to bring in the
reforms that would have allowed such a peasant-based sector to develop (Mitrany 1930).
These back and forth commitments to land reform and to the shift from feudal to capitalist
relations are to be found in every successive effort to reform the agricultural sector in the following
decades.
4.2.1 Legacies from earlier land reforms
Private property and communal ownership based on equal access to land existed in the
Romanian provinces until early 17* century. The subsistence economy and limited exposure to markets
maintained an equalitarian society in which land was evenly distributed among the rural population. Up
to the mid-19 tl century, a feudal system was dominant in the regions where later the modern state of
Romania was created. Peasants provided labor, or paid rents in agricultural products or money, in
exchange for the use of a piece of land from the local landlord. In 1864, the first major land reform4 9 gave
peasants real ownership of their land parcels and formally ended the feudal relations between peasants
and large landlords. Feudal obligations on production and marketing of agricultural products were also
dismantled. Nevertheless, constraints from reform implementation led to further dissatisfaction of the
peasants and to deteriorated economic conditions in the countryside.
First, the land distributed to peasants was barely sufficient to satisfy consumption needs for the
rural families - approximately 3.86 hectares (Patrascanu 1978 p. 27). At the same time, however, a bi-
49The land reform was adopted based on the Law for the Regulation of Rural Property Relations ("Legea pentru
regulares proprietatii rurale") from 15 August 1864, published in Codul General al Romaniei, Vol. II, Bucharest
1907.
modal agriculture persisted, i.e. 77% of the farms were small and fragmented (under five hectares) while
the rest were medium and large farms. Second, land reform did not create communal meadows and
pastures and all the forests were privatized to the large landlords or shifted into state ownership. Third,
and probably most important, the land was inalienable for 20 years (and then extended until 1916). These
restrictions on land transactions prevented the development of mid-level farms, increased again
dependence on large landowners, and in the end led to land fragmentation. More so, in 1866, through
additional contractual arrangements, the large landowners tightly controlled the small farmers (Otiman
2002). Restrictions were placed on labor force and migration, and the use of military force for fulfilling
harsh contractual obligations was common. Additionally, land taxation was much higher for small farmers
than for large estates.50 Land taxes, along with very high land rents paid to landlords, made it impossible
for the peasants to improve their economic performance, particularly in the southern region (Mitrany
1930 p. 70). Therefore, one could argue that the state became "captured" (Stigler 197 1) by the interests of
the rural elite to the detriment of small farmers. Over this period of time, massive migration from Old
Romanian regions to Transylvania, Bulgaria, and Serbia was reported, due to insufficient land and abuses
by the state and the rural elite (Mitrany 1930). Unrest and dissatisfaction culminated in the peasant revolt
of 1907, which made it clear that further land reforms in Romania were inevitable.
Even if Romania was one of the largest exporters of grains in Europe at the time, between 1911-
1914 the country recorded the lowest level of production per hectare. Moreover, physical assets were very
scarce. This meant that agriculture was very labor intensive, suffering from a lack of technical endowment
both on the large and the small farms. At the same time, the level of rent for leasing-in land increased by
more than 50% in only two years (Patrascanu 1978 p. 44). The increase in land rents and land prices
without an equivalent increase in production and prices for agricultural products made way to a stronger
exploitation of the peasants by the rural elite.
One of the peculiarities in terms of the agrarian question is the large regional difference in land
ownership, legal regulation, and natural conditions (van Meurs 1999). The relevance of these differences
holds for the reform of feudal relations in the eighteenth and nineteenths centuries as well as for the post-
communist restitution policies in the 1990s, as I will show later in the dissertation. The most striking
differences are between Transylvania and the rest of the provinces (Moldova, Muntenia, Basarabia, and
Bucovina).
Historically, the main cause for these differences can be ascribed to the Ottoman occupation of
Moldova and Muntenia until 1878, and the inclusion of Transylvania in the Austrian-Hungarian Empire.
As a result, Transylvania benefited from the modernization process that took place in the Austro-
50 Patrascanu (1978 p. 30) documents that in 1905 landholdings larger than 500 hectares were paying 26.16 lei in
taxes, farms between 100-500 hectares were paying 30.41 lei, and those under 10 hectares were paying 37.35 lei.
Hungarian Empire, while the rest of the Romanian regions remained part of a more traditional economy.
Moreover, in Transylvania the system of servitude was abolished in 1948 and land holdings were larger
than in other principalities of Romania (75 percent of the agricultural land was occupied by farms of up to
50 hectares) and villagers were provided with commons and woodlands as well (Mitrany 1930 p. 45).51 In
Moldova and Muntenia land remained under the control of native aristocracy who retained their estates
and political power, while the peasants were serfs on large haciendas. Absentee landlords had little capital
and interest in undertaking large rural modernization programs. However, in Transylvania, under the
Austro-Hungarian Empire, the 1848 land reform was implemented more thoroughly, leading to private
property titles for the peasants, more equalitarian land distribution, and independence from the rural
elites for most of the peasants. 52 As a result, the economic and social problems encountered in the rest of
Romania's provinces were milder in Transylvania. Industrial development, and the transfer of ownership
from conservative nobleman to market-oriented owners stimulated the relative modernization of
production in the region.
Table 4-2: The structure of agricultural farms in Moldova and Muntenia (Old
Romania/Vechiul Regat) in 1918
Farms Arable Land
Farm Size Nr. % Ha %
Under 3 ha 423,401 44 673,212 8.6
3-5 ha 321,163 33.3 1,342,997 17.3
5-10 ha 176,375 18.1 1,187,900 14.6
10-50 ha 36,318 3.7 695,953 8.2
Total up to 50 ha 957,527 99.1 3,813,598 48.7
50-100 ha 2,405 0.3 166,847 2.2
100-500 ha 3,314 0.4 316,385 10.6
500-1,000 ha 1,112 0.1 302,084 10.4
1,000-3,000 ha 771 0.1 1,236,420 15.8
3,000-5,000 ha 112 0.01 484,367 5.6
Over 5,000 ha 66 0.0 520,095 6.7
Total up to 5,000 ha 7780 0.9 3,977,198 51.3
TOTAL 965,307 100 7,790,796 100
Source: M. Constantinescu - L'evolution de la propriete rurale et la reforme agraire en Roumanie, Editura
Culturala Nationala Bucuresti, 1925, p. 291 in Otiman (2002 p. 43).
Overall, by 1918 the agricultural sector in the main provinces of Romania was suffering as a
result of economic decline after the War. The sector was characterized by a bi-modal production system,
51 From this aspect, a similar situation occurred in Bucovina also, part of the Tsarist Empire at the time (Mitrany
1930).
5 As a result of the more even distribution of property rights, leasing practices were more limited in Transylvania:
6.58% as compared to more than 30% in the other provinces (Patrascanu 1978).
based on labor-intensive methods, and dominated by feudal rather than capitalist relations. In Moldova
and Muntenia land distribution was very unequal and fragmented. About 99 % of all farms held less than
5 0% of the arable land, while less than one percent held more than half the land, leaving little room for
potentially competitive middle-sized farms (see Table 4-2).
Therefore, the outcomes of this land reform were contradictory. Even if the new law was intended
to establish the peasants as free, property-owning individuals, the system of large land estates serviced by
peasants through labor contracts, continued.
4.2.2 The 1918 land reform
At the end of the First World War, Romania implemented the most radical land reform in
Europe (Sandru 2005). The level of expropriation and land distribution has been unprecedented. But,
instead of creating a momentum for growth, agricultural development proceeded very slowly. The
institutional structures were not able to respond to these drastic changes fast enough, which led to long
delays in finalizing the reform (Evans 1924; Sandru 2005).
Started in 1918 (Law 3681/1918) and being actually implemented in 1921, land reform involved
massive transfers of property from large landowners to peasants in all provinces of then, Greater
Romania5 3 ("Romania Mare"). 54 The primary motive for this land reform was to redefine property
relations in the rural areas. Ionescu-Sisesti (1925 p. 22) reveals the emotional character that land property
evoked: "by transferring land to the hands that farm it, to those that love it, to those that see land as the
meaning of their lives, the reform strengthened the property rights for all, it defined property as an
institution."
Land transfers involved two steps. First the expropriation of large plots of land by the state from
the rural elites was done based on criteria and compensation levels specific to each province.
Expropriations were more radical in Basarabia, Muntenia and Transylvania (see Table 4-3). In
Transylvania land reform took a larger social and nationalistic meaning since, during the Austro-
Hungarian Empire, 30% of the agricultural land in the province was owned by more than 60% of the
Romanian population living there. Therefore, securing the rights and livelihood of the Romanian
population in Transylvania (without discriminating against the German and Hungarian minorities) was
the main priority of land reform in this region.
5 Greater Romania generally refers to the territory of Romania in the years between the First and the Second
World Wars, the largest geographical extent of Romania up to that time, also including Transylvania, Basarabia and
Bucovina.
54 Law 3681/1918 expropriates from large landowners the following categories of land properties, with the intent of
distributing them to the peasants: a) land owned by the royal domain, institutions/firms (public or private), rural
properties belonging to foreigners and absentees; b) two million hectares from private ownership, according to the
Constitution; 3) the latifundiar estates that were leased for five consecutive years (Mitrany 1930).
Table 4-3: The level of land expropriation and the number of peasants that benefited from
land redistribution in 1938
Expropriated Number of peasants that
area (ha) became landowners
Vechiul Regat (Muntenia) 2,554,658 648,843
Transylvania 1,682,464 319,583
Basarabia 1,489,916 357,016
Bucovina 75,798 76,941
Total 5,811,836 1,393,383
Source: MAD (1938 p. 75).
Second, the state sold back the land to small farmers, landless peasants, war veterans and their
heirs. As such, the state acted as an intermediary between the landowners and the peasants, avoiding
potential social conflicts between the old and the new landowners. Through reimbursements, the partially
expropriated landowners got resources to invest in modernizing the farms, to acquire capital and
livestock, and to invest in other sectors as well.
As a result of massive land expropriations, small landownership predominated in Romania much
more than in other countries in Europe (see Figure 4-2). More than 8 0% of the farms were smaller than
five hectares.
Figure 4-2: The share of small farms (less than 5 hectares) in total private land ownership
(%) in the Inter-War Europe
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Source: Ionescu-Sisesti and Cornateanu (1937 p. 37).
Following this land reform, important national, regional, and local institutions were created. 55
" Some of these new institutions were: The Rural Bank, Agricultural Chambers (offering consultancy, education,
and agricultural support for farmers), The Rural House (concerned with property redistribution, the transfer of land
Approximately six million hectares (i.e. one third of the arable land) were transferred to 1.4 million
peasants (who had to make payments over 25 years) or were turned into community controlled pastures
and forests (van Meurs 1999). After five years the new landowners had the right to sell (or to donate the
land). Restrictions for the amount of land to be distributed (or to be sold) existed only in Muntenia and
Moldova, but not in Transylvania and Bucovina. Moreover, the law specified that land can not be
fragmented (as a result of inheritance transfers) into plots smaller than two hectares in plain areas or one
hectares in hilly areas (Patrascanu 1978 p. 68). This provision, along with land expropriation, proved to
be the most important economic aspect of the reform, although in the end the overall impact has proved
unsatisfactory. In Transylvania, land reform was primarily driven by nationalistic reasons, since large land
estates were in the hands of minorities (mainly Hungarians and Germans) and it resulted in a more
equitable land distribution as compared to the other provinces.
Motivated by the need to prevent the peasants from joining the communist movement rather
than by an urge to achieve socio-economic advancement, land reform became imperative even for the
first post-war government. Nevertheless, as the ministry of agriculture Constantin Garoflid mentioned at
that time, land reform was determined only by political and social criteria, not by economic rationales
(Garoflid 1923 p. 4). Over time, the new small landowners were not able to transform the agriculture from
subsistence to a more commercially oriented sector: scattered plots were not sufficiently consolidated,
were too small56 , and investments in machinery and better farming models were never made.
All in all, the economic rationale was lacking. In Transylvania, for example, redistribution of the
land was aimed to solve the social problem of a growing land-less rural over-population after the eviction
of the Hungarian rural elite and the creation of a larger loyal class of Romanian proprietors. This,
however, was merely a temporary and short sighted solution to the peasant question, and did not
encompass a strategy for economic modernization.
The struggle for political power in the Greater Romanian region also played a significant role in
the strategy of land reform. Under the circumstances of universal suffrage, the younger political leaders of
the National Liberal and National Peasant parties needed a class of small landowners as a constituency. At
the same time, they had to break the political and economic hegemony of the large landowners united in
the Conservative Party. At least in this respect the reform was successful: the Conservative Party of large
landowners lost its constituency and its political power. Romanian, Russian (from Basarabia), and
Hungarian (from Transylvania) large landowners are known to have protested against the nationalization
plots from the large landowners, to the state, and then to peasants, credit operations, marking for agricultural
products and procurement of seeds and fertilizers).
56 Studies made by specialists in the field in the inter-war period determined that based on the socio-economic
conditions at the time, a rural household needed a minimum of 5 hectares for securing its economic independence
(Sandru 2005 p. 46).
of their estates and - even more vehemently - against the redistribution of land to smallholders and the
landless rural population.
Without investment in infrastructure and mechanization, and without a class of middle-sized
farms, the redistributive land reform failed to address the issue of economic modernization. This was true
then, as well as in 1864 (when the first land reform was implemented). Redistribution without facilitating
access to the means of production, increased the dependence of small farmers either on landlords, or on
the state (Otiman 2002; Sandru 2005). The precarious technical endowment in the agricultural sector,
due to low capital accumulation and investment, resulted in the stagnation of the average production per
hectare during the next 20 years at about 900-1000 kg of grains per hectare.
Opinions about the 1920s land reform vary from those that claim that, similarly with the 1864
reform, it failed to achieve its stated goals (Cornateanu 1930), to those that argue that it was actually
successful in setting up the economic and institutional framework for a capitalist society (Ionescu-Sisesti
1925).57 What is certainly true is that the inter-war period brought to the forefront problems and
circumstances that Romania has faced before, which certainly slowed down institutional progress.
Nevertheless, significant changes in property relations were achieved, and the legal stipulations for land
transfers (land market participation and restrictions on land fragmentation) created the right conditions
for the rise of middle-sized farmers. These institutional changes also promoted salaried work in agriculture
and the use of agricultural technologies, as first steps towards a capitalist farming system (Georgescu 1943
p. 342-346).
In addition, other institutional developments were implemented, from lending agencies for
farmers to investments in agricultural scientific research and in education. Moreover, agricultural
transformations affected the other economic sectors as well, as "farmers became the best clients for
industry and commerce" (Ionescu-Sisesti 1925 p. 36). It is true, however, that even if economic
improvements in the sector were slow, the whole economy was undergoing profound changes, requiring
more time for real growth to become transparent. Overall, the agricultural sector was lacking a legislative
and financial policy promoted by the state, similar with the one pursued in the industrial sector at the
time.
But, despite these favorable conditions, demographic and economic conditions contributed to the
fragmentation process, which also constituted one of the most severe problems during the post-communist
land reform. The rural population rose due to a high natural increase, and a lack of other employment
options forced smallholders to continue farming. Under these conditions, the inheritance law (based on
equal distribution between heirs) became a veritable "land ownership chopper" (Dumitru 2002). As a
57 Ionescu-Sisesti (1925) also suggested that the decline in production was rather due to the economic crisis as a result
of the war.
result small plots of land were further divided between family members, until a single peasant ended up
farming a dozen of tiny plots, often widely spread. In addition, even at that time, regional differences in
agricultural performance and institutional arrangements for farming were apparent. Transylvania was
more developed and its rural economy resembled more the capitalist farming system with more secure
private property rights and more economic farm sizes. On the other hand, in the rest of Romania,
traditional farming practices prevailed, and small farmers were in general tenants on the estates of large
landowners.
The significance of this land reform goes beyond the social and political significance and the
economic outcomes at that historical point in time. The institutional structure that prevailed after the land
reform between 1918-1921, which lasted until the 1940s, was the framework based on which the post-
socialist land reform from 1991 was implemented.
4.3 The communist era: agriculture between 1945-1989
4.3.1 Collectivization between 1945-1962
Similarly with most countries in the region under the Soviet influence after the war 58 , between
1940-1962 Romania implemented the process of collectivization and mechanization of the agricultural
sector, known as the "socialist agricultural transformation." As Iancu and Tarau (2000) claim, the effects
of collectivization were extremely complex. Some of them were predictable, other were unforeseeable, but
they all left deep scars in the Romanian society as a whole. However, the process of collectivization has
been only tangentially covered by historians and social scientists, limited mainly to the central themes
related to the post-communist land reform (Dobrincu and Iordachi 2005a).
Soviet collectivization aimed to organize the peasantry into groups convenient for the extraction
of resources from agriculture (through the price mechanism for grains procurement and collectivization)
to finance industrialization (see Kochin (1996) for more references). Forced collectivization was not
favored in the early stages of socialist land reform (early 1920s). However, since in Russia the decline in
state procurement prices for grains plummeted the grain reserves, the enforcement of collectivization
begun in 1929 allowing the state to manage agricultural production by "alienating the control of resources
from the family unit of farm production" (Kochin 1996). In the book "The harvest of sorrow," Conquest
(1986) describes very vividly the dramatic social and economic consequences of collectivization in the
Soviet region.
58 These countries are: Romania, Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Cechoslovakia, German Democrat Republic, Poland,
and partly Yugoslavia.
Collectivization meant not only a reorganization of property relations, but also to a large degree a
"social engineering" of the countryside (Scott 1998) and destruction of preexisting economic institutions
(Kochin 1996). By 1962 most rural families in the CEE and the Former Soviet Union (FSU) countries had
their land removed from direct control, although the timing and speed of this transformation varied across
countries, and even within the same country (Hann 1993). As it is widely documented, collectivization was
imposed by the socialist aparatkins, far from being embraced by the locals. Collectivization was resented
despite the fact that land rights remained nominally in the property of individuals, as was the case in
Romania and Hungary. However, this nominal land ownership during collectivization was irrelevant as
property rights lost their meaning under the Party's control. Land was not transferable, and exit from the
collective (or state) farms was forbidden. 59 As a result, landowners experienced degradation in the "quality
of their property rights" as a result of collectivization (Hann 1993 p. 304).
The "Soviet experiment" in the CEE region started in the 1920s at a time when in Western
Europe private family farms were thriving. 60 The Soviet model of collectivization was based on two
somewhat contradictory tenets of socialist ideology (Swain 1998 p. 6). The first was that large-scale farms
were superior to small-scale farming. The second was that co-operative farming, was both inferior to state
property and "something to be treated with suspicion." This meant that collective farms were not directly
endowed with machinery or financial resources. 61
Interestingly, since in Romania the "thirst" for private property was always strong, in a meeting
between Stalin and Petru Groza (the premier of the coalition government between 1945-1952), the soviet
leader suggested that Romania should maintain private family farming, but that it should invest more in
mechanization. Stalin argued that Romania should not force collective farming on peasants62. Large-scale
agriculture, was argued, should be practiced only on state farms. Nevertheless, collectivization of
agriculture swept through the Romanian countryside as the primary mechanism for modernizing the
rural economy despite opposition from the peasants themselves who favored private property.
In August 1944 the Soviet Union army came to Bucharest, and in March 1945 the new coalition
government led by Petru Groza was formed, dominated by the communists. Much aware of the
difficulties that large-scale collectivization would entail in such a traditional sector like agriculture, the
59 Hann (1993) shows that these terms were more lax in the case of Hungary, where land could be inherited, and in
some conditions it could even be alienated.
60 In an analysis of farming structures in Europe, Virgil Madgearu notes that in the European agriculture
cooperative forms of production are not preferred (or natural) organizational forms (Otiman 2002).
61 Swain (1998 p.6 ) offers further details about the Stalinist model: agricultural purchase prices were low; peasants
and collectives alike were subjected to oppressive compulsory deliveries; incomes from the collective farms were low,
mainly in kind, and based on the labor unit rather than a wage; machinery was held in state-owned machine and
tractor stations (MTS); private household plots were barely tolerated; there was minimal diversification out of
agriculture.
62 Cited in Otiman (2002), from Petru Groza (1946 p. 291), in "Reconstructia Romaniei - Discursuri Politice,
Conferinte, Interviuri 1944-1946".
communist leaders embarked in a step-by-step procedure (Iancu and Tarau 2000). Initially, the stated
goal of the government was to dismantle large landownership and to set up an agricultural sector based on
small-scale farming (Sandru 2005). As a result, Law 22/1945 expropriated from large landowners an area
of 1.46 million hectares, of which 7 5% were given to the peasants (OECD 1996). Land fragmentation
became again an issue of concern. In 1948 around five million family households were cultivating less
than five hectares representing 91 % of the total number of farms. The brief period of individualized
farming was mainly aimed at gaining political support for legitimizing the communist regime in Romania,
while in the medium-term preparing the ground for collectivization as the five hectares were seldom
enough to feed the rural households. 63 This was the first phase of collectivization in Romania.
In 1949 another phase of land reform was implemented, calling for more drastic expropriations.
Properties of more than 50 hectares of land were further expropriated, along with crown properties
(151,740 hectares) and church properties (241,151 hectares). In the mid-1948 there were 7,704 farms up
to 50 hectares, with a total area of 1,031,461 hectares. From this area, following the application of Law
83/1954, around one million hectares were confiscated (Dumitru 2002). Landowners were evicted and
land was given to the state or to the emerging collective sector. Only one-quarter of the expropriated land
remained in the hands of the state at that time. In addition, capital assets (such as tractors, harvesting
combines, seeders) and animals were transferred into state ownership and machinery and tractors stations
(MTSs) were created for renting out services to farmers. Nevertheless, by 1956 only 10% of land was
collectivized.
After the second half of 1950s, collectivization was heavily imposed on the Romanian peasants,
most of the time through extremely violent measures 64. The transformation process was characterized by
"many false starts, dead ends, and shocking misconceptions" (Verdery 2004a). The main actors involved
were the family farmers (households), the party cadres, and the new agricultural experts.
Opposition to collectivization was widespread in Romania. However, in the West, where property
rights were more embedded in the social fabric, resistance to collectivization was more fierce and violent.
Iancu and Tarau (2000) document the peasant uprisings in Arad and Bihor, two counties in the Western
Plain in 1949, rebellion which was violently crushed in August the same year.65 These pockets of
63 Elections were carried out in 1946, when the communist regime came to power, especially due to the votes from
the newly created landowners.
64 In a relatively short period of time, until 1952, already more than 80,000 peasants were sent to jail because they
opposed collectivization (Dobrincu and lordachi 2005a).
65 The authors document that three Securitate (the Romanian Secret Service) battalions from Bucharest were
deployed and successively attacked the rebellious centers. As a result 16 peasants from Bihor and 12 from Arad were
executed in different villages, usually in public areas, after being labeled as "enemies of the regime". In addition,
more villagers were arrested, their properties were confiscated, and they were deported to Dobrogea, in south east of
Romania (270 families from Bihor and 160 from Arad) (Iancu and Tarau 2000 p. 165-166).
resistance 66 shaped to a certain degree the response to de-collectivization 40 years later, as I discuss in
Chapter 9. Table 4-4 illustrates the pace of collectivization from 1949 to 1962, when the process was
considered completed. By 1971, 77 % of the land was in collective farms, 18% was in state agricultural
units, and only 5% of the land was in individual farms (Tsantis and Pepper 1979). Nevertheless, towards
the end of the communist regime, in 1989, land in private property increased to 10% (Rizov et al. 200 1).
Table 4-4: Agricultural collectivization in Romania (1949-1962)
Collective Families Area
farms (thou.) Agricultural land Arable land
thou. ha % thou. ha %
1949 56 4.0 14.3 - 10.1. -
1950 1027 67.7 288.9 2.0 262.5 2.6
1955 2152 184.2 605.8 6.2 792.8 7.9
1960 4187 1420.1 4580.2 31.2 4099.6 40.0
1962 5398 3294.8 9084.7 61.8 7677.7 76.8
Souce: Otiman (2002 p. 184).
As opposed to other countries in the region, such as Poland and Hungary, the collectivization
process in Romania was more profound, resulting in the lowest level of private property in agriculture.
Nevertheless, as many ethnographic studies of different villages around the country show, the experience
of collectivization was very diverse. Hence, it is difficult to draw a unified conclusion on the speed and
strategy of collectivization (Kideckel 1993; Dobrincu and Iordachi 2005b). Collectivization progressed
faster in the less developed regions where the peasants were poorer and less able to farm the land
themselves (such as the southern and eastern regions), securing initial support (Chelcea 2005). The
strategy was to create "cooperative models" mainly in the regions where grains are cultivated extensively
(Sandru 2005). In these regions, large investments were made in mechanization, support schemes and
market access for the farmers. Moreover, in the West, where many well-off German communities were
expropriated, the newly created collective farms had a higher endowment and were better organized as a
result (Goina 2005).
Private ownership of land was limited to garden plots, mainly in mountain areas or in other
inaccessible regions inappropriate for collective farming. The garden or family plot (250 square meters,
which increased later to 1,500 square meters) was a constitutional right, but also a burden because the
plots and the livestock had to be thoroughly registered. Nevertheless, while the household plots were
insufficiently large to satisfy the needs of the families, without them it was hard to make a living. The dues
to the state were set so high that some peasants were forced to buy additional products to fulfill them.
Therefore, a wide informal market developed slowly between the private agricultural sector and the
66 Cartwright (2000) documents that at the end of the campaign to collectivize in 1962, Gheorghe Gheorghiu Dej
admitted that 80,000 peasants had stood trial since 1949 for crimes related to the campaign.
collective farms, especially for procuring raw materials (seeds and fertilizers) and mechanical services
based on barter exchanges (Swain 1998).
State farms underwent several organizational changes since their inception in 1920s (OECD
1996). Prior to 1945 land farmed by state farms was the property of local communities while state farms
with more than ten hectares were owned by regional agricultural offices.
As a result of 1945 land reforms, expropriated land was added to the state reserves and the total
area farmed by these farms increased significantly. In 1948 state farms were reorganized into State
Agricultural Holdings. In 1967 they were transformed into Agricultural State Enterprises (IASs). Both
collective and state farms were functioning based on annual and five-year plans drafted by the state
authorities. Having higher wages and benefits, workers on the state farms were not allowed to use any
land for private purposes, contrary to the collective farm workers. Table 4-5 summarizes the outcomes of
the collectivization process between 1950 and 1962.
Table 4-5: The evolution of property forms during collectivization 1950-1965 (%)
1950 1955 1960 1962 1965
Agricultural area
State farms, from which: 21.6 25.5 29.4 29.2 30.2
- I.A.S. 5.3 6.2 11.8 12.1 14.0
Agricultural cooperatives, from which: 2.0 9.2 52.5 64.8 61.2
- C.A.P. 2.0 6.4 31.5 61.8 60.8
Private individual farms 76.4 65.3 18.1 6.0 8.6
Arable land
State farms, from which: 9.2 13.7 17.2 17.6 20.0
- I.A.S. 5.9 7.2 13.7 13.9 16.6
Agricultural cooperatives, from which: 2.8 12.2 67.1 78.9 75.4
- C.A.P. 2.8 8.2 41.8 77.4 75.3
Private individual farms 88.0 74.1 15.7 3.5 4.6
Source: National Institute of Statistics, Statistical Annual Report for Romania, 1966
4.3.2 The agricultural sector between 1962-1989
The aim of the socialist agricultural transformation was to enlarge production (by using large-
scale production systems), and to improve the technological base (by massive mechanization and use of
chemical fertilizers). However, the underlying rationale has been mostly political (promoting the
collectivist practice of the socialist ideology) rather than economic efficiency. The almost doctrinaire
approach to collectivization, regardless of the productivity of smaller scale farming, and the reliance on
the Soviet example (based on the model put forth by Nikita Khrushchev in 1949) of very large farms
(kolhozes) required a certain degree of "social-engineering" (Scott 1998) of the rural communities. This
process involved not only physical changes in the countryside induced by the consolidation of land in very
large plots, and building the necessary infrastructure to support these large farms. Collectivization also
meant changes in the social relations at the village level. Communist Party leaders became prominent
figures in the village and professionals (engineers) played an essential role in the economic transformation
of the villages. Moreover, through the process of "rural systematization" ("sistematizare rurala"),
thousands of villages were transformed into small urban centers, disrupting local culture and living
patterns.
The process of collectivization was hastened by the push for mechanization and industrialization
of the agricultural sector. The tractor played a key role in shifting from a traditional agriculture based on
horse-drawn plows and seeders, to capitalist practices. The Soviet Union was the first to adopt large-scale
mechanization projects under the guidance of American specialists (Scott 1998). In the course of ten years
the tractor changed from a curiosity to a standard unit of power (in 1924 there were only 1,000 tractors in
operation, by 1934 the number increased to over 200,000) (Dalrymple 1964). In Romania, the number of
agricultural tractors almost tripled from 1960 to 1976 (16,093 to 31,498 in 1976) (Tsantis and Pepper
1979).
Agricultural mechanization started in late 1940s along with the heavy industrialization policy.
The vision of the Communist Party was to achieve self-sufficiency in the production of agricultural
machinery. Hence, significant investments and institutional reorganizations were made to sustain this
goal. It was argued that collectivization should proceed gradually allowing for mechanical implements to
be set up and for specialists to be formed. First, in 1948 all the agronomic universities became part of the
Politechnique University and separate departments for agricultural mechanization were created. In 1946
the former IAR Brasov (an airplane manufacturing plant) has been transformed entirely into a tractors
factory. By 1960s, the first integral Romanian tractor was produced, along with Fiat engine tractors. At
the end of 1948, the Romanian agricultural sector had 10,189 tractors, 8,600 plows for tractors, 560
sawers, 5,100 mechanical seeders, and 6,805 combines for cereals (Iancu 2001 p. 4). By 1962, the year
when collectivization was completed, approximately eleven billions lei were invested in the technical
endowment of the agricultural sector. As a result, the number of tractors increased to 57,500 (Iancu 2001
p. 4) and by 1989 to 116,653 tractors. Mechanical and Tractor Stations (MTSs) for agricultural
equipments were established to serve the collective and state farms. Technical endowment, however, was
not done equally across organizational forms - state farms received more of these investments compared
to collective farms. Nevertheless, despite heavy investment in the mechanization of agriculture, Romania
still remained far behind European countries (see Table 4-6).
Table 4-6: Share of agricultural land per tractor
ha/tractor ha/tractor
Germany 8.3 Greece 30.3
Holland 10.9 Ireland 34.5
Begium 12.2 England 35.7
Italy 12.2 Spain 37.0
Luxemburg 12.2 Portugal 58.8
Denmark 16.9
France 20.8 Romania 100.0
Source: Otiman (2002 p. 201), based on data from the National Institute of Statistics 1990 and La Situation de
l'agriculture dans l'Union Europenne 1992.
Fertilizer use increased significantly. In 1970s most fertilizer was supplied by the Romanian
chemical industry itself (Cartwright 2001).67 All the main inputs needed for effective farming were
controlled by the state. The relevant state enterprises (for upstream and downstream distribution
channels) were organized to service large-scale operations. They provided fertilizer and herbicides in bulk,
agricultural machinery was almost entirely in the hands of the MTSs, and the state purchasing enterprises
bought directly from the farms.
Besides capital investments and organizational restructuring, major institutional changes were
also pushed forward. Professionalization of the agricultural sector was among the top priorities at the time.
The socialist state trained a large class of agrarian engineers and specialists that were considered essential
for increasing labor productivity in agriculture. To support this process, large investments were made in
improving the material base for high schools with agricultural specializations and for polytechnic
universities. Research laboratories, experimentation lots and educational farms were set up for every such
institution. Research contests and exhibitions were organized every year for engineering innovations in
farming and agro-food industry. The largest agricultural research center, Research Institute for Cereal
and Industrial Crops in Fundulea, was founded in 1962 by joining the Research Institute for Maize Crops
(founded in 1957) and the Field Crops Department of the Romanian Agricultural Research Institute
(founded in 1927).
It follows that the socialist agricultural transformation had tremendous influence on the
organization of agricultural production, on shifting away from traditional practices to more scientific
methods of production, and also on the social structure in the villages. However, as Oprea (2005) argues,
this process has not proceeded smoothly. Collectivization was received with strong resistance (as I
described in Section 4.3), and the mechanical implements were not adopted by peasant farmers
immediately. Many peasants found it easier to turn back to their animals as agricultural tools, which were
67 The total amount of fertilizers used in agricultural production increased from 5,900 tones in 1950 to 1.37 million
tones in 1983 (Turnock 1998).
more reliable and much more easily replaced than the early tractors.68 Nevertheless, by 1970s collective
farms and state farms were highly mechanized and professionalized.
Evidently, mechanization required farms to be very large. Table 4-7 shows that even if there were
only a few state farms, they were much larger than the socialist collective farms. This also meant that they
were more equipped with mechanical implements and they received more state subsidies and investments
from the state.
In addition, regional differences were quite evident in farming organization. The southern region,
Muntenia (the older part of Romania comprising the Central Romanian Plains), experienced the most
intense collectivization process, having almost twice as many collective farms, and four times more state
owned farms. This discrepancy will, as I discuss in Chapter 9, affect not only individual choices in terms of
farming arrangements, but also local politics at the time of restitution.
Table 4-7: Average size of collective farms and state farms by region in 1966
Total number Average agricultural Average arable
of farms area (ha) area (ha)
CFs SFs CFs SFs CFs SFs
Muntenia 2,836 459 2,095 3,027 1,794 2,498
Transylvania 1,465 162 1,654 2,372 1,182 1,427
Total 4,301 621 1,924 2,842 1,575 2,230
Source: Verdery (2003 p. 265), with data from Anuarul Statistic al Republicii Socialiste Romania 1967
Note: CFs - collective farms; SFs - state farms.
In addition, as Nelson (1981 p. 87) describes, the state has disproportionately responded with
investment to "ecologically based contrasts in agricultural potential" (see Table 4-8). As a general rule,
investment was highest in the most fertile plains (where the Central Romanian Plain is located). In those
regions extensive grain cultivation lent itself well to mechanization, and irrigation was more feasible. As a
result, in areas with low levels of capitalization (due to lower investments), the farms depended on large
number of laborers often employed at tasks requiring minimum training.
68 Fitzgerald (2003) makes a similar claim about the farmers in the United States at the time of the agricultural
industrialization.
Table 4-8: Zonal variation in agricultural investment*
1951-55 1961-65 1971-75
Lowland Zones
I. Lower Danube 1.63 6.43 16.83
II. Southern Plains 1.34 3.25 8.43
III. Western Plains 0.49 4.47 5.76
Mid-Altitude Zones
IV. Eastern Transylvania 0.40 3.38 6.53
V. Western Transylvania 0.12 2.35 4.10
Upland Zones
VI. Southern Carpathians 0.15 1.61 3.58
VII. Moldavia 0.37 1.91 3.85
VIII. Maramures 0.24 1.73 2.57
Source: Nelson (1981 p. 107)
Notes: Five year investment per rural person, in million of lei. 1951-55 calculated at 1959 prices; 1961-65 and 1971-
75 calculated at 1969 prices.
Zone I: consists of Braila, Constanta, Galati, Ialomita, and Tulcea; Zone II: Dolj, Ilfov, Mehedinti, Olt and
Teleorman; Zone III: Arad, Bihor, Satu Mare and Timis; Zone IV: Brasov, Covasna, Sibiu and Mures; Zone V:
Alba, Cluj, Harghita and Hunedoara; Zone VI: Arges, Buzau, Caras-Severin, Dambovita, Gorj, Prahova, Valcea
and Vrancea; Zone VII: Bacau, Botosani, Iasi, Neamt, Suceava and Vaslui; Zone VIII: Bistrita-Nasaud, Maramures
and Salaj.
The austerity policy of the 1980s, aimed at paying off the foreign debt, relied heavily on the
agricultural sector. Since agricultural products constituted the largest part of the exports to western
countries, the priority of industrialization was partly revised and investments in agriculture started to
increase. Still, in 1980 Romania ranked 20t (out of 23 European countries) in agricultural production per
hectare, despite the objectively good quality of the soil. Maintenance of irrigation projects (which were
very energy intensive) and the physical capital endowments became very costly. Therefore, the decline in
investments for upgrading the machinery stock resulted in loss of productivity and deterioration of income
levels in the rural areas. Agricultural exports as a share in total exports continuously declined during the
1980s, and rural-urban migration increased. Therefore, the post-socialist transformation found the
agricultural sector with a low productivity level, a highly depreciated technological base, and an aged
rural population.
The literature suggests several reasons for why the communist model for agriculture was
considered to be inefficient, some of them being stronger than others. I can group them in two categories -
macro and micro level conditions. The macro conditions were set by the command economy itself, which
insulated the farms from market signals, imposed central targets as a substitute for consumer preferences,
and allowed farms to function indefinitely under soft budget constraints without proper profit
accountability. The micro level conditions refer to the exceptionally large firm sizes and collective
organization of production (Cartwright 2001). The excessive size was reflected not only in large land
endowments, but also in the large number of workers employed (in absolute terms and per hectare of
land). In addition, land was locked into fixed collective use patterns, and land transfers among users could
be initiated only by central authorities (Lerman 2000). This type of organization generated high
transaction costs, including the cost of monitoring labor and various agency costs associated with hired
management.
This, in effect, was the Soviet model of socialist agriculture, which dominated the region since the
early 1950s. It is worth mentioning that only Poland, former Yugoslavia 69, and Hungary partially
deviated from this common pattern. In these countries large-scale collective farms never achieved the
same prominence as other socialist countries, and their agricultural sector remained largely based on small
individual farmers throughout the decades following the Second World War (Swain 1999; Lerman 2000).
Swain (1998 p.5) categorizes the experiences of socialist agriculture in CEE between 1948, when
collectivization came into the political agenda, and the collapse of socialism, into four groups: "stalinist
collectivization", "collectivization abandoned", "neo-Stalinist collectivization", and "Hungarian
collectivization". The Hungarian case was distinct from other countries in the region because here a
"substantial symbiotic" relationship between large-scale socialist and small-scale private agriculture was
self-consciously and systematically pursued (Swain 1998 p. 12).
Nevertheless, "tacit de-collectivization" (Hann 1993), or "neo-Stalinism" (Swain 1999), which was
implemented elsewhere had no precedent in Romania (and Albania). These countries stayed faithful to
the 1950s Stalinist model of collectivization: "agricultural purchase prices and wages remained low, the
traditional Stalinist planning model remained intact, the labor-day method of payment remained in place
and household plots were small and discourages from producing for sale" (Swain 1999 p. 120). Therefore,
once socialism collapsed, former collective farms members were more than happy to dismantle them,
entirely in Albania and to a significant extent in Romania (Swain 1999). On the other hand, countries
such as Hungary and Czechoslovakia reformed collective farming rather than dismantled them in the
post-socialist period.
As we have seen so far, over the last century the land tenure system in Romania moved between
striking extremes: from the domination of large scale private farms until the end of the First World War,
to the domination of small scale family farms towards the end of the Second World War when through
nationalization and collectivization most of the land was concentrated in large collective and state owned
farms. By the end of 1989 7 0 % of arable land was used by large collective farms, 21 % was used by state
farms, and 9% was in private property mostly as garden plots and land in the mountainous regions where
collectivization was too difficult to implement (see Table 4-9).
69The "abandonment of collectivization" in Poland took place in 1956, while in Yugoslavia it was between 1951 and
1953. But, because private farming was not encouraged and market forces were suppressed, what emerged was
something different than the western farming model, a dual agricultural system (Swain 1998 p.6 ).
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Table 4-9: Land property structure in 1989 (%)
Agricultural Arable land Grassland Vineyards Orchard
land and hayfields
(14.8 mill. ha) (9.5 mill. ha) 4.7 mill. ha) (0.28 mill. ha) (0.32 mill. ha)
State farms 30 21 42 31 34
Collective farms 55 70 70 55 44
Private property 15 9 9 14 22
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Forestry, 1997 Annual Report (Dumitru 2002).
4.4 De-collectivization: the 1990s post-socialist land reform
Romania was the last country in Eastern Europe to brake away from its post war era, and to start
implementing the transition reform programs in the 1990s. Since then, the structure and institutions that
were established by the communist government were gradually dismantled. Inevitably, as in the case of
other countries experiencing transition, the process resulted in social and economic hardships (i.e. surge in
unemployment and poverty rates, sharp decline in production).
The post-socialist land reform was unprecedented in the degree of institutional restructuring that
took place. Private property rights were re-instated to the pre- 1 940s levels70 and were even expanded 7',
former collective farms were dismantled or restructured into smaller formal associations, new
endogenously formed family associations were created, state farms were slowly privatized, and the former
state owned channels for product collection and marketing, as well as the networks for inputs distribution
were broken down and in some cases private intermediaries surfaced. All these changes were a
tremendous "shock to the system" for farmers and agricultural professionals alike. At least for the first half
of the transition years, the outcome was a real "muddling through" in an environment marked by wide
uncertainties and complete "grey zones" in a constantly changing legal system.
The starting point for the transition process in Romania was, in many respects, more difficult
than in other countries in CEE. Pre-transition policies had an excessive focus on heavy industry and on
large infrastructure projects that most of the time were not economically justified. Additionally, during the
1980s, the rapid repayment of the US$ 11 billion foreign debt (20 to 30 percent of the Gross Domestic
Product - GDP) imposed severe strains on the population, with deep cuts in imports and a widening of the
technological gap (World Bank 2001 b). Consequently, towards the end of 1980s the Romanian economy
was on the verge of collapse.
The Romanian reform process begun after the Parliament issued the Land Law (known as Law
18/1991) in February 1991. Given the difficult communist legacy, and seeking to protect vested interests
70 As I mentioned in the previous chapter, land restitution was limited to 50 hectares, and later to 100 hectares in
order to prevent wide inequalities among the new landowners.
71 Workers on the collective farms received half a hectare of land if they were not landowners prior to
collectivization, and workers on the state farms received shares in the new commercial companies.
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and to minimize the social costs associated with the transformation to a market economy, during the
1990s the Romanian authorities took a gradualist and piecemeal approach to reform. The imposition of
hard budget constraints and the privatization of state-owned enterprises were significantly delayed. While
social concerns were understandable, this strategy failed to produce sustainable gains in either the
economic or the social realm. The lack of political will to reform, and the constrained institutional and
governance capacity are at the root of Romania's less-than-satisfactory economic performance and
worsened social conditions.
The Land Law was among the first laws to be passed by the newly elected government. As seen
from earlier episodes of land reform, issues around land and property proved highly controversial.
Romania's set of policies framing the land reform was one of the most complex in the region, comprising
of land restitution to pre-collectivization owners, distribution of land to farm workers, and restructuring
state owned farms.72 This approach to reforming the agricultural sector, coupled with lack of knowledge
for setting up an adequate institutional framework for the market economy, as well as the vested interests
at different levels in the administration, resulted in a constantly changing and often times confusing
legislation. Box 4-1 lists the main legislative acts for the post-socialist land reform. As, Popica, one of the
key informant, argued, there were several cases when even the judge in the court was unable to keep track
of the constant changing legislative framework.
Box 4-1: The main legislation for the post-socialist land reform in Romania
The Romanian land reform legal framework includes:
" Land Law nr. 18/1991, amended and extended by Law nr. 169/1997
- Law nr. 1/2000 stipulating the land ownership reconstitution for agricultural and forest land,
requested according to Land Law no. 18/1991 and Law no. 169/1997, amended and extended by
GEO nr. 102/2001
e Land Lease Law no. 16/1994, amended and extended by Law nr. 65/1998
* Land Circulation Law no. 54/1998
- Law nr. 7/1996 on General Cadastre and Real Estate Publicity amended by Emergency Ordinance
no 70/2001.
- Law nr. 268/2001 stipulating the privatisation of the commercial companies which administer the
private and public state owned agricultural land and setting up the State Domains Agency
* Governmental Decision 626/2001 approving the enforcement regulations for law 268/2001 and
setting up the State Domains Agency.
" Governmental Decision 131/1991 approving the regulation for setting up the commission for
establishment of property rights amended by GD 180/2000 and replaced by GD 1 172/2001.
Source: Dumitru (2003 p. 6).
The country with the most similar approach to de-collectivization has been Hungary. However, Hungary has also
used voucher privatization as a land reallocation strategy. The other CEE countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia) adopted only land restitution to pre-collectivization landowners. Albania
was the only country that distributed land based on equal per capita basis (Swinnen et al. 1997).
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Land individualization was a political as much as a social issue in the 1990s, as land became a
"political symbol" (Verdery 2004b p. 15) in the post-socialist context. The new political players tried to
capitalize in different ways on the popular aversion to anything related to the communist regime. As
Cartwright (1994) argues, the specific judgments made over the rights and wrongs of the Communist
regime during collectivization gave a highly selective account of state action and peasant reaction.
In Romania, the most vocal political groups advocating for breaking down all the institutional
structures of the socialist agriculture were the "historical parties" of the inter-war period, the Liberal and
the National Peasant parties. Emphasizing the atrocities of the communist regime during collectivization,
these parties stirred the public sentiment and called for land restitution. Their rhetoric resonated strongly
with the rural population, especially in Transylvania, but not only. As Verdery (1996 p. 137) argues, the
anti-communist sentiment was so pervasive that even the former Communists of the governing National
Salvation Front were forced into the clamor to restore property to its former owners. The historical parties
created a momentum that was irreversible, leaving no options for simple land redistribution.
Nevertheless, the governing party, the Front for National Salvation, made up mostly by members
in the former Communist apparatus, exerted significant pressures to reduce the power that historical
parties were building up in the rural areas. One such measure was the limit imposed on the amount of
land to be restituted (10 hectares initially), with a stated goal to promote equity. The main reason,
however, was to preclude the creation of a "viable propertied middle class" (Verdery 1996 p. 137) in
agriculture, that could place significant pressures on the state. At the same time the rural population was
antagonized against these traditional parties by arguing that their true aim was to re-create the large
estates of the gentry while ensuring poverty for the rest.
Hence, the political scene around land reform was quite convoluted. The institutional changes
that followed reflected these constant push and pull factors from the political scene. Legislation changed
constantly to the point to which, as one key informant mentioned, "not even the judge in the court knew
what were the correct stipulations of the law." In addition, government policy constantly changed in
response to both international demands and national discontent. As Verdery (2004 p. 20) also notes "no
policy was left in place long enough to assess its effects properly."
A major outcome of land reform, aside from land individualization, was the downsizing of
socialist farm enterprises: collective and state farms. Lerman et al. (2004, p. 127) argue that the excessively
large size of the socialized farms made them difficult to manage efficiently and contributed to high
transaction costs relative to the levels observed in market economies. Hence, this process, which occurred
throughout the CEE and, to a certain extent, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) region, was
regarded as a desirable objective. Nevertheless, it was the countries that experienced the Soviet model of
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collectivization, mainly Albania and Romania, who engaged into a large-scale process of breaking down
the old institutions.7 3
Given the overview of the collectivization process across CEE countries, these outcomes were to
be foreseen. In Romania, however, many of the collective farms were reorganized into associations
(farming societies) and informal family associations were created endogenously. By the end of 1995 formal
associations farmed 15.2% of non-state agricultural land, informal associations farmed 14.1 %, and the
remaining 70.8% was farmed by over 3.5 million individual households, on plots of an average 2.24
hectares (Swain 1998, p. 14). Hence, alternative farming arrangements, such as different forms of
associations were soon institutionalized in the Romanian context.74 Although the farmed area declined
from the beginning of the 1990s (1.9 million hectares), these institutional forms still represent an important
share in the Romanian economy.
Chapters 7 to 9 discuss in more detail their role and reasons for persisting in the rural economy
and the agricultural sector. Here, it suffices to mention that alternative farming arrangements should
become even more important following EU enlargement and the disbursement of direct payment to
farmers. Given that the eligibility criteria for receiving the payments are very tight (an area larger than 1
hectare and parcels larger than 0.3 hectares) for the small Romanian farmers, 10% of the area will not be
eligible for EU financial support (Giurca et al. 2006 p. 32). As a result, these farmers will face much
harsher market conditions and will most probably be pushed to seek alternative institutional arrangements
such as associations or land market transactions.
Table 4-10 shows that while collective farms declined following land reform, there was less
restructuring of the state farms over the same period in Romania. Nevertheless, notable progress was
recorded after 2000, when most of the state corporate farms were privatized.
7 The most extreme process of de-collectivization was documented in Albania: "when the regime finally came to an
end in 1991, there followed an extraordinary orgy of destruction and vandalism. As if the world came to an end and
there were no future needs, vineyards and orchards were destroyed, co-operative buildings razed to the ground,
school windows, furniture and books demolished; machinery broken, and the entire rural telephone system ripped
off' (de Wall 1991 p.17 3 ).
74 Formal associations were set up following Law 36/1991 and currently farm 975,545 hectares (7%) of the utilized
agricultural area at the national level (Giurca et al. 2006 p. 34).
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Table 4-10: Downsizing of corporate farms in CEE (average size in hectares)
Cooperatives State farms
Pre-1990 1997-1998 % of 1990 Pre-1990 1997-1998 % of 1990
level level
Bulgaria 4,000 637 16% 1,615 735 46%
Czech 2,578 1,447 56% 9,443 521 6%
Republic
Slovakia 2,667 1,509 57% 5,186 3,056 59%
Hungary 4,176 833 20% 7,138 7,779 110%
Poland 335 222 66% 3,140 620 20%
Romania 2,374 451 19% 5,001 3,657 73%
Source: Lerman et al. (2004, p. 128), based on data from the European Commission, Directorate-General for
Agriculture (DG VI), "Agricultural Situation and Prospects in the Central and Eastern European Countries:
Summary Report", Working Document, Brussels,June 1998.
As discussed in the previous section, agricultural mechanization services were provided until 1989
by agricultural mechanization stations, administered by the state. In 1990, following Law 15/1990, these
entities were turned into commercial companies (e.g. Agromec). The 573 agricultural mechanization
stations were transformed into more than 1,626 companies providing mechanization services (Alexandri
et al. 2005). However, at present, those units that did not face bankruptcy changed their object of activity
by leasing in land and starting farming business. As a result of land individualization, there was less
demand for their services (Alexandri et al. 2005).
The process of land reform in Romania was recently documented more extensively, focusing
primarily on the resulting institutional changes and the social implications of reform (Swain 1999;
Dumitru 2002; Aligica and Dabu 2003; Verdery 2003). Therefore, in the following sections, my overview
will address mainly aspects related to land reallocation as a result of de-collectivization, and the challenges
for land consolidation and agricultural growth.
4.4.1 The restitution of property rights
Land restitution proceeded at a very fast pace resulting in unprecedented levels of private
property and dramatic changes in the socio-economic structure in the rural society. While the most
radical change in private property was seen in Albania7 5 one can argue that land distribution is much less
politically charged and institutionally cumbersome than restitution. In Romania, restitution was made
based on the 1940s land records, generating not only personal conflicts over the historical boundaries, but
also economic setback by superimposing two institutional structures that were based on different
economic, political, and social conditions. As discussed in the earlier sections, prior to collectivization,
Romania was mainly an agricultural economy, with the majority of the population living in the rural
75 In Albania, by 1995 94.2% of the agricultural land was in private hands (Cungu and Swinnen 1999).
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areas, and with limited commercial activity. The massive industrialization policies implemented during
the socialist regime, and the subsequent pressures for economic integration into the EU economic and
institutional structures during the post-socialist transition, created an entirely different social fabric, urban-
rural labor reallocation, and economic environment. Therefore, when discussing land reform, and hence
land reallocation, it is critical to keep in the background this unique reform setting.
Land restitution was the key component in the agrarian reform in Romania, and the socialist
collective farms were the ones to provide the required land assets for this process. Ultimately, by
restituting land to former landowners, the reform strategists intended to reconcile the wrongdoings
inflicted on the population by the communist expropriations. While formally land remained in individual
property during the communist regime, in practice private property rights were not enforced at all, being
essentially "confiscated" by state. Therefore, land restitution resonated deeply with feelings of social
justice, creating at the same time an unprecedented momentum that served well the different political
groups that struggled to secure control in the emerging and very unstable and fragile democratic society.
The economic implications of land restitution were not placed high on the reform agenda. This
outcome was evidenced by: (a) the lack of policies to address land consolidation; (b) delayed reforming of
the upstream and downstream distribution channels; (c) lack of financing schemes for the newly created
small individual farmers; and (d) limited provisions for safeguarding the small producers from the adverse
effects of "price-scissors" as a result of industrial restructuring, inflation, and low prices for agricultural
products. As Dumitru (2002) argues, the Romanian land reform was pushed more by the society and the
international institutions rather than by visionary political leadership. Within this context, it becomes
critical to examine closely the principles based on which land was redistributed, which will later help us
understand the choices individual households made in reallocating their land assets between different
institutional arrangements.
As mentioned earlier, in Romania land reform addressed both land restitution and land
privatization. Law 18/1991 stipulated that those individuals who contributed land to collective farms
could reclaim their land based on historical boundaries. 76 The restitution process typically involved
several stages (Dumitru 2002): 1) claim of the right; 2) checking and validation of the claims; 3)
establishment of land balance for each village; 4) identification of parcels, completion of surveys and
handing over of land; 5) issuance and delivery of property titles. Full property right would be granted only
after all these stages were completed.
76 The main requirement was for individuals to submit claims supported by evidence of previous ownership in a
period of 40 days after the law was published in Monitorul Oficial. If claimants' entitlement was determined and
approved by the special commission appointed for each cooperative, they received "adeverinte de punere in posesie"
(temporary ownership certificates), stipulating the acreage and quality of land which they are entitled to receive.
After the necessary measurements of land have been made and all possible points of dispute have been solved,
eligible persons could receive the final ownership titles, registered as legal documents (Gavrilescu et al. 1999).
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There were, however, limitations on how much land one individual could reclaim. Initially the
law set a minimum of 0.5 hectares of arable land for each entitled person and a maximum of 10 hectares
per family (in addition to at most one hectare of forested land per family), upper limit which was later
increased to 50 hectares according to Law 1/2000.77 In addition, article 46 from Law 18/1991
established that the maximum amount of land that a family could own was 100 hectares (including
donations, inheritance, purchases or exchanges of land). Throughout de-collectivization 10.6 million
hectares were returned to 4,177,898 private owners, of which 3,251,472 received a definitive property title
(Dumitru 2002). The actual process of issuing property titles evolved relatively fast, with 70% of the land
deeds being assigned to the new owners (see Table 4-11).
Table 4-11: Land property titles issued between 1991 and 1999
Annual number of Share of the total number Cumulative % of
property titles of property titles issued property titles issued
issued yearly yearly
1991 25,963 0.60 0.60
1992 81,780 1.88 2.48
1993 592,564 13.68 16.16
1994 857,551 19.80 35.96
1995 843,085 19.46 55.42
1996 439,992 10.16 65.58
1997 188,174 4.34 69.92
1998 188,245 4.35 74.27
1999 125,934 2.90 77.17
Total 3,343,288 77.19 -
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Food, National Program for Agriculture and Development (1999): 13. Aligica
and Dabu (2003).
Despite having obtained land titles, according to the Land Law the new owners were not
permitted to sell the land for a period of ten years. Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence suggests that land
sales (and exchanges) were conducted fairly often based on informal contractual arrangements, mainly
between family members and neighbors. The restriction on land transactions, which will be discussed in
detail in Chapter 7, was intended to prevent land concentration early in the transition and to secure a
stable source of income and livelihood for the rural population when inflation created a large dent in real
incomes and industrial restructuring increased unemployment to record levels. The limit on the amount
of land in ownership and the ban on land sales aimed to ensure that land remains relatively equally
distributed.
The restriction on land transactions was removed in 1998 by Law 54/1998, regulation which also
increased the upper limit of land that one family could own, from 100 to 200 hectares. Nevertheless,
77 The collective and state owned pastures and hayfields were transferred to commune property.
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participation in land markets remained limited, for economic and social reasons that will be discussed in
later chapters. Most land transactions were recoded in the West, following large foreign direct investments
and rapid economic development. Land rentals were more frequent, similarly with other countries in the
CEE (Vranken and Swinnen 2006). The legal framework for leasing transactions was implemented only in
1994, and due to several restrictions and rigidities, it was only after 1998 that leasing became a real
alternative for individual farmers. Slowly, the deterioration in the macroeconomic conditions for private
household farming led to the emergence of very large tenants ("super-tenants", to borrow the term from
Verdery (2003)) that were working extensive areas of land, over 1,000 hectares. These very large private
agricultural entrepreneurs emerged mostly in the South, scattered in the eastern parts of Moldova, and in
the West in the Banat region.
Following an example from Lerman et al. (2004 p. 131) 1 calculated the "Lorenz inequality
curve" for land distribution between different farm sizes, where the vertical axis gives the cumulative
percentage of land across farms and the horizontal axis gives the cumulative percentage of farms of all
types, ranked by size (see Figure 4-3).78
Figure 4-3: Lorenz curve for land distribution in 2002
Lorenz Curve - land distribution (based on used agricultural area) in 2002
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Source: Calculations based on Agricultural Census, 2002.
The straight diagonal line represents "ideal equality", when land is uniformly distributed over all
farms so that 50% of farms account for 50% of land. The chart shows that in 2002 90% of the farms were
working 30% of the agricultural land, while 10% were working the remaining of 70% of agricultural land,
which denotes a quite large disparity in landholding size. Nevertheless, Lerman et al.(2004) show that in
78 The distribution curves include household plots, semi-commercial and commercial family farms, and larger
corporate farms. Also, the data refer to actual land use, and does not necessarily reflect ownership patterns.
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1997 the concentration of land in Romania (along with Estonia) had a "normal" land concentration
curve, close to the market pattern of land concentration (50% of farmland was concentrated in the top
10% of farms). The increase in land concentration in the subsequent years suggests that Romania is
moving towards a "sharply dual" system of land concentration. In addition, the fact that 90% of farmers
work only 30% of the land point to the extremely small and fragmented landownership, which was the
direct result of the reform strategies, and of the delayed and inconsistent legislative frameworks.
As a result of land restitution, most collective farms were dissolved and the land returned to
former owners and their heirs. In addition, part of the land was distributed to workers in the collective
farms that were not landowners at the time of collectivization. Nevertheless, the restitution process was full
of twists and turns because, aside from land, the Land Law also required the restitution of physical assets.
Verdery (2003) documents in quite a lot of details the intricacies of asset distribution, the state auctioning
process, and the haphazard procedures and outcomes of this process. Regional differences in the speed of
land redistribution and farming arrangements became soon evident. One reason for these disparities
relates to the institutional legacies for land registration. Transylvania had, from the time of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire, a well documented cadastral and registration land system, while in the rest of
Romania cadastral maps were lacking, slowing down the restitution and titling process.
The land in state farms was managed quite differently in the aftermath of land reform. According
to Land Law, those individuals that had land within the boundaries of state farms received shares in the
new semi-privatized farms, equivalent to the land confiscated by the communist regime. Because state
owned farms were the cornerstone of the Romanian agriculture, physical restitution of land was not
possible initially. The newly established shareholders were very limited in their property rights since the
possibility to trade the shares did not exist and the voting power within the shareholder assembly was
insignificant (Dumitru 2002). As Dumitru further claims, later on these limitations became less binding.
With the adoption of leasing legislation, the shareholders had two options: to remain shareholders or to
lease out the land by signing a five year lease with the agricultural company using the land, period after
which the landowner would be entitled to get back the land.
4.4.2 Challenges for land consolidation and improved performance
Following land restitution, the most challenging task for policy makers was to tackle the problem
of land fragmentation, by finding socially and economically viable solutions to achieve land consolidation.
While little was achieved in integrating the newly reorganized agricultural sector into the wider economic
structure, farmers sought to enhance their returns by reallocating their land assets into different farming
arrangements (Chapters 7 to 9 discuss these outcomes in more details).
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While land restitution was very effective, proceeding at a fast pace 79 (see Table 4-11), little
progress was made in terms of institutional reforms accompanying land policies (e.g. marketing, credit
access) and in integrating land reform in the overall rural development policy planning. In many ways
land reform was seen by policy-makers as a task for compensating individuals for the historical injustices
that were committed by forced collectivization between 1949-1962 (Cartwright 1994; Swain 1999), which
then detracted efforts from embedding land policies in the larger economic development planning. Other
countries viewed the restitution process in a different light. In Hungary for example, a country that
constantly adjusted the socialist model in order to improve it, reformers were more concerned with
improving the viability of farm structures than with compensating past injustices (Swain 1999).
Land reform dramatically changed the agricultural landscape in Romania. Private property
became predominant to the detriment of public property. Therefore, the former arrangements for input
procurements, output marketing and credit mechanisms became unsuitable for a numerous and dispersed
clientele (Chirca and Tesliuc 1999). At the outset of transition8 0, 411 state farms and 6,000 producer
cooperatives exploited almost all of the country's arable land resources.
Private individual farms occupy 55. 4 % of the agricultural utilized area and have an average size
of 1.73 hectares (Giurca et al. 2006 p. 32). Aside from their very small size, the choice of land restitution
based on the 1940s land records, resulted in a very high degree of land fragmentation. Table 4-12 shows
that in 1998 the level of land fragmentation was more severe than in 1948. In the beginning of the 2000s
the average number of parcels per owner was around four to five, with parcels averaging 3,000 square
meters (FAO 2002).
Table 4-12: Land fragmentation in Romania: 1998 and 1948 compared (%)
1948 1998
Under I hectare 36 45
1 - 2 hectare 27 24
Over 2 hectare 37 31
Total 100 100
Source: Chirca and Tesliuc (1999 p. 38)
Soon after Land Law was adopted, a survey implemented by the Academy of Agricultural and
Forestry Science (ASAS) in 1992 showed that 86% of the farms were smaller than five hectares, and the
average farm size was 2.5 hectares of agricultural land, dramatically smaller and fragmented than two
years earlier (see Table 4-13). The issue of land fragmentation is central to the analysis of landowners'
79 According to the Ministry of Agriculture, in December 1989, 9% of total arable land was in the private sector
(mainly individual garden plots), 70% was in collective farms, and 210% was in state farms (Dumitru 2002 p. 8).
Currently, more than 9 5 % of the land is in private ownership.
80 In 1989 the figures are from the Statistical Yearbook 1990, published by the National Commission of Statistics,
Romania.
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choices of institutional arrangements for farming during transition, analyzed at length mainly in Chapter
8. The term land fragmentation refers to multiple dimensions of the physical characteristics regarding a
specific land plot, such as size and location. As Sabates-Wheeler (2005 p. 1007) discusses, fragmentation
may imply any one or a combination of the following: a) non-contiguous parcels that are owned and tilled
as a single enterprise; b) parcels that are distant from owner's homes or from each other; c) ownership of
very small parcels.
Table 4-13: Farm structure in 1992
Number of On average per household
households Hectares (ha) Number of plots
Number % Agricultur Arable Agricultur Arable
al al
Landless households 671 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
< 0.5 ha 2,431 11.9 0.2 0.1 1.3 1.0
0.5 - I ha 3,022 14.0 0.7 0.5 2.3 1.7
1 - 2 ha 4,551 20.9 1.4 1.1 3.5 2.5
2 - 3 ha 3,640 16.8 2.4 1.9 4.5 3.3
3 - 4 ha 2,481 11.5 3.4 2.7 5.1 3.8
4 - 5 ha 1,619 7.7 4.4 3.5 5.4 4.2
5 - 10 ha 2,710 13.0 6.6 5.3 6.4 4.8
> 10 ha 263 1.5 10.5 7.5 6.6 4.6
Total 21,388 100.0 2.5 2.0 3.9 2.9
7 1Source: Ancneta sociologca corplexa , cuIuctcu in
December 1993.
1992 by ASAS and publshed in 2couuuIStui nr. 4U , 4
Nevertheless, land fragmentation characterized the post-socialist agrarian structure throughout
most of Eastern Europe, and was widely understood as the main constraint to agricultural performance
(Sabates-Wheeler 2005). Table 4-14 provides some evidence on the extent of fragmentation in three
Balkan countries. We observe that even if farm size is relatively larger in Romania, fragmentation is more
severe.
Table 4-14: Land fragmentation for selected Balkan countries
Fragmentation indicators Unit Romania Albania Bulgaria
(2000) (2001) (1998)
Average farm size Ha 2.3 1.25 2
Average plot size Ha 0.43 0.25 0.5
Average number of parcels No. 4-5 3-4 3-7
Private farms with <1 hectare % 40 42 86
Total number of farms Million 4.7 0.48 2.6
Total number of parcels Million 40 1.8 12
Source: Sabates-Wheeler (2005 p. 1007).
Even if land fragmentation is a common phenomenon across the CEE region, the extreme
crumbling of agricultural land poses problems for a clear and accurate delimitation of plots for the
disbursement of funds from the EU's CAP budget. More recently, satellite imaging is being used to map
ownership boundaries in the regions that are lacking cadastral maps, and to bring up to date the older
maps that existed mainly in Transylvania. This process, however, is very time consuming and
controversial since a lot of inconsistencies are being identified, as mentioned earlier. Second, land
fragmentation poses significant challenges for land consolidation increasing the transaction costs for land
registration and land market transactions.
For comparative purposes, Table 4-15 illustrates the average size of all farms as well as the share
of small and large farms in total land cultivated by the EU-CEE countries in year 2002. It can be noticed
that significant differences exist between them, with small farms predominating in Romania.
Table 4-15: Average size of all farms as well as share of small and large farms in total land
cultivated by country
Country Average Share of cultivated Share of cultivated
farm size land bellow 5 ha land above 50 ha
(ha)
Czech Republic 100 1% 93%
Slovakia 31 2% 96%
Estonia 12 9% 56%
Latvia 12 9% 3l1/o
Lithuania 4 31% 11 0
Poland 8 16% 25%7o
Slovenia 6 46% 8%
Bulgaria 4 19% 75%y0
Hungary 4 18% 58%
Romania 2 58% 19%
Total 5 27% T 38%
Source: IAMO (2004 p. 13)
Although initially conceived as a complete set of laws and regulations to secure land ownership
and tenure, the legal and institutional setup was rather devious with big gaps of three, four and even more
years between different laws. The Land Law 18/1991 has been amended and extended in 1997, 1999,
and again in 2001. The legislation on land leasing was approved four years later, in 1994, and amended in
1998. The law on cadastre and land registration was issued six years later, in 1997 and amended in 2001.
Moreover, the land market was formalized eight years after the start of land reform, in 1998.
Another drawback that resulted from the specific institutional design of land policy was that land
reform created more absentee landowners than any other reform in Romania's history. According to the
Ministry of Agriculture by 1992, 43% of those who benefited from restitution were living in the urban
areas, 39% were living in the rural areas but were working in nearby towns, leaving only 18% of the new
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owners living in the rural areas and having agriculture as the main occupation. 8 1 In addition, choosing to
restitute land based on the 1940s records meant that many of the former landowners had died, moved, or
emigrated. The question of how their heirs were to divide the restitution claims among themselves was not
regulated, generating conflicts among family members. According to OECD (1996), disputes related to
the implementation of Law 18 generated about one million court cases.
Aside from difficulties created by the natural changes in population, the so-called process of
"shrinking the land" (Cartwright 2000 p. 1 7 1) created even more contestations during de-collectivization.
Cartwright recounts that in order to reduce the burden of quotas imposed during collectivization, villagers
used different methods of miss-reporting the size of their agricultural land. For example households
divided their land between all the sons and daughters, or families 'sold' land to a neighbor on the
understanding that the agreement was only temporary and that when circumstances were different the
land would be returned. Most of these agreements (generally on oral terms) resulted in under-reporting
their land when the Agricultural Register was compiled, further complicating the restitution process in
early 1991. A similar, but reverse process is being documented now, after joining the EU institutional
structure, on the eve of receiving the direct payment from the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) budget.
Due to a faulty system of monitoring and lack of clear and unified cadastral system (through geo-
mapping), many small farmers are miss-declaring the area in ownership, which could result in a loss of
100 million Euro from the CAP budget for Romania (Morovan 2007).
The literature abounds with evidence about the ideological character of land reform. The post-
socialist land reform in Romania was no exception. On the one hand, individuals saw in land reform
(mainly restitution and de-collectivization) an opportunity for correcting the wrong-doings of the
communists, who forcefully alienated them from their properties, by using the state mechanisms.
Politicians, on the other hand, used the land policies for consolidating their position in the still embryonic
government by securing the votes from more than half of the population that was living in the rural areas.
Nevertheless, even if the end goal was the same for all the political parties (gaining political power), there
were differences in the underlying rationales among political actors.
The reform process was characterized by pull-and-push factors to de-collectivization, as political
factions differed in their support for fully transferring assets from the state to private use. It was not until
1997 that reform efforts started to concentrate on privatizing state farms (Tesliuc 2000), process which
was further delayed till 2001. As Tesliuc (2000 p.2) argues, "the conflict between reformists and nostalgics
often led to intermediary solutions, where one step for reform is taken simultaneously with its antipode."
In addition, the post-socialist outcomes have been determined by the importance of social capital
of professional expertise and more importantly, the political capital and personal contacts enjoyed by
81 Information from the newspaper "Adevarul", 23 April 1993.
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managers of cooperative farms, which ensured access to machinery, services, and markets (Verdery 1997;
Swain 1998; Swain 1999). The extensive literature on de-collectivization, and the field research that I
conducted in the Western Plain and Central Romanian Plain, suggest that land reform was far from a
conflict-free process. Collective farm managers were obviously trying to prevent the dissolution of large-
scale farming. Their success in convincing farmers to keep their land in cooperatives under their
leadership depended both on their earlier prestige and effective leadership of the collective farm, and on
the history of collectivization in the region. As Swain (1990 p. 1208) also points out for the Hungarian
case, managers of successful farms, "had the authority and prestige" to persuade members to accept their
proposals. I had similar findings in the West, where in the context in which most collective farms were
dissolved, Combinatul Agro-Industrial in Curtici, Arad County, has survived and developed considerably
after land reform. The majority of the farmers in the nearby villages continued to be members in the new
private restructured collective farm, based on individual rental contracts. The prestige of the farm during
the communist regime and its strong leadership made it almost effortless for the manager to maintain its
power. Similar cases, which will be discussed in mode details in Chapter 9, were observed in the southern
plains, although there the overall push for de-collectivization was weaker and conflicts over land were less
political.
4.5 Chapter sunmary
The chronology of land reform in Romania showed how the land question represented a constant
struggle for the rural population. Despite different historical and political contexts, it is inevitable to miss
that each reform of the agricultural sector seemed to have generated the similar outcomes, facing similar
constraints to achieving agricultural growth and rural development. Land fragmentation, low degree of
mechanization, and in general a stronger emphasis on ideological factors rather than economic
development, are some of the main outcomes, which are part of the "never ending story of land reform"
in Romania. Therefore, I argue that land reform in the post-socialist period should be viewed through the
prism of historical legacies and circumstances from earlier experiences. Moreover, regional differences can
partially be explained by historical patterns of property rights in Romania. Hence, I will take these issues
further to discuss the persistence of farming associations during transition through qualitative findings in
Chapter 9.
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Chapter 5 : Taking stock of the main land reform outcomes in
Romania
In the previous chapter I discussed the importance of placing the post-socialist agrarian land
reform in a broader historical and economic context. More recently a large body of literature suggests that
initial conditions in reforming countries matter, and that to a certain extent they do influence policy
outcomes. This is not to say that I adopt a "glacial" view of institutions, but that historical patterns of
property rights, production relations, and social processes tend to reproduce themselves and result in
regional differences (within or between countries) in reform outcomes. Along the same lines Smyth (1998)
argues that the speed at which markets develop is likely to depend on the extent to which countries and
regions have a history of market culture prior to socialism.
Having reviewed the institutional progression of land reform since the beginning of the 19th
century, this chapter discusses contemporary outcomes of land reform in Romania. I start by pointing to
the initial expectations created by the adherence to the Neoliberal model of transition, and then I show
that outcomes have deviated significantly from what the architects of post-socialist reform envisaged.
Section 5.2 and 5.3 examines in more detail the role that Romania's agricultural sector plays in the larger
economy (in the European Union and the national economy), as well as the economic and social
outcomes of reform in terms of poverty and rural-urban migration.
5.1 The Neoliberal myth and the Romanian transition
The fall of the communist regime marked the beginning of the most comprehensive land reform
after collectivization in the CEE countries. Nevertheless, under the umbrella of the Neoliberal ideology,
the principles of land reform were reformulated. A faithful adherence to the Neoliberal agenda implied
that the role of the state would be limited to undoing the process of collectivization by reallocating
property rights in land and assets. The economic theories of neoliberalism (shock-therapy policies) were
supposed to eclipse the old order and set in motion an irreversible expansion of the market economy
(Burawoy 1999). The market, through its self-regulating capacity, would ensure that resources get
allocated in the most efficient way resulting into a readjustment of the backward and forward linkages for
a capitalist production system.
Expectations were high that once property rights were distributed to individuals (away from the
state), a new class of small family farms, operating on capitalist practices, would instantaneously emerge.
Privatization of land and assets, formerly in state ownership, would thus be the panacea for agricultural
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development, and generally for economic growth in the former socialist countries. As Amsden (1993)
pointed, diehard free market economists in Eastern Europe and their Western consultants argued that if
any form of state planning is introduced, Communism is likely to return through the back door.
Moreover, in this frenzy of "fundamentalist capitalism" (free market, free trade, privatization), the fate of
small enterprises, like farms, was never an issue (Cohen and Schwartz 1993).
As Roland (2000 p. xviii) argues, the results of policy advice given to transition countries was
particularly humbling for the Neoliberal economists, to say the least, and remain a subject of controversy.
After more than a decade of transition it became evident that the actual strategies for reform in CEE
countries (as well as in Asia) have, to a certain degree, diverted from the standard mainstream
prescriptions, as the "shortages of goods gave way to a shortage of purchasing power" (Amsden 1993 p.1).
The expectations of reform policy makers were unmet both in terms of time and outcomes. For example,
Kornai (1990 p. 103), in an earlier statement, suggested that the reforms could and should be put in place
within a year (cited in Smyth 1998), which proved to be an unrealistic prospect. The difficulties
confronting the reforms were generally greater than the architects envisaged, despite the awareness that
systemic change involved unknown variables (Smyth 1998; Kozul-Wright and Rayment 1997).82
At the same time, the overwhelmingly positive outcomes from land restitution were very slow to
emerge. The expectations of transition, such as an increase in productivity levels and a decline in rural
poor, were not met (Deninger 2003, 2005). In fact, production declined, rural poverty increased, and
public services in the rural areas were severely curtailed as a result of de-collectivization and the
privatization of state farms (World Bank 2007). As Creed (1999) mentioned, the pain of transition became
a major problem not simply because it was a painful, but because as transition proceeded, it moved from
being a temporary inconvenience on the road to capitalism to a seemingly permanent discomfort.
Given the superiority of private property embedded in the tenets of market economy, the
Neoliberal architects of the post-socialist reforms assumed that the transition costs would be lower for
private owners than for state and collective farms (Zbierski-Salameh 1999). The reasons for such
expectations resided in the static belief that once property rights are individualized, entrepreneurial forces
would be magically unleashed and a market economy would be well underway. However, the reality has
showed that peasants have in fact faced the highest costs of transition.
The post-socialist policies of liberalization and stabilization implemented all across the CEE
countries weakened the purchasing power of the population (of those living in the rural areas in
82 For example, Kozul-Wright and Rayment (1997), citing evidence from ECE (1992; 1995) show that the Polish
Government expected GDP to fall by 3% in 1990 and to rise by 3.5% in 1991; in fact, it fell by 12 and 70%
respectively. In Hungary, the government forecast output growth of 2-3 % a year for 1991-1993, but instead it fell
each year and in 1993 GDP was 20% below its level in 1989. In the Czech Republic, the government anticipated a
drop of 5-10% in GDP in 1991 - it actually fell by 15%, and by another 6% in 1992.
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particular), constraining their access to productive resources, and therefore limiting their capacity to
exercise the newly acquired private property rights. Price liberalization fundamentally reshaped
agricultural prices, affecting the profitability of agricultural production. The prices of agricultural inputs
skyrocketed, while retail prices increased only marginally.
Because of unstable economic conditions as a result of stabilization policies, credit preferences
were shifted, and small private farmers were certainly not on the list for credit access. Peasants were
expected to generate their own financial resources through increased productivity, as in the case of Polish
farmers (Zbierski-Salameh 1999 p. 1 96). Aside from imperfect access to financial resources small farmers
also had difficulties in accessing agricultural machineries. Moreover, the sale of agricultural products was
constrained by the plummeting of the consumers' purchasing power, the shift in consumer preferences
towards foreign products (following trade liberalization), as well as by the dismantling of state collection
networks and the restructuring of the food processing industry. This last aspect was extremely problematic
for small family farms because the remaining distribution channels from the socialist agriculture
organization were suited only for large-scale farms, while no new institutions were set-up for facilitating
the marketing of products for small landowners. As a result, instead of actively participating in the market
economy, the immediate and long lasting effect from reform policies has been the retreat of small private
farmers from markets.
At the institutional level, a strategy of "sub-rosa resistance" (Allina-Pisano 2004a) from the state
cadres, coupled with a more complex valuation of land and farming by the rural population (Verdery
2003), in the actual reality of building markets "on the ruins of socialism" (Stark and Bruszt 1998)
contributed to changing the course of transition away from the teleological prescriptions of Neoliberal
reform experts, and reaching unexpected outcomes.
The rise in rural poverty and the decline in agricultural production called researchers to question
the complex interconnection between private property rights and economic development during the post-
socialist transformation (Allina-Pisano 2007). The Neoliberal approach led to an over-emphasis of the
swift removal of state intervention and the belief that such path would unleash economic initiatives among
private property owners. Nevertheless, the reality was that the "invisible hand" of the market prevented
many private landowners to enter the market, and left the state with "inadequate institutional and
technical capacity" to guide the post-socialist transformation.
Taking stock of all these factors allows us to better understand the pattern of farming
arrangements in the post-socialist agricultural sector in Romania and in the very recent environment of
post-accession to the EU economic and institutional framework. I hypothesize that the economic and
social conditions during transition contribute to partially explain the persistence of farming associations
and the slow emergence of land market transactions.
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Post-socialist transformation is unquestionably a process marked by wide economic and political
instabilities. In this environment, policy makers are exposed to entirely new economic principles based on
a different ideology, and hence requiring an altered and innovative approach to policy-making.
Nevertheless, due to uncertainties characteristic of transition, and internal political fights for power, a
short-term rather than long-term vision prevailed in reforming the economy, with serious implications for
socio-economic development.
Banerjee (1999 p. 18) claims that "few historical phenomena share the remarkable uniformity
found in the history of agrarian relation." Indeed, as we saw in the previous chapter, there is a pattern of
agriculture receiving a last minute quick solution, any change being geared to the main stakeholders (i.e.
large landowners). According to Binswanger et al. (1995) this outcome is hardly surprising. The authors
argue that the state has "always and everywhere" intervened in the market for inputs and outputs in order
to favor large landowners.8 3
Soon after reforms were implemented, it became obvious that in the attempt to correct the
wrongdoings of the communist regime through forced collectivization, and to protect the interests of large
state and corporate farms, land reform was viewed as a cushion for the economic and social hardships
generated by Neoliberal policies that resulte in mass unemployment, unprecedented inflation, and
depreciation of incomes.
In the following sections I briefly discuss the main outcomes of the post-socialist land reform, the
opportunities and hindrances to change, as well as the social conditions in which reform was
implemented. I divide the chapter into economic, social, and institutional outcomes of land reform. When
necessary, I compare and contrast the reform outcomes in Romania with other countries in the CEE
region and in the EU in general.
5.2 The economic outcomes of land reform
A discussion of the land reform outcomes should inevitably start with a brief overview of the role
of the agricultural sector in the Romanian economy and the importance of the sector in the broader EU
region. As I showed in the previous chapter, agriculture has historically been very important for the
Romanian economy. Under the Soviet influence, the massive industrialization undertaking of the socialist
regime reduced the reliance on agriculture as a primary source of revenue and employment, but it
significantly increased investments in modernization (specifically in mechanization), specialization, and
production reorganization. In a similar fashion with the other countries in the region, the institutional
83 The authors argue that the withdrawal of government privileges for large landowners led either to their
disintegration into landlord estates of to a shift towards rent seeking and more subtle forms of support for large farms
(p. 86).
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emphasis was on state, collective farms, and mechanization stations to service these new farming
arrangements. Nevertheless, while a wide literature showed that the Soviet model of agriculture proved to
be ineffective (Deininger 1993), other authors point to the need for a broader contextual interpretation of
these organizations to include the social role their played at the community level, and the symbiosis
between the large socialist farms and private farming (on garden plots) (Swain 1985).
Land is one of the main natural resources in Romania. Two thirds of Romania's agricultural area
is agricultural land84, and more than 8 0% of the agricultural land is arable, rich in cernozium, making
most of the Romanian landscape suitable for growing cereals and other temperate climate crops. In the
plains most land is used to grow maize, wheat, barley, sunflower and sugar beets. In hilly areas, alongside
with maize there are orchards and vineyards, and in the river valleys mostly vegetables are grown. The
large cereal sector supports a moderate livestock sector specializing in hog, poultry, and cattle breeding.
5.2.1 Romania's agricultural sector in the EU context
Land provides a source of employment for more than a third of the population. This share is even
higher if we consider the self-employed informal labor and part-time farmers that are not included in the
regular employment or unemployment statistics. As Table 5-1 illustrates, following accession, Romania
became the largest agricultural country in the EU in terms of the value added in agriculture as a
percentage of GDP (13.4% as compared to 50% average in the ten CEE countries that joined three years
earlier), the share of labor force in agriculture, and the percentage of utilized agricultural area from total
land (slightly less than Hungary).
84 Out of a total area of 23.8 million hectare, Romania's agricultural area is nearly 14.9 million hectare (or 62% of
the total).
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Table 5-1 Comparative indicators on the agricultural sector in the EU countries
Value added Labor force in Utilized Share of food
in agriculture agriculture as a agricultural expenses in
as a % from % from total area as a % family income
GDP 2002 2002 from total area (%) 2002
2000
EU 15 1.6 4.3 40.6 16.2
CEEC 10 4.6 13.4 54.4 28.3
Estonia 2.9 6.5 22.1_32.7
Hungary 3.1 6.1_ 27.7
Letonia 2.9 15.3 38.5 32.9
Lithuania 2.1 18.6 53.4
Poland 2.5 58.3 28.0
Slovakia 2.1 6.6 49.8 28.7
Czech 1.2 4.9 54.3 26.4
Republic
Slovenia 2.1 9.7 242 220
Bulgaria 10.7 50.3
Romania
Source: European Commission (Eurostat and the DG for Agriculture), FAO and U
The share of employed civilian working population is the highest, 3 3 %, almost double than
Poland, which has the second highest share. We also see that the share of food expenses in family income
in 2002 was the highest in Romania (40%), almost double the average of the other former communist
countries in the region. Also food prices increased the most (on average 9 .5 %) in Romania.
In addition, while Romania has the largest number of agricultural holdings (4,485 thousands), the
average holding size is the smallest (3.1 hectare/holding) (see Table 5-2). In the EUl5 model of family
farms the average farm size is 20 hectares8 5, revealing large differences between farm structures. It is very
likely (and expected) that many of the small farms will not be able to withstand competitive pressures from
the EU agricultural producers in the years following enlargement (World Bank 2007b). Currently 45.4%
of the individual agricultural holdings are in the size category of 0.31-2 hectares, 38% are between 2-5
hectares, only 5 % are between 5-10 hectares, and much less, I%, are larger than 10 hectares (Gavrilescu
and Gavrilescu 2007).
85 In the United States, a farm operated by full owners has an average of 112 ha, while in Canada it has an average
of 164 ha (Lerman et al. 2004 p. 78).
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Table 5-2: Farm size in Romania, EU-15 and NMS-10 in 2005
Physical average size of Economic average size of
farms (ha) farms (ESU)
Romania 3.1 1.1
EU-15 20.2 20.7
NMS-10 8.3 3.5
Source: Rural Development in the European Union. Statistical and Economic Information. Report 2006, EU, cited
in Luca (2007). NMS (Non-Member States).
These indicators suggest that the agricultural sector in Romania poses significant challenges for
the EU economy as a whole, not only in terms of financial support through direct payments, but also in
terms of market sharing, competitiveness, and social development.
The agricultural sector was one of the most difficult chapters to negotiate prior to accession. The
main problems were the low competitiveness level relative to the EU countries, significant delays in
institutional reform (i.e. cadastral measurements and land registration), and the high degree of land
fragmentation. Moreover, the types of support offered to agricultural producers by the Romanian
Government (i.e. input subsidies and product price supplements) were inconsistent with the types of
support and instruments used within the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) (i.e. decoupled direct income
support complemented by programs effectively targeting the sector's need to increase competitiveness and
efficiency) (World Bank 2005). Therefore, the alignment to the EU institutional structures implies a shift
to efficiency enhancing measures rather than subsidies and price supports.
As Table 5-3 shows, across all types of crops, the yield levels in Romania were much lower than in
the other CEE countries, as well as relative to the EU average. This clearly suggests that the agricultural
sector in Romania was not able to catch up with the EU countries prior to integration in 2007, adding
significant pressures on national producers to adjust to the new standards of competitiveness. This
distinction becomes even more important given that due to already high pressures on the CAP (to reduce
subsidies and become less protectionist), Romania will have access to only a small share of the EU market.
Quality standards will become more stringent and market niches more narrow, increasing the challenges
for domestic producers.
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Table 5-3 Comparison of selected commodities yield level relative to Romania (averages
for 2000-2003
Cereals, Sugar Sugar Rape seed, Sunflower, Milk, Wine,
100 kg/ha yield, t/ha beet, t/ha 100 kg/ha 100 kg/ha kg/cow hl/ha
EU-15 55.0 8.8 n.a. 29.9 16.7 6020 50.9
Romania 16.1 2.0 1.5 12.6 10.6 3025 23.5
Czech Republic 41.9 7.1 40.0 23.2 21.8 5467 26.5
Latvia 22.4 4.4 n.a. 15.6 n.a. 3990 n.a.
Lithuania 27.6 4.5 n.a. 15.7 n.a. 3896 n.a.
Hungary 38.7 6.5 38.0 16.4 18.5 5982 33.8
Poland 29.3 5.4 38.0 21.6 15.4 3945 n.a.
Slovenia 49.3 5.4 n.a. 23.3 11.9 4864 41.5
Slovakia 33.6 4.1 n.a. 17.0 18.4 4835 20.7
Bulgaria 28.9 n.a. n.a. 11.6 6.0 3580 30.5
Source: World Bank (2005)
Moreover, in 2002 land productivity (gross agricultural output per hectare) was between 500-700
Euro, which is less than 30% of land productivity levels in the EU (2,200 Euro per hectare in 2002). The
low land productivity is combined with very low levels of labor productivity, which averaged about 1,600
Euro per worker in 2002, or as little as 7% of EU levels (22,600 Euro per worker in 2002) (World Bank
2005 p. 6).
Important changes are expected for the agricultural sector in Romania following enlargement.
The support policies in the CAP, through direct payments to agricultural producers based on the size of
landholdings, are aimed at increasing competitiveness. In the first year farmers are entitled to 50 Euro per
hectare, amount that will slowly increase to 200 Euro for the same area until 2012.86 The eligibility
criteria for these funds is to own at least one hectare of land in strips not smaller than 0.3 hectares.
These measures will have tremendous effects on the institutional structure of farming, as well as
the capacity of small farmers to survive the new competitive pressures. First, Romanian peasants are
"getting lonelier" (Thorpe 2007) and entangled in the web of requirements that have poured over them
sinceJanuary 2007. The small producers have few months until the end of the year to conform their
locally produced products to the strict food safety standards of the EU or they face oblivion. What exactly
is to be done, who is enforcing it, and so on, is still puzzling for many small farmers. Second, the direct
payments from CAP can affect the relation between the small landowners, the tenants and corporate
farms who are farming their land. For instance, Latruffe and Davidova (2006) argue that while small
86 The financial package negociated by Romania with the EU for 2007-2009 is for approximately 4 billion Euro: 967
millions for direct payments, 732 millions for market measures, and over 2 billion for rural development.
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landowners did not have incentives to withdraw their land from rent contracts before EU enlargement,
with the CAP payments they might have higher incentives since they can cash the payments themselves
provided that the land is kept in good agricultural and environmental conditions. Hence, the CAP
payments may induce more renegotiation of rents, suggesting that a close relationship between the
landowners and the manager of the farm matters. I will dwell more on this aspect in Chapter 7, where I
discuss the difference between contractual arrangements in associations and in leasing transactions, as a
way to understand the persistence of formal associations.
Hence, these policies need to be supplemented with measures for increasing opportunities for off-
farming employment, as well as quality standards for the existing producers. But, almost a year after EU
enlargement, there are concerns that the current institutional structure is not able to absorb the inflow of
funds from CAP. Already, significant delays have been announced in the disbursement of funds due to
additional evaluations of the requests submitted by the agricultural producers and the reform of the
agricultural payment system.87 These delays have been prompted by the very slow progress in instituting a
uniform system of land registration through mapping and cadastral measurements prior to integration in
the EU. Inconsistencies between the information from the land titles and the more accurate records from
geo-mapping decelerate the process of funds disbursement. Poverty in the rural areas and the low
revenues from the sale of agricultural products led some farmers to declare a higher area of land eligible
for EU direct payments. This "stretching of land" along its boundaries or "shifting perimeters," also found
by Verdery (1996 p. 141) in the Romanian countryside, is likely to cost Romania loss of credibility from
the EU institutions, as well as loss of financial aid. For instance, in Neamt County in the north-east of the
country, an excess of 10,000 hectares were found, which means an extra half a million Euro from the EU
budget (Covaci 2007). Also in Iasi County, more than half of the requests were made for land left fallow,
which is strictly against the EU regulations. The delays in setting up a robust institutional infrastructure
for the EU payment led more recently to the possibility of reducing the amount of direct payments to the
Romanian farmers by 25 percent (approximately one billion Euro) (Morovan 2007; Tapalaga 2007), with
significant repercussions initially for the government (who will have to cover the difference) but then to the
consumers on whom the costs will be inevitably passed.88
This overview shows how the policies for EU enlargement are intertwined with the level of rural
development and the rest of the economy. Dependence on land as the main (and in most cases the only)
source of income, prevents wide institutional changes from taking place and postpones broader structural
changes in the agricultural sector towards higher efficiency. The main concern is that a fast shift to
87 In October, AgriNews (2007) reported that the payment of the 50 Euros per hectare, scheduled for December
2007-June 2008 will be delayed with at least two months.
88 According to BBC (2007), before the announcement, in October, an EU official described Romania's farm
payment system as a mess.
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meeting EU competitive standards without the provision of alternative sources of income would have
devastating effects on a wide share of small farmers.
5.2.2 Agriculture in the national economy
Agriculture has always played an important role in the Romanian economy even during the
socialist strong push for industrialization. In the 1990s, land reform received the highest priority on the list
of reformers, with strong implications at all levels: economic, social, and political. Land reforms (and the
continuous tension between large and small landowners) were a constant part of the Romanian history.
But, the context created by the post-socialist transformation generated a unique set of circumstances that
rendered very unclear long-term outcomes at the time. Therefore, the economic effects of land reform
should be understood in this specific framework.
Employment
In general, the importance of a sector in the national economy is reflected in the share of
employment and its contribution to national output. Figure 5-1 shows that currently a large share of the
labor force, 32%, is employed in agriculture, much higher than in industry (24%), and quite close to the
share of employment in services (36%). Interestingly, we also observe a different pattern from the
beginning of transition when the share of agriculture relative to industry and services almost reversed.
Figure 5-1 Share of agriculture, industry and services in total employment during the
transition period
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Source: Statistical Yearbook of Romania (INS 1996, 2005, 2006).
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For the most part, this trend in employment across the entire transition period is at odds with the
structural change theory for economic development, which assumes that as the economy grows, the share
of output and labor force in agriculture decreases, while the share of industry and services increases. In
terms of employment, the only period in which we see a clear decline in agricultural share in employment
is between 2001 and 2004, leveling off in 2005.89 Nevertheless, by 2005 agricultural employment is still
higher than what it used to be at the start of transition and before de-collectivization. This is quite
interesting since as a result of the breakdown of collective farms and privatization of state farms one would
have expected that agricultural employment will decline and there will be an outflow of population from
the rural to urban areas. Nevertheless, due to shortage ofjobs in the industrial sector following the
restructuring programs, land restitution created favorable conditions for workers laid-off from the factories
that were closed down, to return to the rural areas and develop small (mostly subsistence) farms.
While agriculture takes an important share of employment at the national level, in the rural areas,
agriculture is the main (and sometimes the only) source of income. My mid-2003 agriculture was
employing about 6 9 .3 % of the active rural population. As Table 5-4 shows, individuals working in
agriculture are primarily self-employed and unpaid family workers. The employees (receiving wage
payments) account for only 6.1 % in agriculture, as compared to 62 % in the economy as whole. Hence, as
I discuss later, rural incomes derive mainly from in-kind sources of income.
Table 5-4: Agricultural employment by occupational status in 2002
Number % from
total
Total 3,557,505 100
Employee 215,371 6.1
Employer 3,104 0.1
Self-employed 1,825,209 51.3
Unpaid family worker 1,495,679 42.0
Member of a cooperative 18,142 0.5
Source: "Household Labor Force Survey (AMIGO), Second Quarter 2003, NIS (2003).
89 The statistics for agricultural employment in Romania deserve more detailed explanations. Since 2001, the
National Institute for Statistics, in preparation for the Agricultural Census in 2002, has changed the methodology
(according to international standards) for recording the individuals working in the sector, which has drastically
reduced the statistical share of labor force in agriculture (Lang 2003). Only in one year the share of labor force in
agriculture has declined by approximately 5%. One reason why this share has declined is that pensioners that work
less than half time in agriculture have not been included in this figure. Nevertheless, in Romania, where most of the
rural population depends on agriculture for their livelihood, this new methodology omits a large share of the active
farmers.
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Contribution to Gross Domestic Product
Figure 5-2 shows that the contribution of the agricultural sector to the Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) has declined, especially after 1997. By 2005 agriculture was contributing with 9% to GDP, much
closer to the average recorded for middle-income countries. Nevertheless, if we consider that the share of
labor force in agriculture is 3 6 %, the contribution to GDP shows wide inefficiencies. Industry, however,
has continuously declined, while the share of services in GDP has increased dramatically. Nafziger (2004
p. 99) argues that in high-income countries the rising output and labor force share of services leads to
stability (which could be evidenced by the relatively stable shares between 1992-97 for the two sectors in
Figure 5-2) and then an eventual decline in the share of industry to growth.
Since in development economics theory a decrease in the share of agriculture to GDP is expected
to be accompanied by a decline in the share of agricultural employment, these trends suggest that growth
in Romania cannot be fully explained by the structural change argument. One could even argue that the
economy is split between a booming service sector driven by the financial and real estate sectors, and a
large traditional agricultural economy with low productivity levels. The relatively large share of
agricultural employment suggests that the shifts in economic activity from rural to urban areas are not
taking place, and that labor absorption into non-agricultural activities is very slow.
Figure 5-2: The contribution to GDP by sectors between 1985-2005
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Source: Annual Statistical Reports (BNR 1991), Statistical Yearbooks (INS 1996, 2000, 2005).
Investment
As Figure 5-3 shows, agricultural investment has drastically declined in real terms since the
beginning of the 1990s, by almost 70%. The figure suggests that there is a strong correlation between the
126
level of production in real terms and agricultural investment.9 0 With a lag of approximately one year, a
decrease in investment was accompanied by a decline in agricultural production. The only period when
this was not the case (or the time lag was longer), was between 2002-2004, when a major decline in
investment was mirrored by an increase in production. Nevertheless, those years were also characterized
by favorable weather conditions.
The decline in agricultural investments (i.e. irrigation, research, mechanization) is a reflection of
the withering away of the state at all levels as a result of privatization and decentralization, and the
inability of the new landowners to take up investments in land improvements and farm modernization.
Nevertheless, these investments became even more important recently, following the integration in the
EU institutional structures. For instance, in order for farmers to be eligible for direct single farm
payments, they are required to maintain and conserve their land and comply with animal and food safety
requirements. But, due to lack of financial resources, a large share of small farmers will not be entitled for
CAP support.9 1
Figure 5-3: Agricultural production (goods and services) and agricultural investments
during transition (billion lei in constant prices)
Production and investments in agriculture (billion lei, constant prices 1990=100)
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Source: INS (1996, 2005, 2006).
90 The correlation coefficient has a value of 0.48, and is statistically significant at 95% confidence level.
91 Because of these difficulties, recent evidence shows that in order to take advantage of the direct payments, small
farmers resort to different unruly options. For example, in Iasi County, more than 4 0% of the areas for which direct
payments were requested, have been left fallow for years, and due to lack of investment, were actually not eligible for
CAP support (Busuioc 2007).
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Irrigations
Irrigation, one of the largest investments in agriculture, was a priority during the large-scale
agriculture in the communist regime. By the end of 1989, irrigation and drainage facilities covered about
3 million hectares (Alexandri et al. 2005). Nevertheless, following land restitution, the breakdown of
collective farms, and the privatization of state farms, most of the facilities developed in the 1960s and the
1970s are continuously deteriorating and decreasing their operational efficiency. Aggregate statistics show
that currently less than 300,000 hectares of land are actually irrigated (see Table 5-5). Because the
irrigation infrastructure was built for large-scale farming, it needs significant investments in adjusting it for
small and medium scale farming. Nevertheless, with a new pattern of much warmer weather in Romania
(and in general in Eastern Europe), the need for irrigation in agriculture becomes even more stringent.
Table 5-5: The extent of irrigation in agriculture
1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 2000 2002
Areas equipped with irrigation 3109 3110 3184 3089 3007 3007 1511
facilities (thou. ha)
-of which: effectively irrigated (%) 62.5 13.6 23.2 22.0 8.3 14.0 16.6
Source: Romanian Statistical Yearbook, National Institute for Statistics 1990-2000. Data for 2002 is from the
agricultural census.
Physical capital
The reform of the agricultural sector did not stipulate a transfer of machineries from the former
communist entities to the new landowners, along with land restitution. Rather, these equipments
remained in the ownership of specialized units, to which farmers had access in exchange of payments in
kind or in cash. Despite the fact that the number of tractors increased since the 1990s (due to subsidies
provided by the state that Ministry of Agriculture that covered part of the equipment price, since 200192)
(see Figure 5-4), the share of arable land for one tractor is still quite large (i.e. 55 hectares) compared to
the EU average of 20 hectares per tractor.
As a result, in 2001, 94 million Euro worth of equipment was bought, out of which 5,306 tractors and 183 cereal
combines, mainly from the domestic tractor supplier "Tractorul" Brasov (Alexandri et al. 2005). As a result, one can
claim that this policy aimed to salvage this plant that went through several failed privatization efforts.
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Figure 5-4: The number of tractors and the arable area per tractor since 1989
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Prices
The phenomenon of "price scissors" has also afflicted the performance of the agricultural sector
in general, and in particular the small producers who were not able to generate sufficient revenues from
selling their crops. Moreover, in addition to the overall inflationary pressures, the widening price scissors
acted as brakes on rural accumulation. Table 5-6 shows the scale of increase in prices for inputs and
agricultural services in Transylvania between 1994-2000 and the increase in incomes and sales prices for
agricultural produce and land.
Table 5-6: Approximate increases in some agricultural costs and incomes, South-Central
Transylvania, 1994-2000
Service/Good Increase (in lei) Increment
Costs
Gasoline 300-400 tol2,000 per liter 30 to 40 - fold
Plowing services 25,000 to 500,000 per ha 20 - fold
Fertilizer 1,000 to 20,000 per kg 20 - fold
Tractors 9.5 million to 150 million 16 - fold
Incomes
Top pension 130,000 to 2.3 million per month 18 - fold
Wheat sale price 200 to 3,500 per kg 16 - fold
Pig sale price 1,200 to 18,000 per kg 15 - fold
Sale price of land 1.5-2 million to 7-10 million 3 to 5 - fold
Source: Verdery (2004 p. 208).
These rough estimates clearly show that in balancing costs and revenues, small farmers were
clearly at a loss and over-exploiting themselves if they did not want to leave the land uncultivated. As
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Verdery (2004 p. 209) finds, by 1999-2000 some farmers were borrowing money from various sources
simply to pay for plowing.
In the literature on international development this phenomenon of small farmers being swept out
of the market as a result of increase in costs is not a rare occurrence. Long-term structural transformation
in capitalized economies, resulting in a stronger emphasis on industry and services, placed less and less
emphasis on more traditional sectors, rendering them less efficient.
The "price scissors" refers to the ratio between the prices for agricultural products relative to
input prices. A decline in the price scissors reflects a worsening of the economic conditions for farmers as
the prices for inputs increase much more than the price for agricultural products. Starting with 1997 the
prices of agricultural products and inputs were completely liberalized. Nevertheless, the prices for
agricultural products decreased much more than those for inputs, leading to the worsening of the terms of
trade between agriculture and industry (see Figure 5-5). Some of the problems that exacerbated these
outcomes were the lack of marketing channels for agricultural products and input supply, the absence of
financing options for small producers, and the extreme land fragmentation.
Figure 5-5: Agricultural price index, the industrial price index for inputs necessary in
agriculture, and the Price Scissors between 1991-2001
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Source: Lazar (2002) in Alexandri et al. (2005).
Productivity
Improvements in productivity, either through increased efficiency or technological change, is a
key source for sustained increases in agricultural production during the development process, allowing
countries to produce more food at lower costs, to improve nutrition and welfare, and to release resources
to other sectors (Trueblood and Coggins 2003; Lerman et al. 2004).
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In Arthur Lewis' tradition (1963) economic development theory postulates that technology driven
increases in productivity lead to rise in savings and investments shifting excess labor out of agriculture into
other sectors of the economy. Lewis argued that any withdrawal of labor from agriculture (attracted by
higher wages in the non-agricultural sector) is likely to be accompanied by a reorganization of production
by those who are left behind (i.e. technology change) (Ranis 2004). Nevertheless, this trend has not been
observed in the Romanian context for three main reasons: (1) the non-agricultural sector did not create
job opportunities to attract agricultural labor; (2) a process of reverse migration took place, from the urban
to the rural areas, as a result of the combined outcome of industrial unemployment and land restitution;
(3) as I discuss below, agricultural productivity did not increase during transition, with the exception of the
past couple of years.
The research conducted by Aldea and Vidican (2007) is the first study that looks at the total factor
productivity (TFP) change in Romania's agriculture at regional level over the period of 1992-200493.
While productivity has fluctuated over this period, we find striking regional differences, which pose
significant challenges in terms of policy-making (see Figure 5-6). We observe that the south-west and the
north-east regions registered a lowest TFP values during the transition. This finding is quite surprising
especially for the Southern regions that have the largest agricultural area, the best quality land, and
longest tradition in agriculture. The persistence of very large agricultural farms, the slow restructuring of
former collective and state farms, and the lower level of economic development might have contributed to
its relative stagnation. This region is obviously performing under its potential and significant policy
implications could be derived from an in-depth analysis of its economic and social conditions.
Our analysis also points to additional findings, such as that the majority of the counties could
increase efficiency by at least 2 0% with the available resources. While some counties exhibit increasing
returns to scale, a few others (located mostly in the South) are characterized by decreasing returns to scale.
Since this region is the largest producer of grains, a potential diversification of production into other crops
might be appropriate depending on specific regional conditions. Such analysis allows policy-makers to
gauge the performance of the agricultural sector during transition, and to design better targeted measures
for increasing the competitiveness in the sector.
Figure 5-7 shows that TFP has fluctuated over the transition period, but that since 2001 growth
was relatively stable. This trend is a reflection of both exogenous factors such as the vagaries of weather,
but also endogenous factors such as macroeconomic conditions and institutional changes.
We use Data Envelopment Analysis to calculate the Malmquist Index for the change in total factor productivity,
and Bootstrap the results in order to account for more accurate estimation of the index.
Figure 5-6: The Malmquist Index for the change in Total Factor Productivity between
1992-200494
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Source: Aldea and Vidican (2007).
We observe that starting with 1995 until 2000 TFP was continuously declining, which is
associated with the overall deterioration of the macroeconomic condition as discussed earlier, the steady
decline of agricultural subsidies in the first half of the 1990s until complete elimination in 1997, a decline
in agricultural procurement prices and doubling of agricultural imports by 2000, and poor weather
conditions in 1996 and 2000.
94 A value higher than "1" means that productivity has increased over this period, which a value lower than "1"
shows that productivity levels declined.
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Figure 5-7: Average Malmquist TFP yearly change
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The low values and the decline in agricultural productivity throughout the transition period
partially reflect the withdrawal of a large share of small landowners from the markets. As a result of very
high costs for inputs and mechanical services, landowners resorted to what we could call "closed-cycle"
production system. Instead of purchasing seeds and fertilizer, the majority of small private individual
farmers used mostly "in-house grown" seeds and manure, and they produced crops that were needed for
their own consumption and those necessary for their livestock. As a result of these shifts in demand for
agricultural inputs, the ripple effects in the rest of the economy were soon noticeable as several of the
specialized enterprises closed down.
The structure of agricultural holdings
Land reform resulted in an unprecedented change in the organization of agricultural production.
Collective farms were dismantled and in some cases were replaced by farming associations, state farms
were privatized into commercial companies, and a multitude of small and fragmented farms were created
following restitution based on the pre-communist land records. Table 5-7 shows the different types of
farming arrangements in 2005. We observe that farming associations, state farms, and commercial
companies maintained large-scale operation.
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Table 5-7: The structure of agricultural holdings in 2005
Number of farms Agricultura Average
Total Farms -sing the agricultural area 1 area in area in
Total Size classes use (ha) use per
< 5 ha 5-50 > 50 farm (ha)
ha ha
Individual private 4,237,889 4,103,404 3,730,501 366,769 6,134 9,102,018 2.15
farms
Farms with legal 18,263 17,843 5,317 4,830 7,696 4,804,683 263.1
status, from which:
Farming associations 1,630 1,614 66 207 1,341 742,065 455.3
Commercial comp. 4,574 4,325 617 685 3,023 1,720,792 376.2
with mostly private
capital
Commercial comp. 250 238 88 48 102 59,996 240.0
with mostly state
capital
Units of public 4,818 4,750 1,389 530 2,831 2,124,737 441.0
administration
Cooperative units 108 89 46 29 14 3246 30.1
Other types 6,883 6,827 3,111 3,331 385 153847 22.4
Total 4,256,152 4,121,247 3,735,818 371,599 138 13,906,701 3.3
Source: MADR (2007).
Moreover, the table illustrates that even now the size of individual private farms is very small (an
average of 2.61 hectares per farm), with only very few individual farms (0.02 percentage from total
individual farms) being larger than 50 hectares. Nevertheless, small private individual farms use 66% of
the agricultural land, pointing to the large share of subsistence farming and the strong dependence on
land as a source of income. Therefore, agricultural policy should have a strong social component as well
in order to achieve desired growth and long-term sustainability outcomes.
5.3 Social outcomes of land reform
The outcomes of land reform should be understood in a broader context than by simply
evaluating growth and productivity, to include the social dimension. We saw earlier that almost half of the
labor force is employed in agriculture, and that the rural economy is not diversified. This suggests that for
most of the population, land provides the main source of income. Nevertheless, given that access to
markets especially for small farmers is very limited, and that non-farming income sources are not enough
to cover basic needs, farming takes the form of subsistence agriculture.
The restructuring of the industrial sector resulted in a large number of middle-aged workers being
displaced (or forced into retirement) after years of labor in the state owned factories. At the same time,
unprecedented inflationary pressures from liberalization policies eroded the incomes to values that were
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much lower in real terms than prior to 1990. As a result, higher poverty became a new reality across the
country. Nevertheless, in the rural areas, poverty has been more acute as most of the former workers on
the collective and state farms became pensioners, and job opportunities in the urban areas were lacking
entirely.
Agricultural transformation, with its component of land restitution can be understood as a "social
cushion" against the deterioration in living conditions early in transition. The fact that everyone who
owned land prior to collectivization received a small plot of land (even if they were currently living in the
urban areas), provided a social safety-net against the uncertainties of transition.
In the next sections I discuss the issue of poverty and migration with the focus on the rural areas,
in order to unearth the link between the land reform and the social conditions during transition.
5.3.1 Poverty and rural development
The transformation of a former centrally planned economy to a market economy had, as
evidence showed, generated significant social and economic shocks. The severity of these shocks depends
on the speed of reform and the economic and institutional particularities of the country. In Romania, the
downturn has been significantly harsher than in other countries of similar size and economic composition,
mainly due to the extreme economic isolation and strict national centralized planning in every aspect of
social and economic life. In addition, the past ten years of communist rule were the most difficult for
Romania in comparison to other countries in the region due to the extremely tight squeezing of the
population for Ceausescu's ambition of repaying the entire external debt of the country by the end of the
1980s.
Early in the transition industrial restructuring, trade, and price liberalization, resulted in a sudden
surge in unemployment and an immediate and continuous decline in real incomes. After ten years of
reform, average monthly real incomes were down to 5 9 % of the 1989 level, and by 2005 they had still not
recovered the pre-reform level (90% of the pre-reform real income level). Over the same period of time,
due to a constellation of factors, poverty rates surged, affecting mainly the rural population, but also the
middle and low social groups in the urban areas (see Figure 5-8). By year 2000 an estimate of 36% of the
population was living in poverty.
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Figure 5-8: Poverty rates between 1995-2003
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Source: CASPIS (2002) and World Bank (2005).
Poverty in the rural areas
While poverty rates started to decline after 2000, in the rural areas this process was only marginal.
By 2002 the gap between the rural and urban areas widened more than in the previous years. In rural
areas the poverty rate reached 4 2 %, more than double the rate for the urban areas, as the agricultural
sector become a form of "poverty trap" and "occupational buffer" (CARE 2004). The level of poverty in
the rural areas is probably even more severe if we take into account the severe deterioration of the social
(and other public) services.
Inflation, which was not felt by villagers in the past forty years, has continuously emptied the
value of peasants' incomes, who were unfamiliar with the new strategies of storing money in foreign
currencies. For many the periodic increments in prices were not just bewildering, but terrifying. As one
farmer explained, "what you could buy today you could not buy tomorrow." In her interviews with
farmers in Hunedoara County, Verdery (2004 p. 207) finds that devaluation affected Transylvanians
more than farmers in the South because the relatively less fertile soil in Transylvania required more
fertilizer and additional plowings to produce good yields, increasing the costs for these farmers.
Land reform, with its component of land restitution, formed a new class of owners of small and
fragmented farms, which despite their low productivity level, secured consumption and income for more
than half of Romania's population. Therefore, while the rural sector did not join in the positive benefits
from growth, it was, to a certain extent, insulated from the perverse effects of recession. Hence, it is
important to juxtapose the agrarian transformation to the strategies used by the population in coping with
higher levels of poverty and the extreme erosion in purchasing power. In this context, policies addressing
the rural economy should address measures for increasing agricultural productivity as well as rural
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development programs that would include not only infrastructure systems but also social programs and
non-farming employment opportunities.
Poverty is not a new phenomenon in Romania, but it has become more visible in the post 1990s
period. The socialist development plans, with their emphasis on equality and ambitious industrialization,
resulted in artificially reducing regional disparities by developing industries in regions with limited natural
resources or industrial potential. Nevertheless, even then, the rural areas were significantly lacking behind
the urban areas mainly in terms of physical infrastructure.
With the dissolution of the centrally planned economic system and the quick restructuring of the
industrial sector based on efficiency standards (industrial shrinkage), most of the rural communities relied
increasingly on agriculture as the main source of livelihood. But, the slow emergence of markets for
products, the mismatch between the newly created organizational forms (i.e. small family farms) and
policy recommendations, and low competitiveness of food products, created ripen conditions for the
increase in poverty. Earlier studies suggest that the low skilled workforce in rural areas, where non-
agricultural job opportunities do not exist, "constitute the key, and the stagnant poor of poverty in
Romania" (CASE 2004). Further, the report finds that poverty incidence in concentrated in three
categories of households: those headed by pensioners, self-employed in agriculture, and the unemployed.
In 2002 these households accounted for 75% of all the poor (and 80% of those living in extreme poverty)
(CASE 2004 p. 25).
Another important aspect relative to poverty in the rural areas and land reform outcomes is the
age structure of the rural population. The forced industrialization policies during the communist regime
resulted in a fast depopulation of the rural areas, with only the middle-aged and elderly remaining the
villages. Moreover, the prospect of low incomes from agriculture has discouraged younger individuals
from moving the rural areas and investing in farming.
As Table 5-8 shows, the share of elderly in the rural areas increased since 1977, to 24% of the
total population. At the same time, birth rates declined reducing the share of young individuals, from 27%
in 1977 to 18% in 2005. Nevertheless, while the dependency ratio 95 decreased only slightly over this
period of time, the trends in population growth suggest that demographic dependency will increase in the
next decades. Therefore, with respect to farming, this trend reflects that farming will increasingly remain
on the shoulders of older households unless farming associations and land market transactions become the
predominant farming arrangements. The aging of the rural population also poses threats to sustainable
95 Dependency ratio is calculated as the ratio between the dependents (population younger than 15 years old and
older than 60 years) and the working age individuals (between 15-59 years old), multiplied by 100. A dependency
ratio of 71 % means that there are 100 workers in the labor pool over every 71 individuals under 15 and over 60
years old.
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farming practices, as soil degradation increases due to more land being left fallow and inconsistencies in
crop rotation practices and fertilization.
Table 5-8: Demographic dependency ratio in the rural areas
1977 1997 2005
Under 15 years (% from total) 27.1 19.6 17.8
Between 15-59 years (% from total) 56.2 56.4 58.3
Over 60 years (% from total) 16.7 24.0 23.8
Demographic dependency ratio (%) 77.9 77.3 71.4
Source: For 1977 and 1997, Chirca and Tesliuc (1999); For 2005, INS (2006).
Dumitru et al. (2004) claim that in order to get to the average EU level of agricultural
employment, Romania needs to "remove about 2 million people" away from agricultural employment.
The authors recommend that the government should define a policy based on welfare programs and
increase in farmers' pension, rather than continue the support programs for small farms, which result in
the maintenance of current fragmented farm structures. Nevertheless, I argue that while these measures
are very pragmatic, evidence from the field suggests that the role of land in the rural communities goes
beyond the economic benefit that landowners derive (for more details see Chapter 9). This reality is also
reflected by the limited engagement of small landowners in land market transactions or in the new
program adopted by the Ministry of Agriculture for encouraging retirement, i.e. "renta viagera". 96
Hence, reducing support for small farms, which has been the "unspoken" agricultural policy all
throughout the transition period, will fail to address the core social and economic issue in the rural areas,
and it can reinforce the trend of assisting large corporate farms.
Farm income levels in Romania are so low that a prevalence of subsistence strategy and chronic
poverty exists. Table 5-9 shows that almost 45% of the total incomes are non-monetary in nature. The
main source of income for farmers was the sales of agricultural products or service provision, a share of
25% of total monetary incomes, higher than in 2004, but much lower than in 1998 (41% according to
FAO (2002 p. 32)), while the average for all households is 4%.
96 The government is encouraging (rather pushing) farm consolidation by offering 100 Euro per year per hectare for
those that sell land and 50 Euro for those that lease it out. However, by 2007 only 23,000 households have been
benefiting from this program, transferring property rights on 135,000 hectares, suggesting that this program does not
offer sufficient incentives for the small farmers (Daniciun 2007).
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Table 5-9: Household revenues for employees, peasants, and pensioners
Households Employees Farmers Unemployed Pensioners
1998 2005 1998 2005 1998 2005 1998 2005 1998 2005
Total nominal incomes 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Cash incomes 68.7 79.6 79.9 87.4 41.4 56.4 64.1 77 58.6 73.5
Incomes in kind 31.3 20.4 20.1 12.6 58.6 43.6 35.9 23 41.4 26.5
Source: For 1998 from "Aspecte privind calitatea vietii populatiei in perioada iulie 1997-iunie 1998";
For 2005 from INS (2006)
As Table 5-10 illustrates, the rural economy is mostly subsistence based, where almost half of the
consumption in 2005 was from own resources, five times more than for employees.
Table 5-10: Household expenditures for employees and farmers by categories (% from
total)
Employees Farmers Pensioners
1996 1997 2004 2005 1996 1997 2004 2005 1996 1997 2004 2005
Purchasing food and beverages 252 262 22.6 22.6 12,1 120 15.7 17.9 217 22,7 23.2 23.9
Purchasing non-foodgoods 20, - 20.9 22. 18 1.J ,0 14.7 17.7 17,9 .16. 19 21.3
Payment of services _ 9 _ 18.2 19.9 _5_ _6,_ 6.8 8.4 ,0_ _10, 15.4 17.2
Purchasing inputs for
production and investment 1,2 1,5 1 1.3 1,8 2,2 1.7 1.6 1,7 1,8 1 1.1
Taxes and fees 18,3 177 21.6 20.7 2 1 2 1.8 3,3 4.9 5.2
Equivalent value of
consumptison from own
resources 20,2 20,7 11.9 9.6 570 7 52.2 45.3 39,9 40,3 29.7 24.5
Source: National Institute of Statistics 1998, 2006.
Only less than 20 percent is being spent on the purchase of food and non-food goods. We can also
notice that the rural economy is not based on services. Moreover, since most work is based on informal or
self-employed status, the expenditures on taxes and fees are only 10% from the level spent by employees.
Also, the rural economy is only partly based on cash transactions, so expenditures on insurance and other
financial services are almost non-existent. 9 7
In general, as Figure 5-9 illustrates, for the majority of households, the level of incomes at their
disposal after paying for production, taxes and other fees, is very low relative to the expenditures they
need to incur for securing a decent standard of living. Based on households' evaluations, in 2005 68% of
the farmers claimed that they cannot cover all the expenses from their incomes.
97 Only a small share of the population in the rural areas has bank accounts. The reason for this lack of involvement
with financial institutions streams from the limited financial resources at the disposal of rural population, the fact
that the services provided by the financial sector are not at all targeted at small farmers (i.e. high fees, poor loan
conditions), the difficulty of commuting to the city regularly to access the accounts, and certainly one of the most
important reason is the complete unfamiliarity with these new services. Nevertheless, the agency responsible for
disbursing the direct payments from the EU to the farmers has required opening bank accounts at certain banks.
Nevertheless, as the newspaper Gandul (2007) reports, this new regulation creates more inconveniences and travel
expenses for the small farmers.
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Figure 5-9: The distribution of households based on their capacity of covering expenses in
2005, by occupational status
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Source: "Coordinate ale nivelului de train in Romania", INS (2006).
Accounting for loss in purchasing power
To better understand the severity of income erosion, conventional microeconomic tools allow us
to estimate these changes in the standard of living, emphasizing the subsistence role played by the farming
sector in the rural economy. The Slutsky income compensation concept and the Lasoeyres price index
approximation are used to create an indicator for price fluctuations and their impact on earnings.
To do this, we use a real example. Two variables, basic diet and income, are considered to
estimate the change in population food consumption patters and inflation. The major components of the
Romanian diet, namely bread and potatoes, are selected as proxies. Since wage is the main source of
income and wage earners are the dominant category within the Romanian labor force (particularly in the
urban areas), the average nominal wage is selected as the budget constraint for consumption.98 In 1989,
prior to the post-socialist transformation, the average net monthly income was, according to official
statistics, 3,063 lei. The average price of potatoes in 1989 was about 1.5 lei per kilogram and the average
price of a loaf of bread was close to 3 lei. For a rough estimation, lets assume that a typical Romanian
household consumes 5 kilograms of potatoes and 14 loafs of bread per month.99
Using this consumption basket, in 1989 an average household needed 49.50 lei per week ([1.5 lei
* 5 kg] + [3 lei * 14 loafs] = 49.50 lei). Sixteen years later, using the same calculation, a household needs
98 However, it is important to note that the impact of inflation on incomes will be underestimated for the rural
population since income levels are much smaller.
99 The quantities are really not relevant in this exercise. What matters is the differences between the purchasing
power at two points in time.
140
- - --- --- - -
- -- -- - -- - -
- -- --- - - - -
- -- -- - - - - -
- -- --- - - - -
- -- --- - - - -
- -- --- - - - -
260,000 lei to consume the same quantities of potatoes and bread.100 By using the Laspeyres price index
(Li = I Pil*Qi0 / I Pi0*Qi) 101 we compare the average salary earning in 1989 relative to 2005. We
find that the average income should have increased by 5,253 times (260,000 lei divided by 49.5 lei) to
make the individual able to consume the same quantity of goods in year 2005. However, in reality, the
average salary earning has increased by only 2,436 times (the average monthly salary earning in 2005 of
7,460,000 lei divided by the average monthly salary earning in 1989 of 3,063 lei).
The numbers reveal that if an individual wage earner in Romania wants to consume the same,
not more, quantity of goods (potatoes and bread) ten years after transition, considering the increase in
inflation over this time frame, the average wage should be 16,089,939 lei instead of 7,460,000 lei per
month (an increase of 116 percentages). 102 This simple calculation suggests that the average wage earners
have a monthly deficit equal to 8,629,939 lei, more than their current monthly salary. Said differently,
sixteen years into transition, the average income earners in Romanian can consume only 37% of potatoes
and 7 3 % of bread they used to consume.103
The plummeting in the purchasing power was even more dramatic for the population in the rural
areas earning far less than the national average income level. At a time when product markets have
become very thin due to closing down food processing industries and unmatched competition from more
developed and subsidized outside markets, the subsistence character of Romania's farming sector
expanded. At the same time, as mentioned earlier, urban out-migration intensified, exploring this short-
term, last-resort "opportunity".
100 In 2005 the average price of potatoes was 10,000 lei per kilogram and a loaf of bread was equal to 15,000 lei,
([10,000 lei * 5 kg)] + [15,000 lei * 14 loafs] = 260,000 lei).
101 Where Li is the "Laspeyres Index", P'1 is the price in 2005 for the two food products, Q'o is the quantity
consumed, and P'0 is the price in 1989 for the same basket of goods.
This calculation is also know as the "Slutsky equivalent variation" (maintaining the same consumption pattern),
which is determined as: It, = Li * Ito or I, = 5,253 * 3,063 lei = 16,089,939 lei, where Iti is the income to be earned
in time 1 (2005), and Ito is the monthly income that was earned in time 0 (1989). The core of the Slutsky equivalent
variation (or decomposition method) is isolating the change in demand due to the change in relative prices by asking
"What is the change in demand when the consumer's income in adjusted so that, at the new prices, he/she can
afford to buy the original bundle?" To do this, we hold the purchasing power constant.
1 03These numbers are based on the following calculation. We can calculate the relative expenditure for a particular
bundle of goods. For instance we can illustrate that the expenditure to consume good x at time t (Ext = Px, * Qx,) can
be estimated by Ext / Wt, where Wt is wage at time t. Accordingly, the equality of Exi / Wt = ExJ+J / Wt. 1 can
illustrate the proportion of change in quantity of good x at time t+1 relative to time t. If we denote the time t = 1989
and good x = 5 kilograms of potatoes consumed in 1989 at the income level 3063 lei, then our equality is: 1.5 lei * 5
kg/ 3063 lei= 10,000 lei * x,1+ / 7,460,000 lei. Then x = 1.83, which means that at the time t+1 (the year 2005) an
individual wage earner is only consuming 1.83 kilograms grams relative to 5 kilograms of potatoes (the normal diet),
or 37% (1.83/5). A similar calculation for bread expenditures renders a reduction in consumption to 73% of the
1989 level (10.2 loafs of bread in 2005 as compared to 14 loafs).
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This simple exercise also points to an increase in the informal sector.Johnson et al. (1997) and
Lacko (2000) estimate that the share of the informal economy' 0 4 in GDP was in the range between 10 and
65 percent in the transition countries from 1990 to 1995. The informal sector is particularly large in the
rural areas, where the share of seasonal and disguised unemployment is the highest.' 05 Self-employment
in agriculture, without a work contract is the predominant occupational status for the working age
population in the rural areas, as Table 5-4 illustrated. There is also an unaccounted-for share of the
population living in the countryside, which dropped-out of the unemployment statistics (after a period of
9? months of unemployment status), or those that never searched for a paid job but are still engaged in
income generating activities. The loss of purchasing power (as we showed in the previous section) and the
loss of jobs during transition, were major push factors for the return to land and the rise of informal
economy in the rural areas. Aside from agriculture, none of the services provided by skilled individuals
(e.g. mechanics, roofers, interior painters) are registered because of unbearably high taxes.
The importance of the informal sector is highest for the purpose of social policy. If the majority of
the households rely on informal activities to cope with substantial decreases in real incomes, the informal
economy enhances welfare at least in the short run (Kim 2005). Therefore, eliminating the informal sector
might not be desirable by social and economic policy.
While it is difficult to determine what the cause of informality is, the reverse migration (which will
be discussed in the next section), and the high incidence of subsistence farming in Romania, suggests that
the gap between the desired income and the actual level of income contribute to a large degree to
informality. Research on the informal sector in Romania is very scarce, but in a recent study Kim (2005)
finds, somewhat intuitively, that poverty has a strong effect on informality, advocating that participation
in the informal sector is used a survival strategy by the poor in order to cushion negative income shocks
during transition.
The way agricultural policy and rural development were approached from this point of view, took
an overt position to support this informal economy, as a way of supplementing the state welfare system.
Due to inflationary pressures, the state was unable to afford higher pensions. Nevertheless, the cost for the
population was long-term overexploitation for the elderly and for the younger self-employed farmers who,
in the years to come, will lack as well pensions that are high enough to cover a decent standard of living.
104 The definition for the informal sector, as used by the International Labor Organization, states that households'
informal activities are those that generate income but fail to be registered by the relevant authorities and thus avoid
taxes, referring mostly to the unregistered self-employed households or individuals (Bangasser 2000).
105 Seasonal unemployment is likely to exist in activities that can be undertaken only during specific seasons of the
year. For instance, traditional agrarian economies provide work to agricultural labor mainly during the harvest
season. Disguised unemployment is a situation under which productivity of labor is very low. This is because an
excessive number of workers are employed than what is optimally desirable.
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The lack of land taxation106 is one such indirect welfare policy for small farmers. Nevertheless, like
any such indirect measures, it has sizable negative outcomes such as land degradation for strips of land
that are not properly cared for. At the same time, however, withdrawing such benefits, without providing
alternative sources of income leads to even worse social outcomes in the short-run. In the media there is
discussion that the small agricultural producers will disappear due to high level on taxes on land and on
the sale of agricultural products (Daniciun 2007).
Therefore, from this point of view land reform can be viewed as a key component of the social
policy during transition. The persistence of small and fragmented farms is a reflection of these outcomes,
and any attempt to replace these policies would be met with resistance if reasonable alternatives are not
provided.
5.3.2 Migration
The issue of migration was brought back in the focus of policy analysts during transition and land
reform. As we mentioned earlier, in the context of industrial downsizing, land restitution created a social
cushion and job buffer for a large share of the population. As a result, instead of seeing a shift in the
population from the rural areas cities, what we actually noticed was a reverse migration from the urban
areas to the villages.
As Figure 5-10 shows, starting with 1996 the net in-migration in the rural areas became positive
(more people were moving in as compared to those leaving the villages), contrary to what development
economics theory predicts in terms of labor migration during economic restructuring.'0 7 After year 2000
this trend became less pronounced, and while in 2004 the net in-migration in the rural areas declined, it is
unclear whether we will see a much higher increase in urban in-migration rates.
106 Land taxes, at symbolic values, were adopted in the early 1990s but were never enforced. In late 2000, the law
was revisited in the wake of EU enlargement, but even to date its enforcement for the small farmers is not taking
place.
107 A similar phenomenon is also documented by Douglass (2001) for the Asian crisis in mid 1990s and in the UNDP
(2000) report. A more detailed analysis of migration patterns in the post-socialist Romania can be found in Dana
Diminescu's articles (Diminescu 1996), and in Sandu et al. (2004).
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Figure 5-10: Net in-migration in the rural areas Figure 5-11: Rural to urban net out-migration
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Similarly, we see that in Figure 5-11, rural to urban net out-migration rate has been constantly
decreasing since the 1980s, but the trend has clearly intensified since the 1990s. The specific policy
choices for land reform led to the emergence of a new class of farmers with no prior agricultural
experience, how whom land offered a secure source of subsistence. Aside from the population established
in the rural areas and the new post-reform migrants, land restitution was a social buffer also for a large
urban population employed in other industrial but who became part-time farmers (in the weekends) in
order to supplement their incomes. A similar trend as the one we see in Romania, was described in
Ukraine as well, where the rural life became more insulated from the "vagaries of political and economic
change" (Allina-Pisano 2007). Unfortunately, official statistics (and rural surveys) were not able to capture
this important population group. Nevertheless, these trends in urban to rural migration show how rural
areas are often called upon to buffer the impacts of urban economic downturns and to play a role in
national economic resilience (UNDP 2000 p. 9).
These outcomes also point to the interrelationship between the urban and rural sectors. More
recent reflections on development policy and planning have rightfully emphasized the need to consider
the socio-economic linkages between urban and rural sectors of economic life. Hence, incorporating this
conceptual approach in policy-making results not only in balanced national development outcomes, but
also more solid poverty alleviations and higher economic opportunities, and environmental sustainability.
I find the issue of rural-urban synergies, especially as it relates to poverty alleviation, highly relevant for
the Romanian case. Historically, the development of cities has "intimately depended on the vitality of
agriculture and the regional conditions needed to support it" (UNDP 2000 p. 3).
Aside from urban to rural migration, especially after 2002 (when the visa requirement for
traveling to the Western Europe was eliminated), temporary work migration ("circulatory migration") to
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Western Europe became a sudden reality for Romania. From field surveys it appears that 80% of this
migrant population is from the rural areas (Dumitru et al. 2004 p. 54).
Most migration, as Table 5-11 shows, is concentrated on the border areas. Those who migrate
are the young and middle-aged population, emptying the villages of labor force necessary for farming.
This, in turn, places additional pressures on the existing rural population, given that (as I found from the
2006 survey) migrants do not lease-out the land but rather send back remittances to the family in the
village to cover the costs of farming the land individually or in associations.
Table 5-11: Migration rate from rural areas abroad by historical regions in 2002
Migration rate
Banat 145.5
Transylvania 66.3
Moldova 37.2
Crisana Maramures 35.3
Dobrogea 22.2
Oltenia 15.5
Muntenia 11.4
Source: Diminescu and Lazaroiu (2002), in Dumitru (2002).
5.4 Chapter summary
This chapter covered the main outcomes of transition and land reform. I discussed the role of
agricultural sector in the larger EU context as well as in the national economy. In Section 5.2 I showed
that following EU enlargement inJanuary 2007 Romania became the country with the largest share of
employment, the most the number of small and fragmented farms, but productivity is lagging behind
considerably. Hence, important challenges lie ahead for the Romanian farmers who will have to adjust to
new competitive pressures and entirely new market rules and regulations. Already, during the transition
farmers faced extremely harsh conditions as a result trade and price liberalization, decline in investments,
elimination of subsidies and the breakdown of distribution networks. In addition, the widening of the
price-scissors "devaluated" agricultural production (by increasing input prices and decreasing the retail
price for crops) to the point to which farming became a risky undertaking, suppressing any
entrepreneurial undertaking.
In Section 5.3 I examined the social outcomes of reform in terms earnings, changing distribution
of spending, and the dramatic effects of inflation on households' income. I showed that during the
transition period earned incomes became insufficient to cover basic needs. Hence, as a result of land
restitution, when most individuals came to own a small plot of land, farming was seen as an opportunity
for supplementing consumption needs. Urban-rural migration accelerated, at odds with economic
development theory's prediction.
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All these factors form the overall environment in which landowners operate and make decisions
with respect to the most critical asset they own, land. Therefore, the choice of alternative farming
arrangements, the persistence of farming associations and the limited engagement in land markets can be
partially explained by the hardships imposed by transition.
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Chapter 6 : Evaluating regional differences: small farming in the
Western Plain and the Central Romanian Plain
6.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter I highlighted the main outcomes of land reform on the agricultural sector
and the rural economy, taking stock of the social and institutional changes during transition, as well as
describing the overall economic environment. I emphasized that the Neoliberal model of transition
created expectations that were not met, calling for a broader interpretation of the transformation process.
In addition, I placed the Romanian agriculture in a larger context, contrasting it with other EU countries
along different aspects related to the agricultural sector (i.e. farm size, employment, productivity). Lastly, I
overviewed the social outcomes of land reform, in terms of poverty and migration, in interconnection with
the broader macroeconomic environment during transition.
While an overall evaluation of reform outcomes is very valuable, in-depth, micro level evidence
can unearth more subtle nuances in the consequences of post-socialist transformation on small farmers.
Hence, this chapter disaggregates the analysis to regional and household level. I show the diversity of land
reform outcomes that transpires when we hone in to the receiving end of transition policies. From a
normative perspective, this description points to the fallacy of mainstream institutional literature that
views the process of change as static and homogenous. In addition, a closer familiarization with the
regions and the types of small farmers existing in Romania, allows me to generate research hypotheses to
be tested in Chapter 8 and 9.
In general the Western Plain is more economically developed, has a higher capital endowment,
and a more diversified local economy. Investment is also higher suggesting an economic environment
more favorable to entrepreneurial initiatives. Central Romanian Plain, on the other hand, confronts with
higher poverty levels, lower capital endowment, and a higher dependence on land as the only source of
employment and income.
In spite of these differences, there is hardly any research that examines in greater detail the
dimensions and scale of regional differences. Hence, this chapter, more descriptive in nature, examines
land reform outcomes from a regional perspective at the household level, shedding light on the
distributional effects of land reform. Previous regional accounts of land reform were made at the level of
administrative regions (MADR 2007), rather than looking at the agro-regions.10 8
108 The advantages of using the agro-regions as units of analysis have been explained in the Introduction chapter.
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To examine regional differences I use survey data collected by the Government of Romania, the
World Bank, and the EU in 1996, and the survey conducted for this dissertation by myself in 2006. The
surveys are described in greater detail in Chapter 3. In addition, I supplement these data with secondary
statistics published by the National Institute of Statistics (NIS).
To explain differences in land reform outcomes between the two regions, this chapter focuses
mainly on the human and economic development disparities. Later chapters (Chapter 8 and 9) examine
how household characteristics, resource endowments, historical legacies and social capital (and norms)
played out differently in shaping the pattern of land reallocation into different farming arrangements.
Section 6.2 provides a brief description of the two agro-regions, the Western Plain and Central Romanian
Plain in terms of economic structure, agricultural production, human capital, and incomes at county level.
Section 6.3 evaluates regional disparities by looking at household level differences across the two regions
over time.
6.2 Two regions in transition
This section discusses the main differences between the two agro-regions in terms of the economic
structure and urbanization levels, as well as the overall performance of the agricultural sector, farming
organization, and participation in land markets.
Economic structure and urbanization
Western Plain and Central Romanian Plain are quite different in terms of economic development
levels, as Figure 6-1 shows. Over the years, the West has been consistently more developed than the
South, but since 2003, real GDP shows an upward trend in the Central Romania Plain. The graph also
illustrates that there are significant intra-regional disparities, especially in the West, with some counties
growing much faster than others. Such diverse growth patterns, between and within regions, provide a
first insight into the regional distribution of transition outcomes. We observe that some counties have
benefited disproportionately from the reform policies, despite the same policies being implemented across
the country. Therefore, a first assumption is that initial conditions, the economic, historical and political
structure, catalyze different outcomes given the emphasis of the reform policy, as has been discussed by
earlier studies (De Melo 1997). While in Chapter 4 I discussed historical differences between the two
regions in terms of institutional structures around land and property, this section focuses on the economic
factors that differentiate the West from the South.
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Figure 6-1: Regional Gross Domestic Product in real terms, billion constant prices
(1990=100)
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Source: National Institute of Statistics 2002-2006.
Figure 6-2 shows that the economy in the West is more diversified than in the South, with a larger
share of the population being employed in non-agricultural occupations (industry and services). The
Western Plain was traditionally an industrial center since the 19th century. The economy was further
developed during the communist times, when, in the interest of rapid industrialization and efficient use of
investment funds, industrialization was pushed in areas which already had an industrial base rather than
in more rural areas (such as the South) (Nelson 1981 p. 87). The types of industries that predominate in
this region are manufacturing, construction, software and information technology, food processing, and
chemical industry. This industrial base was supported by a long tradition of higher education in the region
that attracted (and retained) highly educated professions in different fields. During the transition to a
market economy, the economic and skill-based structure of the region, and its strategic location on the
border with Western Europe, attracted foreign investors that were pushed East by the pressures of
globalization and the search for low-cost highly skilled labor.109 A report from Price Waterhouse Coopers
on regional development, shows that the West has the second highest level of urbanization (after
Bucharest), low unemployment, large foreign investment, and developed private sector (PWC 2002).
The Central Romanian Plain was historically agricultural, with a less diversified economy, even if
the region extends around the capital city, Bucharest. During the socialist period, as described in Chapter
109 In a study of globalization patterns in manufacturing, based on fieldwork in Timis County, Berger (2005)
discusses the rise in foreign investment through outsourcing and delocalization from Western and Central Europe to
this region of Romania.
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4, large investments were made in the agricultural sector in this region due to its fertile lands. This
economic structure, where agriculture represents the main source ofjobs, is also reflected in a low
urbanization rate. In 2005 only 37 % of the population in the agro-region was living in cities, while in the
Western Plain the urbanization rate was 55% (INS 2006). Unemployment rate has also been consistently
higher in this region, forcing a large share of the population to move back to the rural areas following land
restitution.
Figure 6-2: The share of employment in non-agricultural occupations by counties in 2002
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The level of urbanization and the rural-urban linkagesI 10 were widely emphasized in the
literature as critical for achieving "harmonious" development and for stimulating rural development
(UNDP 2000). The spatial flows between urban and rural sectors include backward and forward linkages
between agriculture, manufacturing and services, such as production inputs and the processing of
agricultural raw materials. Tacoli (2003) argues that the synergy between agricultural production and
urban-based enterprises is often key to the development of more vibrant local economies and, on a wider
level, to less unequal and more "pro-poor" regional economic growth. Therefore, the fact that the
Western Plain is embedded into a more diverse manufacturing economy increases the availability of non-
farming occupational opportunities.
A review of the main reasons behind the growth of rural non-farm employment in different
nations and regions suggests that diversification is a response to a variety of factors that can be broadly
divided into constraints and opportunities (Tacoli 2004 p. 6). For example, in China and Vietnam, one
110 "Rural-urban linkages include flows of agricultural and other commodities from rural-based producers to urban
markets, both for local consumers and for forwarding to regional, national and international markets; and, in the
opposite direction, flows of manufactured and imported goods from urban centers to rural settlements" (Tacoli
2004).
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major reason for the increase in rural non-farm activities was the large surplus of agricultural labor that
emerged after de-collectivization (Anh et al. 2004). Nevertheless, in the Romanian case a large surplus of
agricultural labor is unlikely to occur because average age in the rural areas is relatively high, reducing the
opportunities for jobs outside the agricultural sector.
The agricultural sector
As far as agricultural production, Figure 6-3 shows that the ratio of crop production (measured in
million lei) per employee (measured as thousand persons) has been, on average, higher in the Western
Plain as compared to the Central Romanian Plain, meaning higher labor productivity levels over the
period of transition (1992-2005). However, Figure 6-4 shows that land productivity (measured as crop
production per hectares) has been slightly higher in the Central Romanian Plains over the same period of
time. Nevertheless, given that agricultural land in the South is of higher quality than in the West and that
agricultural investment was disproportionately higher during the communist regime (see Table 4-9 in
Chapter 4), one would expect to see larger differences in productivity. Productivity differences at regional
level were examined by Aldea and Vidican (2007), but further research is needed to isolate the main
economic and social factors that make some regions more productive than others.
Figure 6-3: Crop production per employment Figure 6-4: Crop production per hectare
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The regions show differences in terms of farming institutions as well. Based on Agricultural
Census data, Figure 6-5 shows that the Western Plain has a higher share of pnivate individual farms and
commercial companies as compared to the Central Romanian Plain, while the reverse is true in the case
of farming associations. Of the total number of formal associations (2,255 in year 2002), 17 % (379 entities)
are located in the South, while only 12% are active in the West (279 entities).
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Figure 6-5: Farming structure by regions in 2002
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The 2006 household survey in the two regions allowed me to also capture a commune level
perspective on agricultural resources (labor, land, capital) and land market development. Aggregate
statistics at commune level show that due to a lower urbanization in the South I I, villages in Central
Romanian Plain are more isolated than in the West: on average, villages from the Western Plain are
located closer to urban centers (17 km) as compared to those in the Central Romanian Plain (19 km). This
finding suggests that in general, the Western Plain has a better access to markets than the Central
Romanian Plain.1 2
The literature on rural development and rural-urban linkages emphasizes the fact that better
access to markets can increase farming incomes and encourage shifts to higher value crops or livestock.
However, more recently, Tacoli (2004 p. 4) argues that spatial proximity to markets does not necessarily
improve farmers' access to the inputs and services required to increase agricultural productivity. Access to
land, capital and labor may be more important in determining the extent to which farmers are able to
benefit from urban markets. At times, low incomes do not allow investment in cash crops or production
intensification to compensate for the lack of land and capital. In addition, patterns of attendance to
periodic markets for agricultural products also show that distance is a much less important issue than rural
consumers' income and purchasing power in determining the demand for manufacturing goods, inputs
and services (Morris 1997). Therefore, despite the fact that distance to markets is higher in the Central
Romanian Plain, low incomes, limited access to capital (as I show in Section 6.3), and lack of economic
The rate of urbanization in the Western Plain is higher than in the Central Romanian Plain (5 5 % as opposed to
37% in 2005).
12 Additionally, the access to local traditional markets is not very widespread. Only 2 5 % of the communes in the
west have a local market where they can sell agricultural products (crops and animals), and 2 7 % in the south.
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diversification (which supports the creation of backward and forward linkages) seem to be weight more for
improving rural development in the region.
The commune level data also shows that land markets were much more active in the West than in
the South. On average, in the Western Plain 1,100 hectares of agricultural land (on average 13.4% of
total agricultural land in the commune) were sold in the commune, at an average price of 2,888 RON per
hectare. In the South, less land was sold (an average of 293 hectares, which represents only 4.2% of the
commune agricultural land), but at higher prices (on average 2,565 RON per hectare). Nevertheless, there
are quite significant intra-regional disparities in terms of the level of land market activity especially in the
West, as illustrated by Figure 6-6. One explanation for this heterogeneity is that the communes closer to
urban centers experienced more active land markets. In Chapter 7, where I discuss in more depth the
development of land markets during transition, I emphasize the fact that due to higher foreign investment,
anecdotal evidence shows that in the Western Plain land conversions from agricultural to non-agricultural
use were a widespread practice over the past decade, much more than in the Central Romanian Plain.
Figure 6-6: Percentage of land sold from total agricultural land in the commune (red bars
are communes in the Western Plain and green bars are communes in Central Romanian
Plain)
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Interestingly, however, a higher share of land in the Western Plain remained fallow (2 5 % on
average), as compared to only 15% in Central Romanian Plain, despite what appears to be a more
vibrant land market. One explanation for this finding is that due to higher diversification of the local
economy, more off-farm jobs become available, and landowners shifted to non-agricultural jobs in the
urban areas. Nevertheless, land still provides an important safety net and an asset as collateral for loans, in
addition to the non-economic value it carries, preventing owners from selling it, despite not having
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resources or interest to farm. This pattern has been encouraged by the lack of agricultural land taxation
and lack of enforcement on land cultivation.' 13
Population is younger in the Western Plain than in the Central Romanian Plain. The largest age
group in the western communes is between 45-54 years (63%), while in the South the 55-60 years age
group predominates (55%). The level of youth migration is relatively high in both regions (22% in the
West and 20% in the South)." 4 However, there is a high intra-regional variation, with some of the
communes having a 0.5% youth migration and some communes with 90% youth migration seeking work
opportunities abroad.
Among the most acute problems faced by farmers in these communes, the following issues,
identified by the 2006 survey, were consistent across the two regions: marketing channels for agricultural
production, lack of mechanical equipments, limited access to financing, lack of knowledge about new
farming technologies, and natural disasters.115 Some commune representatives also mentioned old age
and lack of irrigation implements as problems for their communes.
6.3 Household level comparison
The two household surveys, conducted in 1996 and 2006 on a representative sample of farmers in
the Western Plain and Central Romanian Plain, allow me to hone in on key aspects related to household
farms in the two regions. The aspects that I describe in more detail in this section relate to human capital,
land ownership, land fragmentation, capital endowment, investment and finance, household income
sources, and engagement in commercial activities, giving the reader a better understanding of who are the
farmers who's behavior and choices are analyzed in greater detail in Chapter 8 and 9.
113 In order to reduce the hardships on the rural population, generated by the transition reform process, land
taxation was not implemented in Romania until late 2006. While this policy measure diminished the burden on the
rural population, it also prevented land consolidation through an indirect pressure for land transfers. From an
economic efficiency point of view, land taxation is "a necessary evil," as portrayed in the media (Serbanescu 2005).
Nevertheless, it would be shortsighted to rely only on land taxation to achieve land consolidation (through
bankrupting small farms short on liquidities). Incentives to increase farm performance and encourage (rather than
force) land consolidation are needed.
1 International work migration, especially from the rural areas, intensified mainly after 2002, when the visa
requirement for traveling to the Schenghen space has been lifted (Dumitru et al. 2004 p. 50). As the authors
document, Romanian shifted spectacularly from a non-mobility regime to an intense circulatory migration.
115 In the past three years Romania confronted with severe floods in the spring and fall (at critical times in the
agricultural cycle) especially in the west, south, and east of the country. The rural areas, having poor infrastructure
were severely affected to the point to which entire villages were swept away and thousands of hectares of land
inundated. We found cases in our survey in which because of floods, no production was obtained in several
households.
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6.3.1 Human capital
In 2006 the average household size was 3.1 persons, slightly higher in the Western Plain (3.3
persons) as compared to the Central Romanian Plain (3 persons) (see Table 6-1). A decade ago, in 1996,
the average household size was higher. The decline in household size over this decade could be due, first,
to a natural dynamic in rural population (lower birth rates than mortality rates) and, second, to increased
rural-urban (or international) migration. The average age in Western Plain is lower than in Central
Romanian Plain (57 years old respectively 64 years old). Additionally, the educational level of the
household head is higher in the Western Plain and a much higher share of landowners have agriculture as
a secondary occupation (25% as compared to 6% in the Central Romanian Plain), confirming the more
general description in Section 6.2.
Table 6-1: Descriptive statistics for the 1996 and 2006 surveys
Central Romanian
Western Plain Plain
1996 2006 1996 2006
Household size (nr. pers.) 3.9 pers 3.3 pers 3.1 pers 3.0 pers
Age of the household head (yrs) 53 yrs 57 yrs 64 yrs 64 yrs
Gender of the household head (% male) 74.0% 57.0% 74.5% 63.0%
Education of the household head (%
gymnasium) 69.5% 63.0% 84.4% 79.0%
Main occupation (% agriculture) 64.8% 52.0% 85.8% 86.0%
Secondary occupation (% agriculture) 24.0% 25.0% 12.7% 6.0%
Occupational status (% pensioners) 54.3% 55.0% 79.3% 69.0%
Source: Household surveys in 1996 and 2006.
6.3.2 Land ownership
By 2006, 90% of the households in the two regions acquired ownership title, 8.2% had a
temporary proof of ownership ("adeverinta de punere in posesie") and 1.8 percent has other legal
endorsements. Ten years ago, in 1996, only 47% of the households had ownership titles (more in the
Western Plain as compared to the Central Romanian Plain), while 50% had only temporary proof of
ownership. Property restitution in the South caught up with the West, so that by 2006, 93.4% of the
households in the Central Romanian Plain had ownership titles, as compared to 8 6 .7 % in the Western
Plain. In Chapter 8 I examine whether this difference plays an important role in the choice of institutional
arrangements for farming.
6.3.3 Farm size
The average size of the household farm decreased from 3.80 hectares in 1996, to 3.12 hectares in
2006. This decline in farm size is rather surprising since one would expect that over time family farms will
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become larger, especially after 1998 when land market was formally set-up (Law 54/1998). However, it
could also suggest that as land markets became more active, and since there were few marketing and
financing opportunities for small farmers, households decided to sell part of the land to private
entrepreneurs that used the land for non-agricultural purposes.1 6 Land purchases by small farmers, in
order to consolidate their holdings or increase their farm sizes, were very limited, as I show in Chapter 7.
Interestingly, in the Western Plain, the size of the landholding slightly increased since 1996 (from
3.63 hectares to 3.97 hectares in 2006), while in the South it significantly declined (from 3.93 hectares to
2.94 hectares in 2006). Why did the size of landholdings increase in one region while in the other it
declined over a decade? Since 1996 land markets became more developed once Law 54/1998 was
implemented, leading to a formalization of land transactions (buying and selling of land)." 17 On the one
hand, since the West is economically more developed, land consolidation through the land market was
much faster. On the other hand, in the South, since land is the main source of income, further land
fragmentation might have occurred through inheritance among household members.
The 2006 survey shows that 81/% of the farms were smaller than 5 hectares. On average,
landholdings are larger in the Western Plain (3.97 ha) as compared to Central Romanian Plain (2.94 ha).
Interestingly, as Table 6-2 illustrates Western Plain has both a higher number of very small farms and a
higher number of larger farms (over 5 hectares) as compared to Central Romanian Plain.
Table 6-2: Distribution of farms based on landholding size in 2006 (%)
Central Romanian
Average Western Plain Plain
Under I ha 12.2 13.3 10.9
1-3 ha 44.9 40.0 50.0
3-5 ha 24.1 22.5 25.8
5-10 ha 15.6 19.4 11.6
10-20 ha 2.3 2.9 1.7
More than 20 ha 1.0 1.9 0.0
Source: Household survey in 2006.
In these two regions, 19% of the farms are over 5 hectares (between 5 and 70 hectares) and out of
these, 17% are more than 10 hectares. As Table 6-2 illustrates, Western Plain has more large individual
farms than Central Romanian Plain (24% and 13% respectively). These relatively large individual farms
116 This outcome has been observed primarily in the western region, mainly in Timis and Arad county, where large
areas of agricultural land were sold to Italian and German investors and who were not required to use the land for
agricultural purposed. Speculation, in expectations of higher land prices following EU enlargement, was often the
principal reason behind these transactions.
117 Other studies, such as Verdery (2003), suggest that land transactions were made even before Law 54/1998 was
adopted, but based on informal contracts and arrangements. After 1998, those earlier transactions were either
formalized, or they were nullified.
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are likely to be the backbone of Romania's commercial individual farms, closer in size to the EU family
farm model, while the segment of less than 5 hectares, is likely to stay semi-subsistence and subsistence,
gradually becoming the reserve of land for increasing the size of the commercial individual and joint stock
farms, provided that alternative job opportunities (or sources of incomes for pensioners) will be created.
Table 6-3: Distribution of farms based on landholding size in 1996 (%)
Central Romanian
Average Western Plain Plain
Under I ha 5.7 10.5 2.1
1-3 ha 39.1 43.8 35.5
3-5 ha 26.4 18.1 32.6
5-10 ha 23.2 19.1 26.2
10-20 ha 5.7 8.6 3.6
More than 20 ha - -
Source: Household survey in 1996.
Table 6-3 illustrates that a decade ago the average farm size was higher in both region, with more
mid-level farms. However, the maximum size was 20 hectares, lower than in 2006, suggesting a more
normally distributed pattern of land ownership. This pattern of land reallocation in the past decade shows
that a class of family farms entrepreneurs has not yet emerged in Romania, and that the unfavorable
conditions in terms of access to markets and financial resources may lead to the perpetuation of the
subsistence sector.
In addition, especially the more recent land distribution suggests that there might be intraregional
differences in terms of land sizes. Table 6-4 illustrates that the two agro-regions are indeed heterogeneous
in terms of the size of land ownership (especially the Western Plain). All farms larger than 20 hectares are
located in Arad and Timis, as well as 67% of the farms between 10-20 hectares. At the same time,
however, 4 3 % of all farms smaller than I hectare are in Bihor and Satu-Mare. A similar pattern among
the individual household farms can also be observed in the South, although in a smaller degree. Ialomita
has a significantly higher share of larger farms, while Giurgiu has the highest share of farms smaller than 1
hectare. These intraregional differences need to be considered in understanding regional disparities in
agricultural performance, property rights arrangements, as well as market participation.
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Table 6-4: Distribution of farms based on landholding size by counties in 2006 (%)
Under 1 More than
ha 1-3 ha 3-5 ha 5-10 ha 110-20 ha 20 ha
Western Plain
Arad 5.3 11.1 9.4 16.7 14.3 33.3
Bihor 21.3 5.7 3.4 4.2 7.1 0.0
Satu-Mare 21.3 13.6 12.8 8.3 0.0 0.0
Timis 8.0 15.1 22.1 34.4 42.9 66.7
Central Romanian Plain
Calarasi 6.7 9.7 7.4 11.5 0.0 0.0
Giurgiu 22.7 15.8 8.7 8.3 14.3 0.0
lalomita 6.7 8.6 9.4 10.4 21.4 0.0
Teleorman 8.0 20.4 26.8 6.3 0.0 0.0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Household survey in 2006.
6.3.4 Land fragmentation
After de-collectivization and restitution based on the 1940s land records, land fragmentation
became a serious problem for the newly created private farms and, in general, for improving agricultural
performance. The level of fragmentation was almost unprecedented in the region. In 2006 almost 62% of
the household farms had their land divided in more than 3 plots, which is considered a major obstacle for
technological progress in agriculture and for increased productivity levels. This high level of
fragmentation is problematic also because due to the Soviet style of high mechanization, the endowment
with agricultural equipments is not well suited for a majority of small farms (Tesliuc 2000; Sabates-
Wheeler 2005).
Interestingly, however, land fragmentation did not decline significantly in the past ten years, as
was expected once private property rights were reinstituted and land markets were formalized. In Chapter
8 I empirically test whether land fragmentation affects the choices landowners make in terms of the land
reallocation in different farming arrangements. Tables 6-5 and 6-6 illustrate that while land fragmentation
declined on average (from 31% of the surveyed households owning 1-2 plots in 1996 to 39% in 2006), in
the Western Plain the share of farms with more than seven plots of land increased. This suggests that even
if the average farm size is larger in the West, the type of farming arrangements that are operating in this
region were not able to fully absorb land fragmentation. Figure 6-11 shows a cadastral map from a village
in the Western Plain, illustrating the extent of land fragmentation and the irregularities of plot boundaries,
which make mechanization very hard to use.
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Table 6-5: Land fragmentation in 2006 (%) Table 6-6: Land fragmentation in 1996 (%)
Western Central Romanian Western Central Romanian
Sample Plain Plain I Sample Plain Plain
1-2 plots 38.5 39.9 37.1 1-2 plots 31.1 33.3 29.5
3-4 plots 36.7 30.7 43.0 3-4 plots 34.6 36.4 33.3
5-7 plots 20.4 21.5 19.2 5-7 plots 27.6 24.2 30.2
>7 plots 4.4 7.9 0.7 >7 plots 6.6 6.1 7.0
Source: Household survey in 2006. Source: Household survey in 1996.
The small size of the household farms, in addition to high land fragmentation, might lead to a
perpetuation of subsistence farming even after integration in the EU. As of now, out of more than four
million private individual farms, only 1,500,000 farms were determined eligible for the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) direct payments.1 8 Nevertheless, cadastral measurements, which are another
requirement for EU subsidies in agriculture, exist only for 3 8 % of farms. CAP will provide financial
assistance to semi-subsistence farms11 9 (approximately 15,000 Euro/year), but only for a limited number
of years (approximately five). Therefore, reliance only on the CAP payments, without broader social and
economic institutional policies for addressing structural change in agriculture (and more broadly, in the
rural sector) is likely to have limited outcomes on reducing land fragmentation and increasing farm
performance.
6.3.5 Capital endowment
The dismantling of collective farms and the Tractor and Mechanical Stations (MTS) that were
serving them, the return to small private farming after land restitution, and a slow privatization of state
farms, led to de-capitalization of the agricultural sector. Large irrigation systems became obsolete and
land fragmentation made mechanical equipments ineffective on small land plots.
Nevertheless, overall, capital endowment increased since 1996. At regional level, we notice that
capital endowment increased only in the Western Plain, specifically the number of households that own a
tractor, plow for tractor, and seeder (see Table 6-7 and 6-8). In 2006 410% of the surveyed households in
the Western Plain own a tractor and plough for tractor, while only 9 % do so in the Central Romanian
Plain. Rather, in the South, 39% of the households use horse drawn carriages for transportation and other
farming related activities. Moreover, in the South capital endowment declined consistently across different
118 Direct payments will be made on farms that are at least 1 hectare in size, split into parcels of not less than 0.3
hectares.
119 The difference between subsistence and semi-subsistence relates not only to the size of farms (smaller than 3-4
hectares) but also to the share of production being sold on the market. Subsistence farms produce only for
consumption, while semi-subsistence farms sell only a very limited share of the production. Data from the 2002
Agricultural Census in Romania, show that 4 0% of the agricultural area in private individual use is occupied by
subsistence farms, and 39 % by semi-subsistence farms. Only 7% of the area is used by farms with commercial
activity (Giurca et al. 2006).
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physical assets. In Chapter 8 I test whether capital availability affects the choices landowners make in
terms of land reallocation. I hypothesize that households that own agricultural equipments are more likely
to farm the land individually or to join associations if individual farming is not an option for other reasons
(i.e. alternative income opportunities, low farming ability).
Table 6-7: Physical assets in 2006 Table 6-8: Physical assets in 1996
Source: Household survey in 2006. Source: Household survey in 1996.
At national level, capital endowment is also low compared to the size of agricultural area, despite
continuous increase in the stock of mechanical equipments. Secondary statistics show that Romania has
55.34 hectares of arable land per tractor, while the European average is approximately 12.7 hectares per
tractor (AgriNews 2007). In addition, more than 70% of the tractors were in operation for at least eight
years, increasing operation costs, and therefore, making mechanical works unprofitable for many small
farmers that are confronting with serious liquidity problems.
6.3.6 Conmercialization
With a low capital endowment, high land fragmentation, and low prices for agricultural products,
small and medium farms in Romania are able to produce just enough for household consumption without
having the capacity to market their production. According to the two surveys one decade apart, the ability
of the small and medium farms to market their production significantly declined. In 1996 more than 9 0%
of the households claimed to have sold agricultural products, while in 2006 only 3 3 % marketed some of
their production. This is a significant decline and further research is needed to explain the drastic
worsening of the marketing potential.
Central Romanian Plain experienced the most drastic decline in the share of households able to
commercialize part of their production (from 87% in 1996, to only 24% in 2006). In the Western Plain
40% of households sold agricultural products in 2006, as compared to 98% in 1996. This decline in
market participation can be attributed to structural changes in the food industry in Romania in
preparation for accession to the EU, when in the past years, approximately 8 0% of the food processing
industries were closed due to inability to compete and to establish quality standards. As a result, many of
these small producers lost a significant number of their customers. Moreover, decline in agricultural
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% of households Western Central Romanian
Plain Plain
Truck 2.8 0.7
Tractor 21.2 4.3
Plow for tractor 19.3 4.6
Combine for grains 2.2 1.3
Carriage 19.3 38.6
Seeder 8.5 2.6
Equipments for irrigation 3.5 0.3
Equipments for processing 1.6 0.0
% of households Western Central Romanian
Plain Plain
Truck 4.8 1.4
Tractor 9.5 8.5
Plow for tractor 9.5 6.4
Combine for grains 2.9 2.8
Carriage 22.9 43.3
Seeder 7.6 5.7
Equipments for irrigation 6.7 3.5
Equipments for processing 16.2 3.5
subsidies, coupled with rise in imports at lower prices from the highly subsidized EU countries, led to
decline in the demand for local products.
Regional differences in market access in 2006 were reflected also in higher average incomes from
selling agricultural products in the West as compared to the South (4,693 RON120 respectively 2,458
RON). Potential reasons for the difference in product commercialization between the two regions derive
from accessibility to markets, a more diversified economy, capital endowments, as well as the composition
of agricultural production (in the South farmers cultivate mainly grains, while in the West the production
is more diversified). Structural factors in terms of farming practices and the degree of farm fragmentation
are also critical and affect produce sales through their potential effect on farm performance. For example,
since the majority of farmers in the South lease-out part of the land to associations, farmers have a lower
ability to sell agricultural products. This suggests that the agricultural products obtained as rent are just
enough for domestic consumption.
Table 6-9 illustrates that households that were able to derive income from selling agricultural
products had larger landholdings, which is another indication that land consolidation is required for
making the transition from subsistence farming to a more commercially oriented production.
Table 6-9: Market participation by landholding size in 2006
Sold agricultural products:
Yes (%) No (%)
<0.99 ha 5.5 15.3
1-2.99 ha 31.0 51.6
3-4.99 ha 30.0 21.3
>5 ha 33.5 11.8
Total 100 100
Source: Household survey in 2006.
The majority of the farms that marketed part of their crops sold them directly in town or village
markets without a pre-approved permit. After accession to the EU structures, this practice will exclude all
these small producers from CAP price and market support measures (Dumitru et al. 2004).121 Therefore,
in order to benefit from the CAP direct payments, small commercial farmers need to start immediately to
organize in marketing cooperatives or to move from traditional outlets to wholesale markets. This also
means that many households will not benefit anymore from this source of income after integration.
1 RON is the Romanian currency (Lei Noi) introduced in 2005.
121 The current CAP system grants support at the wholesale or processing level and not at the farm gate (milk
delivery, fruit and vegetables, potatoes starch, sugar, etc.).
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6.3.7 Investment and finance
As Table 6-10 illustrates, investment behavior for small household farms has been very limited in
both regions. Most households invested in purchasing livestock and very few bought physical assets or
agricultural machineries. This outcome is characteristic of subsistence farms, pattern consistent with the
results from the 1996 survey.
Table 6-10: Share of households that invested in any of the following categories in 2006 (%
of surveyed households that investment in a particular activity)
Western Central
Plain Romanian Plain
Buy agricultural equipments 1.9 1.0
Plant trees 1.6 2.3
Buy animals 12.3 13.2
Buy land 0.3 1.7
Build house annex 5.7 2.0
Develop a private non-agric. enterprise 0.3 0.3
Develop and food processing enterprise 0.3 0.7
Buy car 0.9 0.3
Children's education 25.0 8.9
Source: Household surveys in 2006.
In the Western Plain most households, 8 3 %, purchased agricultural equipments with savings
derived from selling agricultural products, while only 33% in the Central Romanian Plain used this source
of income for this purpose.
The credit market is an important contributing factor to investments in land and other assets.
Titling programs are critical for increasing the activity of commercial banks in the agricultural sector and
giving access to smallholders to financial services by using land and other assets as collateral. Nevertheless,
since landholdings are so small, affordable credit options have been very limited.122 It is possible that after
accession to the EU, banking institutions would show more interest for this segment of the population,
since they will get involved in handling the direct payments to farmers.
Nevertheless, only a few households in the household surveys took loans for investment or to
supplement their incomes. The majority of these loans, however, were used for other expenses besides
agricultural works, mostly for consumption purposes. In the Western Plain 15% of the households took a
loan (58% from a bank, 25% from a private individual, and 10% from a relative) in 2006, while in
Central Romanian Plain 1 I% took loans, mostly from banking institutions (81 %). Given that the level of
economic development (and financial services) is more developed in the West than in the South, the fact
122 Another obstacle for farmers to get access to credit has been created by the fact that the majority of these farmers
does not have bank accounts and therefore credit records to do exist for them.
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that fewer households resort to loans from private individuals and relatives, suggests that social capital in
the rural communities might be stronger in the Western Plain than in the Central Romanian Plain.
However, economic instability, an undeveloped financial sector for the small and medium
farmers, and lack of information about the financial services in rural areas, led to limited trust in banking
institutions. In both regions respondents claimed that if they would need a larger sum of money they
would rather borrow from relatives (74 % in the West, and 810% in the South). This denotes that social
networks are still very strong in the rural areas, overruling market relations, which is characteristic of a
more traditiona; economy.
6.3.8 Household incomes
As for household incomes, Table 6-11 shows that pensions 23 represent the largest source of
income for farmers. In the Western Plain 68 .4 % of the surveyed households derive incomes from
pensions, while 8 4 % do so in the Central Romanian Plain. As discussed in the Section 6.3.6, only a small
share of households derive incomes from selling agricultural products (33 %). More farmers in the Western
Plain (4 1%) derive incomes from selling agricultural products, than in the Central Romanian Plain (230%).
In addition, 4 3 .4 % of the households in the West have non-farming sources of income (wages), while this
share is much lower for the households in the South (25 .6 %).
Table 6-11: Income sources for the households surveyed in 2006
Central Romanian
Average Western Plain Plain
Selling agricultural products 32.5 41.1 23.4
Associations 8.9 2.2 15.8
Leasing 8.1 2.2 14.2
Wages 34.7 43.4 25.7
Non-agricultural entrepreneur 1.3 1.3 1.3
Pensions 75.8 68.4 83.5
Other state funds (i.e.
scholarships, unemployment
compensation) 13.6 12.3 14.9
Relatives 3.7 5.7 1.7
Other sources 8.7 10.4 6.9
Source: Household surveys in 2006.
In terms of income value, on average in the two regions, pensions represent 54 % of total
household income, wages represent 23 %, and revenues from selling agricultural products account on
average 10 % of total income. Based on the weight of each source of income in total income, the following
types of households can be identified: households where pensions represent the main source of income
123 In pensions we included both agricultural pensions and other types of pensions. A high pension level might be
due to agricultural pensions, which increased since 1993 (MAA 1997 p. 7-1).
163
(55%), households where wages are the main source of income (29%), and households where the main
source of income is derived from selling agricultural products (7%).
Incomes from salaries and pensions are on average very low. Based on official statistics, in June
2006, 57% of the households from the Western Plain were earning less than 500 RON (US$180), while in
the Central Romanian Plain this share was higher, 7 2% earning less than US$100. More importantly,
32% of the households in the West are earning less than the minimum wage (330 RON/month in 2006),
while in the South this share is much higher, 51 %.
Figure 6-7 and Figure 6-8 illustrate the concentration of incomes towards the lower levels in both
regions in 2006. Nevertheless, the West has a more normal distribution for the mid-level incomes.
Figure 6-7: Earned incomes in the Figure 6-8: Earned incomes in the Central in
2006 Western Plain Romanian Plain in 2006
agrorea: Campta de Vest agroreg: Campta Romana Centraa
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Overall, as we can notice from Figure 6-9 and 6-10 below, the surveyed households perceive that,
as compared to a year earlier, the general market conditions for farming have worsened. Even if the
degree of non-response is higher in the Central Romanian Plain, most households responded that 2006
was a worse year mainly in terms of the financial situation, purchasing seeds and fertilizers, as well as
hiring labor and the possibility of working the land with mechanical implements.
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Figure 6-9: Overall perceptions in 2006 regarding specific changes as compared to a year
ago in the Western Plain
Western Plain - changes as compared to last year
Buy fertilizers
Buy seeds
Hire workers
Mechanically work the land
Buy agric. machinery
Contracting with the state
Selling agricultural products
Financial situation
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
E Better U Same N Worse E NR
Source: Household survey, 2006.
Figure 6-10: Overall perceptions in 2006 regarding specific changes as compared to a year
ago in the Central Romanian Plain
Central Romanian Plain -changes as compared to last year
Buy fertilizers
Buy seeds -
Hire workers
Mechanically work the land
Buy agric. machinery
Contracting with the state
Selling agricultural products
Financial situation
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
E Better N Same E Worse ENR
Source: Household survey, 1996.
In the West, as Figure 6-9 illustrates, most households considered that conditions worsened
especially around contracting with the state for selling agricultural products and buying agricultural
machineries, as well as the overall financial situation. Market access for seeds, fertilizers, and labor, seems
to be better than in the South. As far as labor is concerned, despite higher migration for jobs abroad, a
younger rural population in the Western Plain created better conditions for hiring labor as compared to
the Central Romanian Plain.
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6.4 Chapter summary
In this chapter I examined the main regional differences between the Western Plain and the
Central Romanian Plain in terms of economic development, urbanization level, and agricultural
productivity. In addition, using household survey data, I described the type of household farms that are
currently operating in these two regions. Along with Chapter 5, this overview provides a better
understanding of the overall environment in which small farms operate, and hence, of the different
decisions landowners make with respect to land reallocation.
To summarize, I showed that the Western Plain is historically more industrialized than the
Central Romanian Plain, it has a mode diversified economic structure, a higher level of urbanization, and
the income levels are higher. In addition, capital ownership is higher and a larger share of households in
the region commercialize part of the agricultural production. Lastly, but very important, I also showed
that in the Western Plain private individual farms predominate.
In the South, agriculture is traditionally the main economic sector, providing incomes and jobs
for the majority of the population. Therefore, the economy is less diversified (with fewer non-farming
opportunities), more rural (despite being located close to the capital city), and income levels are lower.
Moreover, just a small fraction of the households marketed part of the harvest. In contrast to the Western
Plain, most landowners reallocated part of the land in farming associations.
In the next chapter I describe in more detail the institutional arrangements for land reallocation,
discussion which will lead to the more analytical part of the dissertation (Chapter 8 and 9), where I
examine, through statistical analysis and qualitative fieldwork, the relationship between different factors
(i.e. household characteristics, farm size, land fragmentation, physical characteristics) and the choices
landowners make between different institutional arrangements during transition.
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Figure 6-11 Cadastral map showing the degree of land fragmentation in a Western Plain
village
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Chapter 7 : Land reallocation into different institutional arrangements
7.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters I highlighted the main outcomes of land reform on the agricultural sector
and the rural economy, taking stock of the social and institutional changes during transition, as well as
describing the overall economic environment. I discussed the socio-economic outcomes of land reform at
a macro (agricultural sector in the larger economy) and micro level (the impact on small farmers). I also
showed that, during transition, landowners resort to different institutional arrangements for farming. In
this chapter I take this finding further and I explore in more depth the specific features of the farming
arrangements currently available to landowners in Romania. I trace their evolution over time, and I
examine them in terms of organizational aspects, contractual arrangements, and household
characteristics. This analysis allows me to generate research hypotheses to be tested in Chapter 8 (using
statistical analysis) and in Chapter 9 (based on qualitative fieldwork).
Currently, Romanian landowners who wish to farm their land face a range of options.
Immediately after land reform, in 1991, farmers could choose to farm the land themselves, or in
associations (large formal associations or informal associations). In addition, since 1994 individuals
(landowners and private entrepreneurs) could enter various land-renting arrangements. In 1998,
landowners were also given the option of selling land to either shift out of agriculture, or to release part of
the assets to more productive farmers allowing them to focus their productive energy on smaller land
plots. These farming arrangements are not mutually exclusive. At a given point in time, a household can
make several choices regarding its land: it can release some land to associations, it can lease-out land to
other individuals, and it can retain part of it for self-cultivation. These institutional alternatives can be
viewed as a rearrangement of property rights over a spectrum of tenure forms. This outcome is not unique
to Romania. Stark (1996), for example, points to similar patterns in Hungary, and Csaki and Kislev (1993)
in Moldova. In describing these arrangements Verdery (1999) used the term "fuzzy property rights" to
portray the wide variation of property relations, which are blurred and ambiguous in terms of obligations
and responsibilities associated with the restituted land.
The mixed land reallocation practices make this study interesting for theoretical as well as policy
purposes. The diversity in institutional arrangements challenges orthodox transition theories that
emphasize individual farming as the panacea following land restitution. In addition, this pattern of land
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reallocation provokes the realm of policy-making for more comprehensive measures, sensitive to
contextual and institutional variations.
I start by describing the institutional patterns and the national and regional trends in land
reallocation. Then, in Sections 7-3 to 7-5 I examine each arrangement (private individual farming,
associations, and leasing) separately, emphasizing mainly organizational aspects and contractual terms for
each arrangement. In Section 7-6 I describe the main characteristics of the households engaged in each
arrangement (i.e. age, education, main occupation, land and capital endowment, and land fragmentation)
and I summarize the main hypotheses generated by this chapter. The analysis brings to light potential
motives for landowners' choices of land reallocation during transition, to be examined in greater detail in
Chapters 8 and 9.
7.2 Institutional outcomes, national and regional trends in land reallocation
7.2.1 Institutional outcomes from land reallocation
The alternatives for land reallocation varied significantly over the years. Immediately after land
reform farmers could choose between farming individually or in different forms of associations, while land
markets were formalized only later, after 1994. Following restitution and the transfer of property rights
from the state to individuals, an increasing number of landowners decided to farm the land themselves. In
this analysis, private individual farms refer to landowners (households) that have a final land title as well as
those with a temporary title ("adeverinta de punere in posesie") who farm the land using household
and/or hired labor. This type of farming assumes a complete bundle or rights over the land under
cultivation and over the produce derived from the land (with the exception of land that was leased-in
under a contractual agreement).' 2 4
Nevertheless, immediately after restitution and the breakdown of the collective farms, associations
emerged as alternatives to farming all the land individually, to the surprise of policy ref'ormers.
Associations were of two types: formal associations and informal associations. Formal associations were
created directly on the structures of the former collective farms (i.e. same buildings, capital, and oftentimes
the same management) but they were significantly smaller in size. Membership in formal associations is
easy to obtain and final title is not required for joining. The rent is generally paid as a share of the harvest
at the end of the year. A major advantage of formal associations, as opposed to other farming
arrangements, is the benefit they derive from the networks of production inherited from the old collective
farms.
124 The types of property rights that form the bundle for a good are access, withdrawal, management, exit (or
exclusion), and alienation (Schlager and Ostrom 1992).
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Informal associations were created endogenously by neighbors and relatives in order to
consolidate land plots and to draw on common resources (i.e. capital, labor). These farming arrangements
do not have legal status, restricting members' access to financial services. Because, as Section 7.2.2 shows,
informal associations declined significantly since the beginning of land reform, this study examines mainly
formal associations. In Section 7.2.2 and 7.2.3 I compare trends in these forms of association during
transition. However, in Appendix 7-1 I examine in greater detail the informal associations emphasizing
their evolution over time, the main differences from the formal associations and the household
characteristics of the landowners that engage in this arrangement.
Land market transactions (i.e. leasing and sales), as another form of alternative farming
arrangements (or tenancy), were formalized only later in the transition process. Leasing became available
starting with Law 54/1994 when conditions for lease were more restrictive (i.e. the duration of the lease
was enforced to at least five years, and a minimum rent was specified). The rent for the leasing
arrangements is generally paid as a fixed share of the yearly harvest. This form of tenancy in Romania is
different from the canonical model of sharecropping because the tenants are generally capital rich, having
easier access to financial resources.125
Land sales were formalized in 1998, but with the exception of the Western Plain, purchases and
sales of land were very limited. Therefore my research is centered on leasing arrangements. Nevertheless,
Appendix 2 discusses in greater detail the trends in land sales since the beginning of land reform.
In the following sections I present the main national and regional trends in land reallocation
based on official statistics and household surveys. Then, in Sections 7-3 through 7-5 I examine in greater
detail each of the main farming arrangements (i.e. private individual farming, associations and leasing).
7.2.2 National trends in land reallocation
At the national level, the share of agricultural land farmed by small individual farms has increased
by 2 6 % since 1993 (from 3,420 thousand to 4,104 thousand farms), as Table 7-1 shows. Nevertheless, the
share of land farmed by private individual farms stayed relatively constant over this period (approximately
66% from total arable land), suggesting a high degree of land fragmentation. The number (and size) of
formal associations declined by approximately 16% from 1993 to 1999. Over the same period of time, the
number of informal associations126 declined by much more, 55%. By 2005 the number of formal
associations had been reduced by more than half as compared to 1999. Official statistics show that the
125 Sharecropping typically involves a relatively richer owner of the land and a poorer agricultural worker or farmer.
126 After 2000, informal associations stopped being recorded by national statistics institutions due to lack of legal
status and the subsequent difficulty in assessment. As a result, those households are included in the individual farms
category. Nevertheless, as we will see in the later sections, there are important differences between them and private
individual farms, which one has to be aware of.
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share of arable land farmed in formal associations declined from 17% in 1993 to 5% in 2005. However,
survey evidence' 27 shows that a sizable share of households are members in such arrangements, as I will
show in the next section.
Official data on leasing arrangements is very limited because, as I discuss later (in Section 7.5),
informal leasing arrangements predominated especially early in the reform period. According to the
General Agricultural Census in 2002, the share of agricultural land leased out based on contractual
arrangements represented 11 % of the total agricultural area. From this total, 5. 4 % (754,580 hectares)
were farmed only in leasing contracts, while 7% (982,472 hectares) were farmed in a mixed regime
(leasing and individual farming).
Table 7-1: The pattern of land reallocation at the national level between 1993-2005
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2002 2005
Total arable land 11,006 11,212 11,381 11,539 11,612 11,690 11,921 13,931 13,907
privately* farmed (thou ha)
Fornal associations
- number 4,266 3,970 3,973 3,759 3,912 3,578 3,573 2,224 1,614
- agricultural land (% from
total arable land) 17.4 15.8 15.2 15.2 14.8 13.3 11.9 7.0 5.3
-average size (ha) 448 446 436 466 438 435 396 432 455
Infornal associations
-number 13,772 13,741 15,915 15,107 9,489 7,175 6,264 n.a. n.a.
- agricultural land (% from n.a. n.a.
total arable land) 16.0 13.7 14.0 12.5 8.6 8.1 7.3
- average size (ha) 128 112 100 95 105 132 139 n.a. n.a.
Private individualfarms
- number (thou.) 3,420 3,578 3,597 3,626 3,973 3,946 4,120 4,277 4,103
- agricultural land (% from
total arable land) 66.6 70.5 70.7 72.3 76.6 78.5 78.7 55.3 65.4
- average size per farmer 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.3 1.7 2.2
(ha)
* Private refers to land that is in private ownership (not in state or cooperative ownership), including land farmed by
private individual farms, associations, and tenants (through leasing).
n.a. = data not available from official statistics.
Source: For 1993-1999, National Program for Agriculture and Rural Development 1999, Annex 34, Ministry of
Agriculture and Food Newsletter (July 2000): (Aligica and Dabu 2003). For 2002, INS National Agricultural Census
2002. For 2005 MARD (2007).
127 There are no national statistics recording the share of households that are members in farming associations over
time.
172
Despite the overwhelming presence of private individual farms, it is difficult to accurately assess
the share of households that farm under this arrangement. As Dumitru (2002) claims, estimating the exact
number of individual farms is problematic because informal leasing became very common following de-
collectivization, part-time (weekend) farmers with jobs outside agriculture are not officially registered as
farmers, and the difference between individual farming and informal associations is sometimes hard to
make, as I discuss in Appendix 7-1. This is why household surveys are able to capture a more accurate
description of the institutional arrangements for small farmers. Nevertheless, even if surveys show an
increase in leasing especially after 1998, land markets in Romania are still very thin. For example, in
Slovakia and Czech Republic more than 90% of all cultivated land area is leased. In Bulgaria, Hungary,
Moldova and Kazakhstan, between 50% and 60% of the cultivated area is leased (Swinnen and Vranken
2007).
7.2.3 Regional trends in land reallocation
My survey data in the two agro-regions in Romania, Western Plain and Central Romanian Plain,
shows that private individual farming has increased (from 49% in 1996 to 65% in 2006) (see Table 7-2).128
Most of this increase occurred in the Western Plain, while in the Central Romanian Plain the share of
households that farmed individually declined by 5%.
Table 7-2: The pattern of land reallocation into different institutional arrangements by
year and agro-region (%)
1996 2006
Overall Western Central Overall Western Central
Plain Romanian Plain Romanian
Plain Plain
Private individual 48.8 62.5 37.5 64.5 67.4 32.6
farming
Farming associations 41.9 22.3 77.7 16.2 11.0 89.0
from which:
-Formal associations 67.9 27.1 72.9 84.0 13.1 86.9
-Informal associations 32.1 12.1 87.9 16.0 0.0(a) 100.0
Leasing-out 11.8 34.5 65.5 20.4 28.6 71.4
Land salesi)) n.a n.a n.a. 12.9 87.5 12.5
Source: Household surveys in the Western Plain and Central Romanian Plain, 1996 and 2006.
n.a. = not available.
(a) In 2006 no informal associations were recorded in the sample of households in the Western Plain.
1)) In 1996 land sales were not formalized. Therefore, the 1996 questionnaire did not ask a question on land sales.
128 I run t-tests for the differences of means between the two years along land reallocation choices in the two agro-
regions and I found statistically significant differences between the regions.
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Regional differences in the development of private individual farming are interesting for
theoretical and policy reasons. From a theoretical point of view, this disparity suggests that the reform of
property rights creates a different set of incentives for farmers in different regions, conditional on historical
legacies, economic opportunities, and the social environment. In Chapter 9 I examine this hypothesis
further, based on interviews and participatory observation. The outcome is also important for policy
reasons because it highlights that policies need to be flexible enough to allow the emergence of local
solutions to land reallocation. It addition, it suggests that different regions may require different policies to
make the transition to market based economies.
The share of households that farmed part of the land in associations declined from 42% in 1996
to 16% in 2006. Nevertheless, this reduction can be mostly attributed to a fall in the share of households
that joined informal associations (from 32% in 1996 to 16% in 2006). Among the households that joined
associations, the share of those that farmed land in formal associations has actually increased (from 68%
to 84% in 2006). This trend was influenced by land reallocation in Central Romanian Plain, where the
share of households that joined formal associations increased from 73% in 1996 to 87/0 in 2006. In the
West, the prominence of associations (both formal and informal), as alternative institutional arrangements,
declined over this decade (from 22 % in 1996 to 1 I% in 2006).
Land markets (leasing, sales, purchases) recorded an upward trend during this period, but at a
much slower pace than it was initially expected. Leasing has only slightly increased, while the surge in
land sales (since 1998 when the land sales law was implemented) was driven mostly by land transactions in
the Western Plain region. Land sales in the West were mainly concentrated in Timis and Arad counties.
Despite the fact that there is no published data on land conversions at the national level, anecdotal
evidence from local officials suggests that rural-urban conversions of prime agricultural land have been
widespread over the past ten years. Because these areas, along the border with Central and Western
Europe, are more urban and developed, this process was accelerated in comparison to the South. Such
pattern is common and widely documented across the developing world, where the weakening of
traditional land-use systems, unscrupulous land title transfers from poorer rural households, and the lack
of coherent land use planning at the urban fringe facilitates this process at a faster rate (UNDP 2000). In
Romania, as in other South and Eastern European countries, the system of governance related to land
conversions for non-agricultural uses (industrial and urban sprawl purposes) is largely dominated by
markets, with limited oversight from the state, unlike in the neighboring countries. 2 9 Given that in the
129 Poland and the Czech Republic have instituted strict regulations on the conversion of agricultural and forestry
land to other purposes (Sikor 2002).
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West there is a stronger pressure for land conversion and that there are more non-farming opportunities
(as discussed in Chapter 6), landowners are more likely to engage in land sales.
In addition, counties in the Western Plain became very attractive to foreign investors due to a
higher level of development and diverse economic structure, as discussed in Chapter 6. As a result, in the
late 1990s, Italians and Germans entered the market and bought massive amounts of land from local
farmers, for prices that were much lower than the EU average, hoping to capitalize on the increase in
prices following EU enlargement. Such a surge in land market transactions had no precedent in Romania.
In the South, engagement in land markets was much lower. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that a
similar pattern is underway in the South since the summer droughts of 2007 (Pitulice and Caloian 2007).
7.3 Private individual farning
The simplest institutional arrangement is the "pure peasant proprietorship" (owner-occupancy
farms), or family farms, where the ownership of both land and labor is vested in one group: each peasant
household cultivates its own land using its own labor (Currie 1981 p. 32). Hence, individual private
farming refers to a household cultivating land (owned and/or leased) and making cultivation decisions
independently from other farmers. At different stages in the production process the individual farm can
rely on outside resources such as hired labor and machinery services. In my 2006 household survey, I
came across farmers that were using mostly household labor, and only occasionally hired labor. Family
farms in Romania resemble more Chayanov's (1966) peasant farmers (from the first quarter of the
twentieth century Russia), who were essentially relying on household labor. Other characteristics of
owner-occupancy farms are that households produce for self-consumption or for commercialization, and
that their actions are directly affected by the nature of markets for productive resources (inputs, capital,
finance).
Private individual households in Romania differ significantly from those found in Western Europe
and even in CEE (Lerman et al. 2004), as I showed in Chapter 5, Section 5.2.1. In Romania, private
individual farms are smaller and more fragmented, only few are commercially oriented, and the level of
technology used in production is much lower. The primary role of these farms is to satisfy the level of self-
consumption for the family through a diversified range of agricultural products. Therefore, individual
farms generate little or no cash from these activities, serving a social and subsistence role for the rural
community.
Chayanov's (1966 p. xviii) characteristics for family farms, are very relevant for the Romanian
context. Chayanov argues that "in the conditions where capitalist farms would go bankrupt peasant
families could work longer hours, sell at lower prices, obtain no net surplus, and yet manage to carry on
with their farming, year after year." This behavior of "self-exploitation" has most of the time been the
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price paid by households who chose to farm the land individually in spite of resource constraints and low
farming ability. These nuances are made more evident by qualitative (especially ethnographic) research.
Survey data from 2006 show that while the median size of private individual farms amounts to
two hectares, there is quite a lot of variation among farm sizes. At the 5t percentile, farms are small, 0.6
hectares, while at the 95" percentile the average farm size is 9 hectares. Dumitru (2002) claims that in the
Romanian context, viable family farms should average at least 5-10 hectares, suggesting that further land
consolidation is needed in order to shift from subsistence to more commercially viable farms.
Choices for private individual farmers are constrained by the external environment given the level
of market development (e.g. capital, produce, labor markets) and the availability of backward and forward
linkages.' 30 Following de-collectivization, the input markets and distribution channels remained geared
towards large corporate farms. Moreover, harsher economic conditions and the effect of "price scissors"
(discussed in Chapter 5, Section 5.2.2) placed significant pressures on small farmers' incomes, decreasing
the amount of available liquidities. This poses significant problems not only for investment purposes, but
also for input payments during the agricultural production cycle, as payments are required to be made
immediately following the service (i.e. purchasing seeds, fertilizers, or mechanical services).
7.4 Farming associations
The persistence of farming associations almost all across Eastern Europe following land reform
(Lerman et al. 2004) has come as a surprise to most policy makers who expected that private individual
farms will take off immediately after land restitution. Resource constraints (especially the absence of
affordable credit and machinery) and the slow emergence of rural markets (low prices of agricultural
commodities and lack of backward and forward linkages for producers as a result of de-collectivization
and privatization of state farms, as discussed in Chapter 5) were some of the main factors examined in the
literature to explain the formation of associations. Due to these constraints, associations were viewed as a
hedge against risk (Meurs 2001). In addition, from a political economy perspective, associations were
considered the result of "sub-rosa resistance" to de-collectivization (Allina-Pisano 2004a) on the part of the
new political class who was committed to the idea that large farm size was to be maintained for organizing
agricultural production.' 3 ' Nevertheless, a more in-depth analysis of these institutional arrangements,
130 By backward linkages I refer to a farmer's access to outside markets for purchasing direct and indirect inputs for
the production process, which by forward linkages I refer to a farmer's access to distribution channels for agricultural
products.
131 This argument brings to the forefront the debate on how much do these newly created associations resemble the
old collective farms and therefore, whether they are able to overcome the systemic problems embedded in those
socialist structures. I will discuss this issue in greater depth in Chapter 9.
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their evolution and persistence over time, as well as regional differences suggest that the story is more
complex.
Following land restitution (Law 18/1991) two types of associational forms surfaced after the
breakdown of the socialist collective farms: formal associations (or agricultural societies) and informal
associations (or family associations). Both types of associations work the land of the member farmers, but
they can also hire labor and lease-in additional land from members or non-members (based on formal or
informal agreements).
The 2006 survey shows that the majority of association members (more than 70%) joined
associations in the first years of transition (between 1990-1993), and only 20% joined after 1996. Hence,
some authors argue that landowners were locked-in the decisions made earlier in the transition (Sabates-
Wheeler 2005). However, there is actually variation across villages in terms of the year when landowners
joined associations. In addition, given that 20% of the households joined after 1996 (mostly after 2000)
suggests that landowners found it beneficial to join associations even later on. Moreover, those who were
members in associations longer do not seem to have "abandoned" them once alternative farming
arrangements became available.' 3 2
Findings from qualitative fieldwork (interviews with farmers and participatory observations) show
that among the main reasons landowners choose to join farming associations are:
- the ability to retain full ownership title on the land,
- lack of resources for working the land themselves (physical, financial capital and labor),
- a sense of security and flexibility that the association arrangements offer to compensate for
market constraints (e.g. in-kind payment for mechanical services), and
- the older age of the rural population.
Nevertheless, it has been widely emphasized in the literature that the effective operation of
associations is plagued by collective action problems (in the form of principal agent and free-riding).
Therefore, the question of why have associations persisted throughout the transition period is very
pertinent and requires careful examination. Chapter 9 delves more into these issues by examining findings
from interviews with farmers and professionals, as well as historical facts and earlier research.
Based on household survey data, Figure 7-1 shows that among the association members, over the
years, the share of landowners that joined formal associations increased, while the share of landowners in
informal associations declined. Prior to 1996 there is no survey data for the rural areas in Romania, and
hence we cannot know for sure by how much associations declined in these two agro-regions relative to
national trends since the beginning of land reform.
132 But due to data limitations, we cannot know what farming arrangements were they pursuing earlier.
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Figure 7-1: Farming associations between 1996-2006 in the Western Plain and Central
Romanian Plain
1996 2001 2006
0 Family associations M Formal associations
Source: Household survey data, 1996, 2001, and 2006.
As Table 7-3 illustrates, the share of land in associations has on average declined in both formal
and informal arrangements, from approximately 78 % of the owned land in 1996 to 74 % in 2006. Given
that this share represents less than 4 hectares of total land in ownership, only about one hectare of land
remains to be farmed individually. Hence, this table, showing the large fraction of land farmed in
associations, points to the salience of these institutional arrangements in households' land reallocation
decisions during the post-socialist agricultural transformation.
Table 7-3: Average land and share of land in farming associations
Source: Household surveys in the Western Plain and Central Romanian Plain in 1996 and 2006.
Because informal associations declined significantly throughout the transition period, the rest of
the analysis is focused only on formal associations. Previous studies such as Sabates-Wheeler (2005)
analyzed in greater depth this farming arrangement, and I discuss it in more detail in Appendix 7-1 for
further reference. Hence, in the following subsections I examine organizational aspects, and the rights and
responsibilities embedded in formal associations.
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Formal associations Informal
associations
1996 2006 1996 2006
Average land in associations 2.97 ha 2.25 ha 3.53 ha 2.20 ha
Share of land in associations 78 % 74 % 79 % 74 %
from total land in ownership
7.4.1 Formal associations
Formal associations, also known as agricultural societies, were created following Law 36/1991
(law for agricultural societies and other forms of associations in agriculture), as legal entities that employ
both members and non-member workers. For a formal association to be established, a minimum of ten
member families is required. The members are farmland owners and they can theoretically withdraw at
any time from the association. During the duration of association membership, landowners retain all their
rights over the land. However, association members are entitled to only a fraction of the harvest.
Contractual arrangements are generally made on informal basis based on share contracts.
Despite problems of collective action highlighted in the literature review chapter (Pollak 1985;
Carter 1984), these organizational forms offer important advantages to their members. Because of market
imperfections and the insecurities characteristic of transition, earlier research emphasized that associations
provide risk-sharing alternatives (through access to capital, solving liquidity and labor shortages, partially
shielding from price fluctuations in the market) (Carter 1987; Brooks and Meurs 1994; Rizov et al. 2001;
Verdery 2003). Hence, I hypothesize that given the limited non-farming income opportunities,
associations provide such benefits for landowners that are interested in staying active farmers during
transition.
Below I discuss how formal associations are organized, the type of contractual arrangements, and
the duration of association membership. This overview and analysis generates further hypotheses to be
tested in the next two chapters on the main differences between associations and leasing as two forms of
alternative farming arrangements.
Organizational aspects
In most cases formal associations were created on the structures of the former socialist collective
farms. Leonte and Alexandri (2001) claim that the establishment of the formal associations has been
sought due to the following conditions: (1) the high share of elderly population in rural areas; (2) migration
of young rural population to urban areas; and (3) a large percentage of the landowners living in urban
areas (more than 40%).
Formal associations do not require farmers to have a legal title for the land they are contributing
with, as is the case for leasing contracts. Low registration fees early in transition also encouraged the
formation of formal associations. The Ministry of Agriculture exempted these newly created institutional
arrangements from profit tax for five years. Moreover, early in the transition associations were the only
other alternative to working the land individually, since leasing was institutionalized only later, in the
second half of the 1990s.
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Household survey data shows that in the Central Romanian Plain 8 8 % of the households joined
in the first three years of transition, while in the Western Plain 70% did so. Figure 7-2 also shows large
regional differences in the distribution of formal associations. In 1996 78% of the associations were
located in the Central Romanian Plain, share which increased to 910% by 2006. Examining in greater
detail why associations emerged differently in the two regions early in the transition process can enrich
our understanding of why this institutional arrangement persisted throughout the transition. A large part
of Chapter 9 explains these outcomes, adding to more structural explanations in Chapter 8.
Qualitative fieldwork suggests that joining associations required collective decision making in
order to allow the newly formed associations to operate on compact plots of land and to benefit from
economies of scale. Hence, I hypothesize that the formation of associations early in the transition process
resulted from the constant interaction of different actors (landowners and former leaders of collective
farms) having different interests. I test this argument in Chapter 9 where I discuss how this interaction led
to different choices for farming arrangements at regional level, bounded by historical and social
specificities.
Figure 7-2: The distribution of formal associations by agro-region and years
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Westemn Plain Central Romanian Plain
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Source: Household survey data, 1996, 2001, and 2006.
Contractual arrangements
The associations farm the land of their members and they can also lease-in land from other
landowners. The contractual terms are most of the time different between association members and other
landowners (Amblard and Colin 2005). For association members, generally, no formal contracts are
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signed between the association management and the landowners.133 The term of the agreements is
perpetual. The rent is paid as a share of the yearly harvest, in kind, proportional to the amount of land in
association, and based on the average yield for the entire harvest. This amount can vary from year to year
depending on costs and weather. 134 Such a strategy acts as risk-shielding for the association members
against the unpredictable effects of weather135 and market conditions (i.e. wide fluctuations in prices and
weak distribution channels).
The rental arrangements made with the formal associations resemble the reverse tenancy
sharecropping model described by Bellemare and Barrett (2003). The authors argue that property rights
insecurity matters in contractual choices. They find that if the landlord were to rent out land on fixed rent
contract, he would face an increased risk of losing the claim on land (Bellemare and Barrett 2003 p. 2),
and therefore reverse share tenancy reduced the probability that a landowner will lose his claim to the
land (Bellemare 2006). This suggests that once landowners obtain secure property rights over land, they
would shift out of associations, or they would engage in other forms of tenancy. However, in the two
household surveys we have seen that landowners were still joining associations even if they had full title
over their land. In addition, Bellemare (2006) claims that landowners lease out on shares to minimize the
amount of uncertainty they face over the price of crops. Hence, I argue that in the Romanian case,
multiple risks prevail making sharecropping an important explanation for the persistence of farming
associations during transition.
In addition, interviews with farmers suggests that there is a system of checks-and-balances, a self-
enforcing mechanism, working at the level of the local community, ensuring that the payment received
from the association is not below what landowners are willing to accept. I hypothesize that this self-
enforced mechanism of monitoring contributes to alleviating collective action problems in associations. I
examine this hypothesis in Chapter 9, based on interviews and participatory observation.
In addition, because of high uncertainty during transition, a tighter contractual agreement in
terms of duration and the amount of rent, might be less attractive to farmers that joined associations.
Verdery (2004 p. 199) documents that the main reason why landowners would join associations is because
they receive higher returns than from farming the land themselves. The associations decide the rent based
133 Following a study in Alba County, Amblard and Colin (2005) argue that one reason for this is that associations do
not have to attain a given size (larger than 110 ha, as per Emergency Ordinance Nr. 108/2001) in order to be
entitled to receive state subsidies, as is the case of commercial farms or other private agricultural entities.
134 Amblard and Colin (2005) examine in mode details the contractual choices and types available for landowners
(mainly in leasing arrangements), and point to the "institutional innovation" of "rent as a range of product per
hectare" found in the Romanian setting.
1 In the past seven years agricultural production in Romania has suffered tremendously due to floods and droughts.
As a result, agricultural producers were hit hardly as insurance schemes for the harvest are non-existent. This year,
after unprecedented droughts all across the country, the Ministry of Agriculture conditioned the disbursement of
direct payments to farmers on farmers insuring their harvest in 2008 (Vaduva 2007).
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on the average yield, which is especially advantageous for those with poor-quality land. However, the rent
is in general low in comparison to what landowners would need to secure a decent standard of living. But,
associations, as commercial entities, are also struggling for survival (Verdery 2004). Therefore, tackling
this problem is not so much an issue of power differentials between associations and landowners (Amblard
and Cohn 2005; Ortiz 1981), but rather a systemic, agricultural policy concern.
Individual farmers are very much constrained by lack of liquidities, while the payment for seeds,
fertilizer, or plowing is regularly done "on the spot." Moreover, the costs for working the land are
extremely high, largely due to differences between the cost of inputs and the price of agricultural
commodities (price scissors). In addition, inflationary pressures often resulted in losses at the end of
harvesting season. 13 6Hence, one significant contractual benefit (even if informal in nature) relates to the
payment for inputs and for mechanical work during the production cycle. This practice (payments in kind
for mechanical services) offers more flexible options for landowners to pay for cultivation expenses (i.e.
inputs and mechanical services) due to liquidity shortages. The association eliminates this constraint by
retaining (if needed) part of the production as equivalent for these services. Such arrangements were found
both in the West and South, mostly informal in nature.
The duration of the association membership
As I discussed earlier, most landowners joined associations earlier in the transition. Therefore, the
issue of withdrawal, in case better options became available, is highly relevant. The exit options are part of
the rights and responsibilities embedded in the association agreement. According to legal provisions
stipulated by Law 36/1991, withdrawing from an association agreement is a decision made by the
members, and can be taken at anytime. This gives landowners a significant amount of control. Most
research focused so far on the issue of exit from a different perspective, that of the balance of power
weighting more on the association leaders because of disproportionate access to capital (Verdery 2003;
Kideckel 1998). However, given limited resources available to landowners, I argue that the reason why
associations persisted throughout the transition is not because farmers were locked in their earlier
decisions, but because they needed the associations. The institutional arrangement provided them with
enough flexibility to be engaged in farming at different stages of the production process, and secured
136 In order to show that often small producers (and sometimes large tenants also) are faced with losses at the end of
the production cycle, Popica, an agronomist and private individual farmer in Capalna, Bihor County, laid out for
me all the expenses from land preparation to commercialization. Based on his calculations (and confirmed by other
farmers and policy makers) in 2005 a farmer had the following expenses: 1) preparing the land for seeding: plowing
250 RON/ha; turning the land: 250 RON/ha; seeding 160 RON/ha; fertilizer (5 bags) 250 RON/ha; 2) growing
the crops: hoeing/weeding 300 RON/ha; or herbicides 300 RON/ha; 3) harvesting: 250 RON/ha; 4) transport 50
RON. As a result, the total cost for working one hectare of land (calculated here for corn) is 1,510 RON. In 2004,
100 kg of corn sold for 20 RON. On one hectare of land, one can harvest on average 5 tons of corn, therefore selling
it for 1,000 RON. As a result, the producers were clearly loosing.
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necessary inputs (i.e. mainly mechanical services). However, I hypothesize that the choice and persistence
of associations also depends on the local specifics of de-collectivization, the local politics at the time when
the new associations were formed, and the availability of alternative farming options in the region. I
examine this hypothesis in Chapter 9.
The issue of exit from associations can be viewed from two different angles. First, one can view
the association in a position of power (or monopoly) over landowners, by making their exit strategy
difficult when members' choices for alternative farming strategies are limited. Second, in the West, the
practice by which landowners reallocated land assets in associations to satisfy their short term needs (i.e.
seasonal labor, capital, and access to distribution channels) suggests that the members had more leverage
over the association leaders.
However, based on my own observations in the field, I see the decision to stay or to exit from the
association as a constant interaction between association managers and landowners in achieving a series of
trade-offs that are mutually beneficial for both parties. Ultimately land is a fixed asset13 7 and one cannot
do without the other. The associations need to operate with compact land plots in order to reap
economies of scale, and landowners do not have the necessary capital (physical, financial, and sometimes
labor) to engage in individual farming. The ultimate outcome is similar to a "muddling-through"1 38
strategy in finding the "optimal" outcome for both the associations and the landowners.
7.5 Land leasing
A formal leasing market begun to operate only several years after the implementation of land
reform. This is partly because of the delays in establishing a legal basis for leasing transactions. The first
land leasing law was passed in 1994 (Law 16/1994).139 The Law addressed the visible lack of viable
frameworks for basic economic transactions in agriculture, and was viewed as an alternative for land
consolidation in larger farming units (Aligica and Dabu 2003). In addition, the Law sought to find ways to
transfer use rights from farmers that could not work all the land in ownership to farmers that had the
capacity (labor and capital) to enlarge their farm operations but were unwilling (or unable) to purchase
land. In the literature, leasing transactions are also viewed as a stepping stone in the agricultural ladder,
through which tenancy becomes a stage in the accumulation of capital and expertise, a link between
working as a farm laborer and land titling, and a vehicle for land acquisition and economic mobility
(Winters 1978 p. 91).
137 In the rural areas the population is relatively immobile. It is difficult for a farm manager to move to a different
village or county to establish a farm enterprise if he/she is not satisfied with the local business conditions.
138 Term coined by Lindblom (1959) within the context of decision making in public administration.
139 Between 1990 and 1994 only 4.4% of the agricultural land was leased-out.
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Despite the stated benefits from land rentals, the heavy number of restrictions imposed on the
eligibility to lease-in or out, and on the nature of leasing agreements, Law 16/1994 was slow in promoting
a fluid leasing market (Dobrescu 1999; Sabates-Wheeler 2005). Law 16 was amended in 1998 by Law 65.
The most important change referred to contractual requirements. The five-year minimum lease period
established by the previous law became more flexible, and the stipulation of a rental value was abolished
(Sabates-Wheeler 2005). Nevertheless, a formal leasing market is still in initial stages of development, most
transactions being based on informal agreements (in 1996 5 6 % of the leasing-out transactions were based
on informal agreements while in 2006 the share was 42%).140
Survey data shows that from 1996 to 2006 the share of land leased-out (as a percentage of total
land in ownership) has increased from 6 8 % to 7 3 %. Moreover, the average amount of land leased out by
one household has gone up by 0.13 hectares. This suggests that leasing transactions are on the rise as the
land market consolidates.
Moreover, data from the 2006 survey shows that 17 % of the households declared that they
leased-out land between 1990 and 1994, 6% between 1995 and 1998, and 77% after 1998. This
information by itself tells quite an interesting story. Firstly, leasing transactions were taking place even
before Law 16/1994 was adopted.141 Secondly, the data shows that these early transactions were based on
some form of contractual arrangements (registered at the mayor office), but they attest to their very
informal character, devoid of legal consequences, since the Law was not passed at the time. Therefore,
findings on contractual arrangements need to be interpreted with care, especially early in the transition
period.
Law 16/1990 did not create sufficient incentives for engaging in transactions for neither of the
contractual parts. 142 Nevertheless, after 1998, when the legislation for leasing became more permissive
140 More recently, in 2005, the government proposed a new policy for encouraging the transfer of land from older
farmers to younger ones, with an expected outcome of transferring many of the informal rental agreements from the
informal to the formal market. This program is called "renta viagera" and it is based on the payment of 100
Euro/ha if the farmer sells the land, or a perpetual rent of 50 Euro/ha/year if the farmers leases-out the land. The
conditions for enrolling in this scheme are the following: the landowner has to be older than 65 years, and the tenant
has to have agricultural expertise and commitment for sustainable farming. The success of this measure is, however,
not clear yet, since the payment offered by the government is still low, and alternative sources of income for these
landowners are very limited. Moreover, as media sources show, "renta viagera" has reached fewer than expected
farmers mainly because of the underdeveloped legislation regarding the type of agricultural land that could be rented
or sold (Daniciuc 2007). These institutional uncertainties and confusions in legal provisions were a constant reminder
of the difficulties of changing institutions during the post-socialist transition.
141 In her ethnographic study on Vlaicu village in Transylvania, Verdery (2003) also argues that such early leasing
transactions existed.
142 Interviews with farmers revealed that those wishing to lease-in land thought that the minimum amount of rent
stipulated by the Law was too high, while market conditions did not allow them to gain enough revenues to secure
profit. Moreover, since the macroeconomic conditions were very unstable (i.e. high inflation and low prices for
agricultural products), they favored a more short-term strategy, as five-year contracts seemed too risky. On the other
hand, since the titling process was still in early stages, the landowners did not feel that their property rights were
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and flexible, the number of transactions increased significantly: 77% of the households that leased land
claimed that they signed leasing contracts between 1998 and 2006. This trend could suggest that
institutional innovations in the leasing legislation were successful in stimulating participation in land
markets. However, it could also suggest that other changes in the economic and institutional environment
contributed to shaping these outcomes. For instance, increased opportunities for non-farming jobs might
have pushed landowners out of farming, increasing participation in land markets. In addition, as I discuss
in greater detail in Chapter 9, some associations shifted to leasing contracts with their members, which
could also explain this increased activity in the land market.
The fundamental difference between the owner-operators and tenant farmers is that rather than
enjoying full ownership over land and assets, the tenant farmer has only a right of temporary occupancy
in return for which he pays rent to the owner. From this point of view, both farming associations and
leasing arrangements are forms of land tenancy. These institutional arrangements are similar in terms of
what they seek to achieve (i.e. consolidation and mechanization), but there are significant differences in
terms of legal provisions, and the economic and social context in which the transactions occur. Hence, this
dissertation seeks answers to the persistence of farming associations while land markets were slow to
develop during transition.
In Romania, and generally in the CEE region, the outcomes of land reform deviated from the
standard land tenure arrangements. Land restitution in the former communist countries in Europe
resulted in a so-called process of "reverse tenancy," where a poor landowner contracts with a rich and
risk-taking tenant, quite different from the canonical model of sharecropping. One of the main
assumptions of sharecropping theories is that the landlord has better access to information, markets, and
institutions, while the tenant is better able to supervise family labor (a large component of the total labor
used on the land) (Singh 1989 p. 48). However, in the post-socialist countries the reverse is true. As
mentioned in Chapter 4, the unanimous restitution of private property rights resulted in a large share of
absentee and part-time landowners, in a context of dramatically changed market conditions. These social
and economic circumstances contributed to increased incentives for reverse tenancy. Not having sufficient
capital or labor, landowners seek capital rich tenants to lease part of their land in exchange for rent.
In the following sections I discuss who are the tenants in leasing-out arrangements, how
contractual arrangements are made, and how rents are set. Moreover, I describe the profile of those
households in the sample that leased-in land during the transition period.
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secure enough to permit long-term leasing. The risk of not getting their land back at the end of the lease was too
high when alternative sources of income were lacking in the rural areas (and industrial restructuring was still causing
widespread unemployment).
Leasing to whom?
Leasing arrangements can be made with other household farmers, with farming associations, or
with state farms. Survey evidence shows that in Romania most landowners entered in leasing
arrangements with associations (formal or informal) or with other private farmers.
Figure 7-3 shows that there is quite a lot of variation among farmers surveyed in 1996 and 2006
in terms of their contractual partners in leasing arrangements. Leasing agreements with farming
associations increased dramatically from 17% in 1996 to 66% in 2006. This trend suggests that farming
associations have been the most active players in the land market. I discussed in the previous section that
associations gradually shifted to leasing contracts in order to get easier access to investment opportunities,
which would partially explain the increased share of leasing transactions with associations since 1996.
Private individuals also exhibited an increase in entrepreneurial behavior over this period, as reflected by
the higher share of leasing transactions they engaged into.
Figure 7-3: The entities to whom landowners leased out land to in 1996 and 2006
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Source: Household surveys in 1996 and 2006.
In general, the tenants purchased or rented machineries from former collective farms or state
owned mechanical stations. Several of the tenants I interviewed took loans to purchase tractors at a
subsidized price in the mid 1990s. Tenants draw on village labor, mostly landless farmers, during the
harvest season. The only permanent employees are the professional staff (mechanical engineers and
agronomists) and the managerial staff. Hence, as interviews showed, there is often significant competition
for labor between the associations and the other tenants.
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Contractual arrangements
As opposed to the association arrangements, while the landowner maintains his property title over
land, in leasing contracts he loses two main rights from his "bundle of rights": usus andfructus. As a result,
the ownership remains but the possession, use, and valorization of the products obtained on the land are
transferred to the tenant. In addition, contrary to the association agreements, the farmer cannot break the
contract before the term specified in the agreement. Registration fees are also higher especially for farmers
that do not have full ownership title. Successive renting of the land by the tenant is not permitted by law,
the leasing contract having an intuitipersonae character.
The rent in leasing contracts is generally fixed, as opposed to the case of associations, where the
rent is paid as a share of the harvest. Hence, some landowners were concerned that in good years they
were not receiving enough of the harvest as compared to those who were members in associations. Rents
can be specified in kind or in cash, but in general they are paid in kind as a fixed share of the crop. There
is an abundance of literature on the types of rental contracts in land tenancy and their relation to risk-
sharing (Cheung 1968; Newbery and Stiglitz 1979; Singh 1989). The main argument is that while a fixed
contract is optimal if the tenant is risk-neutral, it causes a risk-averse tenant to bear all the risk. This
suggests that a share contract provides some incentives, while at the same time reducing the tenant's risk
(Singh 1989 p. 44). Similarly, sufficient risk-aversion on the part of the tenant will tilt the scales in favor of
a share contract (Newbery and Stiglitz 1979). The idea that share contracts might have risk-sharing
advantages over fixed rent and wage contracts was first suggested by Cheung (1968). The argument is
interesting for this case because it suggests that landowners are more risk-averse than the tenants that
lease-in the land. Hence, share contracts, practiced by associations, provide higher risk-sharing benefits
both to the tenant as well as to the landowner.
Even if there are few official statistics on land market transactions, interviews with landowners
and tenants reveal that there is a large variety of tenancy arrangements in the Romanian countryside
(both formal and informal). The length of the lease can be specified at the time when the tenancy is agreed
on, or it can be left at the discretion of the parties, in what Currie (1981) calls "tenancy-at-will."
Examining the length of contracts offers some interesting insight into the way leasing operates at the local
level. More importantly, contractual terms are a reflection of the incentives built into different institutional
arrangements. Leasing arrangements appear to be made on very short contractual terms, from year to
year, or on unspecified periods of time.
On the one hand, this lack of specificity in contracting can be attributed to the unequal balance of
power, since usually landowners are older, unfamiliar with the institution of contracting, and the rights
and obligations that it entails. As a result, the tenant benefits from a large amount of discretion in
decision-making on farming the land. These short-term commitments also provide a unilateral advantage
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for the tenant, giving him the flexibility to end the contract at any time, without legal repercussions.
Nevertheless, it can also be argued that these contractual arrangements are the direct result of the external
economic environment and the market conditions for agricultural products.
On the other hand, landowners face unpredictability in their land reallocation decisions, given the
short-term contractual arrangements. Most landowners that rented out land after 1998, when the terms of
the lease were not regulated anymore, did so on very short-term contracts (4 5 %), a much higher share as
compared to households that claimed to have rented out land before 1998. The landowners I interviewed
were concerned that the tenant could break the contract at any time, giving them no alternatives for land
reallocation.
A share of 58% of the households that leased land claimed that the length of the agreement varied
between 2-18 years. Not surprisingly, most of the lengthier contracts occurred in transactions made before
1998 (73% as compared to 55% made after 1998). However, when the lease term is longer, potential
tenants are reluctant to engage in such arrangements because of market unpredictability. Interviews with
tenant farmers brought to the surface these concerns. For example, one tenant from Bihor, in the Western
Plain, claimed that he was very reluctant to enlarge his farm operation by leasing-in land because five
years was a very long period of time to plan for, given the economic conditions in agriculture.
Nevertheless, as I discussed in Chapter 2, earlier literature points to the fact that longer
contractual arrangements provide the tenant with strong incentives for investment due to higher security
for land and the stream of revenues (Cheung 1969; Allen and Lueck 1993). However, based on interviews
and participatory observations, I hypothesize that the opposite is true during transition, when market
imperfections prevail. In a volatile environment (where access to financial resources is constrained, and
prices for agricultural products are low) tenants benefit more from short rather than long-term contracts.
Shorter contracts provide lower risk and a higher leverage in negotiating rents with landowners due to
higher economic uncertainties (poor market conditions, lack of capital, and most of the time lower ability
to farm the land due to old age).
Another aspect related to leasing transactions is the importance of legal recourse. Currently, legal
action against the tenants is very difficult and costly. The costs for starting a legal case are very high for
small landowners14 3, the process very tedious and time consuming and the outcome very unpredictable
given documented cases of corruption in the system. Therefore, it is unlikely that any breach of the
contractual terms by the tenant will be questioned in court by the landowner. This in turn, gives higher
balance of power to the tenant, probably more so than in the case of associations.
143 Ambland and Colin (2005) estimate an amount of 4-5 million lei ($140-$150), much higher than what a
pensioner could afford in the rural areas in Romania.
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Rental arrangements
In general there are three types of leasing arrangements depending on who pays for the
mechanical work and inputs: a) when the landowner pays, more frequent in 1996 reflecting that the land
rental market was still developing; b) when the lessee pays the costs (called "arenda"), the standard and
most common arrangement; and c) when both households cover the costs (arrangement called "dijma"
mostly found in the South).
Earlier, Law 16/1994 stipulated that the minimum rent for one hectare of land should be at least
600 kg of wheat (calculated as being approximately 30% from the total production).14 4 Later, Law
65/1998 eliminated this restriction, and stipulated that the rent should be determined by the two
contracting parties, based on reasonable terms and the local rental market. Following the loosening of
contractual arrangements, survey data in the Western Plain and Central Romanian Plain shows that in
fact, the average rent paid to landowners decreased from 941 kilograms in 1996 to 571 kilograms in
2006.14
Popescu (2007) argues that if a household receives this amount of rent, revenues are still
insufficient for sustaining a decent standard of living.146 Moreover, Ambland and Colin (2005) show that
the tenants determine the rents and there is almost no bargaining between the two parties. Nevertheless,
while it is true that the tenant has more bargaining power than the landowner, I found that the bargaining
power of the tenant is greater where the landowners have wider choices for alternative income
opportunities, as evidenced in my fieldwork in Arad County. I elaborate more on these aspects in Chapter
9 where, based on interviews with landowners and association managers, I examine the role of social
institutions in the persistence of farming associations at regional and local level.
Regional differences, already emphasized in Chapter 6, surface in terms of rental values as well.
The lowest recorded rent was 100 kg, and the highest was 1,000 kg (or, in terms of share of crop, 10% at
the minimum or 66% at the maximum from the total harvest). Central Romanian Plain seems to have
higher rents as compared to the Western Plain (on average 592 kg in 2006 as compared to 473 kg in the
Western Plain). Nevertheless, it is interesting that while in the West rents have on average increased, in
the South they have actually declined. Supply and demand conditions and the timing of the market
144 As Amblard and Colin (2005) mention, rents are established in kind and the reference product is wheat,
regardless of the crop that is being cultivated. An explanation for this standardization is that wheat is a more of a
cash crop than corn (the other main crop in Romania), and therefore, its value is more closely determined by market
fluctuations.
145 The current rent amount is confirmed by other studies also (Popescu 2007) which show that the average rent is
600 kilograms, representing one fifth of the average yield per hectare.
146 The author assumes that a 600 kg of wheat/hectare represents between 1.8-2.4 million lei given that the price of
wheat last year was 3,000-4,000 lei/kg. If I consider a household with an average landholding of 2.4 hectares that
rents out all its land, the total revenues are approximately 4.3-5.8 million lei ($172-232), significantly less than what a
family could live off.
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development in these two regions could offer an explanation for these opposite trends. In 1996, land
leasing was at its peak in the South and private entrepreneurs were trying to offer attractive rates in order
to differentiate themselves from farming associations while maintaining the minimum rent amount
established by law. But, by 2006, when contractual terms were relaxed and pressures for investment
intensified (due to concerns for EU competition following enlargement), rents declined significantly. In the
West, where the demand for leasing was lower earlier in the transition, rents were low, even less than the
stated legal minimum.14 7 Nevertheless, once demand for leasing increased, rents increased as well.
Box 7-1: Leasing-in arrangements
The share of households that lease-in land is very small. In 1996, 2% (10 households) of
the landowners claimed to have leased-in land in the Central Romanian Plain. By 2006, the share
has increased to 3% (42 households), of which 3 3 % were located in the Central Romanian Plain
and 6 7 % in the Western Plain. Hence, this research is mostly concerned with leasing-out
transactions, unless otherwise specified. Nevertheless, to offer more background below I discuss the
profile of landowners that lease-in land in the Western Plain and the Central Romanian Plain.
Currently, leasing-in to expand farm size and to consolidate land plots is mostly done by
large farms (i.e. private entrepreneurs, farming associations), which often led to the formation of
large hacienda types of farms mostly in the southern and eastern Romania.
In 2006, 14% of the landowners that leased-in land claim to have done so before 1998,
25% between 1998-2003, and the majority of 47% since 2004. This pattern is reflected at regional
level as well. Interestingly, most of the leasing contracts are informal, based on verbal agreements
(100% in 1996 and 910% in 2006). The length of the agreement was one year in 1996 and between
one and four years in 2006.
Households that lease-in land own much less agricultural land (on average 2.9 hectares of
land both in 1996 and 2006) than those that farm all land individually or seek alternative farming
arrangements (see Table 7-4).
As far the amount of land leased-in, there is quite a lot of variation among households
especially in 2006. In 1996, a household leased-in on average 1.8 hectares of land (varying from a
minimum of 1 to a maximum of 3 hectares). In 2006 the amount of land leased-in was much
higher, 5.4 hectares, but with a much higher variation, from 0.2 hectares to 60 hectares.
For small landowners, the primary purpose of leasing land is to enlarge their farm size given
that they do not have enough to ensure food security for their household members. The average
household size for landowners that leased-in land in 1996 was 3.6 members, while in 2006 it was
4.6.
In addition, the two household surveys show that those that lease-in are younger (on average
53 years old in 1996, and 50 years old in 2006), and more educated (on average 7.6 years of
education in 1996 and 8.6 years of education in 2006). The demographic profile of the landowners
that lease-in additional land is confirmed by other studies such as Vranken and Swinnen (2006),
showing that better education is correlated with leasing-in land, and older age with leasing-out.
This result suggests that these farmers are more entrepreneurial, and have higher abilities and
skills for working the land, in addition to the need to supplement incomes for the larger families.
147 This finding is also confirmed by qualitative interviews I conducted in Bihor County where tenants claimed to
have offered 270 kg/ha as rent, which was less than half of the minimum amount stated by law.
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Lack of data made it difficult to determine whether the rents from leasing are higher than the
rents from farming in associations. However, surveys from 1996 and 2006 show that actually the rents
from associations are higher than from leasing-out, but there is quite a lot of variation among
1 48households4
7.6 Summing up the research hypotheses
This chapter explored in more depth each of the farming arrangements currently available for
landowners: private individual farming, associations, and land market transactions. I discussed in detail
how these arrangements operate, pointing to the main benefits and drawbacks associated with each
choice. Ultimately, this chapter aimed to set the scene for an empirical inquiry into the choices
landowners make during transition in terms of institutional arrangements for farming. In particular, the
main concern is to explain the persistence of formal associations during the post-socialist transition period.
To this end, based on literature and fieldwork, I generate a set of research hypotheses to be examined in
the remaining of the dissertation using statistical analysis and qualitative research. Depending on the
methods required for different hypotheses, I examine them in Chapter 8 (using statistical analysis) or in
Chapter 9 (using findings from qualitative fieldwork). Drawing from the analysis in this chapter I
distinguish between two main groups of factors hypothesized to affect the choice of land reallocation
alternatives: (i) household characteristics (i.e. human and physical capital); (ii) institutional and socio-
economic environment.
7.6.1 Household characteristics
Earlier research showed that households that are younger, more educated, and have a higher
endowment with physical capital are more likely to engage in private individual farming (Rizov et al.
2001; Sabates-Wheeler 2005; Mathijs and Swinnen 2001). However, given the slow development of land
markets in Eastern Europe, there is limited research, if any, examining the importance of human and
physical capital on the choices landowners make between joining associations or leasing, as alternative
forms of land reallocation. Vranken and Swinnen (2006) find that for the case of Hungary, older
households are more likely to lease out land. Deininger (2003?) also points to a similar conclusion.
Descriptive statistics in Table 7-4 allow me to hone into differences across household
characteristics between landowners that chose specific arrangements during the decade under study.
Hence, based on earlier literature and summary statistics in Table 7-4, I hypothesize that private
148 It is quite difficult to determine exactly by how much are the returns in associations higher than in leasing
arrangements because not all households reported how much they received from associations at the end of the
harvest.
individual farming tends to be practiced by younger households (as defined by the age of the household
head), while older households (> 60 years old) are likely to seek alternative arrangements. Moreover, I test
whether there is a statistically significant difference between households that lease and those that join
associations along age and education characteristics. Physical capital endowment (as measured here by
tractor ownership) shows an interesting difference between the two years in the analysis. I hypothesize that
households with a higher capital endowment are more likely to farm the land individually, or to join
associations if other factors prevent them from farming individually.
As I emphasized several times throughout the dissertation, land fragmentation is a major
challenge for the Romanian agricultural sector, as a result of the land restitution choices made earlier in
the transition. However, there is hardly any research that takes into account this factor in the decisions
landowners make regarding land reallocation. Sabates-Wheeler (2005 p. 108) showed that the higher the
distance from home to the land plots, the higher the probability ofjoining associations rather than
farming the land individually. However, there is no study, to my knowledge, that examines how land
fragmentation affects the choice between alternative farming arrangements. Given the high transaction
costs with registration and notary fees (as discussed in Section 7.5) and the easy entry in associations (as
discussed in Section 7.4.1), I hypothesize that households with more fragmented landholdings (a higher
number of plots) are more likely to join associations rather than to lease out land. Table 7-4 confirms this
pattern, and it will be further examined in Chapter 8.
Table 7-4: Key descriptive statistics by property rights arrangements
1996 2006
PI FA LL Pi FA LL
Household size (# pers.) 3.9 2.9 2.7 3.4 2.9 2.4
Age of the household head (years) 54 63 67 61 66 65
Education of the household head (years) 7 6 5 8 7 7
Agriculture-main occupation* (%) 76 92 74 65 87 74
Land in ownership (hectares) 3.5 4.1 3.8 3.5 3.1 3.8
Land fragmentation (# of parcels) 3.9 4.2 2.6 3.5 3.7 3.2
Tractor ownership (% of households) 3.3 1.9 4.4 18.8 3.2 1.6
Note: PI - Farming all land in Private Individual Farming; FA - Farming part of the land in associations; LL -
Leasing out part of the land; LS - Sold part of the land.
* Percent of households where the household head has agriculture as the main occupation.
Source: Household surveys in the Western Plain and the Central Romanian Plain, 1996 and 2006.
In addition, I hypothesize that the main occupation of the household head matters in the
decisions landowners make with respect to land reallocation. Deininger (2003) argues that the availability
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of alternative sources of income affects whether a household participates in land market transactions.
Table 7-4 also shows that households where the household head has agriculture as the primary
occupation tend to join associations.
Lastly, Table 7-4 also shows that households with more land in ownership are more likely to lease
out land. The transaction costs associated with leasing out larger and more compact plots are lower. A
similar trend can be seen for the decision to join associations as well, but only in 1996.
7.6.2 Institutional and socio-economic environment
The overview of the farming arrangements showed, first, that there are regional differences in the
choices landowners make on land reallocation. While private individual farming predominates in the
Western Plain, in the South the majority of the households joined associations. Regional disparities can be
explained through differences in economic and social factors. I hypothesize that a higher level of
economic development in the West created conditions for private individual farms to emerge (through
easier access to capital), more so than in the South. Also, due to a higher urbanization level, in the West
villages are more clustered and closer to urban areas, reducing the distance between individual plots and
improving access to markets. In Chapter 8 I test this hypothesis, controlling for other variables.
Second, the description of the farming arrangements revealed several institutional differences that
could explain the persistence of farming associations throughout the transition process. This suggests that
structural factors (such as human and physical capital) cannot fully explain the choice of farming the land
individually.
One of the main hypotheses to be examined in Chapter 9 is that associations provide a sense of
security and flexibility (through in-kind payments for mechanical services and longer contractual terms) to
compensate for market constraints (i.e. limited access to credit and distribution channels). The terms of
the contractual arrangements (length of tenure and exit strategies) could provide one explanation for the
persistence of associations and the limited engagement in leasing transactions. Especially after 1998, when
the leasing law was modified (as discussed in Chapter 7), leasing contracts were made on much shorter
periods of time, year-by-year, or based on undefined periods of time (i.e. tenancy at will). The association
arrangements, however, provide a better strategy for spreading risks because the landowners can decide
when to exit the association. Once a landowner becomes an association member, the leadership cannot
decide to not farm the land without the accord of the household. An assumption embedded in this
hypothesis is that the interests and the time frame for decision-making is different for the tenants as
compared to the landowners. The landowners are more risk-averse, seeking longer term contractual
arrangements, while the tenants prefer short-term contracts which allows them to respond easier to
market uncertainties (i.e. fluctuation in prices, vagaries of weather, market access).
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We saw earlier that formal associations were created immediately following de-collectivization.
Hence, I hypothesize that the formation of associations early in the transition process resulted from the
constant interaction of different actors (landowners and former leaders of collective farms) with different
interests in the final outcome. In Chapter 9 I discuss how this interaction led to different choices for
farming arrangements at regional level, bounded by historical and social specificities.
Hence, these institutional and social aspects should be considered complementary to more
structural explanations for the choice of institutional arrangements.
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Appendix 7-1 : Informal associations during transition
Informal associations were created endogenously and are recognized as an organizational form by
Law 36/1991. They are based on informal agreements (verbal or written) between two or several families.
Their main goal is to consolidate landholdings in order to benefit from larger-scale mechanization. A
survey conducted by Rachel Sabates-Wheeler in 2000 shows that association membership is mainly based
on kin and neighborhood relations (5 2 % of the associations had only family members and neighbors and
25% had only family members) (Sabates-Wheeler 2005).
Farming the land is done individually, or in common, and the responsibility for production resides
with the landowner. In general, farming inputs such as physical capital and labor, are shared among the
members. The management of the farm is normally done by one of its members. One distinction from the
formal associations is that at the end of the harvesting season the members have the right to the entire
yield produced on their plot after paying for production expenses. Other differences are that informal
associations do not generally hire labor (Sarris and Gavrilescu 1997), they rarely take credit and do not
own any physical capital in common. 149
Figure 7-4: The distribution of informal associations by agro-regions and years
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Source: Household survey data, 1996, 2001, and 2006.
My survey shows that while in 1996 3 2 % of the households in associations were part of informal
associations, by 2006 this share declined to 2 6 %. In the West less than one fourth of the associations were
149 One immediate advantage of informal associations is that they do not have to cover for earlier debts, as was the
case of formal associations who inherited part of the debts from the former socialist collective farms (Sabates-
Wheeler 2005).
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informal in 1996 and by 2006 no household was member of an informal association. In the South the
prevalence is much higher relative to the West (see Figure 7-4).
One potential explanation for why informal associations predominated in the South resides in the
level of economic development and availability of farming resources. In the South, households that did
not join formal associations or did not lease-out were not able to farm the land themselves (as was the case
in the Western Plain) due to lack of physical capital. The choice of informal associations, where neighbors
or relatives with land strips nearby are sharing capital (and labor) to farm larger plots of land, was
certainly a better alternative in the South. A second explanation could be that voluntary collective action
is very limited in the Western Plain, perhaps due to cultural reasons as shaped by historical legacies. I
expect to find a stronger sense of individualism and private property in the West, as suggested by claims of
mistrust, and lack of community cohesion. Chapter 9 examines these factors in detail based on qualitative
fieldwork.
By the end of 1992 there were already approximately 11,500 informal associations with 720,000
members, operating around 1.8 million hectares (about 150 hectares per association) (Dumitru 2002). As
in the case of formal associations, survey data in 1996 and 2006 shows that most households joined
informal associations very early in the transition process. All households in the sample claimed to have
joined the associations before 1996, mainly in the first years between 1990 and 1992. In 2006 I find a
similar pattern, with 7 0% having joined the informal associations before 1996.
Even if informal associations played an important role in land reallocation decisions throughout
the transition, there were no institutional provisions following Law 36/1991 to facilitate access to physical
and financial capital for the farmers that opted for this type of institutional arrangement. That informal
associations have no legal status, but are at the same time defined by law is confusing. Kideckel (1995)
offers an explanation for this situation. He claims that at the time when Law 36 was passed, the
Romanian Government clearly favored formal associations. However, by including informal associations
within the Law, the government tried to promote the idea that associative activities, other than formal
associations, were encouraged. This appears to be the most logical explanation as to why informal
associations were excluded from the realms of law. But, lacking legal status it is difficult to distinguish
between informal associations and individual private farming, and more recently national statistics have
stopped recording them altogether.
The main reasons invoked by households for joining informal associations are the benefit of
jointly using capital and labor, consolidating land plots, and having more control on farm operation and
cultivation decisions, as opposed to the formal associations (Sabates-Wheeler 2005). However, because
informal associations are so deeply embedded in family and friendship relations, membership tends to be
restrictive to the outsiders. Nevertheless, Sabates-Wheeler (2005) points to the flexibility that informal
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associations provide for the existing members, who, at any time, can decide to add more land or withdraw
land from the association. I found, however, that in certain cases, these close ties between members
contribute to freezing alternative options. One farmer in Petid, Bihor county, claimed that she had her
land farmed in the association by her relative, and that while she could receive more rent by leasing out
the land, exiting the informal association would jeopardize her family relations and position in the local
community.
Overall it does seem that informal associations are a good tradeoff between individual farming
and formal associations for landowners that intend to keep their ownership rights, to exert more control
over the production process, and for those that do not intend (or are not able) to shift out of subsistence by
increasing investments and getting better access to markets. Nevertheless, for these farmers, access to
farming inputs is highly constrained by lack of liquidities. Also, long-term investment plans are difficult to
make when the organizational form is not formally registered and hence not able to offer asset ownership
as collateral for loans. Product commercialization also becomes more costly, lacking the networks that
formal associations inherited from the old collectives.
Therefore, informal associations appear to be more of a transitional farming arrangement, where
landowners adjust their needs of labor and capital to benefit from economies of scale from land
consolidation. In addition, informal associations are able to offer alternative institutional arrangements for
households that are in the process of obtaining land titles. This can be one explanation for why, in the past
decade, informal associations have seen such a drastic decline, period in which significant progress has
also been made in land titling.
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Appendix 7-2: Land sales during transition
Participation in land markets (leasing, selling, buying) is emphasized as a channel for adjusting the
size of land holdings and allocating resources to the most efficient producers. While restrictions on land
transferability create a barrier to the flow of resources from less efficient to more efficient producers, and
thus an impediment to agricultural growth, some scholars argue that temporary restrictions on buying and
selling (especially in the transition countries) may be necessary for political and social considerations
(Banerjee 1999; Lerman et al. 2004). There is concern that land market liberalization leads to re-
concentration of land, especially when access to information, capital, and markets are asymmetric
(Lerman et al. 2004).
As in other countries in the region, in Romania markets for land sales did not exist prior to the
1990s. While land restitution and privatization begun in 1991, the main legislative act addressing
agricultural land sales was Law 54/1998, "Law on the Legal Transfer of Land." This Law provides that
Romanian citizens can acquire and sell agricultural land in conjunction with the norms of Civil Law
(Duncan and Prosterman 2000). Two limitations apply. First, there is a restriction on land ownership,
which currently stands at 200 hectares of arable land1 50, and second, neighbors and co-owners have a pre-
emptive right to buy land over a period of 45 days from the time when the offer was publicized.
By making the bundle of rights for landowners complete (adding the right to sell land), it was
expected that progress will be made towards consolidated farm plots, and that land resources will flow
from less to more efficient farmers, contributing to an increased performance of the agricultural sector.
Nevertheless, despite low economic performance in agriculture, and a high degree of land fragmentation,
land markets are still very thin in Romania. Swinnen and Vranken (2007) show that in the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary, land leasing amounts to approximately 66% of the households, while in
Romania, Albania, and Azerbaijan, the share is only 10 %.
Existing literature and fieldwork document that institutional factors, such as the slow progress of
title registration (including cadastral measurements) contributed to delaying land market development.
While in some regions, such as the West, cadastral maps were "inherited" from the Austro-Hungarian
Empire, in most of Romania the system had to be set up from scratch.151 This inadequacy hampered the
smooth evolution of formal land transactions and contributed to higher transaction costs.
150 On the one hand, since household farms are so small (on average 3.2 hectares) this limit does not hamper the
development of land markets in the short run. On the other hand, as Duncan and Prosterman (2000) claim, it
prevents the formation of large private holdings (so called latifundia).
151 With the support of the World Bank, Romania started in 1998 a $35 million project to implement a general
cadastre and legal registration, much later than in other countries in the region. The main goals of the cadastre are
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The emergence of land markets is difficult to document in Romania (but also in other countries in
the region) as official statistics are lagging behind denoting not only a slow administrative adjustment to
new institutional changes, but also the embryonic stage of land transactions. According to Dumitru et al.
(2004 p. 14), during 1999-2004 private landowners sold 355,725 hectares of agricultural land (3.10% of
total private agricultural land) and another 25,104 hectares changed ownership through donations.15 2
More than 4 % of rural landowners engaged in land transactions during this period. However, as Duncan
and Prosterman (2000 p. 7) indicate, official data on sales might not capture the true level of market
activity for two main reasons: informal transactions and high notary fees113. These factors are actually
interrelated. The high level of transaction costs increases the level of informality in land markets and
encourage underreporting of transactions and price levels.
Therefore, household level surveys are currently the most accurate source of information for data
at regional level. The only available survey that measured these outcomes is the household survey I
conducted in the summer of 2006 in the two agro-regions. Based on this survey, 13% of households have
sold land since 1998. However, the majority of these transactions, originated in the Western Plain (8 8 % as
compared to 13% in the Central Romanian Plain), pointing to wide regional differences. The average
amount of land being sold was 2.34 hectares in the Western Plain and only 0.96 hectares in the Central
Romanian Plain. As I showed in Chapter 6, the economic structure is mode diversified in the Western
Plain. Hence, economic factors could provide one explanation for why landowners in the West are more
likely to engage in land sales. Nevertheless, more data points to document this trend would allow me to
draw more targeted conclusions. However, a higher regional economic development does create more
opportunities for landowners to shift out of farming. Among the reasons for selling land, the most
important ones that households listed were: a) the need for liquidities; b) lack of mechanical implements to
farm the land; c) health problems and physical inability of working the land due to old age.
Purchases of land by small individual farmers are very rare. In 2006 11% of the households
declared to have bought land since 1998. Therefore, in this section I focus mostly on land sales. However,
Box 7-2 summarizes the profile of households that purchased land in the two agro-regions.
to provide clear and current definition of parcels for property registration, and to set up a safe and cost effective
procedure for property transactions.
152 According to Duncan and Prosterman (2000 p.8), land sales have more than doubled each year since 1998.
153 According to Ramniceanu (2004), the expenses with land transfers (notary fees, cadastral registration, intabulare,
and other fees) are amounting to 7- 10% of the transaction value.
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Box 7-2: The profile of households that purchased land in the Western Plain and Central
Romanian Plain
As in the case of land sales, there are regional differences in the share of households
that purchased land since 1998. In the Western Plain 83% of the landowners bought land,
while in the Central Romanian Plain, only 17% did so.
Interestingly, a sizable share, 49%, claimed to have bought land before 1998 when the
Law on land transfers was passed. Similarly with the case of leases and sales, this points to the
informal character of land transactions, and the market still in formation. It also shows signs
that the market should have been formalized earlier since land restitution created small
landowners with fragmented plots, as well as absentee and part-time landowners.
Nevertheless, given the hardships of transition, informal transactions offered a low cost
alternative to land reallocation, despite the lack of enforcement that would have been offered
by a formal contract.
The amount of purchased land has increased between 1999-2003 to an average of
three hectares. Nevertheless, it appears that from 2004 the amount of land purchased by
households dropped by more than half.
Throughout this period, land prices varied significantly. Deininger (2003a) argues that
in formal associations, where risks are higher and savings are the main source of income for
those willing to purchase land (access to credit is limited and land plays an important function
in storing wealth) prices for land can fluctuate significantly overtime. Demand for land, and
hence prices, will be high in the good years when only a few households would be willing to
sell land.
The average age of the households that increased their land ownership is 56 years old,
lower than for the households that sold land, as we would expect. Household size is higher (3.6
individuals), and education levels are higher (on average nine years of completed education).
Moreover, 3 4 % of the households own a tractor, 51 % hired labor, 17 % took out bank loans,
and 63% claimed to have sold agricultural produce on the local market.
This profile suggests that farmers who purchased land are more entrepreneurial, and
have higher abilities, skills, and resource endowment, allowing them to enlarge and
consolidate their land plots.
Official statistics on land sales compiled by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Rural
Development (MAPDR), illustrate the high increase in land sales especially after 2000, as well as in the
average land prices (see Table 7-5).
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Table 7-5: Cumulative figures for extra-vilan land sales
Source: For 1998 and 1999 from Duncan and Prosterman (2000); For 2001
MAPDR (2007).
from Dumitru (2002); For 2005 from
By 2005 more than 500,000 hectares of land were sold, which, however, represents only 6.7% of
the agricultural land under private ownership. Average land sales prices almost tripled over this period.
Only in 2005 63,999 hectares of land were sold at an average price of 3,200 RON/hectare (see Figure
7-5). While there are fluctuations in terms of the amount of land sold, the price for land increased on
average.
Figure 7-5: Land sales and average sales prices between 1998-2005
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Source: Data from the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development.
Note: The spike in land sales in 2003 is difficult to explain given that the data derives from official statistics.
Nevertheless, there is certainly a trend emerging in land sales, denoting volatility in the land market.
Nevertheless, as Table 7-6 shows, land prices in Romania are still very low in comparison to other
EU countries. Interviews with farmers suggest that this is one reason why the sale of land is a less
attractive alternative for Romanian farmers. Land prices are low even within Romania (despite regional
variation) in comparison to other assets. For example, in 2000, to sell land in Transylvania amounted to
trading away one hectare of land for one cow (approximately seven million lei for one hectare of land)
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As of Nov. As of Mar. As of Dec. As of Dec.
24,1998 29,1999 31,2001 31, 2005
Nr. of sales/purchase contracts 6,047 14,335 70,549 308,488
Nr. of separate parcels sold 9,890 20,362 n.a. 339,982
Surface area sold (ha) 11,517 18,408 95,335 513,283
Land sale price (RON/ha) 434 530 n.a. 1,357
(Verdery 2003 p. 209). This situation points to the precarious state of household savings levels in the rural
areas, as well as to the limited availability of financing.
Table 7-6: The market value of the farmland in different European countries, 2001-2004
(EURO/ha)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Netherlands 20,750 22,661 24,869 31,869 37,500 35,500 31,750 29,300 n.a.
Belgium 12,289 12,380 12579 13,852 15,895 16,681 15,653 17,038 20,846
Italy 11,965 12,488 12,806 n.a. 14,266 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Denmark 8,051 8,552 9,734 10,490 12,882 13,727 15,516 16,000 19,995
England 7,535 9,492 9,163 10,176 11,824 11,017 10,247 11,424 n.a.
France 3,188 3,191 3,287 3,461 3,710 3,860 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Poland n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,415 1,307 1,308 1,463 2,049
Slovakia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 878 888 912 945 982
Bulgaria n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 721 721 731 685 n.a.
Romania n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 307 278 237 284 n.a.
Source: European Commission (2006a).
In the past few years, the vagaries of weather increased the demand for land sales in regions
affected by drought and floods. Deininger (2003b p. 95) contends that "the need to satisfy basic
subsistence constraints could give rise to a large supply of people who are forced to engage in distress sales
of their land in bad years, often to individuals with incomes or assets from outside the rural economy."
This argument is confirmed for our case where the major drought that hit Romania in the summer of
2007, responsible for the losses of up to 1 billion Euro, led to farmers in the South selling land at very
meager prices, way below the real market price (Pitulice and Caloian 2007). Moreover, those who sold
their land in a period of crisis may not be able to repurchase land during later periods of recovery
(Kranton and Swamy 1999).
At the same time, regional price differences resulted in large speculative land sales especially in
the Western Plain (Timis and Arad County). There, foreigners (especially Italians and Germans) bought
large areas of agricultural land with the expectation that land prices will increase following the integration
of Romania in the EU, as discussed in Section 7.2.2.154
As a result, there are, wide regional variations both in terms of the amount of land being sold, as
well as prices. Some of the factors driving these differences are the degree of land consolidation, irrigation
implements (Giurca et al. 2004) and, to a smaller degree, land quality (Popescu and Constantin 2007). For
1s4 According to Law 54/1998, foreigners do not have the right to buy land in Romania. Nevertheless, if they set up
a legal entity with majority Romanian capital, there are no restrictions on the amount of land that can be purchased.
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the reasons highlighted earlier, Timis County has sold the highest amount of land (135,241 hectares,
almost three times the amount sold in Arad, the second highest), while Bistrita-Nasaud County had the
lowest amount of land sales (1,228.14 hectares). Similar striking disparities can be observed in terms of
land prices. Teleorman County recorded the lowest price for land sales (309 RON/hectare), while Ilfov
County recorded the highest average price for land sales (15,000 RON/hectare), followed by Prahova
(9,200 RON/hectare) and Brasov (3,140 RON/hectare). This extremely high average land price in these
counties might be due to the proximity to Bucharest (the capital) and to the rapid development that this
region experienced as a result of large foreign investments. Moreover, Prahova and Brasov are resort
areas where purchases of land for building vacation properties were on the rise especially in the past five
years.
For the two agro-regions under study, official statistics show that 207,663 hectares were sold
between 1998 and 2005 in the Western Plain, at an average price of 1,000 RON/hectare, while much less
were sold in the Central Romanian Plain (33,655 hectares at an average price of 780 RON/hectare).155
The Western Plain concentrated 41 % of all the land sales recorded at national level since the
formalization of land markets. Over the same period, land transactions in Central Romanian Plain
represented only 7% from all sales at national level. In the following I discuss in more details findings from
the 1996 and 2006 surveys in order to distinguish potential patterns and regional differences in the
development of land markets.
As mentioned earlier, in Romania like in Russia (Lerman and Shagaida 2007), FSU countries,
Hungary (Vranken and Swinnen 2006), Bulgaria, and other countries in the region, land markets for
leasing and sales become more active in the past years. Land restitution is substantially completed, and
legal provisions related to land transactions are specified (through changes made to Law 18/1991 and the
law "On leasing", republished in 1998, and the 1998 law "On the legal circulation of land").
Land sales are different from other types of farming arrangements because the landowner looses
all the property rights over the plot that is sold. Therefore, one can argue that households engaging in
these transactions are different from households that do not. In the household survey I conducted in 2006
landowners mentioned that the main factors contributing to their decisions to sell land are: a) lack of
financial resources to sustain living expenses and investment needs; b) inability to work the land due to old
age or lack of expertise; c) willingness to shift out of agriculture and reliance on off-farm income sources.
The constraints for land sales relate to high transaction costs exacerbated by land fragmentation, high
opportunity costs, and lack of alternative sources of income.
155 Since land transactions (sales and purchases) were not formal (and hence, registered) before 1998, I do not have
earlier data on land market participation. We know, however, from an earlier household survey (in 1996), that 11%
of the households from the Western Plain claimed that, if they could, they would sell approximately 2 hectares of
land. Only 4% of the households in the Western Plain were willing to sell land at that time.
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Those households that sell land do so either from being constrained by economic circumstances
(limited access to resources), or due to a strong entrepreneurial drive outside the farming sector. My 2006
survey in the two agro-regions suggests that the main reasons invoked by those that did not engage in land
sales were: a) social values attached to land (inheritance motives); b) not enough land to cover subsistence
needs given household size; c) undeveloped land market and poor future prospects in the agricultural
sector, as reflected by low land prices.
Interestingly, the attachment to land seems to be very high, with 4 7 % of the households claiming
that the main reasons for hot having sold land is because they either want to leave the land to their
children, or they inherited it from their parents (see Table 7-7).156 Regional differences play out in this
respect also: only 39% in Central Romanian Plain bring up this motive, while 55% do so in the Western
Plain. This finding points to a higher social attachment to land, beyond the economic value, which due to
historical legacies of private property rights, might be stronger in the West than in the South.
Table 7-7: The reasons for not engaging in land sales (% of households listing a particular
reason)
Overall Western Plain Central RomanianPlain
Not enough land 14.9 7.9 22.1
Land prices are too low 19.7 17.1 22.4
There are no buyers 4.7 2.3 7.2
Land is the only source of income 21.2 28.2 13.8
Inheritance 47.5 55.4 39.3
Source: Household survey in the Western Plain and Central Romanian Plain, 2006.
Twenty one percent of the households in the sample claimed that another reason for not engaging
in land sales is the dependence on agriculture as the only source of income. Interestingly, 28% of those
who invoked this reason are located in the Western Plain (which also has the highest share of land sales),
suggesting that economic development has not reached all the farmers in the West and agriculture still
remains the main income source for a large share of the population.
Nevertheless, the other reasons listed in Table 7-7 reinforce earlier findings that land markets are
less developed in the Central Romanian Plain (land prices are too low, and there are not enough buyers).
Also, 2 2 % of the households in the South claim that they do not have enough land, which might be the
result of both larger households as well as lower standards of living.
156 Earlier research conducted in different regions of Romania by a team of researchers from the Rural
Development Institute had similar findings as well as statements such as "I will never sell my land" from many young
families or pensioners (Duncan and Prosterman 2000).
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Land ownership shielded most of the small landowners against chronic poverty during industrial
restructuring, macroeconomic stabilization and liberalization policies. The social role of land was
strengthened by lack of land taxation. The exemption of land taxation since the beginning of reforms in
1991 was decided politically based on social considerations.
All these factors suggest that agriculture still plays a key role in providing subsistence means for
the majority of population engaged in farming and that land markets are not sufficiently developed. If an
adequate level of rent (or land prices) is not provided, within an overall context in which alternative job
opportunities are lacking, the incentives for shifting land to more efficient uses (engaging in land
transactions) are likely to be very low.
High transaction costs associated also affects the development of land markets. Since Romania
does not have yet a fully operational cadastre, survey costs are fairly high. Notary fees and surveying fees
are two major components of the land transaction costs. These costs may reach 400-600 RON per
hectare, close to the average value of land, being usually paid by the buyer. Hence, transaction costs for
those who want to extend and consolidate their farms are fairly high, seen as a major obstacle in the
development of land markets.
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Chapter 8 : Explaining land reallocation between different farming
arrangements during the post-socialist transition
8.1 The puzzle of long-term outcomes in land reallocation
Given the institutional context for land reallocation laid out earlier, this chapter and the
remaining of the dissertation addresses, what seems to be, an unexpected outcome of land restitution and
agricultural transformation during the post-socialist period. Contrary to the expectations of transition
policy-makers, various forms of associations widely persisted throughout the former communist countries
in the CEE and CIS region following de-collectivization (Meurs 2001; Verdery 2003; Sabates-Wheeler
2005; Allina-Pisano 2007a p. 76). Private individual farms emerged, but in general farms are too small to
take advantage of economies of scale (Slangen et al. 2004). At the same time, participation of landowners
in land markets is very limited.
In Romania, by 1993 more than 40% of land was voluntarily returned to associations, despite
rapid de-collectivization and land titling (Brooks and Meurs 1994). Similar outcomes were recorded in
Bulgaria, where more than 40% of land is being farmed under this institutional arrangement (Lerman et
al. 2004). The reallocation of land into associational forms following de-collectivization occured despite
the fact that this farming arrangement was widely criticized in the literature (see Chapter 2)157 and pro-
individual (family) farming was portrayed as panacea for the agricultural sector in the former socialist
economies (World Bank 2007a). Hence, as Meurs (200 1) claims, the reluctance of households to engage in
private farming was often dismissed as irrational, ideologically motivated behavior of the rural population.
The persistence of associational arrangements is even more intriguiging since in the second half of
the 1990s the opening up of land markets made way to alternative farming arrangements, such as leasing
and sales. Land market institutionalization was viewed as the solution to the current level of low
agricultural performance and the extreme land fragmentation. Small farmers were pressumed to resort to
land transactions in order to consolidate scattered land plots and to release assets to more productive
users. At the same time, past research consistently pointed to several characteristics of associations that
hinder incentives and productivity, while highlighting the gains from land market participation (see
Chapter 2). Therefore, by examining the persistence of associations throughout the transition period I
157 The main critiques of farming associations were lack of incentives in collective production, appropriation of
resources by managers, free-riding and principal agent problems.
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show that this institutional arrangement provides some advantages for small landowners, beyond the
benefits derived from land market participation.
In the previous chapter I showed that two types of associations were created following land
restitution: formal and informal. Because the number of informal association is lower than any other
farming arrangement (individual, formal associations, or leasing), the factors affecting the choice for this
arrangement cannot be captured using statistical analysis. 15 Therefore, the rest of the analysis in this and
the next chapter focuses specifically on formal associations, as one of the institutional alternatives for land
reallocation.
Using econometric analysis, this chapter examines the factors that are associated with different
land reallocation decisions in two main agro-regions in Romania, the Western Plain and the Central
Romanian Plain. The research question that shapes the analysis is: Why do landowners persist injoining
associations in Romania, despite perceived collective action problems, and despite the availability of leasing as a close
alternativefor land reallocation?
To fully answer this question, a few other accompanying questions need to be explored:
(a) Why do households seek alternative farming strategies instead of farming the land individually?
(b) What are the factors that affect landowners' choices between associations and leasing
arrangements?
Following land restitution and de-collectivization, the need to improve land management in the
rural areas is obvious in the changing environment specific to the transition from a centrally planned to a
market-based economic system. Within this context, land consolidation poses one of the most significant
challenges in Romania, as well as in other countries in Europe where land restitution resulted in very
fragmented smallholdings. Land reallocation into different institutional arrangements that could facilitate
this process, while accounting for household characteristics and resource endowment, is critical and
should be thoroughly understood. Therefore, policies that are designed to mesh the local conditions with
the needs of the farmers are more likely to lead to long-term sustainable outcomes.
One of the main assumptions in this study is that the current institutional configuration around
land reflects the choices made by landowners given market imperfections and constraints specific to
transition. Therefore, understanding why these choices were made, why expectations such as land market
participation were not met, and what are the potential benefits and drawbacks from these outcomes, will
contribute to promoting informed policies and will, hopefully, expand the literature on institutional
change and land reallocation.
158 In addition, because informal associations are do different from formal associations, I cannot analyze them
together with the formal type, under the general heading of associations.
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At the heart of this analysis is the household, as a decision-making unit, making choices with
respect to land reallocation based on exogenous factors (such as market conditions), resource endowment,
household characteristics, social considerations, and historical legacies. Using multivariate statistical
analysis on two unique household surveys from 1996 and 2006, this chapter aims to make a first set of
inquiries into why farming associations persisted throughout the transition period. The main hypotheses I
explore in this chapter, by decision tree (see Figure 8-1), are summarized in Table 8-1 and described
below. These hypotheses are derived from the overview and analysis of farming arrangements in Chapter
7.
Table 8-1: Research hypotheses by decision tree
Hypothesis Level 1: Level 2:
Individual vs. Association vs.
Alternative Leasing
HI: Land fragmentation +
H2: Physical capital + +
H3: Land per household member +
H4: Age
H5: Productivity + +
H6: Alternative income opportunities
H7: Earlier private property +
Hypothesis (1):
Li: Households with more fragmented plots are more likely to seek alternative farming arrangements.
L2: Households with more fragmented land plots are likely to join associations rather than lease out land
because of lower transactions costs.
Hypothesis (2):
LI: Landowners that own more physical capital are more likely to farm individually rather than seek
alternative farming arrangements.
Hypothesis (3):
Ll: Households with a higher ratio of land to adults in the household are more likely to farm individually.
L2: Households with a higher ratio of land to adults in the household are more likely to lease out.
Hypothesis (4):
LI: Older households are more likely to seek alternative farming arrangements.
L2: Older households are more likely to lease out land rather than join farming associations.
Hypothesis (5):
LI: More productive farmers are more likely to farm the land individually.
L2: More productive farmers are more likely to join associations.
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Hypothesis (6):
Ll: Landowners with non-farming income opportunities are more likely to seek alternative farming
arrangements.
L2: Landowners with non-farming income opportunities are more likely to lease out land.
Figure 8-1: Landowners' decision tree in respect to land reallocation159
LANDOWNER
Individual Alternative
farming arrangements
- Associations
-+ Leasing-out
The diagram in Figure 8-1 reflects the alternatives for land reallocation available to landowners
following land restitution in the beginning of the 1990s. Within the boundaries imposed by economic and
social constraints, the new landowners were free to decide how to best make use of the land assets they
received in ownership. Given that the full set of choices was restricted, the main decision early on was
whether a landowner should farm all the land individually, or seek alternative (mixed) institutional
arrangements. The second major decision that households could make, and which was less explored in the
literature, is the choice between becoming a member of an association and leasing out land, as two forms
of land reallocation into alternative farming arrangements. Even if there are records of informal land
159 I have not included the decision to sell land in the decision tree for two reasons. First, land sales were formally
allowed only after 1998, and since only 13% of the households sold some land. The majority of these transactions
(88%) occurred on the Western Plain. Second, and most importantly, I consider sales to be quite different than the
other land reallocation alternatives. Land sales, as opposed to the other choices, assume complete transfer of
ownership rights over the land plot that is the object of transaction. Nevertheless, future research should be
undertaken once land markets develop further, to inquire into the factors that affect landowners' choices to sell or
not land. I have conducted preliminary analysis on this question, where I found that the only main factors that
differentiated household that sold from those that did not sell land were the age of the landowner, whether the
household had capital endowment, and the legacy of private property rights in the region as a proxy for
entrepreneurship. Given the small sample of households that engaged in land sales by this date, I will not discuss in
further detail these findings.
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leasing in the very first years of de-collectivization, I expect this choice to weight more in the decision
process after 1998 when land market transactions were fully institutionalized.
Hence, decisions for land reallocation were made at different points in time. In the first half of
1990s, farmers had only the choice of farming in associations or farming individually, although cases of
informal leasing arrangements were found. In 1994, Law 16 was implemented, which institutionalized
leasing transactions. Later on, in 1998, Law 65 has significantly changed the earlier leasing law, and Law
54 was implemented to formalize the market for land sales, although, as in the case of leasing, informal
transactions were recorded prior to 1998.
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gure 8-2: Availability of land reallocation alternatives throughout the transition period
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Figure 8-2 graphs the availability of land reallocation alternatives throughout the transition
period. The dashed line indicates that, as fieldwork and other research studies have found, land market
transactions were recorded even before the market was institutionalized. The timing of the two surveys is
indicated by the dashed red vertical lines for year 1996 and 2006. As the figure illustrates, the 2006
household survey was able to capture important institutional changes mainly related to land market
development, but also other changes such as complete elimination of subsidies for agricultural producers
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in 1997, and efforts to adjust the sector to EU requirements prior to enlargement in 2007, process which
was accelerated after 2001.160
As I emphasized in the literature review discussion, Chapter 2, private individual farming was
previously examined in the context of post-socialist transition and de-collectivization. Nevertheless, there
is relatively less research on the farmers' choices for alternative arrangements and on the persistence of
associations, in the context in which institutional change has proceeded at an unprecedented scale. In
general, the literature is very critical of associational forms of farming, focusing on collective action
problems, and in general on their tendency to generate lower returns. However, with no exception, the
point of comparison in these studies is individual farming, through the lens of capitalist family-farms.
There is less emphasis on comparing the reasons behind farmers' choices for associations relative to other
market-based choices, such as land market transactions, when farming individually is not an option.
The next sections lay out the methodology, data, and the variables included in the statistical
analysis. The last section discusses the main results and interpretations.
8.2 Econometric evaluation of the choice of institutional arrangements for land
reallocation
The key question that frames this analysis is: Why do farmers persist in joining associations in
Romania, despite perceived problems of collective action and the availability of leasing as a close
substitute?
Because of the decision making process related to land reallocation, mapped by Figure 8-1, a few
additional questions need to be explored. First, why do households seek alternative farming strategies
instead of farming individually? Second, what are the factors that affect landowners' choices between
associations and leasing arrangements? The hypotheses that will be examined through statistical analysis
aim to capture the structural factors that explain the choices made by individual households, and the
persistence of associations during transition.
8.2.1 Econometric methodology
Choice analysis is about explaining variability in behavioral response in a sampled population of
individuals (Hensher et al. 2005 p. 72). Theories of individual choice behavior, that are at the core of
empirical discrete choice models, require the specification of several assumptions.
160 This figure is very important because it shows the important contribution that this study is making to the
literature on post-socialist transition in Romania by extending the data available for research and policy decisions. In
addition, this figure also suggests that if longer time series were available prior to 1996 and between 1996 and 2006,
to form a panel, we could have conducted a quite detailed and in-depth statistical analysis to explain the outcomes
from land reallocation.
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The overall assumption is that individuals act rationally, that they take into account all the
information they consider relevant in choosing an alternative. This means that we are accounting for a
very complex interaction between an individual decision maker and his or her environment. Nevertheless,
as Ben-Akiva and Lerman (2000 p. 38) mention, unless defined by a specific set of rules, the notion of
rationality is not a very useful concept in describing individual behavior, because it is based on the beliefs
of an observer about what the outcome of a decision should be. In this analysis, I use rationality to
describe a decision maker with "consistent and transitive preferences."161
Another assumption is that an individual acting rationally is assumed to compare alternatives and
choose the one which gives the greatest level of utility (satisfaction). This means that each alternative is
compared, and the individual chooses the alternative that yields the highest level of utility. Utility, in this
case, can be defined as a function of higher returns (n), commune characteristics (y), and social factors (0).
Ui;= Uij (nij, yij, Rj) (1)
I assign a utility level U# to each alternativej 1,.. .J, for each decision maker i=1,...I. The utilities
are determined by a large number of characteristics of the decision maker and the alternatives. The
researchers have information on some of those determinants, but not on all. This is reflected in splitting
the utilities into a deterministic part V and a stochastic part eg:
Ui; = Vi + sig (2)
Based on the utility maximization assumption, an individual compares UI, U2,..., Uj, and chooses
the one with maximum utility, i.e. max(Uj). For instance, if we had two alternatives, for which the utilities
are defined by Ui and U2, the choice would be made such that C=1 if U, > U 2, and C=0 if U, s U2,
where C=1 represents the choice for the first alternative, and C=0 represents the choice for the second
alternative.
The term Vi is often referred to as the "representative component of the utility" (Hensher et al.
2005 p. 76) because it includes the observed and measured attributes. In its simplest form, V can be
defined as a linear expression in which each variable is weighted by a unique weight (parameter) to
account for that variable's marginal utility input. I can write this definition as:
V, = poi + pl( )+ Pi(X2)+ ... + p ,X), k=1,....K (3)
where #ki is the parameter associated with variable Xk and alternative i.
161 For instance, it implies that an individual, under certain circumstances, will repeat the same choice of farming
arrangements, and if farming arrangement '1' is preferred to farming arrangement '2' and farming arrangement '2'
is preferred to farming arrangement '3', then farming arrangement 'l' is also preferred to arrangement '3'.
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Because the researcher has less information, than the decision maker, to evaluate the outcomes,
one can explain an individual's choice only up to a probability of an alternative being chosen. 6 2 The
probability P# that individual i chooses some alternativej is equal to the probability of U# being the largest
of all Uji, U1,... Uy. Withy; E { 1 ,..,} denoting the alternative that decision maker i chooses, this
probability can be written as (Heiss 2002):
Pij= Pr(yi=J) = Pr(Ui.P Uik V k =1,... J; k d j) (4)
=Pr(V +e#) ;- (Vik + eik-) V k = 1,... J; k ;d j)
=Pr(ei- - Eg) s (Vii - Vik) Vk=l,...J;kidj)
This equation states that due to lack of full information, the individual decision marker's utility
maximization is a random utility maximization. The random utility approach was first formalized by Manski
(1977). Given the deterministic parts of the utility functions Vi,... ,Vg, this probability will depend on
assumptions on the distribution of the stochastic error terms, sji,..
Depending on the number of alternatives, there are different types of discrete choice models. In
this analysis, I examine the choice between three farming arrangements: private individual farming,
formal associations, and leasing out land. Given the structure of the decision tree (see Figure 8-1), I chose
to split the analysis into two binary logistic models: a simple logistic regression to account for the first
decision level, and a logistic regression conditional on the earlier choice (on a sample subset). The decision
a landowner takes on land reallocation can be described by two phases:
(i): Given resource endowment, other endogenous (specific to the household) and exogenous
factors, the farmers decide whether to farm all the land themselves or to seek alternative farming
arrangements.
(ii): If the farmers decide to seek alternative farming arrangements (hence, conditional on this
choice), they will choose between joining associations or leasing-out land.
The probabilities that I will estimate based on the two binary logistic models are the following:
(a) The probability that a landowner farms all land individually:
J
I exp(X'p)
Pr(Y' = 1I/X) =- , for choice j=0, 1 (5)
1 + exp(X'ft)
1=1
162 Manski (1973) identified four distinct sources of randomness: unobserved attributes, unobserved taste variations,
measurement errors and imperfect observation, instrumental (or proxy) variables.
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where F stands for the choice of farming individually (F= 1) or choosing alternative arrangements
(F=O), and X and # are the explanatory variables and the standardized regression coefficients,
respectively, for the first stage binary choice model.
(b) The probability that a landowner seeks alternative farming arrangements:
Pr(Y' =0 /X)= J1 , for choices j = 0, 1 (6)
1+ 2exp(X'fi)
l-1
(c) The probability that a landowner chooses to join associations, given that he/she opted for
alternative farming arrangements:
Iexp(Z'y) 1
Pr(Y^ =2/Y' =0)= ( 1, ), for choice j=2,3 (7)
1 + 2exp(Z'y) 1 + 2exp(X'i)
where YA is the choice of farming the land in associations (rA=2) or leasing it out (r=3), and Z
and y are the explanatory variables and the standardized regression coefficients, respectively, for the
second stage binary choice model.
(d) The probability that a landowner chooses to lease-out land, given that he/she opted for
alternative farming arrangements:
Pr(YA = 3/Y' =)=( , ),for choice j=2, 3 (8)
1 + 2exp(Z'y) 1 + 2exp(X'i)
8.2.2 Data and variables
The data for this analysis derives from two household surveys (see Chapter 3 for more details on
the survey description). The first survey was implemented in 1996 by the Ministry of Agriculture with
funding and expertise from the European Commission and the World Bank, from which I extracted a
regional sub-sample for the Western Plain and Central Romanian Plain. In the summer of 2006, I
conducted a second survey, as a follow up, in the same villages and using the same sampling strategy. The
sample size for this study is 246 households for 1996, and 619 households for 2006.
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The statistical analysis163 is carried out separately for the two years because, from an institutional
point of view, I consider these two years very different from each other. Between 1996 and 2006
important legislative changes were adopted (as shown in
Figure 8-2), influencing the set of alternatives that landowners had in terms of land reallocation.
Hence, by separating the analysis for the two years I am able to capture changes in behavior subsequent
to these legislative adjustments.
Moreover, due to the specific characteristics of informal associations, as discussed in Chapter 7, I
am including only households that joined formal associations. Family associations represent a special case
of associations, which can only be examined separately. Moreover, as survey data shows, this institutional
arrangement has seen a steady decline, in the past decade.164 As a result, 40 households are excluded from
the analysis.
Lastly, Table 6-7 and 6-8 in Chapter 6 showed that some households engaged in mixed farming
arrangements, joining associations with part of the land, and leasing out other plots. However these
observations were too few to be considered a separate category (10 households in 2006 and 6 in 1996).
Hence, I included these households in the leasing category, given that they leased out a higher share of
land than they were farming in associations.
The dependent variables for the discrete choice models are: 1) the choice of farming all land
individually versus not, and 2) the choice ofjoining associations versus leasing out land. Table 8-2 shows
the distribution of households in the different choice categories for the two dependent variables.
Table 8-2: Summary stats for the dependent variables used in the discrete choice models
1996 2006
Phase 1
- farming all land individually 48.8% 64.5%
- choosing alternative arrangements 51.2% 3 5 .5 %
Phase 2
- joining associations 74.7% 1 43.1%
- leasing-out land 25.3% 56.9%
Source: Household surveys in 1996 and 2006.
The independent variables include a series of household specific variables (i.e. human capital,
household productivity, endowment with physical capital, purchases of seeds), land characteristics (i.e.
fragmentation), commune specific variables (i.e. land quality, distance to markets, share of arable land),
163 Data were analyzed using STATA, Version 10.0.
164 Among the households that joined associations, in 1996 3 2 % were in informal associations. By 2006, this share
declined to 26% of the households, as I showed in Figure 7-1 in Chapter 7.
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and regional fixed effects. In the following section I describe each of the variables hypothesized to affect
the choices for different property rights arrangements. .
Table 8-3 provides summary statistics for the independent variables included in the two models,
grouped under three categories: household characteristics, farming characteristics, and commune
characteristics. In the following sections I discuss each of these variables in greater detail.
Table 8-3: Sununary statistics for the variables included in the analysis
1996 2006
Mean St. Mean St.
Dev. Dev.
Household characteristics
AGE Age of the household head (years) 60 (14) 62 (14)
EDUCYRS Years of completed education for the household 6.56 (3.26) 7.53 (3.42)
head (years)
LANDADULT The share of owned land to the number of adults 1.57 (1.61) 1.55 (1.99)
in the household (ha/person)
PRODUCT Household productivity level -0.001 (.81) 0.001 (0.68)
AGRICOCC DV for agriculture as primary occupation 0.83 (0.38) 0.70 (0.46)
Farming characteristics
FRAGM Land fragmentation (# of plots) normalized by 1.38 (0.91) 1.55 (1.07)
total land in ownership
TITLE DV for possession of ownership title on land (nr. 0.46 (0.50) 0.90 (0.30)
Of plots)
HIRE DV for hired labor 0.19 (0.39) 0.31 (0.46)
HHLABOR The number of labor-days expended by household 419 (229) 362 (252)
members
CREDIT DV for contracting bank credits in the past year 0.05 (0.22) 0.13 (0.34)
CAPITAL Capital index .225 (.33) 0.001 (1.62)
SEEDS DV for seeds purchase 0.46 (0.50) 0.59 (0.49)
LIVESTOCK Livestock (# of animals) 3.68 (3.11) 3.13 (3.31)
Commune characteristics
DISTANCE Distance from the commune to the closest city (km) 17.70 (7.27) 18.28 (7.46)
PRIVATE The share of land in private ownership by county 2.40 (3.21) 2.85 (3.32)
in 1985 1
DENSITY Population density in the commune .573 (.30) .571 (.29)
ARABLE Share of arable land in the commune (%) 71.89 (14.82) 70.85 (15.11)
(*)The values in parentheses are standard deviations. (**) DV=dummy variable.
Household characteristics
Under the general heading of household characteristics I include conventional variables that
measure the level and quality of human capital (age and education), measures of wealth, occupation, and
household productivity.
Broadly speaking, human capital reflects the managerial skills and capabilities of rural households
(Sahn and Alderman 1988; Foster and Rosenzweig 1994; Rizov 2003). Using the 1996 survey data for
Romania, Rizov (2003) showed that human capital has a significant effect on the choice of farming
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arrangement in Romania.165 He finds that low skilled households are more likely to join associations. The
human capital variables used here are the age and education of the household head. I consider that the
head of the household is likely to have more decision power over the farm than other household
members.166
Age
In Chapter 7 I showed that the age of the household head varies by farming arrangement.
Younger households tend to farm individually or to join associations, while older households are likely to
lease-out land. Therefore, the effect of age on the choice of farming arrangements can be interpreted in
different ways. Higher age generally implies a higher risk aversion, while it can also suggest higher
managerial experience and ability.167 Hence, I hypothesize that age has a nonlinear effect on the choice of
institutional arrangements. I assume that older individuals have more farming experience and
accumulated knowledge, and therefore they are more likely to farm the land themselves, or to join
associations if they lack key resources for individual farming. Nevertheless, at higher age levels, leasing
becomes a better alternative due to decline in farming abilities. Therefore I also add the square of age in
the estimation process in order to account for this non-linear effect. Moreover, as I described in Chapter
6, average age is lower in the Western Plain relative to the Central Romanian Plain, suggesting that age
may play an important role in explaining regional variation in the persistence of farming associations.
Education
I measure the level of education as years of education completed by the household head. I
hypothesize that education matters not only as a proxy for managerial skills and ability to start up and run
a farm but also as an indicator of access to off-farming job opportunities. As the level of education
increases, so does the opportunity cost for labor. At one point, landowners would be able to find non-
farming occupations with higher returns, and therefore one would expect them to seek alternative farming
arrangements (i.e. join associations or lease-out).
Land-adult ratio
The land-adult ratio, is measured as the amount of owned and rented-in land in hectares divided
by the number of people over 15 years living in the household. It represents a proxy for farm size as well
as a measure of wealth. The average land-person ratio in 1996 was 1.5 hectares, almost the same as in
165 His study examined the choice between individual farming, cooperative farming, hybrid farming, part-time and
full time farming, and absentee owners.
166 Rizov (2003) finds, however, that intra-household decision-making is fairly democratic and that there is an active
exchange of knowledge within the household. Nevertheless, fieldwork shows that in general the opinion of the
household head in the rural areas has higher weight in the final decision.
167 In addition, as Field (1975) shows, young individuals may prefer off-farming employment, while older individuals
may prefer to go back to full (or part) time farming. This finding is also confirmed by the fieldwork I conducted in
the rural areas.
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2006 (1.6 hectares per person). The average size of land farmed individually has not changed significantly
in the past decade. In 1996 a household farmed on average 3.1 hectares of land, while by 2006 the share
increased to only 3.3 hectares. This finding is rather surprising since based on economic theory, policy
makers expected that once land markets are formalized and the leasing legislation becomes less
cumbersome, small farms will increase to a more economical size, closer to the western model of family
farms.
A higher share of land relative to adults in the household means that landowners can benefit not
only from economies of scale, but also from increased opportunities for financing as land is most
commonly used as collateral in transitional economies. Moreover, since land is the most important asset in
farming, more land relative to labor is supposed to encourage individual farming. Therefore, I expect that
households with a higher land-adult ratio will be more likely to engage in individual farming
arrangements. Nevertheless, when the type of agriculture practiced is subsistence-based, and markets are
imperfect (preventing landowners to match the amount of land with the availability of other assets),
farmers with more land are likely to seek alternative farming arrangements, primarily leasing. Having
more land reduces the transaction costs for participating in land markets.
Agriculture as primary occupation
I also measure whether the primary occupation for the household head is agriculture. This is an
important variable in the model because it also proxies for the availability of alternative sources of income
and for whether the household is engaged in full time or part time farming. In 1996 83% of the
households had agriculture as main occupation, while by 2006 the share declined to 70%. This decline
might be a slight indication that the rural economy diversified. My hypothesis is that households with
agriculture as the primary occupation are more likely to farm individually or within the institutional
framework of associations. Hence, households that are either part-time farmers, or have alternative
sources of income will be more likely to lease-out land.
Household productivity
Household productivity is a measure of farming ability and knowledge on the land farmed
individually. As I discussed in Chapter 7, most households joined associations earlier in the transition.
Hence, Figure 8-3 illustrates this pattern, showing that most households made the decision to join
associations more than ten years ago. Also, households that leased-out land did so mostly two or three
years before our last survey.
219
Figure 8-3: Kernel density distribution for the length of time since the household joined
associations and leased out, respectively (2006 data)
q
as-nrears l ease-nryears
joined formal associations Leased-out land
Because these decisions were taken in the past, yields level in the survey year are not an
appropriate measure to capture household productivity. The yield in 2005 (or 1995) includes all things
that affect yield in that year, including a long-term measure of productivity of the household, all inputs
used by the household, as well as shocks to yields in that period (e.g. pests, weather fluctuations). However,
since I am examining choices ex-post, I need a measure of productivity that is time invariant, and more
permanent, unlike the yields measure that depends on the resource endowment (i.e. use of physical and
human capital, and inputs such as fertilizer and seeds) and weather conditions at the time of data
collection.
Hence, to calculate productivity, I decomposed the level of yields into observable and un-
observable factors through simple OLS multivariate regression.168 By controlling for the endowment with
different factors of production and human capital differences, I am able to isolate, what I call, the true
measure of productivity reflected in the inherent farming knowledge, unaccounted for by other factors
(such as inputs). Some of the factors that would be reflected in the level of productivity are better
entrepreneurial skills, higher levels of farming expertise, better organizational structures, newer
equipment, land quality at the parcel level, the care and timing of planting and harvesting.
1 A better alternative for capturing the long-term productivity element in yields would have been the use of
forecasting models, for example using the autoregressive coefficient from an AR model to predict a more permanent
version of yields. I tested such models based on more aggregate yields data at the county level for seventeen years.
However, because there is too much variation in yields at county level, the AR models are not well specified.
However, this method would produce better results if we had a longer time-series (i.e. detailed yields data at
commune level over a longer period of time). Nevertheless, in Romania, secondary statistics at commune or village
data are not very reliable and agricultural production data prior to 1990 is subject to strong biases due to the
communist production targets and presumed over-reporting of harvest levels. But, the AR models should be
considered an option for future research.
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I hypothesize that households with a higher productivity level are more likely to farm the land
themselves rather than to seek alternative property rights arrangements. The assumption embedded
within this hypothesis is that they households would seek alternative farming arrangements only as long as
the their productivity level is higher in other sectors than farming. Moreover, in the choice between
associations and leasing, households with a lower productivity level are expected to lease-out land and
engage in non-farming activities, or to focus their productive energy on smaller plots of land. The model
based on which I estimated household productivity is:
Y = ai + Pf1Labor + p& Land + pf3Capital+ P4 Seeds+ f 5 Fertilizer + p6 Livestock +
+f37jLFragm + , 8 ,10Rainf all+ p3jAgroreg + pA2 Corn + E(
where i is the log of yields (i=1,...,N) and Xi includes a set of inputs used for farming, i are the estimated
coefficients on the inputs, and Ej is the error term. Below I will define each of the variables included in the
productivity estimation model (9).
The measure foryields (T) is the ratio of the quantity of output169 and the number of hectares
under cultivation. I choose to consider only the households that produce corn and/or wheat in order to
avoid aggregation of different crops that might exhibit different production technologies. Moreover, corn
and wheat are the main crops that have been traditionally cultivated in Romania. In our data, in 2006,
76% produced corn, 42% wheat, with an average acreage of 0.89 hectares for corn and 0.46 hectares for
wheat (out of an average of 1.6 hectares of land farmed individually). The rest of the households produced
a combination of other grains and crops (i.e. mainly vegetables).17 0 A similar distribution of crops across
households can be seen in 1996.
By including only households producing corn and/or wheat, the sample size was reduced from
619 to 491 cases in 2006, and from 246 to 185 cases in 1996. The 2006 sample is distributed in the
following way based on crop type: 229 households produced only corn, 23 produced only wheat, and 239
produced both corn and wheat. From the difference of 128 households that cultivated no corn or wheat,
48 households have all owned land in associations, 49 households leased out all land to other farmers, and
31 households cultivated other crops than corn and wheat (see Table 8-4 for the relative distribution of
the households across these characteristics).n17 For 1996, 100 households produced only corn, 4 produced
169 See Chapter 3 for a detailed description of the output measurement.
170 31 % of the households produced vegetables, 2 2% hay, 13% sunflower, 13% grapes, 12% oat, 7% barley, 2%
fruit, and 1% sugar beats and soy. The shares do not sum to 100% because several households cultivate more than
one type of crop.
171 The households that do not work any of the land individually are older in age, have a lower level of education,
and do not have children living in the households that could help with farming.
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only wheat, and 81 produced both. The difference of 61 households cultivated other crops than corn or
wheat.
Table 8-4: Farm types based on crop mix (%)
1996 2006
Only corn 40.7 37.0
Only wheat 1.6 3.7
Both corn and wheat 32.9 41.7
Other crops* 24.8 20.6
*In 2006 some households released all land to associations or leased out, which are included in this category as well.
Source: Household surveys in 1996 and 2006.
Labor stands for the number of days-labor by full-time and part-time household 72, hired, and
exchange labor on the farm. To convert the labor variable to labor-days I used Eurostat (2007)
measurements according to which a worker employed on a full time basis in Romania works 245 days per
year. Therefore, a half-time worker is considered to work 122.5 days and less than half-time 61.3 days.
The 1996 labor data will be slightly underestimated because there is no record of the number of exchange
labors (relatives and non-relatives) used between spring and autumn by the household. It has been often
argued in the literature that hired (and exchange) labor should be valued lower than family labor effort
due to labor monitoring problems, principle agent, and moral hazard problems (Rizov 2003; Sabates-
Wheeler 2005). However, one limitation for this variable is that I did not account for the quality variation
in labor inputs. Nevertheless, as Sabates-Wheeler (2005 p. 125) mentions, hired labor is not widely used in
Romania, and most of the time they work side-by-side with the owner of the land, reducing monitoring
problems. Moreover, day-laborers gain a reputation in small communities such as villages and communes,
which acts as an indirect monitoring instrument and moral hazard prevention for the hired labor.
The other variables included in the model are the log of land farmed individually, the index of
capital endowment (which will be described later), dummies for whether the household purchased seeds
and fertilizer, livestock endowment, the log of land fragmentation (measured in number of land plots). In
addition I use three measures for rainfall: the amount of rainfall in the year of study (1995 and 2005
respectively) at county level, average rainfall levels over the period 1901-1990 and 1901-2000, and
seasonal rainfall for the two crops included in the yield measure (April to August for corn, andJanuary to
June for wheat). The distribution of productivity estimates is shown in Figure 8-4 below. The mean of the
distribution is zero because household productivity was calculated as the residual of the estimation. In that
sense, it measures relative productivity across the households.
172 The concept of family (household) labor is important in this context. This type of labor, as Chayanov (1966)
argues, operates in a more or less closed universe where the producers also constitute the consumption unit, and
therefore there is no separately identifiable concept of wage costs.
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Figure 8-4: The Kernel density of household productivity in 1996 and 2006
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Source: 1996 Household Survey Source: 2006 Household Survey.
Figure 8-4 shows that distribution of household productivity for those that cultivate wheat and
those that cultivate corn in 1996 and 2006. As we can notice from the figures, the k-density distributions
are similar for the two crops (in 1996 the scores are slightly lower and more spread around the mean)
reflecting the long-term component of household productivity across years.
Moreover, given that the there is not much difference between the distribution of the productivity
scores for households cultivating corn and wheat, I computed a weighted average of the two measures for
each household. I use this weighted productivity average for the choice models. The average household
productivity scores were calculated using a weighted average of the two household productivity measures
where the weights are the inverse of the standard deviations.
Farming conditions
The variables included in this category measure the availability of resources necessary for farming
(labor, capital, seeds, access to credit, livestock), and the degree of land fragmentation.
Labor
To measure labor I use the number of days spent on the farm by household members (part time
and full time), as described above. I hypothesize that households who use more household labor are more
likely to farm the land themselves rather than choose alternative farming arrangements.
Physical capital index
Capital is very scarce in the Romanian countryside. The survey instrument includes a list of eight
different physical capital (agricultural equipment) items: truck, tractor, plough for tractor, combine for
cereals, carriage, seeder, irrigation equipment, and processing equipment. The distribution of these
different agricultural implements across households varies. In 2006, 13% owned a tractor, 12% owned
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plough for tractor, and fewer than 6% owned any of the other items, with the exception of carriages that
were owned by 2 9 % of the households. Owning physical capital allows a household not only to farm at a
larger scale, but it can also provide a source of revenue by allowing households to rent services to other
farmers.
In order to get an index of capital stock, I used Principal Component Analysis (PCA), based on
which I determined the weights of asset indices using the variables listed above. PCA is helpful when we
have data on many variables and wish to develop a small number of (possibly) artificial variables (principal
components) that will explain most of the variance in the observed variables. In PCA, it is assumed that
there is some redundancy in the variables collected, implying that some of the variables are correlated
with one another and are possibly measuring the same thing. The first principal component is the linear
combination of variables with the largest amount of information common to all of the variables. The
result obtained from the first principal component is usually used to develop the asset index based on the
following formula:
K =f, * (k - a)+.+ f,*( -'" ") (10)
S1 S
where K1 is the capital index for thejth household;f, is the scoring factor for the first asset as determined
by the procedure; kgi is the jth household's value for the first asset; and al and si are the mean and
standard deviation of the first asset variable over all the households.
Table 8-5: Physical assets weights determined by PCA
1996 2006
Truck 0.010 0.176
Tractor 0.477 0.545
Plough 0.501 0.549
Combine for grains 0.392 0.315
Carriage 0.026 0.109
Seeder 0.399 0.440
Irrigation equipment 0.332 0.140
Equipment for processing 0.297 0.214
The weights determined from the above formula (see Table 8-5), for each type of asset, were used
to determine the index for physical capital endowment.
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Purchased seeds
Another variable to capture farming conditions and endowment with resources is a dichotomous
variable that measures whether the household purchased seeds in the past year.173 Because only a few
households specified the amount of seeds they purchased, I was not able to account for the total quantity
of seeds that was used by the household. Purchasing agricultural inputs suggests a tendency of the
household to move away from traditional farming. Most of the time, subsistence farmers rely on seeds that
result from domestic production, which are of lower quality affecting the level of production.
Livestock
Livestock is another measure for resource endowment, measured as the total number of animals
in the household. A large livestock suggests, on the one hand, that the household is wealthier, and hence it
would be likely to farm the land individually. On the other hand, it also suggests that the household is
diversifying production away from crops, which in turn means that the landowner is likely to seek
alternative farming arrangements.
Credit
Access to credit, is measured as a dummy variable for whether the household contracted a bank
credit in the previous year or not. This variable aims to capture the ability of the household to invest and
take risk. I hypothesize that farmers that contracted bank credits in the previous years are more
entrepreneurial and will be more likely to farm their land individually.
Land title
The variable title shows the share of households with full ownership rights over the land in
ownership. In the past decade significant progress was made in title distribution in the past decade. By
2006 almost 98% of the households had title deeds. Based on the two surveys, in 1996 the share of
households with full titie was 45%, while by 2006 this share has increased to 90% in the two regions,
Western Plain and Central Romanian Plain. Hence, I assume that in our model the statistical significance
of land titles will be higher in the 1996 sample.
The hypothesis here is that having full ownership rights over land gives landowners more security
over their assets, allowing them to choose alternative farming arrangements (such as joining association, or
leasing-out) without endangering their private ownership over the tenure period (as discussed in Chapter
2). Nevertheless, aside from the issue of security, cost in seeking alternative property rights arrangements is
also important. For instance, if a household does not have full title for the land in ownership, leasing out
will be very costly (both for him and for the tenant) because of registration fees and information gathering.
173 Initially I also included a dummy variable for the purchase of fertilizer, but it did not prove to be a good estimate
for the model.
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Hence, I hypothesize that because of the informal contracting nature of associations, households with less
secure property rights will be more likely to join associations rather than to lease out.
Land fragmentation
Land fragmentation is measured as the total number of plots that the land in ownership is divided
into. This measure was normalized by the size of landownership (total land a household owns) in order to
capture the "true" degree of fragmentation, rather than a wealth affect. In addition, I also took the log of
A plot, in this analysis, is not defined by what is cultivated on a piece of land, as is the case in the
African context (Suri 2007). Rather, in studies focused on the CEE countries, a land plot is defined by its
physical boundaries, as a measure of physical separation of land ownership into different units.
In 1996 the average number of plots owned by a household was 4, and by 2006 there was almost
no improvement in land consolidation (an average of 3.7 plots). 74 Land fragmentation is probably the
most frequently mentioned predicament to improving performance in the Romanian agriculture, not only
by policy makers in Romania, but also by researchers and academics, and has been indeed one of the
main challenges that Romanian agricultural was confronted with following land restitution.
As Currie (1981 p. 37) argues, there is wide agreement among scholars that the size, compactness
and connectedness of an "operating unit" 75 determines the production possibilities available to the farmer
and thus influences his activities, and the performance of agriculture. The problem of spread-out land
plots (heterogeneous land) resides in higher transactions costs for the landowners, and inability to gain
from economies of scale and the use of technology especially since the Romanian agriculture is mainly
based on the production of corn and wheat. As Dumitru (2004) also argues, fragmentation is a major
obstacle to technological progress, as subsistence farmers, farming a large portion of the land, do not have
the capacity to invest in modem machinery. Therefore, because of small and fragmented land plots
farmers had no choice but to resort to traditional (manual) production techniques.
Nevertheless, at times, in a traditional economy, and when market imperfections are pervasive,
land fragmentation can act as an economic risk buffer despite higher costs incurred by needing more
labor at peak harvesting times, and commuting between the different plots. In addition, extensive land
consolidation could leave many people landless, putting higher social pressure on the rural communities
(FAO 2005). Land fragmentation can reduce risk through the differences in land quality among plots
(Scott 1976). Nevertheless, despite the positive aspect of fragmentation for subsistence farmers, the costs
spawned as a result (especially when it comes to crops such a corn and wheat requiring more mechanical
implements) are not negligible.
174 The average ratio of number of plots to the land in ownership was 1.4 in 1996 and 1.5 in 2006, showing little
improvement over the decade.
175 By operating unit, the author refers to a land area which is farmed as a single unit by some individual or group.
The land comprising of an operating unit need not be contiguous.
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Aside from this debate between positive and negative outcomes from land fragmentation, a more
nuanced aspect relates to the degree of fragmentation (the number of spread out plots). First, I
hypothesize that land fragmentation does pose a cost for landowners wishing to farm the land themselves.
But, whether they choose to farm the land in associations or to lease it out, depends on how severe is the
level of fragmentation. Hence, I hypothesize that at higher degrees of land fragmentation, landowners
benefit more from farming in associations (rather then leasing out), where consolidation can be achieved
easier and at lower cost (see Chapter 7). By doing so, landowners (and to a certain extent, the association)
gain from risk-spreading strategies. FAO (2002) also makes a similar argument, but not sufficiently
articulated, claiming that the presence of associations is an asset for land consolidation, especially if the
perceived association advantages are analyzed.
When I discuss the issue of land fragmentation, it is important, however, to understand why the
restitution policy resulted in such a fragmented land distribution in Romania. As Dumitru (2002 p. 5)
argues, the pattern of land holdings behind the 1990s land restitution emerged from the radical reform in
1918 that expropriated large areas of land from foreigners, absentee owners, and native owners with more
than 250 hectares of land (see Chapter 4 for more details). Landless and smallholders were given an
average of three hectares. However, as Dumitru (2002) further explains, due to high population growth in
the rural areas, lack of non-farm employment, the inheritance right existent at that time (based on equal
distribution between heirs) became "a veritable land ownership chopper." As a result, "the subdivision of
households could not be avoided and the households were divided and re-divided and interchanged as a
result of marriage until a single peasant ended up farming a dozen of tiny plots, often widely spread."
Moreover, it has been suggested in the literature that where land is fertile, affording its cultivators
relatively high living standards, population increases are likely to be relatively high (Sen 1966). As a result,
fragmentation of units thorough inheritance may be most rapid on fertile land when improved farming
methods are available (Currie 1981 p.140).176
Commune characteristics
Land quality
Land quality is measured as the share of good quality land (category I and II) into total
agricultural land at the commune level. One of the limitations of this dataset is the unavailability of farm
176 Drawing from the England case, Currie (1981 p. 140) argues that large land estates are rarely subdivided between
family members. He claims that in England, when divisibility was established, the majority of large landowners
adopted as customary the previous law of primogeniture, based on which the property descends to the eldest son.
Because consolidation was a laborious process, every effort was made to preserve intact the estates. Moreover, the
device of settlement was employed preventing the current incumbent from selling land. Therefore, the degree of land
fragmentation is contingent on the legal framework with respect to inheritance.
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(or plot) level land quality information. To partially overcome this drawback, commune level data is
supposed to provide some indication of land quality in the particular areas included in the analysis.
The literature suggests that landowners are more likely to give associations land that is of poorer
quality (Verdery 2004b). Therefore, one could argue that in regions where land quality is not very high,
the probability of landowners farming in associations, or leasing out land, is higher.
Distance to markets
The distance from the commune to the closest city is a proxy for the access of the households to
local markets. The average distance in the communes included in the survey sample is 18 kilometers.
Nevertheless, there is quite a significant variation in access to markets across the 45 villages. The effect of
market access on the choice of farming arrangements is important, but hard to predict ex-ante because of
its close interconnection to the local economy and broader market conditions. One hypothesis is that
easier market access lowers the cost of landowners to commercialize their products and increases access to
information on market conditions (i.e. price and demand). This should facilitate individual farming. As a
result, holding other factors constant, a more difficult market access (i.e. longer distance to the urban
areas) should determine farmers to seek alternative farming strategies (associations or leasing
opportunities), which, because of their larges scale of operation, are able to better commercialize the
harvest. Nevertheless, a higher distance to markets (to the urban areas) could also mean that private
entrepreneurs (who could lease land from small landowners) are less interested in investing in an area that
is more remote from markets, and which calls for higher transaction costs. Therefore, I hypothesize that
when this is the case associations are the only alternative for reducing transaction costs for landowners.
Initial conditions
In order to account for the path-dependent effect of property rights or farming practices, I use a
variable that measures the share of land in private ownership in 1985 at county level, before de-
collectivization, first used by Rizov et al. (2001). A high share of land in private ownership during socialist
agriculture is a proxy not only for a higher attachment to land but also for a stronger entrepreneurial
behavior. Generally, the regions with more land in private ownership during collectivization were either
in mountain areas (where collectivization was hard to carry out) or in areas where the history of private
property rights was longer (such as in Transylvania) and as a result there was more opposition to the
imposition of collective farming practices. Nevertheless, despite similarities in geography, regional
differences in the level of private land ownership in 1985 are significant: 5.5% of total agricultural land in
the Western Plain as compared to 0.1 % in the Central Romanian Plain. This disparity is even more
striking since the southern plains are more uniform in topography, while in the West there are more hilly
areas. Such differences can only be explained through historical variation in property rights and
subsequent collectivization practices, as I will discuss in Chapter 9.
228
Therefore, this variable captures both path-dependent as well as entrepreneurial regional
characteristics. I hypothesize that in regions that had a higher share of private property in 1985, the
probability of households engaging in private individual farming is higher than seeking alternative farming
arrangements.
Share of arable land
The share of arable land in the commune aims to capture the specialization of the commune in
agriculture. More arable land in the commune suggests that there is a higher potential for large scale
agriculture, which would make associations or leasing more attractive alternatives.
8.3 Results and interpretations
The analysis is conducted at multiple levels across a decade of transition. Therefore, the results
are presented and discussed separately for the two years. However, I tested how the coefficients changed
across the two decades by pooling the data for the two years together and interacting a time dummy with
all the variables.
Within each year, I broke down the results into the two types of household decisions: a) farming
individually versus choosing alternative institutional arrangements; and b) conditional on choosing
alternative farming arrangements, whether the household chose to join associations rather than to lease-
out land. However, because the sample size is small for the 1996 dataset, the logit regressions allow only
for a very limited estimation. Therefore, comparisons between the two years on this model should be
made with care.
Table 8-6, Table 8-7, Table 8-8 and Table 8-9 display marginal effects for the two decision levels
in four different models (i.e. controlling for different variables). Table 8-10 displays the marginal effects for
the model that tests the difference in coefficients between the two years.
Discrete choice models can reflect a large amount of complexity, which is rarely done justice to by
conventional results interpretation (King et al. 2000). Hence, in this analysis I rely on the technique of
statistical simulation177, to extract the overlooked information and present it in a reader-friendly manner
along different dimensions.
Below, I discuss the main results (in light of the hypotheses stated earlier), in order to reach an
explanation for why associations persisted throughout the transition period.
177 "Statistical simulation uses the logic of survey sampling to approximate complicated mathematical calculations
[...] We learn about a distribution by simulating (drawing random numbers) from it and using the draws to
approximate some features of the distribution. The approximation becomes more accurate as we increase the
number of draws" (King et al. 2000 p. 349). In this analysis, I use a number of 1,000 draws.
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Table 8-6: Estimation results (2006)- Logit Regression: Individual farming (1) vs.
Alternative arrangements (0) (marginal effects)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Household characteristics
Age .014* (.007) .021** (.009) .018** (.008) .021** (.009)
Squared age -.0001 (.000) -.0001* (.000) -.0001 (.000) -.0002** (.000)
Years of education -.007 (.006) -.009 (.006) -.013* (.007) -.014* (.007)
Ratio of land to adults -.044** (.017) -.060** (.019) -.039** (.017) -.044** (.019)
HH productivity .032 (.047) .002 (.039) -
Agric. main occupation -. 120* (.060) .114* (.064) -.094* (.040) -.064 (.057)
Farming conditions
Land fragmentation ratio .061** (.025) .039 (.027) .059 (.039) .052 (.039)
Ownership title -.001 (.051) -.005 (.054) -.084 (.084) -.089 (.106)
Use of HH labor .0003** (.000) .000 * (.000) .0005** (.000) .0001** (.000)
Took credit .099** (.047) .125** (.040) .097 (.074) .149* (.065)
Capital index .179*** (.041) .166*** (.020) .248** (.063) .222** (.078)
Purchased seeds .204** (.078) .090 (.075) .291*** (.065) .240*** (.065)
Livestock -. 006 (.007) .000 (.009) -.007 (.009) -.002 (.011)
Physical characteristics
Land quality -. 002* (.001) -.004** (.003) -.004** (.001) -.005** (.002)
Access to markets .009** (.005) .009** (.004) .003 (.006) -.006 (.007)
Share of arable land -. 002 (.004) .005 (.004) -.004 (.005) .003 (.006)
Dummy-Western Plain .363*** (.125) .430** (.146) .370** (.117) .366* (.216)
Commune fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Pseudo R-Squared 0.422 0.520 0.372 0.451
Observations(a) 457 457 613 613
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. The table reports the coefficients and the standard errors with
various independent variables, namely the age (and age squared) of the household head, the number of
completed education years for the household head, the ratio of owned land to the number of adults in the
family, household productivity, dummy variable for whether agriculture is the main occupation, the log of
land fragmentation normalized by owned land, a dummy for whether the household has ownership title,
the share of household labor, whether the household took loans, the capital index, a dummy for whether
the household purchased seeds, the stock of animals, land quality at commune level, distance to markets,
share of arable land in the commune, and a dummy for the Western Plain region. Model (2) and (4) control
for commune fixed effects by adding commune dummies.
Significance levels: (*) p<.10; (**) p<.0 5 ; (***) p<.01.
W In Model 1 and Model 2, the difference of 162 households from the total number of observations (619) derives
from missing cases on the productivity calculation (19 households in labordays, 49 in land, 5 in livestock, 1 in land
fragmentation, with 30 of these overlapping). In Model 3, the difference of 6 households from the total number of
observations derives from missing cases on land fragmentation (1 case) and livestock (5 cases).
Nevertheless, the results are similar along all the covariates when the model is restricted to 457 households.
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Table 8-7: Estimation results (2006) - Logit Regression: Associations (1) vs. Leasing-out
(0) (marginal effects)
(1)(2)(3) (4)
Household characteristics
Age .042** (.015) .031** (.017) .032* (.018) .028 (.020)
Squared age -.0003** (.000) -.0002 (.000) -.0003* (.000) -.0002 (.000)
Years of education .022* (.012) .024 (.016) .033** (.015) .035** (.017)
Ratio of land to adults .080** (.029) .130** (.032) .021 (.032) .037 (.032)
HH productivity .302** (.095) .256 (.165) -
Agric. main occupation -. 107 (.128) -.081*** (.126) .031 (.103) .069 (.102)
Farming conditions
Land fragmentation ratio .393** (.161) .498** (.215) .318*** (.078) .364*** (.092)
Ownership title -.012 (.123) -.031 (.184) .239* (.091) .265* (.098)
Use of HH labor .001* (.000) .001 (.001) .0004** (.000) .0004* (.000)
Physical characteristics
Land quality .010* (.005) .010* (.005) .009** (.003) .009** (.003)
Access to markets -.041** (.013) -.057** (.018) -.030*** (.009) -.034** (.012)
Dummy-Western Plain -. 199 (.149) -.247 (.150) -.241** (.101) -.250** (.115)
Commune fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Pseudo R-Squared 0.396 0.526 0.367 0.412
Observations(a) 108 108 192 192
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. The table reports the coefficients and the standard errors with
various independent variables, namely the age (and age squared) of the household head, the number of
completed education years for the household head, the ratio of owned land to the number of adults in the
family, household productivity, dummy variable for whether agriculture is the main occupation, the log of
land fragmentation normalized by owned land, a dummy for whether the household has ownership title,
the share of household labor, the capital index, land quality at commune level, distance to markets, share of
arable land in the commune, and a dummy for the Western Plain region. Model (2) and (4) control for
commune fixed effects by adding commune dummies.
Significance levels: (*) p<.10; (**) p<.05; (***) p<.01.
(a) In Model 1 and Model 2, 85 households dropped out of the analysis because of missing values on the independent
variables. In Model 3, only 1 household (out of a total of 193 observations) dropped out because of missing values in
the land fragmentation variable.
Nevertheless, the results are similar along all the covariates when the model is restricted to 108 households.
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Table 8-8: Estimation results (1996)- Logit Regression: Individual farming (1) vs.
Alternative arrangements (0) (marginal effects)
Note: Ulustered standard errors in parentheses. The table reports the coefficients and the standard errors with
various independent variables, namely the age (and age squared) of the household head, the number of
completed education years for the household head, the ratio of owned land to the number of adults in the
family, household productivity, dummy variable for whether agriculture is the main occupation, the log of
land fragmentation normalized by owned land, a dummy for whether the household has ownership title,
the share of household labor, whether the household took loans, the capital index, a dummy for whether
the household purchased seeds, the stock of animals, land quality at commune level, distance to markets,
share of arable land in the commune, and a dummy for the Western Plain region. Model (2) and (4) control
for commune fixed effects by adding commune dummies.
Significance levels: (*) p<.10; (**) p<.05; (***) p<.O.
(a) In Model 1 and Model 2, 49 households dropped out of the analysis because of missing values on the independent
variables. In Model 3, 18 households (out of a total of 246 observations) dropped out because of missing values in the
land fragmentation variable.
Nevertheless, the results are similar along all the covariates when the model is restricted to 179 households.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Household characteristics
Age -.049** (.013) -.025 (.022) -.049** (.018) -.027 (.023)
Squared age .0004** (.000) .0001 (.000) .0004** (.000) -.0002 (.000)
Years of education -.028** (.013) -.015 (.019) -.025** (.013) -.010 (.018)
Ratio of land to adults -.051 (.046) -. 032 (.067) -.043 (.039) -.040 (.070)
HH productivity -.093 (.061) -. 186* (.092) -
Agric. main occupation .011 (.129) .147 (.172) -.074 (.130) .194* (.100)
Farming conditions
Land fragmentation ratio .240*** (.071) .307** (.107) .188** (.082) .320** (.117)
Ownership title -.263** (.114) -. 245** (.173) -.078 (.118) -. 196 (.176)
Use of HH labor .0002 (.000) .0004 (.000) .0003 (.000) .0005* (.000)
Took credit -.261** (.088) -. 300** (.124) -. 183 (.120) -.295** (.103)
Capital index -.211 (.246) -.012 (.034) -.225 (.193) -.584** (.153)
Purchased seeds .119 (.083) .206 (.131) .229** (.094) .234* (.136)
Livestock .070*** (.019) .110*** (.032) .058** (.024) .114*** (.031)
Commune characteristics
Land quality .006** (.002) .168*** (.015) .002 (.024) .172** (.013)
Access to markets .010 (.009) -.418*** (.031) .006 (.009) -.427*** (.028)
Share of arable land -.007 (.006) -.239*** (.020) -.010 (.008) -.246*** (.017)
Dummy-Western Plain .316** (.120) .461*** (.143) .303** (.117) .487*** (.140)
County fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Pseudo R-Squared 0.348 0.517 0.304 0.526
Observations* 179 179 228 228
Table 8-9: Estimation results (1996)- Logit Regression: Associations (1) vs. Leasing-out (0)
(marginal effects)
()(2) (3) (4)
Household characteristics
Age .032 (.064) .011 (.062) .005 (.037) .005 (.043)
Squared age -.0004 (.000) -.0003 (.000) -.0002 (.000) -.0002 (.000)
Years of education .026 (.021) .012 (.015) .025* (.014) .024** (.014)
Ratio of land to adults .095** (.054) .075 (.054) .017 (.031) .017 (.031)
HH productivity .037 (.095) .005 (.097) - -
Agric. main occupation .585* (.282) .785** (.198) .710*** (.106) .713*** (.107)
Farming conditions
Land fragmentation .222 (.197) .244 (.176) .163 (.156) .164 (.155)
Ownership title .254** (.153) .293* .163) -.064 (.085) -.067 (.094)
Commune characteristics
Dummy-Western Plain .099 (.165) .238 (.237) .029 (.134) .050 (.179)
Commune fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Pseudo R-Squared 0.301 0.323 0.266 0.267
Observations(a) 45 45 77 77
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. The table reports the coefficients and the standard errors with
various independent variables, namely the age (and age squared) of the household head, the number of
completed education years for the household head, the ratio of owned land to the number of adults in the
family, household productivity, dummy variable for whether agriculture is the main occupation, the log of
land fragmentation normalized by owned land, a dummy for whether the household has ownership title,
the capital index, and a dummy for the Western Plain region. Model (2) and (4) control for commune fixed
effects by adding commune dummies.
Significance levels: (*) p<.10; (**) p<.05; (***) p<.01.
(a) In Model 1 and Model 2, 14 cases dropped out of the analysis because of missing values on the household
productivity variable. In Model 3, 14 cases (out of a total of 91 observations) dropped out because of missing values
in the land fragmentation variable.
Nevertheless, the results are similar along all the covariates when the model is restricted to 45 households.
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Table 8-10: Testing the difference between the two years (1996 and 2006) along the
independent variables in the two choice models
Individual vs. Associations vs.
Alternative Leasing
Age -.040*** (.011) .079 (.078)
Squared age .0003** (.000) -.001* (.00 1)
Years of education -.023** (.009) .077 (.047)
Ratio of land to adults -.040 (.032) .307** (.155)
HH productivity -.070 (.045) .182 (.227)
Agric. main occupation .012 (.104) .751*** (.106)
Land fragmentation .187*** (.056) .230 (.224)
Ownership title -. 172** (.052) .462** (.180)
Use of HH labor .0001 (.000) .002** (.00 1)
Took credit -. 162** (.083)
Capital index -.017 (.015) -. 344*** (.057)
Purchased seeds .092 (.070)
Livestock .057*** (.016)
Land quality .005** (.002)
Access to markets .007 (.007)
Share of arable land -.006 (.005)
Dummy-Western Plain .256** (.094) .329** (.164)
Year (1=2006, 0=1996) -. 853** (.164) .818 (.892)
Year*Age .056*** (.015) -.013 (.082)
Year*Squared age -.0004** (.000) .001 (.001)
Year*Years of education .015 (.012) -.064 (.050)
Year*Ratio of land to adults -.015 (.041) -.265* (.151)
Year*HH productivity .113* (.054) .020 (.241)
Year*Agric. main occupation -. 164 (.110) -.872*** (.097)
Year*Land fragmentation -. 127** (.063) .044 (.262)
Year*Ownership title .226* (.123) -.295 (.188)
Year*Use of HH labor .0002 (.000) -.001 (.001)
Year*Took credit .174*** (.041)
Year*Capital index .094*** (.016) .398*** (.054)
Year*Purchased seeds .108 (.101) -
Year*Livestock -.069*** (.020) -
Year*Land quality -. 007*** (.002) -
Year*Access to markets .003 (.007) -
Year*Share of arable land .003 (.006) -
Year*Dummy-Western Plain .131 (.152) -.522* (.185)
Commune fixed effects No No
Pseudo R-Squared 0.408 0.289
Observations(a) 636 153
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. The table reports the coefficients and the standard errors with
various independent variables and their interaction with the year dummy (1 for 2006 and 0 for 1996).
Significance levels: (*) p<.10; (**) p<.05; (***) p<.01.
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8.3.1 Why do households seek alternative farming strategies instead of farming the land
individually?
The decision to farm the land individually was often described as a structural problem, depending
on the degree of access to resources and on farming ability (Rizov et al. 2001; Sabates-Wheeler 2005). My
findings confirm these earlier explanations and add additional nuances to understand why some
households seek alternative institutional arrangements rather than farm all land individually. For a more
thorough interpretation of the results in Tables 8-6 through 8-9, I used statistical simulation for different
variables and I generated graphs and confidence intervals around the estimates. 178 I computed predicted
outcomes (probabilities) as a single independent variable changes over a specified range, holding other
variables constant. New variables containing these values were generated and then plotted. Computing
predicted outcomes is important because it allows us to be more precise in interpreting the results, as the
figures below illustrate.
The results differ significantly along several variables between the two years, 1996 and 2006.
These differences are interesting in that they point to changes in economic and social circumstances across
the decade of transition. Qualitative fieldwork is able to better capture these changes over time. Another
important note to make is that since two separate regressions were run for 1996 and 2006, the results for
the two years are not comparable in terms of magnitude. What matters in this comparison is the sign of
the coefficients.
Hypothesis (1): Land Fragmentation
As discussed in the previous chapters, land fragmentation poses major challenges for the
development of agricultural sector in Romania. The multitude of tiny and spread out land plots prevent
mechanization and increase transaction costs for the small farmers. Nevertheless, there could also be a
positive side of land fragmentation. Having many spread out tiny plots may offer a risk spreading strategy
for the farmers by diversifying their crops across plots with different physical characteristics (i.e. land
quality).
The results for the relationship between land fragmentation (normalized by the land in ownership)
and the decision to engage in alternative farming arrangements show interesting findings. First, in both
years households with a high degree of land fragmentation were more likely to farm the land individually.
This suggests that, due to the subsistence character of agricultural production, land fragmentation offers a
risk spreading strategy for the small farmers wishing the farm the land themselves. In 1996 the statistical
significance of land fragmentation persisted even after I controlled for commune fixed effects. By 2006,
178 To obtain predicted values I used the Long's set of Stata commands described in Long and Freese (2003).
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however, the effect of land fragmentation diminished, as also shown by the result in Table 8-10 (i.e. the
interaction between the 2006 year dummy with land fragmentation is negative and significant at 5 %
level).
Another interesting finding, less explored in earlier literature, is that there are regional differences
between the effects of land fragmentation on the decision to reallocate land away from individual farming.
Figure 8-5 shows that in the South the probability of seeking alternative farming arrangements at higher
levels of land fragmentation is higher than in the West, where this factor does not seem to play a critical
role. Since capital endowment is higher in the Western Plain, land fragmentation can be overcome much
easier, and can even be used as a positive attribute for risk spreading. In the Central Romanian Plain,
however, aside from physical resource constraints, age levels are also higher, as we saw in earlier chapters
(Chapters 6 and 7). Hence, this suggests that risk spreading by farming individually tiny plots is more
costly for farmers in the South as compared to farmers in the West.
Figure 8-5: The probability of farming individually and land fragmentation by agro-region
in 2006
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Hypothesis (2): Physical capital endowment
As was also emphasized by earlier research (Rizov et al. 2001; Sabates-Wheeler 2005; Lerman et
al. 2004), access to physical capital is another critical factor that affects the decisions households take in
terms of land reallocation, influencing their ability to farm efficiently. Therefore, it is not surprising to find
that households with a higher capital endowment are more likely to farm their land individually. The
results in
Table 8-6 show that in 2006 a one-unit increase in the capital index raised the probability of
farming individually by 0.17 (slightly higher when we do not control for productivity differences).
In 1996 the relationship between the capital index and the choice between farming individually
was statistically significant (at 5% level) but negative (a one unit increase in the capital index raised the
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probability of seeking alternative farming arrangements by 0.56 when controlling or commune fixed
effects). One explanation for this outcome resides in the very different economic and social conditions a
decade earlier. In 1996 only a few households owned anything else aside from carriage and basic tools for
farming.' 79 Because of lower capital endowment, earlier in the transition landowners were more likely to
draw on the benefits from joining associations. However, a decade later, when the ability to purchase
agricultural equipments (i.e. tractors) improved, as well as the market conditions, landowners viewed
farming individually as entailing lower risks.
Nevertheless, the effect of physical capital endowment (as measured by the capital index) on the
choice between farming individually and choosing alternative arrangements was much stronger in 2006
than it was in 1996 (significant at I % level), as Table 8-10 illustrates.
Hypothesis (3): Land ratio to adult household members
Land-adult ratio, measured as the amount of owned land and rented-in land (in hectares), divided
by the number of adult individuals living in the household (over 15 years old), represents a proxy for farm
size as well as a measure of wealth. I hypothesize that a higher share of land relative to the household
adult members means that landowners can benefit from economies of scale as well as from increased
opportunities for financing, land being commonly used as collateral. As I discussed earlier, in Romania it
is considered that landowners can benefit from economies of scale for farms larger than 5 hectares, while
currently, most farms average less than 2 hectares (Gavrilescu and Gavrilescu 2007).
What I find, however, is that households with a higher endowment of land per adult member are
more likely to engage in alternative farming arrangements. As the land-person ratio increases by one unit,
the probability of engaging in alternative farming arrangements increases by 0.05, significant at 5% level
only in 2006. Nevertheless, the difference between the two years is not statistically significant, as Table 8-
10 shows.
This result confirms again the subsistence character of private individual farming in Romania, as
well as the small scale of farming (potentially constrained by lack of access to finance and capital). Table
8-11 also shows that there is a large difference between the 25th (0.2 hectares per adult) and the 95th (5
hectares per adult) percentile of land-adult ratio (low and high levels). In 2006 the probability of choosing
alternative farming arrangements was 0.355 for a high land-adult ratio, while only 0.052 for a low land-
adult ratio. A similar trend can be observed for 1996, although the probability of choosing alternative
institutional arrangements is higher for low levels of land-adult ratio.
179 In the second half of the 1990s the government subsidized the prices for tractors, increasing the access of small
and medium farmers to agricultural equipments.
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Table 8-11: The probability of choice and confidence interval for high and low values of
land-adult ratio
Probability of Probability of farming in
farming individually alternative arrangements
2006
Low land-adult ratio 0.948 0.052
CI: [0.909 0.988] CI: [0.013 0.091]
High land-adult ratio 0.645 0.355
CI: [0.433 0.857] CI: [0.143 0.567]
1996
Low land-adult ratio 0.885 0.115
CI: [0.782 0.988] CI: [0.012 0.218]
High land-adult ratio 0.689 0.311
CI: [0.439 0.939] CI: [0.061 0.561]
Note: Low - 25th percentile; High - 95th percentile; CI - confidence interval for the probability estimate.
Therefore, only households that have surplus of land beyond what they need to secure a
minimum standard of living for the family will contract out land to associations or would lease it to other
private farmers. Since land is the main source of income and food for the majority of the rural population,
land reallocation occurs only for households with a higher endowment of land relative to household size.
These findings also suggest that because of high transaction costs associated with the alternative
farming strategies (leasing in particular), it is easier for households with more to participate in land
transactions.
Figure 8-6 shows that in 2006 the probability of engaging in alternative institutional arrangements
for farming increased from 0.05 at a low level of land-adult ratio, to 0.36 when the ratio is higher. A
similar trend can be observed for 1996.
Figure 8-6: The probability of choosing to farm individually and in alternative
arrangements, at different levels of land-adult ratio in 2006
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Figure 8-7 shows that while the probability of farming individually decreases as the share of land
per adult household member increases, the magnitude of decline is different not only between the two
regions, but also over time. The most drastic change in the probability of farming individually, over the
decade under study, can be seen in the Southern Plain, where the probability has declined from roughly
0.75 to 0.25 along different levels of land-adult ratio.
Figure 8-7: The probability of choosing to farm individually and land-adult ration by agro-
region
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This trend can be explained by the worsening of the economic situation in the rural areas in the
South, which makes individual farming more costly. In addition, we saw in Chapter 6 that population is
much older in the South than in the West (an average of 64 years as compared to 57 years in the West).
This suggests that once alternative farming arrangements became available, landowners in the South are
more likely to join association or to lease-out land, given that alternative sources of income are lacking. In
Chapter 9 I emphasize other factors that could have played a role in these outcomes, such as historical
legacies and collective memory of collectivization.
Another interesting angle to explore is whether this trend varies in any way along different age
groups. Figure 8-8 shows that between 40-80 years old households are more likely to seek alternative
farming arrangements as the land-adult ratio is higher in both 1996 and 2006. However, we observe that
in 2006 the probability is actually higher for households where the household head is younger, while the
reverse is true for year 1996.
This suggests that in 2006 alternative job opportunities outside farming might prevent these
households from engaging in full-time farming, while older households, more than 70 and 80 years old
might find security from holding on to their land. Interviews with farmers and participatory observation
also revealed that because of the low returns from farming, and the sunk cost character of agricultural
investments (which most households cannot afford), younger households seek part-time employment in
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non-farming activities that could supplement their income from agriculture. Since they cannot fully
commit to being present at critical times during harvest and land preparation, they prefer to reallocate
land in alternative farming arrangements, if such an opportunity arises, rather than leaving the land
fallow. However, in 1996 there were fewer alternative job opportunities available, as land was the main
source of income for most households, which explains the lower probability of seeking alternative
arrangements.
Figure 8-8: The probability of choosing alternative farming arrangements by different
levels of age and land-adult ratio levels
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Hypothesis 4: Human capital (Age and Education)
Human capital, as measured by age and education of the household head, is widely researched as
a reflection of managerial skills and capabilities of the rural households. As mentioned earlier, I
hypothesize that age has a non-linear effect on the choice of institutional arrangements for farming. While
I find that in 2006 there was a non-linear relation between age and the choice for land reallocation,
interestingly the effect of age was very different in 1996.
In 2006 I find that for older households, the probability of farming the land individually is
significantly higher than for choosing alternative farming arrangements (an increase in age by one unit
increases the probability of farming individually by approximately 0.Ot (significant at 10% level only if I
do not control for fixed effects). Nevertheless, as Figure 8-9 shows, age has a slightly non-linear effect on
this decision level. The graph shows that as the age of the household head increases from 40 to 80
years180, the probability that the landowners farm individually starts decreasing for those that are older
180 Holding the other variables to their mean values.
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than 60 to 70 years. This finding is interesting in that it reinforces how important agriculture is as a source
of income for the majority of the rural population. In addition it points to the lack of alternative sources of
revenue in the countryside, resulting in longer years of active farming.
Figure 8-9: The probability of farming individually by age levels
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A decade ago, only five years after land reform was implemented, the relationship between age
and the probability of farming the land individually was entirely different, as Figure 8-9(b) shows. Older
households were more likely to seek alternative farming arrangements (a one unit increase in age
increased the probability of choosing to reallocate land by 0.05 at 5% significance level). One explanation
could be that, alternative institutional arrangements were viewed as self-help options for farmers with
lower abilities for individual farming (entrepreneurship and willingness to take risks).
Hence, one would expect the same trend at higher age levels (indicated by the square value of
age). However, we see that at higher age levels, after 70 years, landowners chose to farm individually. The
non-liner effect of age (statistically significant but with a low magnitude) is worthy to note because it
suggests that earlier in the transition we might have observed the phenomena of "collective memory" as
suggested by the path-dependent argument (Hann 1993). Accordingly, older landowners who experienced
the coercive character of collectivization, and lived through the inter-War period when property rights
were granted (even if for short periods of time in some regions), and the struggles for land were the
defining features of rural life, wished to maintain full control of their property rights following restitution.
As we saw in Chapter 7, farming land in associations and leasing-out results in releasing some rights to
other private entrepreneurs. Hence, at a time when land rights were not clearly defined and the memory
of communist injustices and control from large landowners (haciendas prior to collectivization mainly in
the South) is still vivid, older landowners prefer to subject themselves to "self-exploitation" (Chayanov
1966) and shield themselves from the perceived risk of loosing their land, despite potentially lower returns
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and much higher costs and effort from farming individually. Nevertheless, this hypothesis (interpretation)
will be examined in more depth in Chapter 9 through findings from qualitative fieldwork.
However, as the results in Table 8-10 show, the effect of age on the choice between individual
farming and alternative arrangements was much stronger in 2006 than it was in 1996 (significant at 1 %
level). But, the non-linear effect of age (age-squared) was stronger in 1996 (significant at 5 % level).
There are few explanations for these different outcomes across the decade under study. First, by
2006 the share of part-time farmers and unemployed moving in the countryside for supplementing
incomes increased, as showed in Chapter 5. This pattern of reverse migration could explain why more
senior households were farming the land themselves. Moreover, by 2006 some associations were declared
bankrupt (Verdery 2004b) while the land markets did not develop fast enough. Therefore, more
households ended up farming the land individually. In addition, in 1996 older farmers (those that were in
their 70s) went through a different generational experience than those who were 10 or 15 years younger.
The results for 1996 suggest a relatively stronger attachment to land, showing a higher probability of
farming individually regardless of resource availability.
The coefficients for years of completed education show that households where the household
head is more educated, are more likely to seek alternative farming arrangements in both years (a one unit
increase in years of education increases the probability of seeking alternative arrangements by
approximately 0.01, with a larger effect in 1996). This result suggests that more education increases the
opportunity for outside job opportunities, creating a disincentive for farming all the land individually.
Hypothesis 5: Household productivity
In 2006 households that had a higher productivity level, as measured by the long-term proxy for
ability and knowledge, were more likely to farm the land individually. However, the relationship is not
statistically significant. A one-unit increase in productivity level raises the probability level of farming
individually by 0.01 (if I control for commune fixed effects). Nevertheless, in 1996, productive households
were more likely to farm their land in alternative farming arrangements, as Table 8-8 shows. These
different results suggest that because of higher constraints on access to credit, higher inputs prices, and
generally unfavorable conditions for small farmers (as discussed in Chapter 5), landowners were more
likely to capitalize on their higher productivity by reallocating land in different institutional arrangements.
Table 8-12 shows that in 2006 for low levels of productivity (the 5th percentile) the probability of
farming individually is 0.83, while for high levels of productivity (the 95th percentile) the probability
increases to 0.93. This is interesting because it suggests that households who are farming by themselves
have more experience and knowledge, regardless of access to resources or any other characteristics. As
emphasized above, a different trend can be observed for year 1996. The probability of households with
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low productivity farming individually is lower, 0.93, while the probability of households with high
productivity seeking alternative farming arrangements is higher, 0.35.
Nevertheless, the results in Table 8-10, testing how the coefficients changes across the two
decades shows that the effect of capital on this decision level was stronger in 2006 than in 1996 (significant
at 100% level).
Table 8-12: The probability of choice and confidence intervals for high and low values of
household productivity
Probability of Probability of farming
farming individually in alternative
arrangements
2006
Low productivity 0.831 0.169
CI: [0.738 0.924] CI: [0.076 0.262]
High productivity 0.933 0.068
CI: [0.876 0.989] CI: [0.011 0.124]
1996__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Low productivity 0.929 0.071
CI: [0.870 0.988] CI: [0.012 0.130]
High productivity 0.667 0.333
CI: [0.549 0.786] CI: [0.215 0.451]
Note: Low - 25th percentile; High - 95th percentile; CI - confidence interval for the probability estimate.
This difference in the relationship between household productivity and the choice of alternative
farming arrangements can also be explained through a regional perspective. In 1996 average productivity
scores were slightly higher for households in the South than in the West. However, as I discuss in Chapter
9, the push for creating associations on the structures of the former collective farms was much stronger
given the communist legacies and the socio-economic conditions in the area. Hence, one could argue that
because of these circumstances, individual farming was a less appealing option even for the more
productive households, who had to compete for inputs with the larger associations. Nevertheless, given the
that in the West the familiarity with markets was higher, as the economic conditions for individual
farming improved (i.e. improved access to inputs, formalizing land markets), more productive landowners
were more likely to farm the land individually.
Hypothesis 6: Agricultural occupation
Another factor hypothesized to affect the decision of choosing alternative farming arrangements is
whether agriculture is the primary occupation for the household head. As mentioned earlier, my
hypothesis is that households having agriculture as the primary occupation are more likely to farm
individually, holding other factors constant (such as access to resources). In
243
Table 8-6 we see that in 2006 landowners with agriculture as the main occupation were more
likely to actually seek alternative farming arrangements (significant at 10% level). One explanation for this
result could be that as the transition process advanced, landowners realized that farming by themselves is
not "optimal" anymore due to higher costs and difficulty in accessing markets. Therefore, reallocating
part of the land in other arrangements and keeping some for individual farming seemed a better
alternative, allowing them to spread risks across different arrangements. In 1996, however, households
with agriculture as a primary occupation had a higher probability of farming individually (although not
statistically significant). By then, however, the worst has not yet materialized for small farmers, as subsidies
were fully removed only in 1997 and the price scissors worsened even more afterwards.
In addition, as Table 8-13 shows, in 2006, the probability of farming individually for households
with agriculture as the primary occupation has increased in the West (from 0.895 in 1996 to 0.972 in
2006), while in the South it has decreased (from 0.751 in 1996 to 0.614 in the 2006). In light of the overall
economic development differences between the two regions, this results shows that over time economic
conditions became more favorable for individual farming in the West, offering positive incentives to active
farmers to pursue land exploitation by themselves.
Table 8-13: The probability of farming individually by agro-region and primary
occupation
Western Plain Central Romanian
Plain
1996
Primary occupation-Agriculture 0.895 0.751
Primary occupation-Not agriculture 0.849 0.676
2006
Primary occupation-Agriculture 0.972 0.614
Primary occupation-Not agriculture 0.994 0.805
Table 8-13 also illustrates that in the Central Romanian Plain the probability of farming
individually has increased for households that do not have agriculture as a primary occupation between
1996 and 2006. Since membership in associations has been mostly an early 1990s phenomenon and
associations have reached a scale at which they are not willing to take in more farmers (issue which will be
discussed more in the next chapter), this trend points to the underdevelopment of land markets.
Landowners prefer to farm individually rather than lease-out land, even if their primary occupation is not
farming. A similar outcome can be observed for the Western Plain, but at a lower magnitude.
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Other factors found to explain the choice of alternative institutional arrangements
Other variables for which I tested the relationship with the choice of seeking alternative farming
arrangements are: land titles, hiring outside labor, land quality in the commune, and the share of arable
land in the commune.
Land titles are important because they offer security of tenure to the landowners, allowing them
to take risks in investment and offering them the option of using land as collateral for bank loans. Land
titling proceeded rather rapidly in Romania, but nevertheless, by 1996 only half of the title deeds were
distributed. A decade later more than 90% of the land was fully registered, although cadastral
measurements were still lagging behind and litigations and disputes of land boundaries and locations are
widespread (Luca 2007).
The results rightfully show that land titles bared more importance earlier in the transition in the
choices farmers made in respect to farming arrangements. In 1996, for farmers with full ownership rights
over their land, the probability ofjoining associations or lease-out land increased by 0.25 (significant at
5% level). This result shows that land titles gave owners the security (or certainty) of ownership, reducing
the likelihood of losing the asset in case contractual problems arise. By 2006, when almost all landowners
had titles for their land, the statistical significance of titles over the choices between farming individually
and alternative property rights arrangements diminished, as expected.
The availability of labor outside the household is a major concern for small farmers during
transition, when youth migration for jobs abroad has increased (a phenomenon entirely foreign to rural
areas fifteen years ago), and occupations in agriculture became less appealing due to low and
unpredictable returns. Therefore, the ability to rely on hired labor plays an important role in enlarging
farming operations.
In 2006, households that hired labor were more likely to farm the land themselves (statistically
significant at 5% level), denoting an increased entrepreneurial behavior, as one would expect, even after
controlling for commune fixed effects. Nevertheless, earlier, in 1996, the relationship between hired labor
and the choice of farming arrangements was very low. One explanation for this difference could be that
earlier on the use of paid labor was more limited. Interviews with farmers suggested that, oftentimes,
especially earlier in the transition, working for pay for someone else in the village was fairly stigmatizing.
Collectivization has imposed an artificial sense of equality in the rural communities by stripping the
middle and upper-class by land and physical assets. However, following land restitution, all of a sudden a
more clear division between wealthy and poor, transpired, and with it, a sense of pride and
marginalization. Nevertheless, a decade later, in the face of economic pressures, these social hierarchies
become less constrictive.
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Aside from household specific variables I find that commune level variables also play a role in the
pattern of land reallocation. For instance, the quality of land at commune level is an indication of the
environmental conditions for agriculture in the region. The importance of land quality in the choice for
farming arrangements varied over the decade under study. In 1996, a higher share of good quality land in
the commune was associated with landowners choosing to farm the land themselves. Nevertheless, by
2006, this relationship did not hold anymore, and good land quality in the commune did not represent a
premium for farming individually. Rather, good quality land was associated with households choosing to
farm the land in alternative arrangements. This result could simply suggest that because of increased costs
of individual farming, associations were better able to benefit from good land quality, drawing on scale
economies.
Moreover, the higher the share of arable land, the higher the probability of households engaging
in alternative farming arrangements. More arable land in the commune, given that main crops are grains
and corn, suggests that economies of scale through land consolidation are critical.
Summary of findings
The analysis of the first decision level for landowners, that of farming all land individually or
choosing alternative institutional arrangements, revealed some interesting findings, pointing to regional
differences as well as variations in the choices made across time. Moreover, the findings in this section
confirm earlier studies showing that the choice or farming individually (as opposed to seeking alternative
arrangements) is structural in nature (i.e. it depends on access to physical capital and on human capital),
and therefore household farms could strive if better access to inputs and markets is facilitated.
I found that households with more fragmented land plots (relative to the land in ownership) are
more likely to farm the land individually, emphasizing the risk-spreading character of land fragmentation,
and the subsistence character of agricultural production. In the next section I examine whether higher
fragmentation increases the likelihood ofjoining associations or leasing out. I also found regional
differences in land reallocation along different levels of land fragmentation. In the South, where
endowment with physical capital is lower and the economy is less developed, households with more
fragmented holdings were more likely to seek alternative farming arrangements. In the West, the
transaction costs associated with fragmentation, were partially overcome by improved access to capital.
These findings are important from a policy point of view given that the current layout of land plots is
considered the most challenging problem for agricultural development.
Moreover, several household characteristics matter for deciding whether to farm individually or
to reallocate land in alternative farming arrangements. In 2006, households for which the household head
is older are more likely to farm individually denoting more experience with farming. Nevertheless, above
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60-70 years old, households are more likely to seek alternative land reallocation options. In addition,
households where the household head has more years of education are more likely to seek alternative
farming arrangements.
Households with a larger endowment of land (mostly above 3 hectares per person) have a higher
probability ofjoining associations or leasing-out land rather than farming all land individually. This trend
holds across different age groups, but younger households are more likely to exhibit this behavior,
potentially because of the availability of alternative sources of income. In addition, more productive
households are more likely to farm the land themselves, holding other factors constant.
Nevertheless, a decade earlier some of these findings differ, pointing not only to different
economic and institutional conditions in terms of market access, availability of non-farming income
sources, and land market development, as discussed in Chapter 5, but also to a different generation of
landowners with different experiences of ownership and collectivization, aspects which will be discussed in
more depth in the following chapter.
8.3.2 What are the factors that affect a landowner' choice betweenjoining an association
and privately leasing their land?
In the previous section I examined the factors that affect the choice between individual farming
and alternative property rights arrangements. I found that households that choose not to farm all land
individually are either resource constrained (limited access to capital), they own land plots that are too
fragmented, or they own too much land per adult household member given the previously mentioned
constraints. Moreover, these are also households that are older and hence have lower farming abilities,
despite higher farming experience.
While some of these aspects were previously examined (for the Romanian case Rizov 2001,
Sabates-Wheeler 2005), there is no research, to my knowledge, of the factors based on which landowners
choose between associations and leasing, as land reallocation alternatives. This question becomes even
more relevant given that the literature abounds with critiques of associations as being plagued by
collective action and free riding problems.
The main hypothesis, as seen in Table 8-1, is that households with a higher degree of land
fragmentation are likely to join associations because of higher transaction costs entailed by participating in
land transactions. In addition, landowners with more physical capital are more likely to join associations
as they can capitalize on easier access to inputs and distribution markets. However, household with a
higher ratio of land per person, are more likely to lease out rather than join associations. Here, the
assumption is that because of limited access to labor and capital, landowners are likely to release some of
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the resources to others to farm. Moreover, because of transaction costs, it is easier to lease out a larger plot
of land.
Another hypotheses relates to the age of the household head. Older households are more likely to
lease-out part of the land in ownership, as well as the landowners that have alternative income
opportunities. Lastly, I hypothesize that more productive households are more likely to join associations.
Because of limited data in the two regions in 1996, this part of the analysis will be mostly focused
on the 2006 survey. Nevertheless, I are still hoping to draw some light comparisons with the data a decade
earlier, since, as I will discuss in the next chapter, associations have gone through some institutional
adjustments in the past years.
Table 8-6 and Table 8-8 show that the factors affecting households' decisions over reallocating
land to associations or leasing have slightly changed overtime, suggesting both a change in the overall
institutional environment for agriculture and rural development, as well as demographic patterns and
changes internal to the organization.
Hypothesis (1): Land fragmentation
One of the most interesting findings for why associations persisted throughout the transition
period, which has not been previously discussed in the literature, refers to the degree of land
fragmentation. I found that households with more fragmented land plots are more likely to join
associations rather than to lease out land. A one-unit increase in land fragmentation increases the
probability ofjoining associations by 0.50, significant at 5% level. Figure 8-10 shows that at low levels of
fragmentation, households are more likely to lease-out land. However, for households with more
fragmented plots, especially more than 3-4 different plots, the probability ofjoining associations is much
higher. Hence, one can argue that decisions on land reallocation reflect a response to multiple dimensions
of fragmentation.
This result brings to light an interesting difference between associations and leasing arrangements.
Due to high transaction costs for leasing (i.e. land registration, notary fees), land consolidation through the
land market seems difficult at this stage. Land registration is not completed in most areas of the country,
and, as I will discuss in the next chapter, other factors related to social stratification and embeddedness of
these institutional arrangements in the local economy, make consolidation through leasing a more tedious
process. As I discussed in the previous chapter, most associations were created on the structures of the
formal collective farms, which facilitated farming on larger plots without additional costs related to
contractual arrangements and land registration. In addition, as Meurs (2001) argues, there is an additional
social costs emerging from the unfamiliarity with new arrangements and market circumstances, which
farmers are factoring in their decision-making process. It is likely that as land markets develop and
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landowners become more accustomed with these transactions, consolidation through leasing could
become a closer alternative for landowners. Nevertheless, as Chapter 9 emphasize, other factors, such as
social institutions, also play a role in the decisions that farmers make for land consolidation.
Figure 8-10: The probability ofjoining associations and leasing at different levels of land
fragmentation in 2006
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Therefore, policies that address the problem of extreme land fragmentation should look at
farming associations as the primary channel for consolidating disperse land plots. However, it is also
critical for land registration to be addressed, in order to reduce transaction costs associated with land
market participation.
Hypothesis (3): Land-adult ratio
The ratio of land to adult members in the households shows that in 2006, households with more
land were more likely to join associations rather than leas-out (significant at 5% level), against my initial
hypothesis. A similar result was found for 1996 as well. However, the effect of land-adult ratio on the
choice between associations and leasing is stronger in 1996 (at 10% significance level).
This finding suggests that currently, land markets are not likely to be an option not even for
households with more land. The factor that could be invoked to explain this outcome is transaction costs.
Land registration, especially in the Central Romanian Plains, are still not finalized, delays which could
contribute to constraining land market participation.
Hypothesis (4): Human capital (Age and Education)
One interesting distinction between households that joined associations and those that leased-out
land comes from the demographic profile of the landowners. If we take age as an indicator of ability and
experience with farming, we observe that its effect on the choice for land reallocation is two-dimensional.
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First, senior landowners are more likely to join associations, while much older landowners are more likely
lease-out land. To understand these results, it is important to mention that non-farming occupations are
extremely limited in the Romanian countryside. Hence, given the low level of non-farming incomes (i.e.
pensions and salaries) landowners with more farming experience prefer to join associations. Under this
framework landowners have more control over their land and over the harvest, and they can benefit from
access to physical capital for farming the land. Hence, the coefficient for age shows that those who have
the capabilities to work the land (but lack sufficient resources to work all the land themselves) will join
associations where they can contribute with both land and labor, rather than lease-out land and renounce
additional rights over the land.
As Figure 8-11 clearly shows, the probability ofjoining associations is higher for households where
the household head is more than 50 years old. But, beyond 70 years old, landowners are more likely to
lease out land (as indicated by the non-linear effect through the squared value of age). Hence, leasing is
the land resort for households that lack the ability to farm. Joining associations, as I will examine in more
depth in the next chapter, does require some involvement and higher responsibility, either with labor, or
just monitoring and marketing. Therefore, associations are better suited for households that can be more
actively involved in farming.
Figure 8-11: The probability ofjoining associations along different age levels in 2006
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Education also plays a role in the decision farmers make between joining associations and leasing
out land. Households where the household head is more educated are more likely to join associations (a
one unit increase in education increases the probability ofjoining associations by 0.03 in both years). The
difference, between the two years, however, is not statistically significant, as the results in Table 8-10
show. These results are interesting in that they suggest that even if those that have higher opportunities for
non farming jobs (as suggested by higher education), prefer to join associations rather than participate in
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land markets. One can argue that because associations are more embedded in the social communities,
they offer lower risks (i.e. more predictability) as compared to leasing. I will further examine these aspects
in Chapter 9, based on interviews and participatory observations in the villages.
Hypothesis (5): Household productivity
On a different level, I find that more productive households are more likely to join associations
both in 1996 as well as in 2006. In 2006 a one-unit increase in productivity, results in a probability of 0.01
for joining associations (although not statistically significant). This suggests that households that are more
productive but lack the necessary resources for farming the land individually are more likely to join
associations. As association members, landowners can still be active farmers and they can maintain a
higher control over land.
Hypothesis (6): Alternative income opportunities
Moreover, in 1996, households with agriculture as primary occupation were more likely to join
associations (significant at 5% level). This can be viewed as a self-help strategy. Landowners who want to
remain active farmers, can get easier access to inputs, physical capital for the planting and harvesting
season, as well as improved access to distribution networks.
In 2006, however, landowners with agriculture as primary occupation were more likely to lease
out (statistically significant at 1% level). Since associations require a certain degree of active participation
in farming activities (either with labor or through marketing activities, as discussed in Chapter 7), this
result suggests that by 2006 landowners were less able to perform these tasks, making increasing the
likelihood of leasing-out.
Other factors related to commune characteristics
On a different note, variables related to the physical characteristics of the region also play a role
in the persistence of associations. In 2006, in communes with better land quality the probability of
households joining associations is 0.50, significant at 5 % level. As I discuss in more detail in the next
chapter, associations were created mostly in areas with better land quality, hence in the southern areas.
The leaders on the old collective farms were able to make a stronger case for setting up associations as
these farms received more support from the communist state (in the form of equipment and preferential
access to markets and distribution networks) and therefore were more productive. Hence, following de-
collectivization, because of better performance (and better position in the market due to their networks in
the upstream and downstream industries), these organizational structures persisted and landowners were
more willing to join as members in the newly formed associations.
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Moreover, we see that in communes with worse access to markets, landowners are more likely to
lease out land. Oftentimes joining association means that the landowners receive all the production back,
without the cost for mechanical services (and sometimes for labor), case in which the responsibility for
marketing the products rests with the landowners. But, when access to markets is costly (due to distance
and difficult access to information), it might be better for households to lease-out the land to other private
farmers, based on contracts that require the tenants to market the harvest themselves, and to pay the
landowner a pre-determined rent.
8.4 Sumnary of findings
To summarize, this analysis showed that the issue of choosing how and whether to reallocate land
is mostly structural (it depends on resource availability and human capital). However, when landowners
who cannot farm all land individually decide between joining associations or leasing out land, there are
several subtleties that need to be considered. First, formal associations appear to be a good option for
farmers that are resource constrained but are still willing and able to be engaged in farming. Associations
provide security of tenure, and capital access (through mechanization), allowing landowners to draw on
the benefits of scale economies.
More importantly, formal associations are better able to address the problem of extreme land
fragmentation as compared to leasing arrangements. Because land registration and cadastral maps are not
completed, transactions costs related to leasing are much higher than those associated with membership in
associations. This finding has important policy implications at a time when the Romanian agriculture is
confronted with high inefficiencies from extreme land fragmentation. The myriad of small spread out
plots prevent farm upgrading through investment and mechanization, within an overall economic and
financial system that is not well adapted to small farming. Hence, given the transaction costs currently
necessitated by land transaction, farming associations should be emphasized as a channel for achieving the
much needed land consolidation. But, are transaction costs the only barrier to land consolidation through
land markets? Would the transition away from association be achieved once land transactions become less
costly? In the next chapter I examine other factors related to social institutions (such as historical legacies
and social costs of familiarizing with new institutions) that might factor in the choice between associations
and leasing transactions.
In addition, I also found that age play a role in landowners' decision to join associations.
Households that have a higher ability level and experience, as reflected by age, are more likely to join
associations. But, beyond 70 years in age, landowners are more likely to lease out. Given that associations
require a certain level of engagement, either though labor or monitoring of the production process (in
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general a higher commitment on the part of the landowner), those who are part time farmers are
benefiting more from leasing out.'8 '
Hence, leasing becomes a viable alternative for elderly and for younger landowners who can
engage in non-farming activities. Hence, from a policy point of view, one channel for stimulating land
market participation lies in the macroeconomic realm. By diversifying the rural economy and by creating
job opportunities outside the rural areas, important rural-urban linkages could be created, which would
shift out of agriculture part of the active labor force and it would induce the development of land markets.
The case of Town Village Enterprises (TVEs) in China offers interesting examples to draw on for
diversifying the rural economy into a mix of non-farming and farming activities. Such model ensures that
further urban and international migration is kept under "reasonable" boundaries, without placing too
much burden on the urban job-market 82 and without losing the rural active labor force for long periods
of time through emigration.
All in all, associations appear to be a preferred alternative for landowners that intend to remain
actively engaged in farming, for those that are physically able to work the land and are more productive.
In addition, given the high fragmentation of land plots, landowners need an institutional framework (i.e.
formal associations) to draw on in order to consolidate and use mechanical implements. Leasing, however,
addresses the needs of the rural population who is younger and has alternative job opportunities, and of
those with lower productivity and more land than what they can physically work.
Nevertheless, since land provides the main source of income for most of the rural population, as
discussed in earlier chapters, and given the type ofjobs that are being created in the larger economy, it is
very unlikely that there will be a large flux of rural out-migration (aside from international migration) in
the near future. Hence, the role played by farming associations in the local communities remains critical.
In the next chapter I highlight other factors related to the embeddedness of these institutions in the rural
communities and in the historical legacies, adding to the explanations of why farming associations
persisted throughout the transition period.
m Verdery (2003) also finds that associations are not a very good option for part-time farmers, for those who are not
in the village at all times. She finds that association managers tend to expend less effort on their land and offer lower
returns at the end of harvest.
182 Post-socialist transformation and the more recent integration of these countries in the global market and the EU
larger institutional and economic framework, has created a strong shift in the economic structure of the transition
countries. Secondary statistics show that industry has made way to services, as a result of investment from
multinational corporations and outsourcing of services. Hence, most jobs that are being created are white-collar
rather than blue-collar, suggesting that migrants from the rural areas might find less job opportunities even in a
growing economy.
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Chapter 9 : Alternative explanations for the persistence of farming
associations
9.1 Introduction
This dissertation addresses two key questions on the post-socialist transformation of the
Romanian agricultural sector: 1) why did landowners persist in joining associations throughout the
transition process despite the availability of alternative farming arrangements, and 2) why do we see wide
regional differences in the pattern of land reallocation. The previous two chapters offered a detailed
analysis of different farming arrangements and the factors that affect landowners' choices during
transition. This chapter brings a qualitative, reflective approach to explain regional differences in the
persistence of associations.
In Chapter 7 I discussed in detail the variety of institutional arrangements currently available to
the Romanian landowners (i.e. private individual farming, associations, land market transactions). In
addition, using survey data and secondary statistics, I described the type of households that engaged in
each of these arrangements. This analysis allowed me to generate research hypotheses to be tested in
Chapters 8 and 9.
Having laid out the institutional background for land reallocation, in Chapter 8 I tested
empirically a series of hypotheses on the choice between farming arrangements, evaluating factors related
to capital endowment (i.e. human and physical capital) and farm characteristics between 1996 and 2006. I
showed that the choice for alternative institutional arrangements depends on the availability of physical
and human capital, farm size, productivity and the degree of land fragmentation. In addition, structural
factors (capital constraints, land fragmentation) also explain the persistence of formal associations,
pointing to key differences between this institution and leasing transactions. I found that because of
transaction costs related to land registration, associations are better suited to achieve the much-needed
consolidation of land plots, while consolidation through leasing is still too costly and institutionally
cumbersome.
But, focusing only on the capital constraints argument to describe land reallocation patterns
during transition is unlikely to unearth a complete set of explanations for the persistence of formal
associations. As Ostrom (2000 p. 173) argues, "while all forms of capital are essential for development,
none of them are sufficient in and of themselves."
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This chapter captures a more comprehensive story of land reallocation during transition, by
focusing on the role of past institutional legacies, experiences with collectivization, and the interaction of
different actors in affecting change. These factors contribute to explaining regional differences in the
formation and persistence of associations, as a more dynamic process. In addition, I examine the main
differences between the old collective farms and the formal associations as well as the risks and
opportunities embedded in different arrangements. This more in-depth evaluation of the outcomes of land
reform allows me to examine the social meaning and the social process at the local level explaining the
regional differences in land reallocation.
Earlier studies of farming arrangements during transition were limited to a more static approach,
of looking at household characteristics, capital endowment, and productivity differences in the post-
socialist period (Mathijs and Swinnen 2001 a; Rizov et al. 2001; Rizov 2003; Sabates-Wheeler 2005). In
addition, other scholars analyzed the role of social relations, the value of land and property, and the effect
of local politics on the organization of agricultural production during transition (Verdery 2003; Allina-
Pisano 2004a; Allina-Pisano 2007b). Nevertheless, there is hardly any research on why associations were
formed only in some regions, how earlier institutional arrangements and the process by which
collectivization was achieved in the first place influenced the choices landowners made and their
interaction with other actors, and the criteria by which landowners assess the risks and benefits of different
arrangements.
By focusing on these aspects, I offer a more dynamic perspective on the persistence of farming
associations and on regional differences during transition. I examine how aspects related to historical
legacies, the specificities of de-collectivization, and social relations in the local communities contributed to
shaping farmers' choices during transition.
The role of institutional legacies and the relevance of past experiences are important in
developing this story, but should not be viewed as binding. As Creed (1999 p. 224) mentions, "people can
be influenced and even constrained by history without being its prisoners." Moreover, one should be wary
of arguments based on path-dependent explanations because what might look like legacies are often better
seen as responses to contemporary processes and environments (Creed 1995, 1999; Verdery 2003). It
follows that a complete analysis of land reallocation during transition needs to account for both these
factors: how aspects from the past affect landowners' choice between farming alternatives within the
constraints and incentives offered by new market conditions.
Hence, I expand the interpretation of findings from Chapter 8 and probe motivations for regional
differences in the observed behavior. The following questions are the focus of this chapter:
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(1) Why were associations formed only in some regions, while in others they were not, given that
at the time of de-collectivization everyone was emerging from the socialist agriculture with a
similar capital endowment?
a. Did the legacies of property reforms and the process of collectivization contribute to
the differences in formation and persistence of farming associations between the two
regions?
b. How were individual agents' decisions with respect to their land affected by their
interaction with others in their local communities?
(2) How different or similar are the associations for from the old collective farms?
Methods
Qualitative research was carried out over several months in the summer of 2005 and 2006. I
conducted preliminary research in the summer of 2005 when, through semi-structured interviews and
participant observation, I identified the main problems that the agricultural sector, and small farmers in
particular, were facing, as well as the regional sites in which to conduct my larger research. A second
round of interviews was carried out during the summer of 2006.
I interviewed small farmers (landowners) in different villages in the two agro-regions, as well as a
total of fourteen engineers, eight policy makers from the Ministry of Agriculture and research institutions,
four academics, and five local officials. In order to maintain confidentiality of the individuals I
interviewed, in compliance with the Committee on the use of Use of Humans as Experimental Subjects
(COUHES) at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, whenever I refer to (or a cite) a specific
individual, I use a fictitious first name.
The villages where I did most of the interviews are: Curtici, Zarand, Capalna and Petid in the
Western Plain, and Vlad Tepes and Lita in the Central Romanian Plain. I chose these villages to capture
a broader set of experiences, within different settings and development levels. The fieldwork I conducted
in the two agro-regions, as well as in-depth village specific ethnographic studies, point to the existence of
very diverse contexts and experiences with agricultural transformation. The Romanian countryside, unlike
other similar places in Eastern Europe, is characterized by varied and distinctive social and economic
patterns that have been shaped not only by post-war political history, but also by the communist economic
growth policies that have been very regionally oriented.
Figure 9-1 shows the sites' location for interviews and participatory observation within the two
agro-regions. The villages in the Western Plain were chosen such that some were closer to developed
urban centers, such as Curtici and Zarand, and some were further away from urban centers, such as Petid
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and Capalna. When selecting these villages, a hypothesis was that in more economically developed
villages landowners would be more likely to farm the land individually rather than to join associations.
Nevertheless, I found the opposite. In more developed villages, landowners were more likely to join
associations. In the Central Romanian Plain, the two villages were selected based on the same rationale
(i.e. closeness to developed urban centers). Nevertheless, here, landowners joined associations in both
villages.
Figure 9-1: Site location for interviews and participatory observation
Western Plain (left) and Central Romanian Plain (top)
Source: www.liis.ro
During several trips I spent time talking to farmers and local officials and I occasionally
participated in harvesting activities along with the villagers, mainly in the western villages. In addition, I
attended meetings between the association managers and the members, and between tenants and
landowners. Participatory observation allowed me to capture the type of problems that farmers were
confronted with, their concerns and perspectives based on personal experiences and values, as well as
their motivations behind different individual and collective choices related to land.
In-depth qualitative interviews and participatory observation are part of what Burawoy (1998)
calls "reflective models of science." This approach promotes engagement in the local environment, and
"extraction of local knowledge (Geertz 1973, 1983) through "thick descriptions" (to use Geertz's
terminology). Integrating research techniques (quantitative and qualitative methods) opens enormous
opportunities for mutual advantage in research design, data collection, and data analysis. Such "mixing"
(Kanbur and Shaffer 2007) allows to interpret counterintuitive or surprising findings from household
surveys, probing motivations, and explaining observed behavior.
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Chapter organization
The structure of the chapter lays out the narrative for what aims to be a more comprehensive
explanation of the current pattern of land reallocation and the persistence of associations in Romania's
agriculture.
Based on the research questions laid out above, Section 9.2 examines why formal associations
were created mostly in the Central Romanian Plain and less so in the Western Plain immediately after the
fall of the communist region. I examine factors that draw on both the perspective of former collective farm
managers as well as small farmers. The main argument is that institutional legacies, drawing on past
property rights arrangements and collectivization experiences, as well as social relations. limit the choices
available for land reallocation to those that are acceptable in the historical and social context.
Formal associations appear to address these needs better than land markets. Given the common
critiques of associations found in the literature, as discussed in Section 2.5.1 of Chapter 2, in Section 9.3 I
examine how closely formal associations resemble the old collective farms. I argue that associations are
able to overcome collective action problems because of a self-enforced monitoring mechanism. This
process is made possible by the deeper embeddedness of associations in the rural community. Section 9.4
concludes with a narrative about why associations persisted throughout the transition and why
landowners were slow to engage in land market transactions as alternative institutional arrangements.
9.2 Why were associations created in some villages and not in others?
The formation of farming associations, as soon as Land Law was implemented, was not uniform
across and within the country. While in the Western Plain individual farming predominates, in the
Central Romanian Plain formal associations persisted throughout the transition. This section explores
why in some regions associations were formed while in other they were not. At the time of de-
collectivization everyone was emerging from state and collective farming with similar capital endowment.
Therefore, explanations based on structural factors (i.e. physical and human capital) cannot fully account
for those outcomes. Hence, the following questions are examined in this section in order to account for
broader explanations to land reallocation: a) What role did the legacies of property reforms and the
process of collectivization play in the formation and persistence of farming associations? b) How did
different actors at the local community level interact in shaping these outcomes?
The main protagonists directly involved in shaping the outcomes of de-collectivization and land
reallocation at local level are: 1) landowners, 2) association managers and 3) new entrepreneurs (tenants).
In this dissertation the term landowners refers to small household farmers, former workers on the socialist
collective farms, who received private property rights following land restitution. Association managers are
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former professionals (agronomists or other specialists) on the old collective farms, who took charge of the
newly formed formal associations (agricultural societies) in the early 1990s. The new entrepreneurs are the
resource-rich tenants that leased-in land from small landowners, in a so-called process of reverse tenancy.
Explanations for the diverse outcomes at regional level are multifaceted. Historical legacies,
networks, and social relations, are interlinked and contributed to making the presence of associations a
result of individual as well as regional characteristics. Interviews with farm managers and landowners
revealed some factors that shaped the decisions to create farming associations in the early 1990s. Table
9-1 summarizes these factors, reflecting different time horizons, incentives and concerns.
Discussions with agronomists and association managers depicted a rather top-down process in the
formation of associations and the breaking down of the collective farms, where small farmers had limited
agency. Yet, interestingly enough, interviews with landowners showed that agricultural transformation
was far from a one-way process. Legacies from collectivization and beyond, as well as socio-economic
conditions in the local communities, led to the active participation of landowners in shaping the outcomes
of land reform.
Table 9-1: Factors affecting the formation of farming associations following land reform
in the 1990s
Associations Associations
were created were not created
Economies of scale Retain Low
Supply chain network Retain Low
Farm managers/ Agronomists' relations
motivations were conditioned on: Pre-reform farm Good Low
performance
Collectivization Good Harsh
experience
Landowners/ Households' Social capital and Low High
motivations were conditioned on: relations
Capital endowment Low High
Table 9-1 shows that for agronomists, current leaders of associations and/or former professionals
on the old collective farms, the factors that framed their reaction to de-collectivization and land
reallocation were: (a) the potential to retain economies of scale in agriculture; (b) the desire to retain the
supply chain network relations inherited from the communist system; and (c) the pre-reform performance
of the old collective farms they were managing (or they were working in). The outcome of whether
associations were created or not varied along these different factors that conditioned their motivations.
For instance, if the old collective farm had a high pre-reform economic performance, the likelihood of
forming associations was higher. Similarly, if the supply-chain network relations, inherited from the old
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collective farms were weak, the likelihood of breaking down the collective farms and shifting to individual
farming was higher.
On the other hand, the small landowners (the households) were taking into account other factors
in their decisions for retaining the associations or farming all the land individually. For them, the following
main factors mattered: the collectivization experience, the strength of social capital and relations in the
community, and the level of capital endowment (discussed in Chapter 8). Where collectivization was
imposed in a more forceful way, such as in the West, the likelihood ofjoining associations was lower.
Similarly, where social capital and relations were stronger, the likelihood of farming individually was
higher. Social capital, in the post-socialist context, is mostly limited to kin relations, offering a support
network at times of uncertainty.s 8 3 Where social capital is lacking, landowners are less able to confront
market imperfections characteristic of transition.
Ultimately, the pattern of land reallocation following de-collectivization, resulted from the
constant interaction between the interests of both actors and the importance of these factors in the local
community, within the overall framework created by market imperfections during transition. In the
following sub-sections I discuss these factors from the perspective of both sets of actors involved in the
early decisions on de-collectivization.
9.2.1 The agronomists
Engineers on the former collective farms argued that the main problem following de-
collectivization was not the decline in production but the actual breakdown of the distribution networks
between the socialist enterprises (i.e. old collective and state farms) and the state institutions supporting the
production system. Large farms were part of a wide network for collecting agricultural products, storage,
distribution, and processing. The threat of creating a rupture in these networks, without the prospect of
replacing them in the near future, created a sense of crisis among the agronomists who were taught to
value the vision of Soviet agriculture and the modernizing ideals of large-scale mechanization.
Consequently, these values were very much at odds with the proposals for de-collectivization and
privatization of state farms. Ghita, an engineer trained in one of the best agricultural colleges in the
country, claimed that while he understood the importance of land restitution, he viewed the process of de-
collectivization almost as "a crime against the earlier accomplishments for modernizing the sector." He
further argued that his generation of professionals was educated in the ideology of the US and Soviet
models of large-scale agriculture, and they grew disillusioned to see the shift in institutional emphasis.
183 The Prosperity Index developed by Legatum (2007) shows that broader notions of social capital (i.e. community
networks, local political and social organizations) are under-developed in Romania.
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Ghita, however, was not alone in his perceptions of de-collectivization. The commitment for
large-scale agriculture has been deeply rooted in the skills and mentality of the professional class. Without
exception, engineers and other professionals on the former collective farms had similar beliefs. The
common reaction almost everywhere was to seek ways to preserve the status quo, preventing the
dissolution of the former collective farms.
Economies of scale, networks, and performance
Discussions with policy makers and agricultural professionals involved in the initial phases of
reform suggest that there was an abiding faith in the efficiency of large-scale production. From their point
of view, the only available option for modernizing, for increasing the competitiveness of the agricultural
sector, and for reducing the poverty nucleus in the rural areas was to support large corporate farms on the
structures of the former collective and state farms.
In the South, collective farms were larger than in the West, mainly due to the predominance of
corn and wheat crops, but also due to legacies of land distribution prior to collectivization. Therefore,
association managers, such as Florian, argued that breaking down the old collective would have been
simply infeasible in this region. The costs of dismantling the collectives would have been too high, and
land quality varied significantly across different land plots. The association, he said, had the interest of
holding on to the best quality land, which had the potential to generate wide conflicts for restitution.
Therefore, in the interest of avoiding such clashes, the association managers and the villagers, decided to
maintain the structures of the former collective farms, and to distribute the harvest to the members
proportional to their land contribution in the association.
Nevertheless, aside from economies of scale, agronomists were responding to more practical
dynamics. In trying to decide the future of collective farms, the former leaders were weighing not only the
needs of the community but also the capacity of the farms to perform in the new conditions imposed by
the post-communist transformation. Given the fast pace of change and the socially sensitive aspects of
land reform, a long-term vision was difficult to imagine. The focus was on evaluating the assets at their
disposal and how they could capitalize on those resources following de-collectivization. Therefore,
according to this rationale less emphasis was placed on individual choices and preferences. What mattered
most for the agronomists was the economic condition of the collective farms at the end of the 1980s.
The main assets that old collective farms had, as opposed to individual farms, were machineries
and networks of production and marketing. In order to to survive in the socialist and transition challenges,
farm managers had to cultivate extensive and far-flung networks with banks, fertilizer and herbicide
distributors, or with customers for their produce. These networks proved crucial in taking advantage of
early opportunities in the context of imperfect markets. However, the quality of these networks, as assets,
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varied across different collective farms and, hence, were differently converted to a positive advantage in
the post-socialist period.
Interviews with former engineers on collective farms, now managers of associations, suggest that
these factors played a key role in maintaining the structures of former collective farms by forming
associations. Small landowners (former workers on the collective farms) were reassured, by the association
managers and the policy makers supporting this transformation, that the new associations will be able to
operate more effectively than they could farm by themselves in the absence of those resources. In addition,
the standard of living was fairly low in the South and alternative job opportunities were lacking.
Therefore, investment capacity for land improvements and mechanical work was very low.
In the West, the values and visions embraced by the professionals were similar to those found in
the South. Nevertheless, there, collective farms were, in general, smaller, having less physical capital and
weaker supply chain networks. In villages where association were not formed, local engineers argued that
"collective farms were simply too run down and the equipment was too old to be able to continue farming
well" at a time when the price of gasoline was higher than ever, there was no access to bank credits, and
the level of subsidies (mostly in the form of vouchers) from the state was low. These circumstances created
a different dynamic between the collective farms managers and the landowners, compared to the South.
However, one example from the Western Plain also shows similarities with the southern
experience. For instance, the Agro-Industrial Complex in Curtici, Arad County, was formed as an
association immediately after Law 36/1990 was adopted. This was one of the largest collective farm in the
region, highly connected with the communist political elite at the regional as well as the national level. As
the association leader mentioned, the collective farm benefited enormously from investments in inputs and
machineries prior to 1989. Moreover, given its strong networks within the system, it had access to first
class information on current trends in policy debates related to agriculture, which allowed him to
maintain a first-mover position during transition. At the time of de-collectivization, it was very clear that
the old collective was to remain intact. The leader promised high returns (which he delivered in the years
to come), investments in land improvements, but he required complete independence in decision-making.
Given that the village is close to a dynamic urban center and a large part of the population was
commuting to non-farming jobs, this strategy has not raised much opposition from the villagers. Some
farmers still decided to farm the land individually at the time of de-collectivization, and generally these
were wealthier households willing to build up self-sufficiency by being actively engaged in farming.
The association started in 1990 with 1,800 hectares, but, seeing higher and steady returns, more
farmers joined in. The association is currently farming 5,200 hectares. On average, each member
household contributes with two hectares, which raised the number of members to approximately 2,000.
The manager, Ion, argued that even if more farmers want to join in, he is not willing to expand. Farming
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all these different land plots has been very difficult and the consolidation of land plots has only now been
achieved. Despite the hardships of transition, Ion managed to carry on several large investment projects to
upgrade his agricultural equipments and also to diversify the activity from only crops to also include
livestock and food processing. Ion estimated that he made one million Euro investments every year in
preparation for EU enlargement, placing the other producers in the region at a clear disadvantage for
competing in the new environment.
This case was the most successful and dynamic association I came across in the two regions.
Landowners also obtained higher revenues than what they were able to obtain by themselves or from
smaller leasing arrangements. In this particular case, the fact that landowners did not have a lot of power
in decision-making did not seem to raise concerns in the local community. The leadership of the
association inspired trust among the members.
Nevertheless, in many other cases where associations did not benefit from this initial capital,
leaders "felt abandoned by the state." They argued that without state support throughout the transition,
they are "isolated from the rest of the economy," as one agronomist argued. The state has not succeeded
in integrating the large class of local engineers and agricultural professionals in the post-communist
transformations of the rural economy. One agronomist, Popica, in a village where the collective farm was
entirely dismantled currently works in the mayor's office, where he is responsible for land cadastre and
land transactions. When I asked him what exactly his role is, he acted very dismayed, replying that he did
"nothing but paperwork.. .a waste of time." Moreover, given that he became a small farmer without
access to the means of production (i.e. inputs and equipments) like everyone else, he saw the outcome as a
complete neglect of his expertise as an engineer. He argued that during the communist regime he was
assigned to this village (to the collective farm) to increase productivity and enhance production.
Nevertheless, now he feels limited in his alternatives, further degrading his knowledge and professional
preparation. He claims that: "now we work the land by hand, as during the medieval times."
Despite the willingness of the collective farm managers to maintain the structures of the collective
farms and despite their expert training, weak networks prior to the 1990s, and degraded material base (i.e.
machineries and building stock) imposed too many risks. On the one hand, the agronomists were not
willing to take these risks. On the other hand, the material condition of the associations did not inspire
trust among the landowners. Hence, this outcome suggests that expertise and strong networks are
complementary for creating opportunities to forming farming associations early on.
Nevertheless, the period of transition was also a time when those with power and resources had a
large amount of discretion to fill the vacuum created by de-collectivization and the withdrawal of the
state. Laws and regulations were frequently changing to the point that legislation became an inaccessible
domain for ordinary individuals. As a result, there was space for maneuvering for those who wanted to
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appropriate the resources and opportunities that opened up. This was hardly an isolated phenomenon.
Rather, such practices were highly specific to the transition period, and at times they were viewed as
critical for the success of these new organizational forms, given market imperfections.
Verdery (2004) and Allina-Pisano (2007) thoroughly document the process by which local elites
took advantage of this momentum to appropriate assets that resulted from the breakdown of the collective
farms, given the uncertain legal environment and lack of familiarity with public auctioning activities. In
certain cases this process prevented the associations from forming, and led to the creation of an
entrepreneurial class that was seeking to gain profits from land rentals (and later purchases). Verdery
(2004) calls this process the emergence of "super-tenants," a new form of tenancy arrangements, "reverse
tenancy," as I discussed in Chapter 2 and 7. For instance, in one village in the Western Plain, the former
collective leader was too old to be able to handle the wide institutional and economic transformations
following land reform. As a result, the local elite that surfaced once the veil of social equality was lifted was
quick to realize the opportunities that became available as a result of de-collectivization in terms of easy
and cheap access to capital (i.e. machineries, even if highly depreciated) and infrastructure (i.e. stables and
storage for grains). The auctioning process was "easily manipulated," as one of the new local tenants
acknowledged, due to the vague legal system and regulations, and the overall unfamiliarity with such
transactions. The whole process developed in a very anarchic way. "Everyone grabbed what they could,"
a farmer recalls, "bricks, tools, anything." People felt justified to act in the most unruly manner. But, those
with more financial capital at the time were able to strategize and maneuver the system to their benefit. In
these circumstances, the interest in maintaining farming associations was lower as assets were shifted to
the hands of private entrepreneurs.
These different perspectives stress the importance of initial conditions. The performance of
former collective farms and the social and productive capital that the association managers inherited, as
well as strong supply chain networks were critical for the emergence of associations. These networks
provided a "first mover advantage" for the associations in comparison to the new private farmers (or
entrepreneurs) who had to build such relations following land reform.
Nevertheless, as I will show in the next section, decisions were not made by only one set of actors.
As Verdery (2004 p. 362) also mentions, "people do not wait quietly for institutions to form at the top and
percolate downward." Following their own interests and values, landowners reacted to what the leaders of
the former collective farms proposed, with varied intensities in different regions.
9.2.2 The new landowners
Despite imperfect access to information and sources of power (i.e. capital and networks),
landowners were not passive to the events that were unfolding at the national level and to the strong biases
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of the agricultural professionals in their communities. While some villagers were very critical of the
collective farms, many others supported them, resulting not only in different outcomes but also fomenting
discontent in the local communities. Different views of de-collectivization, as well as conflicts over land
boundaries, strongly divided local communities and broke down social relations in the villages. As one
farmer from the Western Plain, Nelu, mentioned, "land became a blessing and a curse at the same time."
Aside from the economic burden that land became for most households (not having the necessary
resources to extract value from it) almost overnight "friends became foes" when conflicts over land broke
out, in a clash of competing social memories.
The local reaction to the engineers' efforts to maintain the structure of the old collectives as
formal associations is quite different when we compare cases from the Western Plain with the Central
Romanian Plain. To understand regional dissimilarities between the West and South, in this section I
examine factors related to historical legacies and social dynamics as reflected by interviews with farmers,
historical facts, and earlier literature. Ethnographic studies, such as those collected by Dobrincu and
lordachi (2005), show wide variation between villages in the outcomes of land reform and in terms of local
characteristics. This pattern is also reflected in the household surveys for the two agro-regions.
Therefore, in this section, I argue that the experience of collectivization and the strength of social
capital and social relations in the local communities contribute to explaining the formation and
persistence of farming associations following land restitution. These experiences and local conditions result
in different valuations of land, which in turn, affect the choices farmers make in respect to land
reallocation.
The experience of collectivization and historical legacies
When discussions about reforming the agricultural sector began in the early 1990s, those who
promoted the creation of associations as reformed collective farms faced severe criticism and opposition in
the local communities in the Western Plain. Popica, one of the agronomists in the old collective farm, who
was hoping to convince the locals to leave their land in the association, recalled the tension that such a
proposal created, and their labeling by locals as "communist partisans." The only acceptable option for
those farmers was to get their land back at any cost. One farmer argued that he could not have imagined
a different outcome. "They took their land from me and my family and when I had a chance to get it
back, it would have been an affront not to do it," Dumitru said. At that time, most people in the area
shared his opinion. As a result, even today, there are no farming associations in the village. This case
cannot be explained through a structural argument (resource availability) since the population was aged,
alternative sources of income were not available, and the village was not very close to urban centers.
Similar stories were found in other villages as well.
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In a study of entrepreneurial behavior in the West, Baga (2004 p. 46-48) claims, "Banatian 84
peasants came to define themselves in terms of land ownership. In order to conserve and enlarge it, they
took over a series of practices from the German settlers, whom they regarded as technologically more
advanced and culturally superior."' 1 Large investments were made in agricultural improvements, which
were financed by off-farm employment in the nearby cities. In addition, the domination of the one-child
family prevented the fragmentation of property among heirs (Hitchins 1994 p. 373-374). In turn, this led
to higher competitiveness in the agricultural sector, and to the replacement of family with property as a
central focus of personal identity (Baga 2004 p. 47).
In the South, however, this process has been quite different. Florian, association manager from
Calarasi County, recollected that there was almost no resistance to continuing the tradition of collective
production system in the Central Romanian Plain. Actually local farmers "were worried that there would
be no interest in forming associations." He further argued that the new landowners had no interest in
farming the land themselves because they felt they had no experience and resources to farm all the land
individually.
To find explanations for this strong and different reaction at the local level, we need to look back
in time at the process of collectivization and even before. While it is true that one cannot do justice to the
complexities involved in the process of collectivization in only a few paragraphs'86, for the purpose of this
dissertation, I focus on few aspects, emphasized by farmers, which help explain the initial reaction to
joining associations.
First, collectivization was implemented at different times and with different intensities across the
country. Verdery (2004) has clearly articulated the social and political implications of collectivization in
the rural communities: "the party-state would seek to insinuate itself directly into rural communities and
even into families, breaking down existing social relationships and creating wholly new alliances and
enmities between newly formed groups while completely refashioning villagers' sense of who they were."
In order to secure support for collectivization at the local level187, the Agrarian Commission
established in 1949 to carry out this task, decided that the process should start gradually, in only a few
counties (Levy 2005). In a meeting of the Agrarian Commission in August 1949, Ceausescu said: "We
discussed the issue of not starting now in all counties and all households. We need to start first in a few
counties around the country, to see what the environment is, and how things develop. There will be
184 Banat is the historical region in the south west of the Western Plain agro-region.
185 This quote refers to the 18t century when many German settlers, mainly merchants, arrived from Swabia, Alsace
and Bavaris, as well as people from Austria.
186 Verdery (2004) explored the aspects of collectivization from the angle of peasant-state relations. Other
anthropological analyses of this historical time are discussed in the edited volume by Dobrescu and Dobrescu (2004).
187 The slow pace in collectivization was also intended because of lack of cadres to carry out the "persuasion"
("munca de lamurire") process at the local level.
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hardships.. .we could stumble. We thought of starting in Ialomita where lands are easily consolidated. The
county is relatively well off but there are only few villages [...] We could also do Constanta, Teleorman,
Timis, Olt, Vlasca, Falciu, Braila.. .in total ten counties. Let's do one now, and see how things
develop."1 88 This was the overall approach in the first wave of collectivization, before the "final assault"
(Oprea 2005). The party cadres intended to create collective farms as role models for the rest of the
country ("heroes of the socialist movement"). Scott (1998) viewed such examples of the new socialist vision
as a process of "social engineering." Hence, investment in these farms was higher, and the early system of
incentives and production was quite appealing to the rural population.
The villages in the South, where land had better quality, were the first to experience this
production system. The main crops cultivated there were corn and wheat. Because the Socialist Agrarian
Commission intended to shape these farms on the model of large-scale US grain farms, the types of crops
cultivated were important. Other appealing factors were lower population density and a recent history
(due to migration from other regions on the country), which meant that villagers were not so rooted in the
land structure.
Chelcea (2005 p. 426) describes that in the 19th century Baragan plains had large latifundiar
estates and experienced successive colonizing waves up until the beginning of the 20th century. Given the
low population density, these circumstances resulted in high in-migration and the creation of new villages.
Because newcomers ("veniti") formed the population majority, social cohesion was less pronounced and
individuals were less rooted in one place as compared to the West. Interviews with farmers in the South
suggest that the level of community bonding was weak because oftentimes the newcomers would return
for part of the year in their native regions (generally hilly or mountainous areas) where part of their family
was still living. They would come South for harvest time and leave in the winter.189 The relationship
between these people and their land was fluid because at the time of collectivization some families decided
to return to their native regions, while other stayed in the South.
Another aspect relates to the size of farms prior to collectivization. Because of the very large
estates (haciendas) owned by landlords ("boieri"), farmers (households) owned small plots far away from
villages. Hence, they had to bear high costs associated with "waking up in the morning and coming back
late, high depreciation of the carriages, food for animals, absence from the household, and sleeping in the
field" (Chelcea 2005 p. 428). Therefore, the socialist cadres believed that land consolidation into collective
farms would face less resistance in this region.
With few exceptions, in the South, the socialist collective farms were embraced by the local
communities in the 1940s. In a way, collectivization replaced the servitude system on the large estates of
188 From "Stenograma sedintei Secretariatului PRM, 26 august 1949, ANIC, fond "CC al PCR-Cancelarie", dos.
72/1949, ff. 3-4", in Levy (2005).
189 Similar findings are found in Chelcea (2005) based on Reviga Village.
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the landlords with a system of wage payments and other informal benefits that the small farmers drew on
(i.e. access to inputs, education, and health services). Many believed at the time that this more structured
system played to their benefit. One farmer in the South claimed that collectivization was inevitable. For
many villagers, socialist collective farms provided more stability and security in their lives. Hence, the first
to join the collective farms were the poorer farmers with fewer resources and alternatives.
Moreover, as I discussed in Chapter 4, private property has been very limited in the Central
Romanian Plain, and therefore, the sense of ownership deprivation did not create strong resentment to
collectivization. In my fieldwork I did not come across individuals who projected a high attachment to
land as private property, but Chelcea (2005), in a more ethnographic study concludes that even in the
South, some of the individuals who received land 20 years before collectivization showed intense
sentiments of regret for having to give away the land. Nevertheless, I argue that these cases are more
isolated in the Central Romanian Plain as compared to the Western Plain.
All these factors discussed above (history, institutions, demography) contributed in different ways
to limiting the response of farmers to the reverse process, de-collectivization, as individuals preferred to
rely on a system that they were more familiar with, and which exposed them to less risks. As Petru, a small
farmer in the South argued, "the responsibility as individual farmers was too high, and I, for one, was not
willing to take it. The stake was too high".
In the West, however, as mentioned earlier, collectivization was met with a lot of skepticism as
peasants tried to withstand "the social conformity handed down from above" (Verdery 2006 p. 353). As a
result, resistance built up on both sides (the peasants and the state), as the party cadres moved to forced
confiscation of land, livestock, and physical assets "for the benefit of the socialist state," as one farmer
sarcastically recollected. The state, anticipating resistance, resorted to measures such as high taxes and
quotas on agricultural production, arbitrary arrests, confiscations, and even physical violence.190
One explanation for these different reactions to collectivization and hence different strategies
adopted by the socialist state resides in the structure of property rights prior to collectivization. As I
discussed at length in Chapter 4, private property has a much longer history in Transylvania as compared
to the historical region of Greater Romania, in the South. In Transylvania property registration was
introduced by the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the 1860s. In other parts of Romania land records were
introduced much later and in a more provisional form. Hence, in the South for instance, anyone who had
to prove ownership had fewer and less reliable documents at hand. This legacy was reflected in all my
interviews with farmers in the Western Plain where landowners have projected a much stronger sense of
190 The system of quotas on agricultural production for individual farmers has not been unique only to the West.
Roske (2005) documents that high quotas were imposed in the South as well, in order to coerce farmers to join the
collective farms. Most of the time these requirements were so high that farmers had to purchase additional produce
to supplement the harvest fill in the quota level.
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attachment to land, viewing it as a reflection of individual and class identity. Villagers recalled the sense of
fear for re-collectivization at the time of restitution. These sentiments were augmented by the intense
political campaign organized by the historical Peasants' Party and Liberal Party in the villages, especially
in Transylvania.
For instance, one farmer, Dumitru, claimed that at 60 years old, when he got his land back, he
felt he "was alive again", and finally he was able to cherish the "land for which his parents gave their
lives." Dumitru argued that "there was nothing that could stop" him from getting his land back, and he
"will no longer be a slave to anyone on his own land." He, along with others in the village, were very
quick to clearly signal their property rights and demarcate their plots "with sticks, stones and ditches" in
the lands once farmed by the association. This attitude towards the new status of owners has also been
captured by Verdery (2004 p. 193) in Transylvania, among farmers that decided to work the land
individually despite the difficulties highlighted earlier: "we couldn't do anything under the communists;
now at least we can do something."
Farmers remembered the times of exhilaration and tension in the early 1990s, when villagers took
to the fields to find the exact location and size of their plots based on old maps, kin and neighbors'
testimonials, and early memories from almost half a century ago. More impressively, thousands of
ownership titles from the time of the Austro-Hungarian Empire came to light from hidden drawers and
were brought as evidence in disputes and claims as proof of private ownership. This process, as one would
expect, has not been free of conflicts as all of a sudden older disputes over land boundaries and
inheritance, that were rendered irrelevant as a result of collectivization, have surfaced in the local
communities. Nevertheless, in general, landowners aimed for independence and freedom from other
sources of authority hoping for the ability to strive for themselves in the new economic environment.
These reactions, however, have been hardly felt in the Central Romanian Plain. There, decades
of servitude on large land estates, and short periods of private ownership (as discussed in Chapter 4)
together with lack of cadastral maps and property titles, almost erased the memory of private ownership.
As a result, farmers knew how much land they owned, but did not know exactly in what location. When I
asked landowners where their land plots were located, they pointed elusively in a certain direction and
said "around there" ("cam pe acolo"). This was an entirely different reaction when compared to the
farmers in the West, where they would insist in showing me the exact location, and in sharing the story of
that piece of land and all the disputes around its irregular boundaries. Hence, in the South it was much
easier to maintain the associations rather than distribute land plots given ambiguities related to property.
But, as I discussed in Chapter 5 and 6, these outcomes, have to be understood in the broader
economic context that differentiated these regions, the South being historically poorer, with fewer
resources and a less diversified economy. Therefore, farmers preferred to continue the arrangement with
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the former collective farms, transformed in associations, where they became "members" instead of
"workers," were not obliged to contribute with labor, and they had a secure source of income in the form
of rent (generally as a percentage of the harvest).
Another factor (but closely related to the legacy of property rights) that explains different reactions
to collectivization (and later on to de-collectivization) draws from the geo-political conditions in the
region. Massive uprisings against collectivization (and land takings) in the West in Arad, Timis, and Bihor
counties in the 1950s were associated not only with a stronger sense of property (which created
disincentives for collectivization), but also with a potential influence from the more reformed socialist
Yugoslavia under Tito. The perceived threats to the communist state resulted in considerable deportations
from these counties in Baragan (Central Romanian Plain), mainly Germans, Serbs, but also many
Romanians.191 Nevertheless, in 1955, as a result of international pressure, around 75 % of the deported
individuals were allowed to go back to their regions, but they did not receive their land back (Levy 2005).
These specific circumstances in which collectivization was implemented in the West certainly
affected the reaction of the farmers to land restitution and privatization. As a result, de-collectivization
gained a meaning of social justice through which the unfairness of the socialist times was to be undone.
The manifestation of this process was through a wider return to private individual farming and quick
dismantling of the collective farms. As I showed in the previous chapter, households who chose to farm
the land themselves had access to sufficient technology and draft animals to support their decision.
Social networks and social pressures
Interviews with farmers show that not all who opted for withdrawing land from collective farms
were equally endowed. Marioara, for instance, was living with her three young children and her mother,
without any technology for farming the land, but they still decided to farm the land themselves, seeking
more independence and, what she thought, more security in terms of access to land for her children. To
farm her land, she relied on her social networks, limited mostly relatives, and they engaged in a series of
activities that required exchange labor during harvest time.
Land restitution has been a very emotionally charged process, running deep into issues of social
identity and class at individual and community level. As Kideckel (1993 p. 218) argues, de-collectivization
191 The interlinkage between ethnicity, collectivization, and post-socialist agricultural transformation might be
worthwhile to explore in future research. Historical events such as deportations to Baragan, partially targeted at
other nationalities are very likely to have shaped later responses to de-collectivization in these ethnic groups.
Interviews with farmers in the West brought out some interesting differences that were perceived in comparison with
a neighboring village where the population was mostly Hungarian. Aspects of higher social cohesion and level of
trust in the community were associated with ethnicity and past experiences of discrimination. Also, Levy (2005 p. 68)
makes a very brief reference to a quote reflecting the prejudices committed by communist cadres during
collectivization against ethnic minorities (i.e. excluding Hungarians from collective farms). Verdery (2004) also refers
to the fact that Germans formed their own association following land restitution.
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was "as socially wrenching as collectivization had been in the first place." Land has always been an
essential part of the peasant mentality (Iancu 200 1). Hence, by regaining land rights villagers could assert
their dignity and worth in addition to providing livelihood and future security. Moreover, as Verdery
(2004 p. 364) mentions, for many Transylvanian landowners, "receiving their land was a promise of the
prosperity they associated with the years before World War II."192
Hence, I argue that social networks and the level of social cohesion at the local level played a role
in whether associations were created, and in later land reallocation decisions. Access (or lack of access) to
politically connected relatives or neighbors, the diversity of the occupational backgrounds, as well as the
quality of relationships among network members affected choices and perceptions of the opportunities
available to them. 193 As opposed to association managers and engineers, small landowners relied mostly
on social networks in the local community, not having the opportunity to reach outside the community
and kin. The sociologist James Coleman (1994) claimed that, "like other forms of capital, social capital is
productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that would not be attainable in its
absence.. .In a farming community.. .where one farmer got his hay baled by another and where farm tools
are extensively borrowed and lent, the social capital allows each farmer to get his work done with less
physical capital in the form of tools and equipment."194 Therefore, social capital (mostly limited to
relatives) enabled landowners who wished to farm the land individually to overcome market imperfections
in relation to physical capital and finances.
In addition, land restitution disrupted the sense of equality in the local communities by partially
recreating the pre-collectivization class structure defined by ownership of assets. Even if initially restitution
was limited to 10 hectares of land per household, the re-creation of ownership based on the 1940s land
records, made possible the re-definition of land-rich and land-poor in the local communities. The massive
expropriation efforts imposed through collectivization erased such class hierarchies, only to be recreated
40 years later. As a result, old conflicts resurfaced and new ones emerged.
Some farmers were reluctant to farm in associations or to lease out because of perceived feelings
of pride and socially constructed attitudes of inferiority created at the community level, associated with
certain farming arrangements. For instance, Floresu, an engineer, landowner and tenant in a village in the
Western Plain, who started a small agricultural business by raising livestock and leasing in land, argued
that it was very difficult to convince villagers to lease out land even if he was willing to pay decent rents
and offer good contractual arrangements. He argued that because he came from a poor family, villagers
192 However, no one informed them that farming individually in the current environment, when the state has
withered away and price and trade liberalization became the mantra of mainstream policy advisors, implies different
risks and market circumstances than prior to collectivization.
193 Kideckel (1993) also points to these factors, as well as to perceptions of a households' position, prestige, and
possibility within the village.
194 This quote was cited in Putnam (1993).
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were reluctant to lease-out land to him out of "pride and envy." Floresu was highly educated as an
agronomist, but he argued that villagers would rather "struggle by themselves" than let him work their
land. There were cases in which he could not consolidate a larger plot of land because one landowner,
whose plot was located in between Floresu's plots, was refusing to reach an agreement to lease-out his plot
in order to allow consolidation, and hence to make possible the use of mechanical implements. Such an
arrangement would have helped him as well as Floresu, but consensus was far from being achieved. When
I asked the farmer why he would not lease-out, he said that he has not reached such a "helpless stage"
("nu am ajuns atat de neajutorat") as to have his land worked by Floresu, whose family was the poorest of
the poor ("cei mai sarantoci") in the local community.
This case shows how land became a measure of status, differentiating the villagers along earlier
social structures in the community. Their meaning, however, one generation later, was at odds with the
present reality.
Similar attitudes were also seen from farmers who refused to join associations or to lease out land
to other villagers who were wealthier before collectivization and immediately after land restitution seized
the moment to regain status and power in the community. One farmer argued that even if "he dies on the
field," he will not "beg them" to farm his land. Without discounting the hardships of returning to active
farming, he argued that he will continue farming as his ancestors did, and he will not step on his pride to
have someone else "take advantage of his land."
This behavior was common in the West, due to historical circumstances discussed earlier, but it
was hardly felt in the South. In the West, private individual farming was the supreme form of land
management, while, oftentimes, formal associations and leasing transactions were seen as exploitative.
Such a perception on alternative farming arrangements derives from the scars of (and lessons
learned from) collectivization in this region (but not only). The strong resistance displayed by the rural
population in the West resulted in larger "garden plots" for individual households during the socialist era.
It has been widely documented that during collectivization households (and the leadership of the collective
farms) appropriated resources from the collective and state farms for individual use due to significant
shortages. The channels through which these resources were appropriated relied on informal exchanges
and favors, petty theft and the like.
Nevertheless, the downside was that these coping strategies inhibited cooperation among
households that were not directly related to each other, eroded trust and promoted conflicts that
undermined social networks and advanced a self-interested behavior to the detriment of social cohesion.
Because these relations were more intense in the West, the incentives to form associations were limited in
a context in which the appeal of private property was much stronger. Landowners aimed for
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independence and freedom from other sources of authority, hoping for the ability to strive by themselves
in the new economic environment.
The sacrifices that landowners were making in the name of private property and the set of values
attached to land (Verdery 2003) brings back the concept of "self-exploitation" used by Chayanov (1966) to
describe the Russian peasantry. One landowner, Maria, from a village in the West, reminisced her
family's experience and decisions they made in terms of land management. When property rights in land
were restituted, farming individually was the only alternative her husband envisioned, despite their
children (living in the urban areas) advising them otherwise. They were in their late 60s and they could
imagine at the time the hardships they would later encounter. At the time, however, they were very
hopeful. They had a carriage that stayed unused for decades in their storage, for which they bought a
horse. These two "equipments" proved to be instrumental in the years to come. Nevertheless, the plunge
in the prices for agricultural products and the increase in farming costs, made the life of Maria and
Nicolae progressively harder. Nevertheless, while there was no association in the village, Nicolae refused
to even consider the option of leasing-out the plots that were further away. "As long as I am alive no one
else will step on my land," Nicolae would say. After he passed away, his wife had no choice but to request
help from a neighbor, a wealthier tenant, to farm her plots for "whatever return he considered
appropriate." "It was a hard decision to make," she recalls, because the villagers were "judging" her,
saying that now that she is alone she became negligent with her property. Her fellow villagers were saying
that "only the helpless have their land worked by someone else." Nevertheless, she overcame the
community critique and now she feels very content with her decision since the garden plot was more than
enough for herself. She lamented that if they would have done this earlier, her husband might have been
alive now.
An additional, quite interesting, factor that transpired from discussions with farmers in this region,
is the strong sense of "shame" and "stigmatizing" among landowners for leaving their land fallow. As a
result, the outcome has often been an excessive effort to farm the land with limited resources and
insignificant returns, beyond what one would consider an optimal level.
These cases, not uncommon at all in the West, suggest that the value individuals attach to land is
socially constructed. It depends on community enforced norms and values of what a good landowner
means, shaping social relations around land. These norms and social relations define, ultimately, the
decisions farmers take in respect to reallocating their land assets among different institutional
arrangements. The case also suggests that individual farming, the predominant arrangement in the West,
is not necessarily the most "efficient," or economically "rational." Rather, it is shaped by historically
defined and socially accepted norms of behavior.
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Stories like these are fairly common in the Western Plain and they point to the dramatic changes
in the local communities as a result of land restitution. The rearrangements of the social structures into
"rich and poor," along with the strong attachment to land due to historical circumstances, contributed to
defining the pattern of land reallocation during transition.
However, in the Western Plain, not everyone felt that private individual farming was the best
option following land restitution. In villages where associations were not formed in the early 1990s some
farmers were unsatisfied and argued that lack of trust and social cohesion in the local community were the
primary factors for this outcome. The expression "everyone for their own" ("fiecare pentru al lui") was
often mentioned as an explanation for the reduced motivation to join farming associations where farmers
could benefit from economies of scale and shared mechanical services. National surveys such as The
Opinion Barometer (Barometrul de Opinie) conducted by the Open Society Foundation in 2002, found
that lack of trust and involvement in community related decisions have characterized the transition period
especially in the rural areas.195 Nevertheless, the issue of trust requires much more detailed examination
through ethnographic research, which could be a topic for future research.
Even in the West, where associations were formed following de-collectivization, membership gave
a sense of security, and shared risk during periods of uncertainty following high inflation and difficult
market access. Kideckel (1993 p. 221) brings out another nuance, by arguing that some farmers got
accustomed to shorter workdays in the collective farms and were unwilling to commit more hours of work
by farming all land themselves. Moreover, those who commuted to work in the nearby towns needed the
extra-help provided by associations in farming their land.
To summarize, in this section I discussed why farming associations were created mostly in the
Central Romanian Plain and less so in the Western Plain. I showed that to a large extent, historical
legacies of property rights structures, and collectivization experiences explain these different patterns of
land reallocation after de-collectivization. A longer experience of private property in the West, as well as a
more forceful and violent collectivization, created resistance to any remnant institutional structures (i.e.
associations) from the socialist regime. There, private individual farming prevailed. I also showed that the
choices landowners made were constrained (or embedded) in a system of social relations in the local
communities. Land restitution led to the re-creation of class differences between "rich and poor" based on
the pre-collectivization social structure, where land became a symbol of status and identity. These social
195 Some of the findings from this survey show that 7 2% of the rural population in the sample has not participated in
community meetings. If they would participate, 4 1% claimed that they would not bring up or discuss any issues.
Moreover, if they would have any complaints or need some type of community assistance, 5 3 % responded that they
would not bring it up in a meeting. Kideckel (1993 p. 129) also notes the lack of involvement in political and
community life, which he explains through the villagers' "understanding of the limits of their influence" shaped by
the bitter socialist takeover and arbitrary authority.
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relations ultimately constrained the choices considered by landowners. Cases from the Western Plain are
illustrative for this argument, showing that even if individual farming predominated in the West, this
arrangement is not necessarily the most "efficient," or economically "rational." Rather, it is shaped by
historically defined and socially accepted norms of behavior.
9.3 How different or similar are the associations from the old collectives?
Given that associations were formed immediately after de-collectivization, in the previous section
I showed that this process resulted from the intersection of historical, institutional, and social factors at the
regional and local level. As I mentioned in earlier chapters (Chapters 2 and 8), the persistence of farming
associations is an unexpected outcome because there is an abundance of literature critiquing this farming
arrangement as inefficient and plagued by collective action problems, such as free-riding and principal
agent problems. For the post-socialism countries in CEE, the main concern is that farming associations
are too entrenched into the practices and management of the old socialist collective farms. Hence, the
unbroken link with the collective farms would make associations unsustainable in the future, being
replaced by individual farming and land market transactions. However, what we actually see is that
farming associations are still playing an important role in the Romanian agricultural landscape. Hence,
the question of how different or similar associations are from the old collective farms requires a more in-
depth examination.
The transformation of the Romanian agricultural sector in the post-socialist period was followed
by expectations that the collective farms, the most inefficient component of the agricultural sector, will be
replaced by private individual farming. It was expected that market forces, through the operation of land
markets, will transfer land in the hands of more efficient private farmers. However, the general trend has
been for collective farms to be restructured into formal associations, maintaining the same leadership and
professional staff. This outcome led many critiques to argue that associations are propagating the practices
of the old collective farms, preventing them from responding to market incentives in a new economic and
institutional environment. In this section I show that associations are responding to market stimuli, this
being one reason for their persistence throughout the transition process. The following aspects proved
important: learning and adaptation to a new economic environment, solving collective action problems,
and the fluidity of associational forms.
Adaptation and learning
Even if formal associations are the heirs of the old collective farms, many undergone visible
changes. The most notable change is the significant reduction in size, both the total amount of land
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farmed and the number of associated members (Sabates-Wheeler 2005). Nevertheless, as other authors
show, due to a lack of expertise among the new landowners to manage large-scale farms (Kideckel 1995),
the leadership of the collective farms (engineers and technocrats) pushed for and took over the setting up
of the new associations (Sarris and Gavrilescu 1997; Verdery 2003; Sabates-Wheeler 2005). Some of the
professionals in the socialist collective farms either succeeded in convincing farmers to keep their land in
the formal association, or started an agricultural enterprise by themselves, leasing-in land. Yet, it is hard to
know whether changes in the association reflect meaningful internal restructuring or whether the
management has merely changed the "sign on the door" (Sabates-Wheeler 2005).
Based on fieldwork in the two regions, I found that formal associations were forced by
circumstances to operate differently than the old collective farms. Following land reform in 1991 and the
policies for stabilization and liberalization during transition, the new associations are operating in an
environment governed by the price mechanism and not by production quotas. As a result, even if the
management has remained by and large the same, the new institutional arrangements were able to survive
only if the leadership shifted their strategy from achieving production targets to generating economic
profits. Those associations that were not able to adjust to the new environment were gradually driven out
of business.
Moreover, despite fiscal facilities offered in the beginning of transition, associations were not able
to rely on state support anymore, as the old collectives did. State subsidies continuously declined especially
after 1997, due to the slow withering away of the state. The soft budget constraints of the collective farms
were replaced by hard budget constraints where the goal to expand production was replaced by profit
maximizing targets (Kornai 1992). 196At the same time, the government removed all the contracting
channels with the state for product distribution and input procurement. Hence, these farms were forced to
operate under a real threat of bankruptcy if they were not able to cover their costs, relying mostly on
personal networks for market access (as discussed in the previous section). As a result, these conditions
"sharpened their response to market forces" (Lerman et al. 2004 p. 147).
Valentin, the chief agronomist of a formal association in the Central Romanian Plain claimed
that they "made great efforts to adapt to the new economic conditions." The main difficulty, he argued,
"was the uncertainty created by not knowing where to sell the production." "You had to be quick and
very responsive to what was happening around you.. .no one told us what to do.. .it was us and the people.
Those of us who made it succeeded because we learned to be more flexible, to adapt...like fish in the
water. But, the future is uncertain for all of us."
196 It is true, however, that associations did receive financial support following de-collectivization (e.g. tax exemption
for five years) along with other incentives, but it was by far smaller than prior to the 1990s.
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One aspect for justifying that formal associations are different from the old collectives relates to
market access for agricultural products. In the socialist system of production, the state, using organized
collection centers (i.e. ROMCEREAL), secured the market for the agricultural production at the end of
the harvest. But, in the mid-1990s, the capacity of these collection centers was significantly reduced (and
later they were dismantled). As a result, the associations were left in need to find for themselves marketing
strategies (markets where quality became more important than quantity). The association leaders had to
pursue much more active productive and marketing strategies in order to survive the new economic
environment.
Of course, it is to be expected that the association managers capitalized on networks and social
capital inherited from the previous regime. However, it does not suggest that they were perpetuating the
practices from the old collectives. Nelu, an association leader in Arad, former employee of a state farm,
relied heavily on the mechanical services provided through this agency, but also on individual networks
for finding information related to distribution, prices, and access to inputs. These assets proved to be
crucial for emerging in the new environment. Moreover, the association in Curtici, discussed in Section
9.2, is a clear example for how networks inherited from the collective farm structure were so critical for
surviving and growing in the new conditions imposed by the transition context.
Lastly, but very important, following land restitution the association members were not simply
workers on the farm but they became landowners, they are the owners of land, the critical resource that the
association needed. There are indeed power differentials197 between managers and landowners (mainly
due to disproportional ownership of capital). But, despite this imbalance, managers are compelled to win
the trust of the landowners and also take into account their needs. Given that not everyone decided to
leave their land in associations following de-collectivization, association managers found themselves in
need to attract members in order to consolidate their plots and gain from economies of scale. This process
of persuasion ("munca de lamurire") has been quite active in some villages where I conducted interviews,
process through which the associations were trying to establish a good reputation in the local community.
They were compelled to pay the returns to the members on time, to provide the necessary mechanical
assistance, and to perform good quality work on the land. As one association manager mentioned, if a
landowner that has a plot in the middle of the association decides to withdraw his land, it would create
major disruptions for the well functioning of the association. Therefore, developing a strong social capital
in the community, around land relations, can be viewed as a pre-requisite for the persistence of farming
associations. Social capital, as Narayan and Pritchett (2000 p. 285) mention, is a "many splendored word
197 It is also important to note that the issue of power differentials in rural areas might be overstated. As Ortiz (1980
p. 1 77) argues, access to power and resources will certainly improve the position of small farmers. However, small
farmers still have to face "the difficult task of planning an enterprise in the face of uncertain weather, demand, and
market conditions".
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which means different things to different people." Here, social capital should be viewed as features of
social organization, such as networks, norms, and trust, that facilitate cooperation and coordination for
mutual benefit (Putnam 1993). Hence, social capital, by analogy with notions of physical capital and
human capital, enhances the benefits of investment in physical and human capital, and therefore, induces
households, as a collectivity, to advance the role of associations.
The concern of associations for the satisfaction of the members was more pronounced as land
markets became more active and landowners had access to other farming alternatives. Slowly associations
were competing for land with tenants. Having compact land plots was critical for being able to farm the
land efficiently. Nevertheless, as Floresu, a local agronomist in the Western Plain, argued, it was quite
challenging to reach consolidation not only because of transaction costs, but mainly because it was a
matter of gaining the trust of the landowners. To gain trust and credibility, one had to offer better risk
protection and show higher reliability in land rental payments. Avram, an association member in the West
claimed that the association gave him (and others in the village) a higher share from the harvest because
there were talks about landowners wanting to withdraw land and give it to a local farmer who started
leasing-in land from the landowners in the nearby villages. Ion, the manager of the association in Curtici
also argued that it was critical for them to offer high returns to the landowners in order to build
confidence that "it is a secure investment" and that they are "prosperous." Nevertheless, a stronger
competitive environment for the associations intensified mostly after the mid 1990s. Therefore, one could
argue that the increase in land market participation has been a catalyst for improving competitiveness for
the associations with potential for growth.
Collective action problems in practice
Interviews with farmers suggest that the legacies of old collective farms in terms of collective
action problems affected the way formal associations were perceived in the local communities. Collective
farms were never highly supported by the state prior to 1990s (as compared to the state farms, as I
discussed in Chapter 4), leading to shortages and inefficiencies. Nevertheless, they operated in close
interdependence with the "petty commodity production of individual farm members" (Swain 1985 p. 3).
Free riding and shirking were widespread for members that would disproportionately expand labor effort
on their private plots, while drawing on resources (e.g. seeds, fertilizer) from the collective farms. Such
behavior was common among all the hierarchical layers of the collective farms. Hence, due to this
"complex symbiosis" (Verdery 2003) between different organizational levels, there was a general sense of
mistrust in the ability of association leadership to distribute returns in an efficient and equitable manner
and to dissociate farm operations from the private interests of the association leaders.
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It is well-known that, during socialist collective fanning, the returns to working in collective farms
were not very rewarding, nor were the profits of the farm managers. Collective farms played a social
rather than economic role, providing resources for social projects in the community (i.e. schools, health
clinics), and acting as informal redistributors of resources from the state to individuals. Since access to
farming inputs (seeds, fertilizers, pesticides) was very limited for private farmers, oftentimes in exchange of
favors, farm workers would draw on resources from the collective farms to enhance their production on
private individual garden plots. This practice was widely known and practiced at all levels, but never
explicitly dealt with by the socialist cadres. In a way this is not surprising, since the whole socialist system
was based on scarcity of resources, resulting in wide channels of informality. Hence, following the
dissolution of socialist regimes, expectations that these practices would persist (and they did although at a
smaller scale), led to mistrust not only in association leaders (former leaders of collective farms), but also in
private entrepreneurs (the new tenants).
However, only farmers who had a larger set of choices for institutional arrangements vocalized
more intensely these concerns. Those who were more regularly "cheated" by the associations were the
absentee landowners who were not in the village regularly, and as a result were not able to exert social
pressure on these "entrepreneurs." One farmer in the South, Petre, who was working in a nearby town
and had land in the local association, claimed that he knew he was receiving a lower payment on his land
plots, but he was still pleased that his land is not staying fallow and he has enough harvest to feed his
animals.
The most common critique to cooperative or associative forms of production relates to imperfect
monitoring and uncertainty. Putterman (1989 p. 327) claims that "uncertainty regarding other members'
labor and the distribution rule, add to production uncertainty which [...] would make co-operative
production relatively less attractive to risk-averse farmers."
In addition, oftentimes landowners were benefiting from lack of accountability, and informal
arrangements being perpetuated as legacies from the old collectives. Farmers were often drawing on
resources from the association (such as seeds or fertilizer) for use on their individually farmed plots, and
through a system of informal favors and commitments they were using additional mechanical services
from the associations.198
Nevertheless, since private property was reinforced, I argue that the interest of the association
members in adequately assessing the costs and benefits of the association was more pronounced and called
for higher accountability. Moreover, the level of social embeddedness of these institutions (the old
collectives and the newly formed associations) in the local community played a major role in achieving
198 Verdery (2004) also shows how, in Vlaicu village, these types of informal activities were actually stretching the
resources available to the associations, often affecting their performance.
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monitoring through peer-enforced mechanisms. This process contributed to reducing collective action
problems and making the option more attractive for risk-averse farmers.
Costel, a farmer from the Western Plain claimed that after so many years in the collective farms,
he knew how the association functioned, who was "pulling the strings and how strong they were pulling
them." He also knew that without his land (and that of the villagers) the managers of the collective farms
would not be able to continue their position in the new associations. Hence, he left his land in the
association but he "watched closely every step they made." "I was a thorn in their back, and they knew
it," he said. "I knew they would take a little more than they should, but as long as they would not take
advantage of us (atata vreme cat nu isi bat joc de noi), it was fine by me. We are farmers as well, we know
what it takes to farm a piece of land, and we know even better how much corn grows on that land. They
can fool us a little but they can not fool us entirely... .These are different times, and this is my own land. No
one tells me what I can and what I cannot do anymore....If I could farm it myself I would do it."
The interlinked relations between the landowners and the association leaders contributed to
solving not only issues of trust, but also collective action problems. Having full ownership rights over the
land farmed in associations, landowners showed more interest in how their plots were farmed, what type
of seeds the association used, how much fertilizer it received, how well the land was ploughed. They also
knew exactly how large the harvest was. Therefore, accountability was quite high for the association
leaders and for those who contributed with labor in the association. Some farmers mentioned that if they
found their plots poorly farmed and harvested, they would complain to the farm managers, discuss it with
their neighbors, stirring up the local community. This, in turn, would affect the credibility of the
association leaders.
The fluidity of formal associations
In Chapter 7 I showed that even if associations are still important in the Romanian economy,
their number has declined since the beginning of transition. This decline suggests that two processes might
be at play: going out of business or reorganization (consolidation). Verdery (2003) documents that some
formal associations went bankrupt as a result of inability to stay competitive during the economically
unpredictable transition period. Nevertheless, a more interesting process that associations went through,
especially in the beginning of the 2000s, surfaced from interviews with corporate farms and formal
associations in 2006. In several cases I found that in a hostile economic environment, formal associations
reorganized to resemble private corporate farms, in order to secure an easier access to finances and
investment, and therefore a better position in the market. This more recent process adds to the previous
discussion on how different associations are from the old collective farms.
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One example from the Central Romanian Plain, illustrates how an association changed its status
due to external circumstances. InJuly 2006 I interviewed a large private farm in Calarasi County, which
claimed that in the past five years, under pressures for upgrading their farm operations, they changed
their status from association to private farm enterprise, purchasing some land from former members and
shifting the rest to leasing contracts. The rationale for such a decision was based on the fact that under the
associational status it was too difficult to carry out investment projects due to the need for a majority (or
unanimity) vote and lack of collateral. 199 Without alternative options, the farmers agreed to release some
of their rights in exchange for still having someone work their land, and hoping for higher returns
following larger investments. The farm manager argued that for households the implications were
minimal as "nothing changed for them." However, from a legal point of view, the status for the farmers
did change, contracts being made for five years and the control of the farm management on cultivation
decisions being formalized. This new contractual arrangement also meant that at the end of the term the
association had the right to stop farming the land for certain households since there was no legal binding
to do so. Essentially, the farmers lost part of their rights from their "bundle of property rights," their use
rights. In some cases the rents actually increased.
Similar cases were also recorded in the Western Plain, reflecting the fluidity of property rights
arrangements in the face of external conditions shaped by transition. Verdery (2003 p. 241) also points
that throughout the decade the extent of associations' control of use-rights has changed. She argues that
the associations needed more control over the use-rights, more stability and leverage over the production
process, which could be achieved through longer-term contracts. Earlier on, however, the degree of
control exerted by the associations was lower, as they had to submit more to "the desires of owners for
what they were to plant and for where to plant."
Market pressures and the need for profit generation, slowly changed the associations' production
strategy. Additional factors that led to these adjustments were the increased competitive pressures on
associations as different alternatives for farmers were transpiring, such as renting or selling land. Verdery
(2003) also found that locals made constant comparisons with other villagers, other associations in the
area, and with other options for land use, increasing the pressures not only for better performance, but
also for higher returns and flexibility. Yet, market limitations in credit access and product distribution
made it almost impossible for formal associations to improve performance as such.
199 The associations do not own the land that they are farming. They only own part of the machineries and buildings
with which they operate. Nevertheless, the physical capital is in a fairly advanced state of degradation, which reduces
the amount of collateral that associations can use when applying for bank loans. In the case of leasing transactions,
however, the tenant has a written contract for the use rights of land over a period of time, which provides better
collateral when applying for loans.
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As reflected in interviews, this process of increased pressure on associations in the past five years
was more pronounced in the Western Plain than in the Central Romanian Plain. In the South alternative
property rights arrangements (i.e. different associations, leasing opportunities, or a more developed
market for land sales) were more limited than in the West, mainly due to differences in the size of
collective farms, the process of de-collectivization, and different levels of regional economic development
as illustrated in Chapter 6. Specifically, in the South, even if collective farms were larger, the number of
claimants was smaller relative to the available land because no landowner could recover more than 10
hectares of land initially. As a result, large plots of land were left at the disposal of the authorities and
there were few entrepreneurs able to compete with the large associations, deeply rooted in the former
channels of procurement and distribution.
Nevertheless, the fact that associations were large did not create an immediate competitive
advantage as compared to other farming arrangements. An interview with an association in Calarasi
County revealed that searching for distribution channels for agricultural products posed great difficulties.
This association, SC Mecanica, had only one client for their products (corn and wheat), Nutricom
Oltenita. SC Mecanica had signed a contract for five years with this firm, to deliver the harvest at
contractual prices, in fixed quantities. The association viewed this arrangement positively because the
client was paying for all the inputs. It was beneficial for the association because it did not have to go
through the difficulties of getting a loan since they were afflicted by lack of liquidity. The fact that they
had only one customer for the entire production surprised me and suggested that their situation was
actually quite precarious. However, when asked how they perceive this arrangement, the association
manager argued that they were quite content with it since they were among the "lucky ones" to have a
relatively stable market for their products.
Hence, we see that associations are in a constant state of flux, trying to adjust to new market
conditions imposed by the transition to a market economy and to the standards of competitiveness
imposed by the EU. Nevertheless, these changes, while beneficial for the associations (in terms of lower
risks and higher potential for investment), often result in landowners having less control over their land,
and essentially weaker property rights. Slowly the associations begun to resemble more private
entrepreneurs that operate through land market transactions, which almost defies the purpose for which
they existed in the first place (i.e. risk sharing arrangements for households that intended to remain active
farmers and maintain a higher level of control over the land in ownership). From a policy point of view
this is important because it suggests that measures to support small farmers should aim to support farming
associations, rather than encouraging land market transactions and the emergence of large private farms
to the detriment of these institutional arrangements.
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To summarize, in this section I examined alternative explanations for why farming arrangements
persisted throughout the transition process. I specifically analyzed how closely associations resemble the
old collective farms in response to criticism from earlier studies. I showed that in the new economic
environment formal associations have adapted their production and management practices to respond
both to market incentives (and hard budget constraints) as well as to members' needs. Their
embeddedness in the local communities triggers a system of peer pressure monitoring through which
collective action problems can be addressed.
9.4 Summary of findings
There is little ambiguity that post-socialist land reform resulted in one of the most complex
agricultural transformations in Romania's history. The extent of social, economic, institutional, and
physical reorganization has been unprecedented. Land restitution, privatization, and de-collectivization,
created conditions for land reallocation into different institutional arrangements. Later on, the
formalization of land market transactions extended the options for farming institutional arrangements.
The broader goal of this dissertation is to explain the persistence of agricultural associations
throughout the transition period, despite perceived collective action problems and the availability of
alternative farming arrangements such as land leasing. This chapter illustrated that even if structural
factors (e.g. access to capital, human capital) are important for decisions related to land reallocation (as
discussed in Chapter 8), other dynamics reflected in the social environment, historical legacies, and
institutional conditions, are equally, if not more important.
Among these factors, farmers have consistently pointed to the experience of collectivization and
the historical circumstances that played a role in that process. Through this lens, regional differences
between the West and the South come to light in a more forceful and unambiguous form. This
perspective sets the scene for a deeper understanding of the social dynamics around land and private
property in the rural areas. Moreover, different actors (i.e. former collective farm managers, small
farmers, emerging entrepreneurs as tenants) played different roles in shaping the outcomes of land reform.
All these factors created push and pull forces in what seemed to be a "third-way" for Romania's
agriculture - a move away from collective and state farms to a mix of private and associational farming
arrangements.
Former collective farm managers and engineers emphasized the importance of economies of scale
and retaining the networks for access to markets and mechanical implements. In the initial stages of land
reform, oftentimes facing opposition from small farmers, they pushed for maintaining the structure of the
old collective farms under the new institutional configuration of formal associations. Especially in the
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West, such an allegiance created wide disagreement in the local community, because of a much stronger
awareness of private property and the memory of forced collectivization. As a result, landowners were less
inclined to join associations, and the prospect of individual farming and land market participation was
more appealing.
Another interesting finding relates to the role of social networks in the rural communities and the
way in which the dynamics they generate affect the decisions landowners make on land reallocation. The
experience of collectivization had a very disruptive effect on the social fabric of the rural communities
(from interpersonal relations and networks to social institutions and structures). In the West, these
outcomes contributed to a gradual breakdown in the community life, and a stronger emphasis on
individualism and self-help behavior. When collaboration took place it was generally centered along close
kinship. The case of Floresu, a tenant who had difficulties finding landowners to lease land and workers to
farm his land because of his lower position in the community is illustrative of this circumstance.
These aspects, however, explain mostly why associations were established in some regions and not
in others. In Section 9.3 I examined why associations persisted throughout the transition process despite
perceived collective actions problems and the opening of land markets. I showed that formal associations,
created on the structures of the former collective farms, are quite differently from their predecessors. First,
these new farming arrangements operate in a different environment shaped by profit maximizing rather
than production maximizing goals, supported by hard rather than soft budget constraints. These market
conditions require them to respond differently to market incentives, and to be more flexible to changes in
the larger economy. Second, association members are the owners of the key asset they depend on, land.
Therefore, the managers had to incorporate the needs of the landowners in the decisions about
production and the disbursement of payments (rent). Moreover, because of the collective farm legacy,
associations are highly embedded in the social relations at the local level. Hence, collective action
problems are often solved through a system of peer enforced monitoring of the production process.
Ultimately, this chapter completed the analysis of why farming associations persisted throughout
the transition period and why regional differences prevailed in land reallocation choices during transition.
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Chapter 10 : Conclusions - Land Reallocation During Transition
This dissertation examined why associations persisted throughout the post-socialist transition
period despite concerns for collective action problems and despite the availability of leasing as a close
substitute. Contrary to initial expectations, various forms of associations were created in the former
communist countries. The reallocation of land in associations occurred while this institutional
arrangement has been widely criticized in the literature and individual farming was portrayed as the
panacea for the agricultural sector in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. Following the
formalization of land markets, small farmers were expected to resort to land transactions for consolidating
fragmented plots and for shifting out of the "inefficient associations." In addition, wide regional
differences shaped the outcomes of land reform both in terms of economic performance, as well as in
terms of institutional patterns for land reallocation.
That new landowners were slow to embrace the market mechanism for reallocating land assets
came as a surprise to most neo-liberal policy reformers. As Roland (2000) argues, the results from policy
advice given to transition countries "have been particularly humbling for Neoliberal economists, to say the
least, and remain a subject of controversy." The slow market development has been one of the many
"transition surprises," along with increase in poverty, fall in production, a process which Meurs and
Ranasinghe (2003) label "de-development."
Hence, this dissertation examined the outcomes of post-socialist transformation in the context of
land reform, the most controversial policy following the fall of the communist regime. The economic and
social consequences, as well as its ideological connotation, placed land reform on the top of policy
priorities in all former communist countries in Europe and East Asia. However, the reform strategies and
the specific outcomes in terms of institutional structures, economic performance, and social processes,
varied widely. Moreover, despite far-reaching commonalities imposed by the communist policy agenda on
the CEE countries, and on agriculture in particular, deep cultural, social and economic differences
remained. Explanations for these unexpected outcomes call for more in-depth country specific analysis of
land reform in order to understand the historical and institutional context that led to certain outcomes.
Romania is an interesting case to examine the outcomes of land reform for several reasons: 1) in
the 1990s Romania engaged in one of the most complex reforms in the region, pursuing both land
restitution based on the 1940s land records, as well as de-collectivization and privatization of state farms;
2) during the communist regime the level of private property (and hence familiarity with markets) was the
lowest among the Soviet block countries; and 3) Romania emerged out of communism with the lowest
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level of economic development and standard of living for the population. Hence, the shock of transition
was felt much stronger and the challenges for institutional change were in many ways convoluted.
Most explanations put forth for the persistence of farming associations and the limited
participation in land market transactions stressed the irrational, ideologically motivated behavior of the
rural population. In addition, from a political economy perspective, small farmers were viewed as
powerless in the face of capital rich former socialist elite dominating the former collective farms and
influencing the outcomes of de-collectivization. This unbalance of power was thought to result in the
preservation of inefficient practices from the former collective farms, preventing markets to unfold
naturally. Theories of institutional change, in the new institutional economics (NIE) tradition, emphasize
the role of transaction costs in the limited market development. However, they do not explain well the
outcomes of land reallocation during transition. Economic rationality, power structures, and transaction
costs depict a rather static view of institutional change and post-socialist transformation, assuming that if
one or the other constraint is removed, farmers will undoubtedly shift to private individual farming or
would engage in land market transactions. In addition, these explanations cannot fully explain the wide
regional differences in land reallocation that transpired soon after land reform was implemented.
This dissertation research found that there are some missing explanatory variables that account
for the persistence of associations during transition, and for regional differences in land reallocation,
which cannot be accounted for by mainstream theories of institutional change. Aside from resource
(mostly capital) constraints, the choices landowners make are embedded in past institutional legacies, the
experience of collectivization, and the interaction of different actors in affecting change. These factors
help to explain why, in some regions, the old collective farms were transformed in farming associations
while in other regions they were rejected in favor of private individual farming. In addition, in this
explanation landowners are given more agency in the decisions they made in terms of land reallocation.
Former managers on the collective farms were not always overpowering the small landowners. The
outcome resulted from the constant interaction between the interests of the main protagonists in land
reallocation.
The role of institutional legacies and the relevance of past experiences are important to
developing the story in this dissertation, but they should not be viewed as binding. It is possible that the
role of history diminishes over time, but at least for the transition countries in Eastern Europe, this process
still has relevance. Hence, a complete analysis of land reallocation needs to account for how aspects from
the past affect landowners' choices between farming arrangements within the constraints and incentives
offered by new market conditions during transition. To this end, the first part of the dissertation discussed
the chronology of land reforms in Romania since the beginning of the 1900s, with emphasis on regional
differences as well as on the similarities that could be drawn in terms of policies and outcomes. In
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addition, I discussed the current economic conditions for the agricultural sector in Romania with
reference to the larger European context and the national economy. The social environment during
transition was also analyzed in order to provide the context in which farmers operate.
At the heart of this analysis is the household, as a decision-making unit, making choices on land
reallocation based on exogenous factors (such as market conditions), capital endowment, household
characteristics, social considerations, and historical legacies. In order to disentangle the many inter-related
factors hypothesized to affect the choice of farming arrangements for land reallocation, I used a mixed
methods approach. Statistical analysis on household survey data was used in combination with findings
from qualitative fieldwork (i.e. interviews and participatory observations). This research design allowed me
to capture a wider range of motivations for landowners, which would not have been possible otherwise.
Through interviews with different actors in the rural areas (i.e. landowners, association managers, and
tenants) I traced back the early sentiments to de-collectivization, how decisions to form associations were
taken, and what were the factors that shaped those decisions for different actors.
Considerable time was spent in two regions in Romania, the Western Plain and Central
Romanian Plain, in discussions with small farmers (the new landowners), agronomists (association
managers), tenants, and policy-markets. I aimed to understand what land meant for different actors, how
they viewed differently the changing economic and institutional environment, and what factors they were
drawing on from past experiences in their current decisions on land management.
Household level data is very scarce in the rural sector in Romania, although they provide the
most reliable source of information to capture the variety of institutional arrangements and the extent to
which they exist. In addition, available data is lacking consistency for tracing long-term trends and
outcomes of institutional change at household level. Hence, in the summer of 2006 I conducted a
household survey in the two main agro-regions, as a follow-up on the first survey applied in 1996 by the
Ministry of Agriculture, European Commission, and the World Bank. These two surveys resulted in a
unique quasi-panel across villages in Romania, for a period in which major institutional changes took
place (i.e. formalizing land sales, major changes in land leasing regulations, elimination of state subsidies
for agricultural producers, and major steps in institutional converge on the eve of EU enlargement 200 ).
Hence, this research bridges the literature focused on ethnographic research on the outcomes of
post-socialist transformation in CEE countries (Verdery 2004; Hann 1998; Creed 1999) with the literature
drawing more on the political economy of transition (Swinnen 1999) and the efficiency outcomes of
reform (Sabates-Wheeler 2005; Rizov et al. 2001; Mathij and Swinnen 200 1).
200 Romania became a member of the European Union on the 1s ofJanuary in 2007.
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10.1 Choosing between institutional arrangements for farming: a review of findings
The study of land reallocation into different institutional arrangements for farming during
transition generated conclusions on the factors that affect the choice of farming arrangements and the
persistence of farming associations during transition. These findings shed more light on our understanding
of institutional change during transition.
The most important finding from the empirical work is that choices of farming arrangements
were influenced by both economic factors (i.e. capital constraints, human capital, transaction costs) as well
as by social and historical factors. Current literature on post-socialist transition, especially on land reform,
places limited emphasis on a larger theoretical framework that includes institutional and social legacies
from past reforms to explain current patterns of institutional arrangements. The revival of institutionalist
theories and their recent focus on explaining the outcomes of post-socialist transformation, overemphasize
the role of private property rights for successful reforms. In addition, high transaction costs, characteristic
to the transition period, are used to explain any unexpected outcomes. I also found that transaction costs
are important for the choices landowners make in respect to land reallocation. However, other factors
explain equally, if not even more, the pattern of land reallocation and the persistence of farming
associations.
In Chapter 8 I showed that the following factors explain the persistence of farming associations
throughout the transition: 1) the degree of land fragmentation; 2) age and household productivity; 3)
capital and land endowment.
Land fragmentation poses, currently, one of the most serious challenges for both the owners of the
land, as well as for policy reformers. Land restitution, based on the 1940s land records, resulted in
property being divided in multiple scattered plots. The degree to which this breakup occurred was the
highest among the CEE countries. Hence, the recent integration in the EU structures generated intense
debates on the appropriate strategies for achieving land consolidation. The main concern on land
fragmentation relates to high transaction costs incurred in land transfers. In addition landowners bare
higher production costs from the inability to use mechanical implements in land preparation and
harvesting, as well as higher transportation costs. All these factors are considered to contribute to
inefficiency in farming. Therefore, with the advent of markets, the solution, sought by policy advisors, is to
increase the activity on land markers through leases and sales. Land markets are viewed as the primary
channel through which the agricultural sector in Romania can shift out of subsistence into commercial
farming practices.
However, my findings show that households with more fragmented landholdings are actually
more likely to join associations than to lease out land. When the land in ownership is broken into more
than three separate plots of land, associations provide a better option for land consolidation. The
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explanation for this finding relates to the high transaction costs that leasing necessitates, due to registration
and notary fees. The benefits from leasing (in the form of rent) are low, and certainly not much higher
than from joining associations. At the same time, the cost ofjoining associations is minimal, and full title
for the land is not required.
Associations are also able to offer a higher risk-sharing option as opposed to leasing. Once
landowners become members in associations, they can exit only with their own consent. Hence, formal
associations offer longer-term commitments for farming the land. By contrast, leasing arrangements are
based on short-term contracts, from year to year, or on unspecified periods of time. As a result, the
tenants have a lot of leverage in deciding for how long they are willing to farm the plots of land. By using
short-term leases, the tenants can respond easier to changes in market conditions. However, the
landowners are facing higher uncertainty because of short-term contracts.
I also found that age plays a role in landowners' decision to join associations. The role of age has
been previously researched but only with respect to land individualization (the shift to private individual
farming). Policies that aim to encourage participation in land markets are often devised around the age of
the landowners. However, there is no study, to my knowledge, that specifically analyzed how age would
play a role in this outcome and who exactly would benefit from the formalization of land markets when
other alternatives are available (i.e. farming associations). I found that households with a higher ability
level and experience, as reflected by age, are more likely to join associations. However, beyond 70 years of
age, landowners are more likely to lease out. Moreover, younger households (where the household head is
younger than 50 years) with higher opportunities to derive non-farming sources of income, have a higher
probability of leasing-out land. Given that associations require a certain level of engagement in the
production process, either with labor or monitoring, those who are part time farmers are benefiting more
from leasing out. These findings suggest that leasing transactions are a viable option for only a small share
of the rural population, those older than 70 years and those with alternative sources of income. However,
as qualitative research shows, even within this population group, the choices are not entirely clear-cut.
Lastly, the statistical analysis confirmed what earlier research found, that availability of capital is
critical for the choices landowners make in terms of land reallocation. Specifically, I found that
households with a higher endowment of capital are more likely to farm the land individually rather than
to seek alternative farming arrangements. This is hardly surprising but the wide lack of capital reinforces
the fact that agriculture in Romania, and in other transitional countries, requires significant levels of
investment in modernization. The level of private individual farming has been relatively high following
land restitution in Romania (approximately 6 5 % of the agricultural land). At the same time, capital
endowment, as reflected by the two surveys one decade apart, has not improved significantly. Hence,
291
explaining land reallocation only through the lens of resource endowment (i.e. human and physical
capital) cannot fully explain why in some regions the choice of farming arrangements varied.
Hence, in Chapter 9 I asked the question of why in some regions associations were formed while
in others they were not, given that at the time of de-collectivization everyone was emerging from the
socialist agriculture with similar capital endowment. I found that institutional legacies, drawing on past
property rights arrangements and collectivization experiences, as well as social relations, limit the choices
available for land reallocation to those that are acceptable in the historical and social context. Through
this lens, regional differences come to light in a more forceful and unambiguous way. This perspective
allows for a deeper understanding of the social dynamics around land and private property in the rural
areas.
Hence, in the West, a longer experience with private property, as well as a more forceful and
violent collectivization process, created resistance to any remnant institutional structures from the social
regime, resulting in higher private individual farming during the post-socialist transition. By contrast, in
the South, the sense of private property was eroded by the predominance of large hacienda type of farms
prior to collectivization. Hence, after the reform in the 1990s, landowners were less eager to engage in
individual farming. In addition, I showed that land restitution led to the re-creation of class differences
between "rich and poor" based on the pre-collectivization social structure, where land became a symbol
of status and identity. These social relations ultimately constrained the choices considered by landowners.
Aside from the institutional aspect, the fieldwork revealed that different actors (i.e. landowners,
association managers, tenants) played different roles in shaping the pattern of land reallocation. Former
collective farm managers and engineers emphasized the importance of economies of scale and retaining
the networks for access to markets (inherited from the socialist collective farms). Their push for the
formation of associations on the structure of the old collective farms, had, however, generated different
reactions in the two regions. In the Western Plain this proposal generated wide disagreement in the local
communities. Nevertheless, in the South, where the memory of private property faded over the years, and
the economic conditions discouraged the development of individual farming, the agronomists were more
successful in pushing forward the creation of formal associations.
One of the main critiques of farming associations is that they are plagued by collective action
problems. The literature argues that free-riding and principal-agent problems, inherited from the old
collective farms, contribute to making these institutional arrangements inefficient and short-lived.
However, in Chapter 9 I challenged this view and, based on interviews with landowners and association
managers, I showed that there are some important differences between these two farming arrangements.
Because associations are deeply embedded in the social structure of the local communities, they are able
to overcome collective action problems mainly through peer-pressure monitoring. Landowners, in their
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new status as association members, are closely monitoring the production process (i.e. land preparation
and harvesting) making sure that their land gets farmed well and that they receive the proper amount of
rent.
Formal associations are different from the old collective farms also because, in the new economic
and institutional environment, associations adapted their production and management practices to
respond both to market incentives (and hard budget constraints) as well as to members' needs. A key
argument is that association members are not simple workers (as was the case in the socialist collective
farms) but they are owners of land, the critical assets that associations depend on. Hence, striking a
balance between their needs and those of the landowners was critical for their survival.
10.2 Lessons for policy making
This framework for understanding the outcomes of transition with respect to land reallocation in
different farming arrangements is not meant to dismiss earlier findings on the factors that affect individual
choice within the constraints and incentives created by the post-socialist transformation. Rather, the goal
is to integrate these findings in a larger context for evaluating institutional change during transition.
When I started my qualitative fieldwork in the summer of 2006, the agricultural sector was under
high scrutiny and monitoring since in a few months, inJanuary 2007, Romania was becoming a member
of the EU. Speculations about how the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) will affect the Romanian
producers and what course agricultural policy will take were made on the daily basis. However, interviews
with small farmers, with associations, and larger tenants, pointed not only to the lack of information on
the implications of EU enlargement, but also to the strong sense of uncertainty, worry, and at times even
despair on the part of farmers. Small farmers were concerned that an increase in prices for inputs would
make it even harder to cultivate the land, and that new European standards would make it difficult for
them to sell any of their products on the local market. The associations and the larger tenants were
concerned that even after sizable efforts to upgrade their farms prior to accession, they might still not be
able to survive the new competitive pressures. In effect, everyone was waiting to see how domestic policy-
making in the larger EU context will affect each of them individually.
Hence, the economic and institutional environment is quite volatile for all types of farms,
requiring careful planning and, as my research shows, increased understanding of the historical and social
conditions in which decisions are grounded.
The findings from this research suggest that despite wide critiques in the literature and policy
circles, formal association do offer important benefits to the member landowners. The first such
advantage is the ability to consolidate land plots, at a time when land fragmentation poses one of the most
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stringent challenges for agricultural development. Currently, associations are not considered at all a long-
term solution to the problem of high land fragmentation in the CEE countries. Rather, the emphasis is on
devising measures to encourage leasing and sales, supporting landowners who wish to shift out of
agriculture.201
However, there is little emphasis on the fact that, because economic diversification is lacking, few
of the landowners are willing, or able, to shift out of agriculture. Under these conditions, land provides the
main source of income for most rural households. I showed that the rents from leasing transactions are not
higher than those from associations. Therefore, given the higher transactions costs with land registration
and notary fees required for leasing contracts, there are little incentives for landowners to lease out land.
Moreover, short contractual terms practiced by tenants to alleviate long-term uncertainty, deter
landowners from using leasing alternatives.
Hence, policies for land consolidation should turn to associations as one alternative for reaching
this goal. One way associations could be supported is to facilitate their access to financial services (i.e.
bank credit). From interviews with association managers, I learned that this arrangement has gradually
shifted over the years to leasing contracts. One reason for this outcome was the difficulty of making large
investments. Not having formal contracts with the association members, the amount of collateral that the
association could show when applying for loans was minimal. Devising channels through which
associations could get easier access to credit would help these farming arrangements to stay competitive
and to secure land consolidation.
An interesting policy discussion arises if we question whether associations are sustainable in the
future in the CEE context. More recent developments following EU enlargement call into question the
persistence of alternative farming institutions. Latruffe and Davidova (2007) argue that CAP payments
might induce small farmers to withdraw land from associations or leasing arrangements because they
could cash the payments themselves, provided that they keep the land in good condition. Nevertheless,
research in Czech Republic and Slovakia showed that increase in private individual farming did not take
place. Instead, one could expect to see a renegotiation of rents, but not necessarily withdrawal. What
matters a lot in this renegotiation process is the relation between the association manager and the farmers,
as a form of social capital. I expect that such an outcome would also result in the Romanian context, once
direct payments will be disbursed to farmers, in the beginning of 2008. Hence, to use Granovetter's (1985)
concept, economic transactions, like contracting, can be more efficient when they are embedded in social
201 In the most recent report on the agricultural sector in Romania prior to EU enlargement, it was argued that the
three market mechanisms that may effectively act to achieve land consolidation are: a) development of markets for
land transactions; b) provision of adequate pensions for elderly rural landowners; c) development of non-agricultural
employment opportunities in rural areas. However, these measures would address only a small share of the
population: "the very old" who cannot engage in farming anymore, and "the very young" who are able to seek
alternative income opportunities.
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networks. Wolf (2001 p. 167) also argues that informal social relations (kinship, friendship, or patron-client
relations) are responsible for the metabolic processes required to keep the formal institutional operating.
From this point of view, associations are likely to persist because of their embeddedness in the social
relations at the level of local communities. Consequently, re-negotiation of rents is more likely to occur
within the framework of associations rather than in leasing arrangements.
Another view argues that associations are a temporary arrangement until market imperfections,
specific to transition, will be alleviated, or removed (Mathijs and Swinnen 200 1). Given that the share of
land farmed in associations declined since the beginning of land reform, this could well be a valid
argument for the Romanian case as well. Nevertheless, as long as the rural economy is not diversified
enough to offer non-farming opportunities, landowners are less likely to lease-out land. It is possible that,
as Verdery (2003) also claimed, farmers are more likely to shift to leasing transactions if the rent from
leasing is significantly higher than from associations. In addition, if the benefits from leasing exceed the
social cost of experimenting with new institutions (Mearns 200 1) and if the transaction costs incurred by
contractual fees decrease, leasing should become a more appealing alternative. Nevertheless, enforceable
contract mechanisms are also required, as well as less complex administrative procedures for land
registration.
But, as other studies showed, institutions are slow to change and to adapt to new market
conditions. Devising tools and mechanisms for what individuals might do if certain institutions would be
in place in the future, and dismissing the motives for the choices they make today, does not represent
sound and sustainable policy-making. Understanding the complexity around the motives for farmers
choosing associations, should instill a certain degree of flexibility in policy design to allow landowners a
range of options for land reallocation, sensible to their economic and social needs.
In Chapter 7 I discussed that formal associations are not the only form of associations that sprang
following land restitution. Informal associations, or family associations, are a type of farming
arrangements that were endogenously formed mainly among members of the same family or neighbors
with the sole purpose of pooling resources together and consolidating land plots. However, because
informal associations were not recognized by law, members were not able to take loans as an
organization. Informal associations declined significantly during transition and official statistics even
stopped recording them since 2001. However, if policies would have encouraged these arrangements, they
might have provided a closer alternative to formal associations. Research in the southern region of
Romania showed that informal associations are, potentially, the most efficient arrangement for small
farmers (Sabates-Wheeler 2002).202 Hence, financing through micro-credit programs for the farmers
202 A similar conclusion was made for "partnerships" (small groups of farmers that pooled their effort in certain
production and marketing tasks) in East Germany (Mathijs and Swinnen 2001).
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engaged in informal associations could have helped these institutions to increase their capital endowment,
a major barrier to their performance, as landowners mentioned. Policy-makers argue that large-farm bias
has persisted in agricultural policy in Romania (World Bank 2005 p. 80). As a result, subsidies were often
given based on size rather than on the type of activities farmers were pursuing. Hence, the report argues
that successful development of the agricultural sector requires the abolishment of preferential treatment to
large farms and the establishment of a level playing field for farms of all organizational forms and sizes. I
can only agree with this conclusion as it would enlarge the opportunity set for most farmers, and hence
their choices for land reallocation. 203
Improvement in private sector financial intermediation in the rural areas is critical to agricultural
development. A recent World Bank report (2005 p. 104) claims that, since 1998, some progress has been
made on the development of financial services that reach out to rural households and enterprises as short-
term credits. However, most of these credit services were made for suppliers and traders, and less for
agricultural producers. In order to expand rural finance, a larger variety of credit institutions need to be
created to respond to the needs of small as well as larger farmers, such as: banks, leasing companies, credit
cooperatives, and micro-finance institutions. In addition, access to rural finance can be improved only if
procedures are streamlined for both the lenders and the borrowers. Investment in agriculture is risky,
requiring mechanisms for a better assessment and hedge against risks.
In general, however, agricultural policies should be devised such that farmers are able to shift
freely between different institutional arrangements. Currently, availability of labor does not pose as many
constraints20 4 as does the availability of physical capital and financial resources. Access to credit is a
problem for individual farmers as much as for associations. Facilitating access to credit and subsidizing
machinery acquisitions or rentals would create conditions for improving agricultural performance in all
farming arrangements.
Lack of participation in land markets does not only mean that farmers are reluctant to lease-out
land because of high transaction costs. The other side of the transaction matters as well. It could also
suggest that the demand for land leasing is weak. Potential tenants do not find agriculture a profitable
activity, being subjected not only to the economic risks but also to the vagaries of weather without having
a solid insurance mechanism. Hence, land markets will not become more dynamic unless measures are
taken to promote agriculture as a viable sector to invest in for the young and entrepreneurial farmers.
203 I became more aware of the bias towards large farms when I started my research on small household farms in the
summer of 2006. All policy-makers that I discussed with in the Ministry of Agriculture told me that "I am targeting
the wrong group." If I was interested in the performance of the agricultural sector, large commercial farms would be
the ones to deliver these outcomes. Small farmers were the "ailment," the segment that required major cut-backs.
204 However, more recent studies on the patterns of rural migration show that in certain areas there is a sizable flow
of young migrants seeking income opportunities abroad. This outcome suggests that agricultural labor might become
a problem in the near future.
296
In addition, regional differences in land reallocation during transition suggest that there is scope
for regional policy. I showed that different historical legacies of private property rights and different
experiences with collectivization contributed to landowners engaging in different farming arrangements.
These outcomes were catalyzed by disparities in economic and social conditions, which determined how
likely it was that a household would derive most of the income from agriculture.
10.3 Areas for future research
The research in this dissertation is by far exhaustive. Several aspects remain to be examined as
topics for future research. One main constraint in most such studies is the lack of complete data. To fully
understand the outcomes of transition, data extending over long periods of time, and/or long-term
ethnographic studies205 ensure more complexity in evaluating the post-socialist transformation and the
outcomes of institutional change. Moreover, there are hardly any studies that use mixed methods to
capture the complexities of transition. Examining land reallocation patterns is a topic that would benefit
greatly from such endeavor.
My research represents one step in this direction, by building longer data series to trace the
patterns of land reallocation across regions and time. However, the results from this study could be
sharpened if time-series, rather than a panel across villages, would become available. Multiple cross
sections, generally used for the post-socialist countries, can only capture a snapshot in time, and cannot
account for outcomes that result from specific policy-changes.
A fruitful area for future research is to examine whether and how land reallocation will change in
response to EU enlargement. Will associations be able to survive the pressures from higher competition
and more stringent regulations? Are regional differences going to be widened by these new circumstances?
Moreover, in order for the direct payments to be disbursed to the landowners, the system of land
registration and cadastral measures needs to be finalized by the end of 2007. Recent developments show
how problematic this process is. However, once land registration is achieved, transaction costs for land
transactions should decline. Hence, researching whether land markets develop further, will allow us to
determine a closer causal relation between transaction costs and land markets.
Moreover, despite strong attachment to land beyond its economic value, manifested by
landowners, as documented by ethnographic studies, it is unclear whether older landowners would pursue
farming if pensions and social security would be increased to support the precarious standard of living for
most pensioners in the rural areas. More research is required to examine how these factors would play out
in improved social conditions for farmers.
2 Verdery's (2003) research is among the very few studies that extends in both pre and post-communist times.
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Another area for further studies relates to the effect of land fragmentation on the performance of
the agricultural sector. Even if land fragmentation is considered one of the main concerns for the
agricultural sector, no studies have been conducted to assess how problematic fragmentation is for
achieving higher performance in the Romanian context. 206 Examining household incomes and production
levels for different farm sizes would offer a crude measure for the scale of the problem.
Lastly, future research should focus on the productivity of formal associations during the
transition. Are associations becoming more productive or not, during transition? What are the factors that
affect their performance over time? How do they compare with other institutional arrangements? A more
in-depth evaluation of their performance would strengthen the argument made above, that they operate
differently from the collective farms and are able to respond to market stimuli.
Hence, this topic provides a fertile ground for future research on transitional economies, with
relevance to other developing countries as well. There is an abundance of literature confirming that
institutions matter for developing as well as developed countries. Nevertheless, an area that remains
unexplored is evaluating of process of institutional change in a broader framework shaped by historical,
social, and economic factors. This research is one step in elucidating this process, calling for future
research to expand out theoretical and empirical knowledge and understanding.
206 Lerman (2002) conducted a similar study for Poland.
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